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Abstract
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of 
Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU) are all outspoken about their goal to see 
Russia developing into a democratic state that respects human rights. This thesis 
explores cooperation on human rights and democratisation between these organisations 
and Russia: how the organisations promote European norms in Russia, how the 
cooperation has developed over the years, and what kind of impact the interaction has 
had -  first of all, on Russia but secondarily also on European norms and on European 
organisations -  and why.
These questions are examined through three empirical case studies on different sets of 
norms that the OSCE, CoE and the EU actively promote in Russia: the institution of a 
human rights ombudsman, the abolition of the death penalty and free and fair elections. 
European documents clearly define these norms, and Russia has explicitly declared its 
commitment to implement them.
The thesis advances both the theoretical discussion on the interplay between 
international cooperation and domestic change, and our practical knowledge on how the 
policies of these organisations have influenced developments in Russia.
As regards theory, the thesis argues that the theoretical democratisation and 
socialisation models reflect the universalistic optimism of the post-Cold War era. 
Developments in Russia do not support this optimism. Basing analysis on the three 
empirical cases, it is suggested that instead of viewing socialisation as a one-way 
transference of norms, greater attention should be accorded to the interaction that takes 
place between the actors, and that the clear-cut stages of development inherent in the 
socialisation and democratisation models do not always grasp the essence of the change 
and may, in fact, restrict our analysis.
Policy-wise, it is argued that the European human rights and democratisation strategies 
towards Russia have by and large failed because they are based on similarly over- 
optimistic expectations, typical of the Zeitgeist of the post-Cold War years. The thesis 
warns that if an exception is granted to Russia with regard to once-agreed norms, the
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normative base for European cooperation will be weakened. In the long run, this could 
have a negative impact on the legitimacy of the European organisations.
3
Declaration
I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own and has not been 
submitted before for any degree at this or any other university.
Sinikukka Saari 
Helsinki, 25 January 2007
Acknowledgements
This thesis sprung from a desire to understand why the expectations at the end of the 
Cold War about the "new world order" never quite materialised. Many of my original 
hunches and ideas ended up in a rubbish bin, but some of them developed into more 
specific ones, which are studied in this thesis. This initial desire still looms identifiably 
in the background.
This thesis would have not seen the daylight without many important institutions and 
people to whom I owe a great deal. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to 
the Helsingin Sanomat Centenary Foundation and for the Academy of Finland and its 
Russia in Flux programme for their generous financial support. The Helsingin Sanomat 
Centenary Foundation funded the first two years of my studies in London, and the 
Academy of Finland the latter two.
I would also like to thank the Department of International Relations at LSE for its 
contributions towards field trips and conference participation. In general, I owe much to 
the intellectual and enthusiastic atmosphere of the department, its staff members and my 
peers. In particular, I am indebted to my hard-working supervisor Karen Smith. Her 
critical comments were always helpful -  although I sometimes only realised their true 
value much later.
I am also indebted to the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. My thanks go to its 
director Tapani Vaahtoranta and the rest of the staff at the institute. In particular, I 
would like to express my gratitude to the people involved in the "Russia’s European 
Choice?" programme at the institute and abroad. The helpful comments and insights of 
Christer Pursiainen, Arkady Moshes, Hiski Haukkala, Vadim Kononenko, Katri 
Pynnoniemi and Pami Aalto have guided me at all stages of the process.
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family members and friends 
for their invaluable support along the way. In particular, I would like to thank my
5
mother Maijatta for her encouragement and empathy, and my partner Santeri who has 
given me so many things to look forward beyond this thesis.
Sinikukka Saari 
Helsinki, 25 January 2007
6
ABSTRACT 2
DECLARATION............................................................................................................ 4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................... 5
LIST OF TABLES....................................................................................................... 11
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................................12
CHAPTER 1 ..................................................................................................................14
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROMOTION...............................................................................................................14
1 Modelling Domestic Social Change.........................................................................14
Democratisation......................................................................................................17
Debates around democratisation........................................................................ 21
Socialisation........................................................................................................... 22
Risse-Sikkink model of socialisation................................................................. 25
Debates around socialisation.............................................................................. 27
2 Thesis Outline......................................................................................................... 30
Goals of the thesis.................................................................................................. 30
Timeframe and focus.............................................................................................. 31
Source material....................................................................................................... 32
The case selection.................................................................................................. 34
Norm-specific scope conditions..................................................................... -....36
Further scope conditions for socialisation.......................................................... 38
Central issues and concepts.................................................................................... 39
International norms............................................................................................ 40
Human rights...................................................................................................... 41
International cooperation and its effectiveness and impact............................... 42
International human rights policies.................................................................... 45
Chapter outline....................................................................................................... 47
CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................. 49
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE RHETORIC AND 
POLICIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND RUSSIA..............................................49
1 Socialism and Human Rights.................................................................................. 49
Non-intervention versus human rights....................................................................52
2 Human Rights Enter the East-West Agenda............................................................53
The Helsinki Process kicks off............................................................................... 55
Empowering transnational actors........................................................................... 58
Empowering Soviet dissidents................................................................................59
The grip tightens.................................................................................................... 60
Evaluation.......................................................................................................... 63
3 Liberalisation in the Soviet Union...........................................................................65
Evaluation.......................................................................................................... 68
7
Spiral towards the end.............................................................................................70
Evaluation...........................................................................................................71
4 Post-Soviet Russia and Human Rights and Democratic Norms..............................73
A distressed society in search of national identity and interests.............................73
State of political transformation..........................................................................74
Foreign policy.....................................................................................................77
Disenchantment and normative hesitation..............................................................78
State of political transformation..........................................................................79
Foreign policy.....................................................................................................83
Illiberal stability and pragmatism............................................................................84
State of political transformation..........................................................................85
Foreign policy.....................................................................................................88
5 Conclusion................................................................................................................89
CHAPTER 3 ..................................................................................................................92
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COOPERATION IN EUROPE..................92
1 Construction of the European Human Rights Framework.......................................92
Perestroika and European human rights cooperation..............................................96
Post-Soviet era and European human rights cooperation.......................................98
The Conference/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.............98
The Council of Europe...................................................................................... 101
The European Community/Union..................................................................... 106
2 International Human Rights and Democracy Promotion Strategies...................... 112
Selection of human rights policy instruments....................................................... 113
European multilateral human rights policies vis-a-vis Russia.............................. 116
Evaluation of international scope conditions.................................................... 117
The wider context: Russia's place in Europe........................................................ 118
CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................ 122
NORM OF A HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN.................................................122
1 Background to the Norm of a Human Rights Ombudsman................................... 122
Classical ombudsman institution....................................................................... 124
Human rights commissions............................................................................... 124
Hybrid ombudsmen........................................................................................... 124
2 The Ombudsman Institution as a European Norm................................................. 125
3 European Promotion of an Ombudsman Institution in Russia............................... 126
4 Developments in the Soviet Union and Russia...................................................... 128
Early aspirations and a bitter end 1990-95............................................................ 128
Evaluation......................................................................................................... 135
CoE membership as an incentive for compliance 1996-98................................... 137
Evaluation......................................................................................................... 142
Institutionalisation of the norm or a case of individual learning? 1998-2003......144
Evaluation......................................................................................................... 152
Finally institutionalisation? 2004-06..................................................................... 153
Evaluation.........................  155
5 Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 156
8
CHAPTERS..............................................................................................   159
NORM OF ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY........................................ 159
1 Background to the Norm of Abolition................................................................... 159
2 Abolition of the Death Penalty as a European Norm............................................. 161
3 European Promotion of Abolition of the Death Penalty in Russia........................ 166
4 Developments in the Soviet Union and Russia...................................................... 169
Historical roots......................................................................................................169
The Soviet rule......................................................................................................172
Evaluation.........................................................................................................175
Early commitments after the Cold War 1991-94.................................................. 177
Evaluation.........................................................................................................180
Emerging irregularities in the phase of prescriptive status 1995-98..................... 182
Evaluation......................................................................................................... 187
Russia's request for an exception 1999-2006........................................................ 190
Evaluation.........................................................................................................197
5 Conclusion..............................................................................................................199
CHAPTER 6 .....   205
NORM OF FREE AND FAIR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS..............................205
1 Overview of International Election Standards.......................................................205
2 Free and Fair Elections as a European Norm.........................................................207
3 European Promotion of Free and Fair Elections in Russia....................................212
4 Developments in the Soviet Union and Russia......................................................214
Soviet elections.....................................................................................................214
Evaluation.........................................................................................................216
First post-Soviet elections: moving towards prescriptive status?.........................218
Parliamentary elections of 1993........................................................................221
Results...............................................................................................................222
European involvement......................................................................................223
Parliamentary elections of 1995........................................................................225
Results...............................................................................................................225
European involvement......................................................................................226
Evaluation.........................................................................................................227
Presidential elections of 1996: moving away from the European norms?............230
Results...............................................................................................................231
European involvement......................................................................................231
Evaluation.........................................................................................................234
Elections of 1999 and 2000: institutionalisation of irregularities.........................235
Parliamentary Elections of 1999.......................................................................235
Results...............................................................................................................236
European involvement......................................................................................236
Presidential elections of 2000...........................................................................237
Results................................................................  238
European involvement......................................................................................240
Evaluation.........................................................................................................241
Elections of 2003 and 2004: European authority challenged................................243
Parliamentary elections of 2003........................................................................ 243
9
Results...............................................................................................................244
European involvement......................................................................................245
Presidential elections of 2004...........................................................................246
Results...............................................................................................................247
European involvement......................................................................................247
Evaluation.........................................................................................................251
5 Conclusion..............................................................................................................253
CHAPTER 7 ................................................................................................................257
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................257
1 Comparison of the Cases: Scope Conditions.........................................................257
2 Comparison of the Cases: the Socialisation Model................................................263
3 Assessing the Policies of the European Organisations..........................................269
4 Future Prospects: Continent of Community or Islands of Order?..........................274
BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................278
OTHER SOURCES....................................................................................................292
10
List o f Tables
Table 1: Socialisation model.......................................................................................... 27
Table 2: Democratisation model.................................................................................... 27
Table 3: Dimensions of human rights policies...............................................................45
Table 4: Summary of policy instruments and main characteristics of the human rights 
policy of the OSCE, CoE and EU towards Russia................................................ I l l
Table 5: Complaints to the ombudsman office 1998-2005 ......................................... 146
Table 6: Complaints by issue area............................................................................... 147
Table 7: Current implementation of the European norms by Russia...........................258
Table 8: Norm-specific scope conditions.....................................................................262
Table 9: Domestic scope conditions.............................................................................262
Table 10: International scope conditions..................................................................... 262
Table 11: Environmental scope conditions.................................................................. 262
11
List of Abbreviations
ACEEEO Association of Central and East-European Elections Officials
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China
CBSS Council of the Baltic Sea States
CEES Central and Eastern European States
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
Cheka Vserossiiskaia chrezvychainaia komissiia po bor'be s
kontrrevoliutsiei i sabotazhem (VChK), All-Russian 
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution 
and Sabotage
CHR Commissioner for Human Rights (CoE)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CM Committee of Ministers (CoE)
CoE Council of Europe
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CPT Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CoE)
EAD Electoral Assistance Division (UN)
EAU Electoral Assistance Unit (UN)
EC European Community
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
ECHO Humanitarian Aid Office (EU)
EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EU)
EIM European Institute for the Media
EP European Parliament (EU)
EU European Union
FSB Federalnaia sluzhba bezopasnosti, Federal Security Service
HR Human rights
KPSS Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovietskogo Soiuza, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union 
KPRF Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii
LDPR Liberal 'no-Demokratichskaia Partiia Rossii, Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NHRI National Human Rights Institution
NKVD Narodnyi komissariiat vnutrennih del, People's Commissariat for
Internal Affairs 
MEP Member of the European Parliament
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PPC Permanent Partnership Council (EU-Russia)
RF Russian Federation
RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
SPS Soiuzpravyh sil, Union of Right Forces
SU Soviet Union
12
TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States Programme (EU)
TsIK Tsentralnaia izbiratelnaia komissiia, Central Electoral 
Commission
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Venice Commission European Commission for Democracy through Law (CoE)
13
CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS PROMOTION
This chapter identifies the general points o f departure for this thesis. It commences with 
a critical assessment o f current research on democratisation and state socialisation. 
Central research questions and the structure o f the study are formulated on the basis o f  
the theoretical analysis. The latter part o f the chapter outlines the research design and 
the source material used, and addresses some methodological questions and central 
concepts.
1 Modelling Domestic Social Change
Since the mid-1970s, a growing number of states have moved away from authoritarian, 
human-rights-trampling rule and striven towards a more democratic and humane form 
of government. The last group of states to join this so-called "third wave" of 
democratisation1 was the former socialist Central and Eastern European States (CEES) 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latest wave of democratisation was characterised 
by a growing internationalisation of the democratisation process and the debate by 
which it was accompanied. Other states, international organisations and various 
transnational actors, such as non-governmental and quasi-govemmental organisations, 
actively participated in democracy and human rights promotion in "target states".
The internationalisation of human rights and democratisation is a sign of the growing 
interconnectedness of actors in the globalising world. The traditional division between 
"internal" and "external" policy fields has increasingly become blurred.2 State 
sovereignty has begun to be interpreted in a more flexible way. Democratic rule and 
respect for human rights have become the only means by which states can gain 
unquestioned international legitimacy. International actors are concerned about human 
rights and democracy internationally because they are considered essential elements in
1 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 109-63.
2 This is highlighted in particular in the literature on global governance and post-modern 
security threats. See, for example, Didier Bigo, "Internal and External Security(ies): The 
Mobius Ribbon," in Identities, Borders and Orders, eds. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and 
Yosef Lapid (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2001); David Held, Democracy and 
Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995); R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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the construction of long-term stability and regional security. Democratic states are often 
considered to be more reliable, predictable and cooperation-seeking players in the game 
of international affairs.3 Humanitarian and normative considerations also matter. 
According to current international law, human rights are considered to be universal, and 
all states are obliged to respect them. A great many states agree that it is an international 
duty to also defend human rights outside their own borders for humanitarian reasons; 
the disagreements among states primarily revolve around the question of legitimate 
means by which this duty should be conducted.4
International normative concerns are also closely connected with the processes of 
deepening cooperation and integration in a globalising world. The wider and deeper the 
cooperation, the more normative concerns the actors have towards each another. The 
European states, for instance, share a web of overlapping institutional structures and a 
set of well-established norms and values that states have agreed to respect. This is both 
a prerequisite and a result of deepening cooperation.
There are thus three interlinked background conditions for the topic of this thesis: the 
process of the division between internal and external becoming increasingly blurred, the 
internationalisation of human rights and calls for democracy, and the link between 
normative concerns and integration. These developments have attracted the interest of 
growing numbers of researchers since the 1960s. Members of the English School were 
among the first to draw attention to normative concerns in international politics. Hedley 
Bull theorised on the international society of states, which accommodated and 
encouraged cooperation among its members.5 Later, in the 1980s, John Vincent drew
3 This idea, which is commonly referred as democratic peace theory, has long roots. Immanuel 
Kant proposed this idea already in 1795 in his work Perpetual Peace. The theory has been 
developed further and debated actively since the late 1960s. See, for example, Lee James Ray, 
Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation o f the Democratic Peace Proposition 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
4 Peter R. Baehr and Monique Castermans-Holleman, The Role o f Human Rights in Foreign 
Policy, 3rd ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
5 Cooperation is naturally possible without shared norms, but then cooperation is likely to be 
non-institutionalised, ad hoc based and less effective. See the reprinted article, Hedley Bull, 
"The Grotian Conception of International Society," in Hedley Bull on International Society, eds. 
Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 95- 
124.
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attention to the growing role of human rights in international relations.6 Since then, 
many of the issues have inspired vivid scholarly debates. There has been discussion on 
the "normative power" of Europe,7 on the changing essence of the concept of state 
sovereignty,8 and on the perspectives of global governance.9 In particular, the 
appearance of Constructivism as a mainstream school of International Relations has 
brought state identities and the role of norms and values in international politics into the 
limelight of research.10
This thesis focuses on the issue of domestic change and how it is -  and how it could be 
-  supported from the outside. It looks into the interaction process between Russia and 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the 
European Union, and explores the dynamics of the interplay between international 
cooperation and domestic change. The thesis draws from theories that have explained 
transitions to democratic and human-rights-respecting rule in its analysis of how 
democracy and human rights are in practice promoted in Russia by international 
organisations, and why this promotion has not been successful. The study does not 
engage in philosophical or moral debates on the justification of human rights promotion 
in third states, nor does it envisage how things should be in a perfect, ideal world. 
Essentially, the thesis takes the world as it is, and tries to make some sense of it through 
its analysis. By offering a more complete understanding of developments, one is better
6 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs and Cambridge University Press, 1987).
7 Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," Journal o f Common 
Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002).
8 See, for example, Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social 
Construction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Stephen D. Krasner, 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Alexander 
Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992).
9 Held, Democracy and Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance.
10 Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European 
Journal o f International Relations 3, no. 3 (1997); Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and 
Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security," in The Culture of 
National Security, ed., Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Wendt, 
"Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics."; Alexander 
Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; 
reprint, 2000).
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equipped to provide an explanation of how certain kinds of behaviour are possible, or 
likely, and why.11
Reflecting the general approach of the thesis outlined above, the theories considered 
here are mid-range, practice-oriented theories on democratisation and state socialisation 
to international norms. They both seek to explain major normative change in domestic 
politics, and how that change is likely to take place. These theoretical frameworks will 
be explored in the following sections.
Democratisation
The democratisation of states has been explained in a number of ways. These 
explanations often tell us more about the Zeitgeist of the particular period, than about 
the "objective" dynamics of democratisation process. While the earlier theories usually 
highlighted the importance of structural issues, such as the stage of economic 
development, culture and historical experience -  often in a very deterministic fashion -  
more recent theories suggest that there are no fundamental preconditions for democracy. 
Democracy may be more difficult to establish in some states due to cultural and other 
structural issues, but in principle, it is a feasible task. This more recent strand of 
literature has been labelled as "transition literature" or "transitology".12 Transitology 
represents the mainstream in current democratisation literature.
There are some underlying assumptions that are typical for the transition paradigm of 
this third wave of democratisation. Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter have 
developed these points in their contribution to the edited book Transitions from  
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (1986). Since then, many researchers 
have followed their points, either explicitly, or -  more frequently -  implicitly.
11 Alexander Wendt, "On Constitution and Causation in International Relations," Review o f  
International Studies 24, no. 5 (1998): pp. 104-105.
12 See the seminal, agenda-setting pieces of this school: Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. 
Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, eds. 
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986); Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a 
Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (1970).
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In all its simplicity, democratisation of transition societies is expected to be a three- 
phase process moving from totalitarianism towards genuine democracy.13 The first step 
towards democracy is taken when the authoritarian society opens up and begins to 
liberalise state-society relations. Repression is diminished, and the room for political 
debate grows. Civil society gains strength gradually through the mushrooming and 
strengthening of NGOs. Although political liberalisation is often accompanied by 
economic reforms, transitologists are primarily concerned with the process of political 
liberalisation. According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, liberalisation is the "process of 
making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from 
arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties".14 Liberalisation does not 
yet mean that political freedoms are completely respected at all times, and that rulers are 
accountable to their subjects; liberalisation is only the opening of the window for 
democratic change.15 Schneider and Schmitter claim that the general indicators for 
liberalisation are the following:16
1. The regime makes significant concessions on human rights.
2. There are no -  or at least very few -  political prisoners.
3. Tolerance for opposition increases.
4. There is more than one legally recognised political party.
5. There exists at least one recognised opposition party in parliament.
6. There are trade unions or professional associations, which are not controlled by state 
agencies or governing parties.
7. There is an independent press and access to alternative means of information that are 
tolerated by the government.
The initial liberalisation can stem from different sources; it can be, for example, the 
result of negotiation within the ruling elite, or it may be that the opposition outside the
13 These phases are clearly explained, for example, in Carsten Q. Schneider and Philippe C. 
Schmitter, "Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of 
Democratization," Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004).
14 O’Donnell and Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies," p. 7.
15 Schneider and Schmitter, "Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the 
Components of Democratization," p. 61.
16 Ibid.: p. 64.
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government pressures the government to make concessions.17 The sources of the change 
are first and foremost domestic, and international actors are expected to play a relatively 
restricted and modest role in the development. The growing freedom is likely to lead to 
growing demands from the oppositional elite and/or the broader civil society and/or the 
more liberal part of the elite and/or the outside actors, such as international 
organisations, transnational networks of activists, and other states. The government may 
agree to negotiate with the opposition, or to hold competitive elections. However, the 
government may also at times respond to the strengthening of the opposition by moving 
to suppress it. If such a backlash does not occur, the state is expected to progress 
gradually towards the next phase.
In order to access the next stage of transition, a democratic breakthrough is needed. The 
breakthrough is embodied in the first free, multi-party elections, the so-called founding 
elections.18 The new democratically elected government aspires to further 
democratisation, and establishes new democratic structures that usually include a new 
democratic constitution guaranteeing basic political rights and freedoms. According to 
Schneider and Schmitter, there are eight items on the transition mode list:19
1. Oppositional social/political movements enter into public negotiations with the 
government.
2. There exist open conflicts within the administrative apparatus of the state over public 
policies, which are acknowledged by the government.
3. Legal reforms, which are intended to limit arbitrary use of power by the regime, are 
introduced.
4. Constitutional/legal changes, which eliminate the role of non-accountable powers of 
veto-groups, are introduced.
5. A constitution, which guarantees equal political rights and civil freedoms to all 
citizens, has been ratified.
6. Founding elections have been held.
17 •See Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, pp. 121-
63.
18 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies," pp. 61-64.
19 Schneider and Schmitter, "Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the 
Components of Democratization," p. 66.
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7. The founding elections have been free and fair.
8. The results of the founding elections have been widely accepted.
Subsequent to the establishment of all necessary structures, the process of 
democratisation will gradually proceed to the phase of consolidation o f democracy. 
During the consolidation of democracy, democratic institutions, procedures and policies 
will become deeply rooted and well-functioning practices. By way of definition, Larry 
Diamond suggests that consolidation is "a discernible process by which the rules, 
institutions and constraints of democracy come to constitute 'the only game in town', the 
only legitimate framework for seeking and exercising political power".20 Consolidation 
is the most crucial and most difficult phase to enter. Schneider and Schmitter suggest 
the following criteria for measuring the degree of consolidation of democracy:21
1. No significant political party advocates major changes in the existing constitution.
2. Regular elections are held and their outcomes are respected.
3. Elections are free and fair.
4. No significant parties or groups reject previous electoral conditions.
5. Electoral volatility has diminished.
6. The actions of elected officials/representatives are not constrained by non-elected 
veto-groups.
7. A first rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has 
occurred within the rules already established.
8. A second rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has 
occurred within the rules already established.
9. Agreement (both formal and informal) has been reached on the rules governing the 
association formation and behaviour.
10. Agreement (both formal and informal) has been reached on the rules governing the 
executive format.
11. Agreement (both formal and informal) has been reached on the rules governing the 
territorial division of competencies.
20 Larry Diamond, "Introduction: In Search of Consolidation," in Consolidating the Third Wave 
Democracies. Themes and Perspectives, eds. Larry Diamond, et al. (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1997), xvi-xvii.
21 Schneider and Schmitter, "Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the 
Components of Democratization," p. 68.
20
12. Agreement (both formal and informal) has been reached on the rules governing the 
rules of ownership and access to mass media.
Debates around democratisation
Democratisation theorists are good at categorising and analysing the state of democracy 
within a state but they are often vague about how states enter and progress on the scale 
of transition. Many researchers have settled for emphasising the inherent uncertainty of 
democratisation. Samuel Huntington, for example, expects that many of the newly bom 
democracies would be caught in a "reverse wave" and would eventually fail to 
consolidate the democratic system.22 Although he lists many possible reasons for the 
phenomenon, he maintains that there is something inevitable and natural about the 
sequence of the waves. The transition paradigm concentrates on the nature and degree 
of democratic change in the target state. It does not specify the exact causal mechanisms 
of change, nor does it usually look outside the target state, that is, how international 
actors may influence the outcome. Transitologists have been vague about the explicit 
causal links in the process, and have therefore faced accusations on occasion of an 
inability to offer a proper theory of democratisation.23 To many their categorisations 
merely constitute a general approach to the analysis, rather than a testable theory with 
"if X, then Y" claims.24
However, in practical terms their points have widely been interpreted as a theory. The 
phases of liberalisation, transition and consolidation have made their way to the 
common vocabulary of democracy promotion and are often taken as a definite model of 
democratisation. Despite the fact that theorists and promoters often admit that states can 
-  and sometimes do -  take backward steps, or stall at one of the stages of the model 
there is a strong teleology implicit in this transition paradigm.25 All analysis takes place
22 • rm  r * ftHuntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, pp. 13-33.
23 For a good overview of the democratisation literature, see Graeme Gill, The Dynamics o f  
Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press, 2000).
24 Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?," Slavic Review 54, no. 1 (1995): p. 
123.
25 Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal o f Democracy 13, no. 1
(2002): p. 7; Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise o f Semi-Authoritarianism 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), pp. 12-14.
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in terms of the democratisation model, and hence development completely outside the 
model goes unaccounted for.
The democratisation model is a comprehensive model for the evaluation of the nature 
and degree of democracy in a target state. Because of its comprehensive nature, it 
cannot be as such applied to specific issues of democracy, such as specific human 
rights. Therefore, in this thesis the model is used first and foremost in Chapters 2 and 7 
in the evaluation of the degree and nature of democracy generally in Russia.
Socialisation
By contrast to the democratisation theorists, who allegedly have failed to offer a 
"proper" theory with "if X, then Y" claims, the Constructivist socialisation theorists aim 
to do precisely that. Constructivist socialisation theorists direct their attention more 
specifically to the ways in which international rules and norms are transferred from one 
party to another, usually from a state, international organisation or transnational 
network to another state. The socialisation literature looks at fundamental domestic 
social change as a multi-level process of norm adaptation, and endeavours to reveal the 
causal mechanisms and modes of action involved in the transformation process. The 
socialisation literature has not been restricted to the study of human rights and 
democratic norms: there have also been studies, for example, on transference of security 
and environmental norms.26
The socialisation literature draws heavily on democratisation literature. The 
characteristics of different phases of socialisation are very similar to the phases of 
democratisation described above. Their difference lies, first and foremost, in their focus, 
selection of actors and levels of analysis. Socialisation literature explores the interplay 
between international, transnational and domestic levels, and hypothesises about the 
causal mechanisms at play. In contrast, the democratisation model settles for describing 
the general changes that are taking place in the target state.
26 Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Oran Young and Marc Levy, "The Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes," in The Effectiveness o f International Environmental 
Agreements, ed., Oran Young (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
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The most comprehensive attempt to formulate a multi-level model of socialisation is 
found in a volume titled Power o f Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (1999), edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink. The 
editors outline a particular model of socialisation to human rights, which shares the 
same underlying assumptions as democratisation theory: the theory is universally 
applicable, the phases of development are very similar in both models, and there are no 
structural -  for example economic or cultural -  conditions that should be met before 
change is possible (besides the establishment of transnational networks between 
domestic groups and outside actors).
The "spiral model" draws a trajectory of state socialisation to international human rights 
norms, and singles out the causal mechanisms as well as the dominant actors at play in 
each of the stages of development. It embraces interplay between international, 
transnational, state and sub-state levels. The most important factor in the process is 
claimed to be the formation and sustainability of a transnational human rights advocacy 
network. The network links domestic and transnational actors together with 
international organisations, western public opinion and western governments.27 This is 
also the most significant point on which the socialisation model differs from the 
democratisation model. Whereas the Risse-Sikkink model highlights the importance of 
civil society challenging the regime, the democratisation literature emphasises the 
importance of elite bargaining. Both models make predetermined assumptions about the 
pathways of change.
The Risse-Sikkink socialisation model is Constructivist inasmuch as it combines 
rationalist, material interest-based causal mechanisms (bargaining, instrumental 
calculations) with more socially constructed mechanisms (argumentative rationality, 
habitualisation). Its analysis is rooted in the Constructivist understanding, which asserts 
that states seek to act according to their identities. Identities are definitions of self in 
relation to others, and they are constructed -  and reconstructed -  in intersubjective
27 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms 
into Domestic Practices: Introduction," in The Power o f Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change, ed., Thomas Risse and Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 5.
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processes between states and international structures.28 States care about their 
international reputation and can become entrapped in their own words. Alongside 
material gains and power, values and norms matter in international relations.29
The model understands state socialisation to international norms in a more 
comprehensive fashion than Realists or Institutionalists. Realists view socialisation 
simply as the principle that all states are forced to respond to the constraints of 
international anarchy in a similar fashion, that is, to imitate the strategies of their 
rivals.30 Institutionalists also downplay socialisation by claiming it influences only state 
strategies: institutions encourage a certain type of behaviour through sanctions, changes 
in domestic balances of power or by making states consider their international 
reputation.31 In contrast, Constructivists believe that socialisation may change a state's 
identity, its interests and behaviour.
The Risse-Sikkink model of socialisation is by no means the only attempt by 
Constructivists to explore the mechanisms of socialisation in international cooperation. 
In recent years there have been a number of studies on international norm socialisation, 
in particular within the European and human rights studies camps.32 Many of these 
studies have brought valuable contributions to the debate. For instance, recent studies 
have highlighted specific scope conditions that condition the socialisation process in an
28 Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in The 
Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed., Peter J. Katzenstein 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 23-25.
29 Naturally, there are different variations of social constructivism: mainstream "modernist", 
"rule-based", "commonsense" and more post-modern constructivists. Despite all their 
differences, the points made here are common to all of these approaches. On different variations 
of constructivism, see, for example, Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in 
World Politics."; Ralph Pettman, "Commonsense Constructivism and Foreign Policy: A 
Critique of Rule-Orientated Constructivism," in Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, ed., 
Vendulka Kubalkova (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001).
30 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 2nd, revised ed. (Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 74-77.
31 Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 240-47.
32 Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy o f Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human 
Rights Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Ronald H. Linden, ed., Norms and 
Nannies: The Impact o f International Organizations on the Central and East European States 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002); Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: 
International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise o f Communism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001); Michael Zum and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build 
Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation State," International 
Organization 59, no. 4 (2005).
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illuminating way.33 Nevertheless, since the majority of these writings draw from the 
Risse-Sikkink model, it is appropriate to take their model as the reference point for this 
study.
Risse-Sikkink model o f socialisation
The five-phase socialisation model (see Table 1) starts with a repressive society in 
which human rights norms are denied. Only if and when the transnational advocacy 
network succeeds in putting the norm-violating state on the international agenda, the 
process moves to the next phase. During the second phase of denial, there is growing 
international awareness of human rights violations taking place in the target state. 
Transnational advocacy groups gather information on violations and lobby for the cause 
internationally. The government is expected to deny the validity of international human 
rights norms and insist that the criticism is a violation of the non-interference principle 
in international relations.34
However, if international pressure continues and escalates, the government is likely to 
make minor concessions to pacify the international criticism. The third phase is thus 
characterised by tactical concessions on human rights issues by the repressive 
government. The government is acting purely out of instrumental calculations: it is 
trying to get something out of the concession in the human rights field (economic 
assistance, for example). As in the democratisation literature, the spiral model expects 
concessions eventually to facilitate further social mobilisation in the target country. At 
this stage, the state moves towards more enduring change in human rights and 
democratisation policies or, alternatively, it may result in a backlash in human rights. 
Improvement in human rights is more often than not accompanied by a change of 
regime, whereas a backlash is expected to be carried out by the repressive government 
remaining in power. The potential backlash is expected to be merely a temporary
33 In particular, Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: 
Introduction and Framework," International Organization 59, no. Fall (2005); Frank 
Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the Central and 
Eastern European States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," in Norms and Nannies: The 
Impact o f International Organisations on the Central and East European States, ed., Ronald H. 
Linden (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).
34 Risse and Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction," pp. 22-24.
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suspension in the progress towards human rights socialisation.35 During the phase of 
tactical concessions, the dominant mechanisms at play are, first, strategic bargaining 
and instrumental adaptation on the government side, and consciousness-raising, 
dialogue and persuasion on the advocacy network side. As the next phase of the 
prescriptive status of human rights nears, an "argumentative self-entrapment" takes 
over, and argumentation and persuasion will become the dominant causal mechanisms. 
The phase of tactical concessions corresponds roughly to the liberalisation phase in the 
democratisation literature. Both models presume that once the government opens the 
door for limited liberalisation, socialisation to democracy and human rights will almost 
automatically follow. The governments seem to have only marginal influence over this, 
as they are bound to become "trapped in their own words" and lose control over the 
situation.36
The next stage of the prescriptive status of human rights denotes that the target state's 
government accepts the validity of human rights norms without reservations. The state 
commits itself domestically and internationally to the implementation of human rights 
norms and standards. The government creates institutional arrangements in order to 
secure human rights for its citizens. There may still be some problems in the 
implementation of international human rights standards, but the government is firmly 
committed -  both in words and in deeds -  to the values, and strives for their 
implementation. The official discourse on the norms becomes consistent throughout, 
regardless of the audience. During this phase, the dominant mechanisms at play are, 
first, consciousness-raising, dialogue and persuasion, and later institutionalisation. The 
phase of prescriptive status corresponds again roughly to the stage of transition in the 
general democratisation model.
The final stage in the socialisation to human rights is rule-consistent behaviour. This 
phase corresponds to the consolidation period of the democratisation model. Risse and 
Sikkink maintain that during this final stage, the processes of institutionalisation and 
habitualisation reign, and the norms become firmly internalised by the target state and 
its society. During this phase, human rights become fully institutionalised, norm
35 Ibid., p. 26.
36 Ibid., p. 27.
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compliance becomes a habitual practice, and they are implemented effectively and 
consistently.37
Table 1: Socialisation model
Repression Denial Tactical
concessions
Prescriptive
status
Rule-consistent
behaviour
Dominant
actors
Transnational 
human rights 
networks
Transnational 
human rights 
networks
Transnational 
networks and 
domestic opposition
National 
governments and 
domestic society
National 
governments and 
domestic society
Dominant 
mode of 
action
Instrumental
rationality
Instrumental
rationality
Inst, rationality 
rhetorical action-> 
argumentative 
rationality
Argumentative 
rationality and 
institutionalisation
Institutionalisation 
and habitualisation
Description Modest liberalisation, 
domestic opposition 
gains strength, 
pressure leads to 
regime change 
or controlled 
liberalisation
After breakthrough, 
norms 
uncontested: 
ratification of HRs 
conventions, 
constitution 
confirms HRs, HRs 
institutions 
established etc.
Human rights 
norms are fully 
institutionalised 
domestically and 
norm compliance 
becomes a 
habitual practice of 
actors and is 
enforced by the 
rule of law
Table 2: Democratisation 
model
Sources:
Table 1: Adapted from Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink: 'The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction." In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by 
Thomas Risse and Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 25-33. 
Table 2: Adapted from Carsten Q. Schneider and Philippe C. Schmitter. "Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: 
Measuring the Components of Democratization." Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): pp. 59-90.
Debates around socialisation
The Risse-Sikkink model of socialisation is clearly not the only model of socialisation. 
Indeed, many researchers have outlined their own models and research agendas for the 
study of state socialisation.38 Nevertheless, the model is consistently used as a reference 
point in the subsequent articles. As stated earlier, the subsequent articles primarily
37 Ibid., pp. 11-34.
38 Kai Alderson, "Making Sense of State Socialization," Review o f International Studies 27, no. 
3 (2001); Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework."; Trine Flockhart, "'Complex Socialization': A Framework for the Study of State 
Socialization," European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (2006); Schimmelfennig, 
"Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the Central and Eastern European 
States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues."
Liberalisation Transition Consolidation
Description State opens up, 
reforms start, civil 
society gains strength 
and leads to regime 
change or controlled 
liberalisation
Democratic 
breakthrough in 
the form of free 
elections and a 
new constitution, 
institutional and 
legislative reforms, 
political 
negotiation 
between political 
actors
Implementation
and
institutionalisation 
of democratic 
institutions, 
habitualisation
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endorse the predominant characteristics of socialisation process as outlined in the Risse- 
Sikkink model, making only smaller adjustments and additions to it. Despite the lively 
debate that has taken place on state socialisation, the main theses of the Risse-Sikkink 
model have not been challenged.39 Many of these contributions have, however, helped 
to bridge some of the shortcomings of the model.
One of the most crucial points of criticism has been the bias against the ruling elites 
embedded in the model. Socialisation to international norms naturally does not always 
occur as a result of transnational network and civil resistance. Sometimes the change in 
a state takes place through top-down processes: that is, the elite internalises the norms 
first and society follows their example. The democratisation literature has traditionally 
seen normative change as essentially an elite-led process, with civil society and 
international actors being of secondary importance. Few socialisation theorists would go 
quite so far as to concur with this view, but many of them do recognise that there are 
more possible pathways to internalisation than the Risse-Sikkink model suggests.40
Another addition to the model has been the realisation that domestic structures such as 
culture may also condition the socialisation effect of international norms. Daniel C. 
Thomas, for example, has claimed that domestic identity should be added to the analysis 
as an independent variable. He claims that gaps between the rhetoric in the international 
arena and the actual implementation of norms domestically stems from incompatible 
domestic and international identities. The change in identities can either encourage the 
socialisation development or influence it negatively.41 Thus, according to Thomas, 
domestic structures matter more than the Risse-Sikkink model suggests. Various other
39 See, for example, Alderson, "Making Sense of State Socialization."; Checkel, "International 
Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework."; Flockhart, '"Complex 
Socialization': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization."; Schimmelfennig, 
"Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the Central and Eastern European 
States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues."; Cameron Thies, "Sense and Sensibility in the 
Study of State Socialisation: A Reply to Kai Alderson," Review o f International Studies 29
(2003); Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise o f 
Communism; Ziim and Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and 
Rationalism, Europe and the Nation State."
40 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," 
International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): pp. 558-59; Flockhart, "'Complex Socialization': A  
Framework for the Study of State Socialization," pp. 97-100.
41 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise o f  
Communism, pp. 15-17.
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researchers have also raised similar points concerning the importance of the domestic 
structures and their interaction with the international system.42
More generally, a considerable amount of work has been conducted to identify scope 
conditions for the normative impact of international norms -  an issue which the Risse- 
Sikkink model leaves almost untouched.43 Frank Schimmelfennig, for example, argues 
that the socialising impact depends upon the normative power, authority, and material 
bargaining power of the socialising agent. In addition to these features, domestic 
conditions and issue- and norm-specific conditions are also likely to play a part in the 
socialisation process.44 There have been other critical points made in the debate, yet 
frequently they have been met with more criticism than applause by other researchers.45 
The points of convergence in the debate on socialisation have, nevertheless, been more 
dominant than the points of divergence. There are three typical features of the 
socialisation research in international relations:
1. The dominance of international and (sometimes) domestic structures over agents. 
Once certain conditions have been met and the process has been kicked off, the process 
progresses almost automatically. There is little need for active politics after the initial 
kick-off stage and socialisation pathways are predetermined.
2. Norms are the moving force of the socialisation process. Norms are often considered 
little black boxes that are, and will remain, unchanged. The cultural side of socialisation 
is considered -  if indeed considered at all -  of secondary importance.
3. Socialisation is considered essentially a one-way adaptation process of those little 
black boxes known as norms. Norms are transferred from the international system to the
42 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 
International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999); Thies, "Sense and Sensibility in the Study of 
State Socialisation: A Reply to Kai Alderson."
43 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework."; Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the 
Central and Eastern European States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," pp. 14-15.
44 Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the Central and 
Eastern European States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues."
45 A case in point is Alderson's attempt to define socialisation as an outcome rather than a 
process, which led to growing confusion. See Alderson, "Making Sense o f State Socialization."; 
Thies, "Sense and Sensibility in the Study of State Socialisation: A Reply to Kai Alderson."
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domestic field. Socialisation may fail, but the failure only affects the target state; it does 
not reflect back to the system, nor does it affect the norms.
These three sets of potential problems are, in part, the same as the potential problems in 
the case of democratisation. The points are evaluated against the empirical case studies 
in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
This thesis argues that the socialisation model fundamentally reflects the ideas of the 
transition paradigm and the basic features of democratisation literature. The 
socialisation model is more developed theoretically with its rigorous study of causal 
mechanisms and their scope conditions than the democratisation framework. It is also 
more broadly applicable than the earlier models of democratisation as it relates to 
various specific norms, not just the democratisation process in general. The socialisation 
model framework runs through the entire thesis; contrary to the democratisation model, 
it can be applied to the specific case studies elaborated in this study. Nevertheless, it is 
claimed here that the Constructivist literature on socialisation is a further development 
of the ideas first articulated in the transition literature. Both of these models reflect the 
optimistic Zeitgeist of the post-Cold War years.
2 Thesis Outline
Goals of the thesis
The aim of this thesis is to advance both theoretical discussion on the interplay between
international cooperation and domestic change, and our practical knowledge of how the
interaction has influenced Russia, the norms in question, as well as the organisations
themselves and their policies. The main empirical research questions revolve around
these themes: how the organisations promote human rights and democracy in Russia,
how the cooperation has developed over the years, and what kind of impact the
interaction has had on the actors, their policies and the norms. These practical findings
will be contrasted with the theoretical debate on democratisation and, in particular, on
socialisation: can the theories explain developments and how, and to what extent, do
they do that; if and when they fail to explain the developments, how and why do they do
that?
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The thesis includes three empirical case studies on different sets of norms. Through the 
cases, the thesis aims to provide a nuanced picture of the development that escapes the 
stereotypical black-and-white generalisations offered by the western, and Russian, 
media. The thesis looks at long-term and everyday cooperation between the actors, 
which rarely makes the headlines but is likely tell us more about the true state of the 
relationship between Russia and European organisations than the eye-catching stories in 
the newspapers. This picture will be contrasted with the wider discussion on the nature 
of the Russia-Europe relationship in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
Timeframe and focus
The thesis studies the socialisation efforts of the organisations and their impact on 
Russia's human rights policies. Due to the primacy of this task, the timeframe is 
flexible. It is considered more important to ensure that all relevant measures taken by 
the actors are covered in the study, than to set exact dates for the start and finish of the 
analytical timeframe. In each of the cases, the analysis starts whenever the cooperation 
has started to intensify between the actors. The periodisation of the case studies flexibly 
follows the dynamics of developments concerning the norms: Chapter 4 has been 
periodised according to the terms of Russian ombudsmen, Chapter 5 according to 
general trends in the abolitionist discussion in Russia, and Chapter 6 according to 
electoral cycles at the federal level. There is also a strong continuity between the Soviet 
era and Russia. Unlike the experience of perhaps other former socialist states, there is 
strong continuity between the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods: in Russia, no former 
dissidents ascended to leading positions, no charges were ever brought against former 
party leaders or KGB generals who were responsible for systematic violations of human 
rights, and even the national anthem of the Soviet Union was reintroduced as the 
anthem of the Russian Federation. As Johan Matz convincingly argues, Russia has not 
only claimed to be a successor state of the Soviet Union in the judicial sense, but also 
in a more profound, identity-related way which helps to make sense of the post-Soviet 
international reality.46 Due to this feature, it is also important to draw attention to the 
Soviet roots of Russian developments. This is done in Chapter 2.
46 Johan Matz, Constructing a Post-Soviet International Political Reality: Russian Foreign 
Policy Towards the Newly Independent States 1990-95 (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2001).
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This thesis studies the cooperation between Russia and the European organisations on 
an intergovernmental level, and the developments in Russia on a federal level. Hence 
the attention is directed towards governmental actors. However, it is not the purpose of 
this study to claim that states or international organisations are unitary actors. The 
interests of sub-state and non-state actors are mediated to the state level through 
complex processes of interest transformation. Although the thesis refers to "Russia" as 
an actor, this is only a shorthand term for persons acting in the name of the Russian 
Federation (such as the president, ministers, members of diplomatic service and 
administration).
The chosen approach for this thesis is policy- and outcome oriented. It does not look 
inside the institutions’ or Russia's decision-making bodies and trace how their policies 
came into being. The thesis directs its attention to the interaction between the actors, 
and not to the internal decision-making processes of the actors. The thesis fills a void in 
the current literature; cooperation as an interactive, continuous process that may also 
have unintended consequences has so far received little attention by researchers.47
Source material
Instead of looking at the decision-making processes of the OSCE, CoE, EU and Russia, 
the study is interested in the policies and the arguments backing the policies of these 
actors. The primary research material consists of texts and documents on human rights 
cooperation produced by the OSCE, the CoE and the EU and, on the other hand, by the 
representatives of the Russian state. A wide range of Russian and western newspaper 
articles have also been used in the analysis.
In order to find relevant Russian newspaper material, the study takes advantage of the 
Integrum database, which is the largest full-text Russian-language database. The 
database includes both newspapers and journals. This method has proved to be time- 
effective and it has enabled the use of several journals and newspapers. Integrum covers 
only the post-Soviet period; to cover the earlier years, this study has used The Current
47 Kate O'Neill, Jorg Balsiger, and Stacy D. VanDeveer, "Actors, Norms and Impact: Recent 
International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate," Annual 
Review o f Political Science 1 (2004): p. 168.
48 Alderson, "Making Sense o f State Socialization," p. 427.
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Digest o f Soviet and Post-Soviet Press database, which unfortunately is not as 
comprehensive as Integrum. The most important publications are those that represent 
the "official" or influential opinion. For a long time, most Soviet publications reflected 
the official opinion, and it was only in the late 1980s that some diversification started to 
emerge. Since 1993, the Russian government has had its own official newspaper, 
Rossiiskaia Gazeta.
On the level of European organisations, the sources include reports, documents, 
resolutions, decisions and statements by the decision-making bodies, as well as by other 
organs involved in human rights cooperation with Russia. It is also necessary to 
underline that as the primary interest of this study is multilateral cooperation, it 
concentrates on analysing comments made by the European institutional bodies and 
officials, not by the representatives of member states. Several interviews of the 
representatives of the European organisations have been carried out. These interviews 
have been used mainly as background material and an additional check for the 
arguments advanced in this thesis.49
The methods used in this study reflect its practical orientation. Following the principle 
of taking the world as it is, it takes policies as well as arguments and comments 
surrounding them as they are. Naturally, comments are not, however, treated as facts: 
instead, they are interpretations of reality, which happen to have certain authority and 
thus impact on the social world surrounding them. From this vantage point, the 
motivations of the speaker are secondary -  most important is the "speech-act"; the fact 
that the words are uttered to the public and that other actors may respond to the words.50
Reflecting again the practical orientation, this study engages first and foremost in the 
causal form of inquiry, whilst a constitutive mode of explanation is, for the most part, 
left aside.51 The main task of the thesis is to explain what has happened, and why it 
happened the way it did. Only at the very end are the findings of the causal form of
49 A complete list o f interviews and interviewees is provided to the examiners separately.
50 On speech-acts, see J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, eds., J.O. Urmson and 
Marina Sbisa, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
51 Wendt, "On Constitution and Causation in International Relations," p. 105. Hollis and Smith 
label the constitutive mode of explanation as Understanding, and the causal form of inquiry as 
Explaining. See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Understanding and Explaining International 
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
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inquiry contrasted with more static, constitutive questions, such as what the nature and 
prospects of the relationship between Russia and these organisations are. The thesis 
draws its evidence from process-tracing, which is a rather typical method for causal 
analysis.52
In general, the study is sceptical about finding universal "truths" that can be generalised 
across different cases. It is, however, agreed that a certain degree of objectification is 
possible by fixing the criteria of knowledge in a particular research setting. Within this 
setting, one can construct a representation of reality and examine causal relations 
between the elements included in it.53 This is precisely what this study does by engaging 
in a causal form of inquiry through process-tracing. After doing this, the study locates 
structures that enable an understanding of the relationship between the actors.54
The case selection
The thesis explores the causal links through three different empirical case studies. These 
cases study the interaction and its results around three different sets of norms, which the 
OSCE, the CoE and the EU have actively promoted in Russia, and by which Russia has 
agreed to be bound. The whole cooperation process is placed under scrutiny: how it 
started, which instruments and strategies have been employed, and what impact the 
cooperation has had on Russia, on the norms in question, as well as on the European 
actors, and why.
This study looks at the effectiveness of European human rights and democracy 
promotion in only one state. The most important reason for this focus is that a large, 
comparative study often narrows the scope of analysis, and many potentially important 
aspects are left out. An in-depth, single-state study allows the researcher to bring in
52 On process-tracing, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students o f Political 
Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics.
53 Cf. Christer Pursiainen, Beyond Sovietology: International Relations Theory and the Study o f  
Soviet/Russian Foreign and Security Policy (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs, 1998), pp. 34-35; Kristi Raik, "Democratic Politics or Implementation of 
Inevitabilities? Estonia's Democracy and Integration into the European Union," (University of 
Turku: 2003), pp. 31-33.
54 This is the point at which the study turns to a constitutive mode of explanation. However, 
unlike Hollis and Smith, it is claimed that the constitutive mode of inquiry (understanding) is 
more than mere description; its aim is also to explain the nature of more static structures. See 
Hollis and Smith, Understanding and Explaining International Relations.
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more variables and analyse their relations more flexibly. General democratisation 
studies have been notably weak in causal explanation, which is a reflection of their 
preference for large, cross-country comparisons. Too wide and too general a focus is 
often inadequate to uncover the causal mechanisms at play.
In addition to looking at developments in one state, the study also looks at the policies 
of three major European intergovernmental organisations: the OSCE, the CoE and the 
EU. Whilst acknowledging that particularly in normative questions the organisations 
form their policies in interaction with each other, most researchers have concentrated on 
the policies of one organisation only.55 This approach clearly makes the researcher's job 
easier, but also gives a somewhat distorted picture of developments, as the norms and 
cooperation are often developed in dialogue with other European organisations. The 
organisations' overlapping memberships make coordination between them relatively 
easy, and coordination and common action between them have become increasingly a 
formalised practice. All this goes unaccounted for when only the policy of one 
organisation is studied. In addition, single-organisation studies often give too much 
credit to one organisation -  changes in policies are often due to the common efforts of 
these organisations, rather than just one.56
The thesis has chosen to focus on three sets of norms and the international cooperation 
around them. The empirical case studies are the institution of a national human rights 
ombudsman, the abolition of the death penalty, and free and fair federal elections. These 
are all issues on which the OSCE, the CoE and the EU have sought to influence Russian 
domestic policy. All these norms and the criteria for their implementation are clearly 
defined in the documents of the organisations. The Russian representatives have also 
agreed to be bound by these norms. The responsibility over the implementation of these 
norms can be located at the federal level in Russia.
55 For an example of a multi-organisational approach, see Elena Jurado, "Complying with 
’European’ Standards of Minority Protection: Estonia's Relations with the European Union, 
OSCE and Council of Europe" (DPhil Thesis, Oxford University, 2004).
56 An example of this kind of research is Ian Manners' study of the abolition of the death 
penalty. While the article's study of the nature of the EU's external action is indisputable, its 
study of the EU's influence on the issue of the abolition of the death penalty suffers from one­
sidedness and sloppiness in important details. Manners, for example, claims that Russia 
continued executing prisoners until 1999 (which is simply untrue), completely disregards the 
importance of the CoE membership process, and gives too much attention to EU's contribution 
to the issue. See Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," pp. 250-51.
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Norm-specific scope conditions
Literature on norm- and issue-specific scope conditions for socialisation has also 
directed the selection of these particular norms. In his book The Power o f Legitimacy 
among Nations (1990), Thomas Franck argues that international rules have a stronger 
ability to induce voluntary compliance by states if the rule and the rule-making process 
is characterised by determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence,57 In a 
nutshell, determinacy means transparency and textual clarity of the norm - the clearer 
the norm, the more likely its implementation.58 Symbolic validation means that some 
ritualistic act or tradition gives the norm greater legitimacy, and thus pulls strongly 
towards implementation. This could be, for instance, the act of signing a treaty or 
passing a law.59 Coherence implies that the norm is interpreted and implemented widely 
and consistently. The more coherent the practical application of the norm, the more 
likely its implementation is. Finally, adherence refers to a norm hierarchy. Norm 
hierarchy refers to the existence of an organised chain of norms. For example, there 
exists a primary rule of respect for human rights, and secondary rules about its practical 
interpretation and implementation. The rule is likely to oblige states if there exists a 
framework of organised normative hierarchy.60
In addition, other researchers have added the variables of international consensus on the 
norm (this comes close to Franck's coherence criterion).61 The stronger the international 
consensus, the more likely the implementation of the norm is. It has also been argued -  
in a commonsensical way -  that the less material resources are needed, the more likely 
the norm implementation. In particular, this is the case when the requirements exceed
57 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), pp. 48-49.
58 A similar point is made in Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the Tailure' 
of Internationalism," International Organization 51, no. 1 (1997).
59 See also Kai Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law, International Relations 
and Compliance," in Handbook o f International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 546.
60 Franck, The Power o f  Legitimacy among Nations, p. 184.
61 Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the Central and 
Eastern European States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," p. 15.
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the material capabilities of the state.62 Finally, it has also been suspected that technical 
norms are more easily adopted by states than political ones.63
According to Franck's criteria, all of the norms under scrutiny in this thesis are strong in 
their appeal for implementation. Their textual wording and interpretation is clear in the 
European context and there is a requirement of their symbolic validation. There exists a 
strong European consensus on the norms, and they are coherently interpreted and 
implemented throughout Europe. This is also embodied in their wide symbolic 
validation across the continent. Furthermore, there is a highly developed norm hierarchy 
on all of these issues. All these general, principled norms include secondary rules, 
which further define their interpretation and implementation criteria. These secondary 
norms set the specific conditions for implementation, such as ratification of certain 
protocol, technical conditions for ensuring the secrecy of the ballot, and so forth. In all 
of the case studies, the degree of adherence (that is, norm-hierarchy) is high. Thus, 
according to Franck's criteria of determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and 
adherence, the pull for implementation of the norms is high.
The norms under scrutiny differ with regard to the last two norm-specific conditions, as 
different amounts of material and political resources are required to implement them. 
The institution of a human rights ombudsman is the most "technical" of these norms. 
The budgetary implications are also fairly limited and public opinion is likely to be 
largely in favour of, or at least indifferent to, such a norm. The norms of abolition of the 
death penalty and free and fair elections are, however, interpreted as having major 
political significance on both sides. The abolition of the death penalty is often claimed 
to have significant material consequences, yet the actual number of convicts executed 
has been low since the Gorbachev years.64 The resources needed are less material and
62 O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, "Actors, Norms and Impact: Recent International 
Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate," p. 165.
63 Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the Central and 
Eastern European States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," p. 15.
64 For example, in 1993 Russia executed 3 persons and in 1994 10 people. See Council of 
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion: Russia's Application for Membership o f the Council 
of Europe, Doc. 7463. However, contrary to a decade long pattern of decreasing execution 
numbers, from January 1995 to August 1996, Russia executed 139 prisoners. See Anatoly 
Pristavkin, "A Vast Place o f Execution - the Death Penalty in Russia," in The Death Penalty: 
Abolition in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1999), p. 133.
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more political: a clear majority of Russians favours the death penalty.65 In the case of 
free and fair elections, the resources needed are first and foremost material. At face 
value, most Russians favour the concept of democracy, but a significant amount of 
resources are needed to reform Soviet-era election practices and to create preconditions 
for truly democratic and competitive elections (such as the establishment of party 
system) throughout Russia.66
In conclusion, on the one hand the norms are strong and clear, which should make their 
implementation and gradual internalisation by Russia a likely outcome. On the other 
hand, the norms are different enough to make their comparison relevant, and likely to 
advance our knowledge on the causal links between norms and outcomes.
Further scope conditions for socialisation
The case selection section already explored the scope conditions related to norms. 
Recent Constructivist studies have also outlined possible scope conditions for 
successful socialisation with regard to international, domestic and environmental 
conditions.
According to Frank Schimmelfennig, one of the preconditions for successful 
socialisation on an international level is an asymmetrical relationship between the 
international actors and the state in question. This structural condition will make the 
state more sensitive to the policies of the organisations. For softer argumentative and 
ideational socialisation processes to occur, the organisations need to have normative 
power. This normative power arises from unquestioned authority and legitimacy of the 
organisation. In order to instigate more instrumental socialisation mechanisms, the 
organisation will require superior material bargaining power. It needs to be able to 
pursue coercive action effectively and credibly.67
65 According to an opinion poll by FOM institute carried out 18-19 February 2006, almost 75 
per cent of Russian respondents regarded the death penalty as an acceptable practice. See 
Angelika Nussberger and Dmitry Marenkov, "Death Penalty," Russian Analytical Digest, no. 10 
(21 November 2006): p. 5.
66 According to an opinion poll by the Levada center, in April 2004, 55 per cent of Russian 
respondents expected expansion of democracy from Putin. See Lilia Shevtsova, Putin's Russia, 
2nd, revised ed. (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 353.
67 Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the Central and 
Eastern European States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," pp. 14-15.
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There are also several domestic conditions that influence the efficiency of international 
socialisation efforts. The efforts are enhanced if the norm in question enjoys strong 
domestic salience. This means that the domestic norms, values, interests and practices 
do not clash with the international norm, which is being promoted by the international 
actors. The more domestic salience the international norm has, the more likely the 
mechanisms of argumentation, persuasion as well as institutionalisation are. Secondly, 
domestic structures play an important role in defining which pathways of socialisation 
are likely to be decisive. The structures determine whose interests are likely to prevail if 
a contestation over the norm occurs. For example, programmes directed towards the 
state are unlikely to produce a strong pull for implementation if the structure of the state 
is fragmented and weak, and the opposition forces outside the state structures constitute 
the main source of power in the state.68 Related to this, one can add the commonsensical 
criterion of material capacity to enforce reforms.69
In addition to norm-specific, international and domestic conditions, one must also 
consider environmental conditions. Ernst Haas has suggested in his work on learning 
that change in behaviour is more likely when there are high levels of desirability, 
possibility and urgency.70 This can be generalised into a hypothesis on state 
socialisation. Desirability of normative change means that there is a problem that needs 
to be solved, or that there is strong pressure from below, above and/or outside to adopt 
the norm in question. Possibility of change rests upon the availability of means of 
reassessment (for example new information and knowledge on the issue). Urgency, on 
the other hand, means that change is more likely when there is the time pressure of a 
crisis situation and issue salience is high.
Central issues and concepts
Before proceeding further, clarification of a few issues and concepts is needed. The 
issues elaborated in this section are all important conceptual cornerstones of this thesis,
68 Ibid.
69See, for example, O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, "Actors, Norms and Impact: Recent 
International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate."
70 Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models o f Change in International 
Organizations (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 27-28.
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namely international norms, human rights, international cooperation and its 
effectiveness and impact, and international human rights policies.
International norms
Norms, or more specifically, the dominant interpretations of the norms, have the 
capacity to influence social and political worlds, and how people perceive those worlds 
and their own place in them.71 According to the Constructivist understanding of norms, 
norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity in world 
politics.72 Norms are guiding principles, rules of action, for states in the pursuance of 
their national interests. They can be broken, but they still constitute the standards 
against which the actors will be judged by the community. If identities change, the 
standards of appropriate behaviour also change.
Many Constructivist researchers have dedicated their work to proving that alongside 
material conditions, norms matter. Their point is that -  contrary to Realist beliefs -  
normative structures can determine interests, identity and action of agents. Their 
ambition has, however, often led them to view norms as static "black boxes". An 
example of such research is Daniel C. Thomas' book The Helsinki Effect: International 
Norms, Human Rights and the Demise o f Communism (2001), which studies CSCE 
norms and their impact in eastern Europe. Thomas treats the norms as fixed even though 
his empirical research seems to suggest that the interpretations of norms changed during 
the process of cooperation on both sides, and it was really the political framing and 
interaction that mattered, and not the norms per seP  When referring to international 
norms, researchers are in fact often referring to the dominant interpretations of the 
norm. Even the norm of state sovereignty, which is often seen as fixed and immutable, 
has changed and varied significantly over the years.74 The same applies to the concept of
71 Hans Peter Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Human Rights," in Handbook o f  
International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: 
Sage Publications, 2002), p. 517.
72 Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," p. 5.
73 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of  
Communism.
74 Christian Reus-Smith has convincingly demonstrated that sovereignty has never been absolute 
in its nature but has always been tied to the question of legitimacy and ethics. See Christian 
Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose o f  the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional 
Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 3-11.
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human rights.75 It is not only that international normative structures influence state 
behaviour, but also state behaviour directs the development of norms. It is therefore 
essential to open up international norms and admit that they are constantly contested 
and reconstructed by states and other actors.
Rather than artificially fixed norms, this study takes the cooperation process as its point 
of reference. This choice is important: it underlines agency as opposed to structures, and 
reflects the aspiration to define socialisation in terms of political choice rather than a 
natural, pre-determined process.76 The study is structured around specific European 
human rights norms, but its analytical focus is on the interaction process surrounding 
these norms.
Human rights
Analytically, the concept of human rights has two dimensions. Firstly, human rights 
relate to relations between the state and its citizens. This is the domestic norm of human 
rights. Secondly, in the modem world human rights are also international norms, which 
bind states but speak directly to individuals. If a state does not provide protection of its 
citizens' rights, it breaks the rules of international law. That means that other states, 
groups and individuals have a right to act against the state by means of the tools at their 
disposal. The international dimension and the idea of an individual as a subject of 
international law are more recent than human rights as a domestic norm. The 
breakthrough happened only after the Second World War, and the institutional 
framework for its protection is still globally weak.77
Without denying the universality of human rights, this study claims that human rights 
norms need to be adjusted to fit the domestic identities and structures. In a way, human 
rights have become an "empty signifier"78 -  a term that everybody in principle seems to
75 On the contested nature of norms, see, for example, Jan Klabbers, "The Meaning of Rules," 
International Relations 20, no. 3 (2006): pp. 296-98.
76 Thies, "Sense and Sensibility in the Study of State Socialisation: A Reply to Kai Alderson," p. 
549.
77 For an overview of the general internationalisation of human rights, see, for example, David 
P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), pp. 28-50.
78 On empty signifiers, see Emesto Laclau, "Discourse," in A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy, eds. R. E. Goodin and P. Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
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agree with, but whose contents and implications for practical policy are fiercely 
debated.
An example illustrates the point: there is hardly any doubt that both, say, the United 
States and Sweden are democracies and agree on human rights norms. Nevertheless, 
they interpret these norms very differently. The role of the state in providing human 
rights is different, and so is the general willingness to enter into international 
commitments that restrict state sovereignty. The significance of economic and social 
rights is also viewed very differently in these two states. Despite these crucial 
differences, human rights still constitute an important building block in the state 
identities of both states. Certain minimum standards and their exact application can 
naturally be defined by common agreement, by signing a convention or joining an 
organisation, which is given the right to define the norm. Nevertheless, even in these 
cases some domestic characteristics and dynamics will remain. Peter Juviler has labelled 
this approach "contextualism". He emphasises that instead of unqualified universalism 
or cultural relativism, it should be acknowledged that a given country’s interpretation of 
human rights invariably reflects all aspects of its history, institutions and political 
circumstances.79
In order to escape the "empty" nature of the concept of human rights, this study has 
climbed down the ladder of abstraction and specified the human rights norms and their 
evaluation criteria using the European documents on the issues. The study has thus 
taken a practical step towards identifying concrete, tangible human rights norms.
International cooperation and its effectiveness and impact
International cooperation is commonly defined as the action "of working together 
towards the same end, purpose, or effect"80. This definition does not say anything about 
the nature of the process, or the reasons and motivations behind the need to cooperate. It 
does, however, imply that once the goal has been reached, cooperation would dissolve. 
This has also been a typical way of thinking in International Relations. Realists do not
79 Peter Juviler, "Political Community and Human Rights in Postcommunist Russia," in Human 
Rights: New Perspectives, New Realities, eds. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 115.
80 Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford University Press at <http://www.oed.com/>.
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believe in the prospect of long-term institutionalised cooperation, as all states are 
viewed as primarily seeking to defend their own national interests against other states in 
a world of zero-sum games.81
Neo-liberal institutionalism and regime theory challenge this pessimistic view by 
claiming that the relations between states are not necessarily a question of immediate 
gains and zero-sum logic; occasionally, when the interests of states coincide, they are 
capable of long-term cooperation in order to improve their absolute gains in the 
international system. Neo-liberal institutionalism shares Realism's state centrism and 
conception of states as rational unitary actors.82
In the 1990s, these positions were increasingly challenged, particularly by 
Constructivists. Constructivism emphasises the social character of international 
relations. States and their understanding of themselves and others are fashioned through 
their interaction with other international actors (states but also international 
organisations, transnational advocacy groups, international media and so on). Material 
interests and power matter, but so do the norms and identities of actors. International 
cooperation can even start developing into deeper integration as disparities between the 
actors' identities are reduced.
This study draws from the Constructivist school of thought, and sees cooperation as an 
iterated, non-linear and open-ended process, which may have a transformative impact 
on actors, and on international and domestic structures (such as norms).83 Thus, 
cooperation is seen in this thesis as a more complex -  and potentially more 
contradictory -  process than traditional cooperation theory drawing from Functionalist
81 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, pp. 104-07.
82 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 243-51.
83 On the "new wave" of cooperation theory, see ONeill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, "Actors, 
Norms and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent- 
Structure Debate," p. 151.
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ideas would allow.84 The cooperation process may have important unintended 
consequences, which do not conform to the formal, agreed goals of cooperation.85
To clarify this point, the thesis draws attention to both the effectiveness of the 
cooperation in a Functionalist sense, and the impact of the cooperation in the broader 
"new wave" of cooperation theory sense. Effectiveness is defined as the ability to 
"achieve stated goals or objectives, judged in terms of both output and impact".86 
Impact, on the other hand, refers in this thesis to the wider, by and large unintended 
impact on the target state, the international organisations and their policies, as well as on 
the norms that are the very object of cooperation.87
The criteria for assessing the impact of cooperation are, by definition, open-ended. With 
regard to effectiveness, this study has directed its attention to three aspects. The first 
criterion is naturally meeting the formal requirements (for example, passing a law or 
ratifying a treaty). Legislation must meet the standards set by the international norm. 
Secondly, the norm needs to be accepted in the general discourse of state 
representatives. The discourse needs to be consistent regardless of the intended 
audience. This study focuses on the federal level in Russia, and thus studies only the 
discourse at the federal level. The third criterion for evaluation of the effectiveness of 
the norm promotion policies will be the consistency of practical implementation, and 
the degree of institutionalisation of the norm. Effective cooperation encourages and 
contributes towards the formal adaptation, consistent national discourse, practical 
implementation and institutionalisation of the norm.
84 Classical Functionalist theory as outlined by David Mitrany sees international cooperation as 
essentially non-political, pragmatic, and inherently rational action in order to solve common 
problems of welfare. See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (London: The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, 1943).
85 Neither do international organisations necessarily act in a rational and effective way to 
achieve their goals. See Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and 
Pathologies of International Organizations," International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): p.
726.
86 This definition is a mainstream one in general evaluation of assistance programmes. It is used, 
for example, by the US environmental protection agency as well as by the Center for Program 
Evaluation of the US Bureau of Justice Assistance.
87 On the debate around the concept of effectiveness, see George W. Downs, "Constructing 
Effective Environmental Regimes," Annual Review o f Political Science 3 (2000); O'Neill, 
Balsiger, and VanDeveer, "Actors, Norms and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory 
and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate," pp. 163-64.
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International human rights policies
Human rights policies of states have external and internal dimensions. Internal human 
rights policy refers to how a state implements human rights norms and treats people in 
its territory, whereas external human rights policy refers to how a state seeks to 
influence human rights in other states.
Further, both internal and external policies can be multilateral or unilateral by nature. 
Internal multilateral human rights policy allows for multilateral supervision of the 
domestic practices of that state. External multilateral human rights policy means that a 
state promotes the establishment of international supervisory bodies, and uses 
multilateral instruments in its external human rights policy. Internal unilateral human 
rights policy values national sovereignty over multilateral human rights structures with 
supervisory powers. External unilateral human rights policy means that a state actively 
promotes human rights in other states, but prefers to act outside multilateral settings.88
Table 3: Dimensions of human rights policies
Unilateral human rights policy Multilateral human rights policy
Internal human rights 
policy
No international supervision of 
domestic practices is allowed
State allows for multilateral supervision 
of domestic practices
External human 
rights policy
Unilateral (or bilateral) promotion of 
human rights in others states
Use and promotion of multilateral 
instruments when seeking to influence 
human rights policy of other states
Source: Kathryn Sikkink: 'The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Europe." In 
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1993.
This typology clarifies the basic relations between Russia and the three European 
organisations. This study focuses upon the ways in which the multilateral human rights 
policy of the OSCE, the CoE and the EU influences the internal human rights policy of 
Russia. In general, internal and external human rights policies in Europe have become
88 Kathryn Sikkink, "The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States 
and Europe," in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, eds. Judith 
Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 142-43.
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increasingly multilateral in recent decades.89 Following the general European trend, 
Russia is expected to allow multilateral supervision in its internal human rights policies 
through the European institutional framework.
International organisations and states are often accused of double standards in their 
external human rights policies: states which commit similar human rights violations are 
often targeted with different human rights policies by the organisations.90 On this basis, 
many have argued that human rights are only a pretext to other, material interests of 
international actors.
However, certain researchers openly back a differentiated approach to states, rather than 
one consistent policy for all states. For example, Rein Miillerson claims that a 
differentiated approach can be supported by at least two claims. First, it can be argued 
that since the target states are different from one another, the policies towards them 
should also differ. States vary a great deal not only geographically and economically 
(two factors that the critics have been eager to point out), but also socially and 
politically. The second argument in favour of differentiated approaches to human rights 
violations by third states is that the human rights violations that seem similar on the 
surface may have very different causes and effects on society. Thus, the practice of 
international law and politics should, in fact, be individualised on the basis of the 
specific characteristics of the actors.91 Further, Miillerson argues that the principled 
approach to international law ought to be one that takes into account not only relevant 
principles and norms and context, but also the consequences, or at least the potential or 
foreseeable results, of the application of these principles and norms to unique situations.
Miillerson’s example illustrates the point. He argues that a humanitarian intervention 
could possibly restore human rights in a small state where strong internal opposition
89 There have been various attempts to answer the question of why European states agree to 
limit their sovereignty and allow international supervision of their internal human rights 
policies. The explanations vary from identity politics of the European project, to intentional 
"locking in" future domestic policies. See Jack Donnelly, "An Overview," in Human Rights and 
Comparative Politics, ed., David P. Forsythe (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000); 
Andrew Moravcsik, "The Origins of International Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe," International Organization 54, no. 2 (Spring 2000).
90 See, for example, Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p. 116.
91 Rein Miillerson, Human Rights Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 118-20.
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already exists, but it is far less likely to be successful in a geographically wide, 
regionally very powerful and strongly assertive state with distinctive historical traditions 
and limited opposition. Even if the norms are naturally the same to every state, the 
policy instruments towards the states differ on the basis of the state characteristics. The 
policy instruments should be changed if they are not effective, that is, able to reach the 
stated goals. A good external human rights policy is effective and produces few 
unwanted consequences. This sort of double standard is based on clear-headed, 
objective analysis, and it is almost inevitable in international relations: international 
actors are limited in their ability to change events in other countries in a positive 
direction, thus they are required to choose and be selective.92 However, even Miillerson 
is critical of what he calls subjective double standards -  those not dictated by rational 
and prudent calculations of one’s ability to change the course of action but by a 
subjective attitude towards violators.
Chapter outline
Chapter 2 provides a historical background for the thesis. It looks into the general 
developments of democracy and human rights in the Soviet Union and post-Cold War 
Russia. The developments will be assessed against the democratisation and socialisation 
models. This chapter provides a basis upon which the case study chapters are later built.
Chapter 3 discusses the general internationalisation of human rights, and outlines a 
general framework of the current European human rights and democratisation policies 
towards Russia.
Chapter 4 provides the first of the three case studies on norm socialisation. It addresses 
the question of whether Russia has internalised the European norm of a human rights 
ombudsman. The European organisations promoted the establishment and functioning 
of such an institution in Russia. This norm can be described as rather "technical", and it 
is not likely to clash with domestic norms or policy priorities.
Chapter 5 looks into the question of abolition of the death penalty in Russia. This is 
clearly a more normative and principled issue than the norm of an ombudsman in the
92 Ibid., p. 121.
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previous chapter for the European organisations and Russia alike. The European norm is 
likely to clash with previously held beliefs and popular opinion in Russia, which is 
likely to make the internalisation of the norm more difficult.
Chapter 6 concentrates on the development of free and fair elections in Russia. This 
issue can be described as a fundamental question for the European organisations. In the 
democratisation and socialisation models, free and fair elections are often considered to 
constitute a turning point, a watershed after which the process of democratisation will 
take its own course. The organisations have attached great value to this particular norm.
Chapter 7 sums up the findings, compares the cases with each other systematically, and 
links them to the theoretical discussion. It contemplates the significance of the findings 
for both practical policy and academic research.
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CHAPTER 2
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE RHETORIC 
AND POLICIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND RUSSIA
This chapter provides a historical background for the empirical case studies. First, the 
chapter looks into the Soviet thinking on human rights and international relations. It 
describes how the Soviet Union responded to the internationalisation o f human rights. It 
analyses the developments that led to the collapse o f the Soviet Union, and outlines 
Russia's subsequent policies on the issues o f human rights and democratic norms. The 
chapter further explores how these general developments fit  into the models o f 
democratisation and socialisation outlined in Chapter 1.
1 Socialism and Human Rights
The Russian communist revolution of 1917 was a great leap into the unknown. No one 
had any experience in building a socialist society, and the guidelines set by Marx and 
Engels were, even at their best, vague. In accordance with historical materialism, the 
development was expected to proceed through clear stages towards communism. Every 
stage of development was characterised by its means of production that determined 
society's social structure. Relations of production were the fundamental base; legal and 
political systems were part of the secondary superstructure. Historical materialism was 
reflected also in the Soviet legal thinking. The law was supposed to be based on the 
interests of the working class during the transition years to socialism. Later, when 
socialism was already established, the law would reflect the interests of the people. 
Finally, when the communist society arrived, the state and its legal system would cease 
to exist: in the society of total harmony, law was simply unnecessary.93 Socialist society 
loomed in the minds of revolutionaries as a humane system defending the oppressed 
people. At last, people would be free of the exploitation of capital -  and hence truly free 
for the very first time.
Socialist legal theory saw the legal system as an instrument of the ruling class to 
maintain their power and denied universal values and morality.94 Universal rights and 
values were a myth invented by the ruling class in order to secure their dominance. The
93 See V.M. Chkhikvadze, ed., The Soviet State and Law (Moscow: Institute of State and Law, 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1969), pp. 216-17.
94 See, for example, G. I. Tunkin, Theory o f International Law (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974),
p. 82.
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nature and content of rights and freedoms depended on the nature of the society.95 
Human rights were considered to be benefits granted by the state and they did not exist 
outside the state.96 Thus, even legal theory viewed rights in an instrumental fashion.
Human rights constituted a two-sided issue in socialist legal theory. The theory stressed 
the importance of the collective, common good and the responsibilities of citizens as 
opposed to individual freedoms, which were considered to be bourgeois.97 The starting 
point for thinking was, however, that an individual would voluntarily choose to serve 
the collective: rights and duties were different sides of the same coin. Socialist thinking 
did not see the rights of the individual as a counterweight to the state because it was 
thought that in a socialist society the interests of the state and the individual would be 
the same. Obedient fulfilment of one's duties was also caring for one's own rights and
* Q Rinterests.
In practice the socialist system put economic and social rights before political rights and 
freedoms.99 It was, however, officially maintained that Soviet citizens also had much 
wider civil rights and freedoms than was ever possible in a capitalist society. The Soviet 
Union was claimed to be based on true democracy.100 The fact that there were not many 
options in elections was explained officially by the strong unity of the Soviet people.
The Soviet reality was always far from the picture that the state propaganda tried to 
promote: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Kommunisticheskaia partiia 
Sovietskogo Soiuza, KPSS), which claimed to represent the will of the people, governed 
the state in a totalitarian manner. The party asserted that it interpreted the principles of 
Marxism-Leninism in all policy sectors according to scientific methods, and that it was
95 Because o f this, Soviet scholars avoided using the term human rights (prava cheloveka) until 
the mid-1960s. Before that, rights of the individual were referred as citizen rights (grazhdanskie 
prava). See Georg Brunner, "Recent Developments in the Soviet Concept of Human Rights," in 
Perspectives on Soviet Law for the 1980s, eds. F. J. M. Feldbrugge and William B. Simons, Law 
in Eastern Europe (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p. 37.
96 Tunkin, Theory o f International Law, p. 182.
97 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs and Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 64.
98 Chkhikvadze, ed., The Soviet State and Law, p. 209; Voijn Dimitry evic, "Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression," in Human Rights in a Changing East/West Perspective, eds. Allan Rosas and 
Jan Helgesen (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p. 63.
99 Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p. 64.
100 Chkhikvadze, ed., The Soviet State and Law, p. 183.
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leading the society towards the complete fulfilment of communism.101 The legal system 
did not have the autonomy that is typical of western legal systems. Even if it was 
claimed that a strict "socialist legalism" existed, the party and the state were in fact 
above the law and they were not bound to their promises of human rights.102 As a 
vanguard of the revolution, the party claimed to know what the socialist people needed 
better than the people knew themselves.
The communist party's dominance, and the fact that the rights of the individual were 
defined on the basis of the interests of the state, underpinned the paternalism of Soviet 
state and society.103 The state reimbursed obedience by taking care of its citizens and 
promising benefits such as social security, employment and education. If an individual 
did not realise that the interests of the society were also in his or her interests, then that 
person had failed as a citizen. He or she was an outsider, and did not deserve the rights 
and freedoms of true, honest citizens. According to this logic, the dissident was not 
punished on the basis of his or her opinions, but as a result of his or her crime against 
the collective.104 Soviet understanding of rights was contrary to the natural law tradition, 
which has strongly influenced western legal thinking. According to the natural law 
tradition, rights are considered to belong to each and every citizen on the basis of 
humanity -  regardless of his or her personal characteristics or merits.105
A summary of the main characteristics in Soviet thinking and practice on human rights, 
which all have been passed on to present-day Russia in one form or another, is in 
place.106 The first of the special features was the predominance of the state, and the 
belief that the common good overrides individual freedoms. The second characteristic 
was the general instrumental approach to human rights; it was accepted that rights 
always serve someone's interests. Thirdly, it was typical of the Soviet human rights
101 Arfon Rees, "The Soviet Union," in Foreign Policy and Human Rights. Issues and 
Responses, ed., R. J. Vincent (Cambridge: The Royal Institute of International Affairs and 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 61.
i Harold J. Berman, "The Struggle for Law in Post-Soviet Russia," in Western Rights? Post- 
Communist Application, ed., A. Saj6 (The Hague: KluwerLaw, 1996), pp. 41-42.
103 Marshall S. Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 125.
104 Rees, "The Soviet Union," p. 62.
105 Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p. 63.
106 See, for example, Grazyna Skapska, "The Legacy of Anti-Legalism," in Marxism and 
Communism: Posthumous Reflections on Politics, Society and Law, ed., Martin Krygier, Poznan 
Studies in the Philosophy o f the Sciences and the Humanities (Amsterdam: Radopi, 1994).
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policy that the official rhetoric on human rights was misleading, and in conflict with the 
real state of affairs.
Non-intervention versus human rights
Soviet legal thinkers claimed that human rights as an international issue was one of the 
progressive features of international law, and a fruit borne through determined action by 
the Soviet Union and other socialist states.107 The SU was active at UNESCO and in the 
drafting of the UN Human Rights Covenants of 1966 (the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). The SU 
ratified both of these covenants in 1973. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union insisted that 
international cooperation on human rights matters had rigorous limits that had to be 
respected.
Despite the international human rights conventions, the rights of the individual were 
considered to be strictly an internal matter for states. This was due to the fact that states 
had different social and economic systems. Law was always political by nature, as it 
reflected the desires of their ruling class. Socialist states could never agree to be bound 
by the decisions by international tribunals whose judges would have represented the 
interests of the capital. Human rights as such did not exist outside a state.108 According 
to this way of thinking, the goal of international human rights cooperation should not be 
the development of international commitments, but rather to support and encourage 
states to formulate domestic laws for the protection of human rights.109
International cooperation on human rights was subjugated to state sovereignty, non­
interference in internal affairs and self-determination of states which were considered
107 Tunkin, Theory o f International Law, p. 315. The fact that the Soviet Union had abstained 
from voting on the Universal Declaration in 1948 was justified on the basis that it put too little 
emphasis on social and economic rights.
108 Ibid., p. 82. In this respect, the Soviet Union's participation in the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals after the Second World War had been exceptional. Soviet scholars tried, nevertheless, 
to hold on to the principle of territoriality. They explained clumsily that the criminal courts were 
dealing with crimes that did not belong to any particular place. In other cases, the jurisdiction 
belonged to the state in which the crime was committed. See F. I. Kozhevnikov, "Law and 
Customs of War," in International Law, ed., F. I Kozhevnikov (Moscow: Institute of State and 
Law, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1962), p. 452.
109 K. Y. Chizhov, "Population in International Law," in International Law, ed., F. I. 
Kozhevnikov (Moscow: Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1962), 
p. 140.
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the most fundamental principles of international law.110 Soviet legal theorists and 
representatives interpreted these principles rigorously: even public criticism - not only 
by state officials, but also by NGOs and private individuals - was against the non­
interference principle.111
The Soviet Union's approach to human rights as an object of international relations leant 
on two practices. Firstly, a typical Soviet practice was the propagandist ratification of 
human rights treaties and documents, and the international employment of human rights 
rhetoric without implementation of human rights domestically. Secondly, the Soviet 
state leant on the ultimate primacy of a conservative interpretation of state sovereignty 
over human rights obligations.
2 Human Rights Enter the East-West Agenda
,f[I]n recent periods some Western circles have been in effect trying to circumvent these 
principles [of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in internal affairs] by 
proposing something like a new edition of the 'cold' or, if you prefer, 'psychological' 
war. I am referring to the campaign conducted under the hypocritical slogan of 
'defending human rights' in the socialist countries."112
Despite the fact that the socialist states did not consider human rights issues to be a 
topic that other states were allowed to comment on, it entered the political east-west 
agenda almost unnoticed through the CSCE process in the 1970s.
Brezhnev launched his Peace Programme in 1971. This programme was aimed at 
improving relations with western states through disarmament and widening cooperation,
110 Arie Bloed and Fried van Hoof, "Some Aspects of the Socialist View of Human Rights," in 
Essays on Human Rights in the Helsinki Process, eds. Arie Bloed and Pieter van Dijk (The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Instituut, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p. 39.
111 International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Law in the Service o f Peace: Two 
Conceptions (Brussels: 1963), p. 41. The only exception to these fundamental principles was 
the case of broad and systematic oppression that threatened international peace and security. 
However, even in such cases, states should not criticize oppressive governments on their own. 
Action was only allowed in the framework of the United Nations Security Council.
112 L. I. Brezhnev, Socialism, Democracy and Human Rights (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 
p. 82. Speech at the World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow in September 1973.
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especially in the economic field.113 One of the main propositions outlined by the Peace 
Programme was to organize a pan-European security conference.
This proposal was not altogether new but the western attitude had gradually changed in 
the spirit of detente and German Ostpolitik in the late 1960s. The western European 
states gave their conditional support to the proposal under the condition that the topics 
of human rights and individual freedoms, human contacts and the free flow of ideas 
would be added to the agenda, and that the United States and Canada would be invited 
to take part to the conference alongside the European states.114 The Soviet Union agreed 
to the demands.
In 1972, European states (excluding Albania), Canada and the United States began 
preparatory negotiations on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
upon invitation by Finland.115 Proper negotiations proceeded in three phases: first, a 
meeting of foreign ministers in Helsinki in July 1973; second, long negotiations in 
Geneva; and finally a conference and ceremonious signing of the Final Document by 
the heads of state in Helsinki in August 1975.
Before and during the negotiations, the SU made some superficial concessions on 
human rights -  for example, it increased the number of Jewish people allowed to leave
113 The initiative was brought about for various reasons. The Soviet Union wanted to bring the 
arms race to a standstill at the point when the Soviet and the American nuclear weapon arsenals 
were still roughly equal. It also wanted to strengthen its position through a formal confirmation 
of the post-war territorial arrangements, and stop the diplomatic rapprochement of China and 
the United States. Additionally the Soviet Union also sought to address its economic stagnation 
by increasing trade and the exchange of technology between the eastern and western blocs. See, 
for example, Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics. Coexistence, Revolution 
and Cold War 1945-1991 (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 66.
114 Soviet foreign minister Molotov brought up the idea for the first time already in 1954. The 
Soviet state was eager to get a general recognition of inviolability of the existing borders in 
Europe and the existence of two German states. The Soviet proposal was renewed in different 
forms over the years but the plan did not receive much support from western states. See John J. 
Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 4.
115 The 35 participating states in the first CSCE conference were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Denmark, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Romania, 
San Marino, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United 
States of America and Yugoslavia.
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the country116 and ratified both 1966 UN Human Rights Conventions in 1973.117 This 
was an easy way to gain positive international attention with very little practical 
significance.
However, signs of change were already starting to emerge in the early 1970s. 
Transnational human rights organisations were becoming more active with regard to 
human rights violations in the Soviet Union and pressuring their own governments to 
demand stricter reciprocity in international cooperation. In addition to the CSCE 
negotiations in which human rights were linked to other issues, the US also linked 
bilateral aid with socialist states to freer emigration policy in 1974.118
The Soviet Union responded to the growing internationalisation. Brezhnev claimed that 
the campaign was imperialistically motivated, and its purpose was to eliminate the 
achievements of socialism. As a warning, Brezhnev tightened the Soviet Union’s visa 
exit policy.119 The idea behind the gesture was to demonstrate that the west could not 
pressure the Soviet Union into making concessions on human rights. Despite the doubts, 
the Soviet Union did not pull out of the CSCE negotiations.
The Helsinki Process kicks off
After years of negotiations, the 35 participating states adopted the Helsinki Final Act in 
a summit meeting in 1975. The document reflected the bargaining between the socialist 
and capitalist Participating States. The document was claimed to be "politically binding" 
and it fell into three "baskets", or areas of cooperation.120 The signing of the document
116 Rees, "The Soviet Union," pp. 70-71.
117 Brunner, "Recent Developments in the Soviet Concept of Human Rights," p. 37.
118 On Solzhenitsyn's arrest and the CSCE negotiation, see Maresca, To Helsinki: The 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975, pp. 89-90.
119 Brezhnev, Socialism, Democracy and Human Rights, p. 82. In 1973 Jewish applicants were 
given 34 733 exit visas, in 1974 20 642. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
The Helsinki Process and East-West Relations: Progress in Perspective. A Report on the 
Positive Aspects o f the Implementation o f the Helsinki Final Act 1975-1984 (Washington DC: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1985), p. 117.
120 The Final Act was claimed to be a politically and morally (but not legally) binding 
document. In practice, this formulation had only little significance because the authority of a 
document signed by 35 heads of state is considerable. See Suzanne Bastid, T., "The Special 
Significance of the Helsinki Final Act," in Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki 
Accords, ed., Thomas Buergenthal (Montclair: Allanheld, Osmun & Co, 1977), pp. 11-19.
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started a cooperation process, which had long-lasting effects on east-west relations, as 
well as on the liberalisation process and its dynamics in the socialist states.121
The first basket consists of ten guiding principles of cooperation and a document 
concerning security questions, such as confidence-building measures and disarmament; 
the second basket concentrates on cooperation in the field of economics, science and 
technology, and environment and cooperation in the Mediterranean area; the third 
basket deals with cooperation in "humanitarian and other fields". The Final Act did not 
set clear guidelines for the future of the CSCE but mentioned only the place and time of 
the next CSCE meeting. In practice, the CSCE participating states convened 
approximately once in every 2-3 years and the meetings lasted for several months, 
sometimes years during the Cold War era.
The guiding principles of the declaration between participating states were:
1) sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty,
2) refraining from the threat or use of force,
3) inviolability of frontiers,
4) territorial integrity of states,
5) peaceful settlement of disputes,
6) non-intervention in internal affairs,
7) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belief,
8) equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
9) cooperation among states, and,
10) fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.
These principles reflect a degree of bargaining between western and socialist states: the 
socialist states succeeded in securing the principles of the inviolability of frontiers, 
territorial integrity of states and non-intervention; whilst the western states managed to 
obtain the inclusion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (seventh 
principle) on the list.
121 See Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of 
Communism.
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The third basket treated human rights issues in a more practical , manner. Its four 
chapters covered human contacts (for example the improvement of conditions for 
tourism, re-uniting families), information (improvement of the exchange of and access 
to information, improvement of working conditions for foreign journalists), cooperation 
and exchanges in the fields of culture and education (for example, the development of 
different kinds of exchange programmes). The participating states pledged, for example, 
to cut application fees for family reunification and to grant multiple visas for foreign 
correspondents.122
Despite the fact that the text of the Final Act reflected perhaps more the western 
conception of human rights, the Soviet authorities took it for granted that the document 
would be interpreted on the basis of Soviet legal theory. First and foremost this meant 
that human rights claims would be subjugated to the more fundamental principle of non­
intervention.123 According to the Soviet view, this meant that public criticism of Soviet 
human rights policy would not be allowed.124 The Soviet representatives underlined a 
sentence in the Final Act which stated "the questions relevant hereto must be settled by 
the States concerned under mutually acceptable conditions".125
Within the socialist camp, the Final Act was considered a victory for Soviet diplomacy, 
and likely to prop up the status of the Brezhnev's political leadership. This confidence 
was demonstrated through the publication of the text of the Final Act in widely 
circulated newspapers Izvestiia and Pravda.126 However, the document was not received 
by the people in quite the way that was anticipated by the leadership. Even if the 
majority of Soviet people might have been more or less indifferent towards the CSCE,
122 See the Helsinki Final Act, points 421-470. Reprinted in Maresca, To Helsinki: The 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975, Appendix II, pp. 284-88.
123 See Arie Bloed and Pieter van Dijk, "Human Rights and Non-Intervention," in Essays on 
Human Rights in the Helsinki Process, eds. A. Bloed and P. van Dijk (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p. 64.
124 Ibid., p. 65.
125 On the Soviet interpretation, see I. S. Sergeyev, "Co-Operation in the Humanitarian Field," in 
European Security and Co-Operation: Premises, Problems, Prospects, ed., Cherkasov P.P. et al. 
(Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy, 1977), pp. 
264-77.
126 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and 
Human Rights (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), pp. 335-36.
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an outspoken minority started to refer to the Final Act in their appeals for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms almost immediately after the document was signed.127
Empowering transnational actors
"But public attitudes toward Helsinki underwent a slow evolution. Gradually, the Final 
Act came to be seen less as a Western confirmation of the status quo in Europe and 
more as a potentially usefully weapon for supporting human rights in the communist 
countries. The CSCE increasingly appeared as a unique basis for raising human-rights- 
related issues with the USSR and the East-European governments and a unique forum 
for discussion for these issues."128
While negotiations about the Final Act were ongoing, very few -  if any -  of the western 
diplomats truly believed that the text would change the oppressive practices in the 
Soviet Union. Even if the western representatives disapproved of the Soviet human 
rights policy, most states were not willing to risk cooperation in other areas for the sake 
of human rights.129 However, this attitude started to change already in the 1970s, in the 
US in particular. International public opinion started to pay more attention to the Soviet 
violations of human rights. Activist networks pressured western governments to conduct 
a tougher policy on human rights questions towards the socialist states. This 
development became apparent also in the CSCE process.130
In the late 1970s there was a remarkable proliferation of NGOs, associations and 
institutions dedicated to monitoring the implementation of CSCE commitments and 
pressuring governments to take a stronger stance on these matters.131 Many inter­
governmental organisations (for example, the Council of Europe and NATO), different 
groups in public administration (for example, the US Commission on Security and 
Cooperation, the Helsinki Review Group in the UK), NGOs and coalitions (for 
example, Helsinki Committees and Helsinki Watch Groups in the CSCE states) and
127 Joshua Rubinstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1980), p. 215.
128 Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975, p. 
207.
129 Ibid., p. 43.
130 See, for example, Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since 
World War II, 3rd ed. (Exter: Pergamon Press, 1988), pp. 288-302.
131 Virginia Leary, "The Implementation of the Human Rights Provisions of the Final Act: A 
Preliminary Assessment: 1975-1977," in Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki 
Accord, ed., Thomas Buergenthal (Washington D.C.: The American Society of International 
Law, 1977), pp. 113-27.
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religious groups and associations (for example, the World Council of Churches) and 
research institutes (for example, the European Cooperation Research Group and the 
EastWest Institute) prepared reports on implementation of the Final Act. This 
development led to a gradual change in the attitudes of political actors, diplomats and 
journalists alike. Direct, public pressuring became more acceptable.132 Critical 
comments on Soviet human rights policy were voiced also from former allies: a number 
of western communist parties publicly stood out from the socialist camp.133
Empowering Soviet dissidents
The CSCE not only inspired western activists, but also a small group of dissidents in the 
Soviet Union and in eastern Europe. The first Helsinki monitoring group was founded 
in Moscow in May 1976.134 The basic idea of these Helsinki groups was to gather 
information on the human rights violations of the socialist states, and transmit this 
information to western governments and the general public. Within the Soviet Union, 
the working method was to prepare reports that were delivered not only outside the 
USSR with the help of foreign correspondents and diplomats, but also to the Soviet state 
authorities and elsewhere in the Soviet Union, through an underground network of 
activists.
The Helsinki movement spread rapidly throughout the Soviet Union: in November 1976 
similar groups were formed in Ukraine and Lithuania, in January 1977 in Georgia and 
in April 1977 in Armenia. In addition to the Helsinki groups, the following years also 
witnessed an establishment of related groups with a narrower focus, such as the 
Christian Committee for the Defence of Freedom of Belief and the Working Group for
132 See David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, "From Helsinki to Belgrade: 
Report of the Helsinki Review Group,” (London: 1977), p. iv.
133 The dividing moment was the Soviet suppression of the demonstrations in Prague in 1968. 
This movement for "new internationalism" was lead by the strong communist parties of Italy 
and, after Franco's death in 1975, Spain. See Robert L. Hutchings, Soviet East-European 
Relations: Consolidation and Conflict, 1968-1980 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1983), pp. 207-16.
134 The first group was called the Initiative Group for the Implementation o f the Helsinki 
Accords. See Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and 
Human Rights, pp. 340-41; "Sbomik dokumentov obshchestvennoi gruppy sodeistviia 
vypolneniiu khelsinkskih soglashenii," (New York: Khronika Press, 1976), pp. 5-7.
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the Investigation of Psychiatry for Political Purposes.135 The CSCE framework seemed 
to unify the previously fragmented opposition: regardless of the poor resources 
available for dissidents, in a short period different groups and organisations formed a 
geographically and thematically wide network of cooperation both within and outside 
the Soviet Union.136
There were also interesting developments behind the official curtains. For example, Iuri 
Kashlev, a Russian diplomat who took part in several Soviet delegations at the CSCE 
meetings, later claimed that the CSCE was a tool for the more liberal foreign ministry 
officials in their attempt to cause rifts in the rigid ideology of the state socialism.137
The Soviet government replied to the rebirth of dissident activism in traditional, 
repressive ways. The security service KGB intimidated the leading activists and 
published compromising articles on them in the Soviet Union and abroad.138 Later, the 
methods became harsher. Some western governments appealed to the Soviet 
government for the sake of the activists, but this action had little impact.139
The grip tightens
In a very short period of time, the CSCE Helsinki document succeeded in incurring 
some serious rifts in the unquestioned power and totalitarian ideology of the CPSU. The 
Soviet government did not want to admit that it had evaluated the development 
incorrectly and lost in the CSCE deal. Its solution was to publicly insist that it was 
satisfied with the CSCE, but simultaneously to tighten its grip on the dissidents.140
135 "Sbomik dokumentov obshchestvennoi gruppy sodeistviia vypolneniiu khelsinkskih 
soglashenii," pp. 47-49.
136 Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human 
Rights, p. 340.
137 Juri Kashlev, "CSCE: The Unique Experience," OSCE ODIHR Bulletin 3, no. 3 (1995): pp. 
27-28.
138 Yuri Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts: Memoirs o f a Russian Life (New York: William Morrow,
1991), pp. 193-95.
139 William Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process and American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Institute for EastWest Studies, 1993), p. 62.
140 The new Soviet constitution of 1977 confirmed the ten guiding principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act in its section on Soviet foreign policy. See Constitution o f the Union o f Soviet 
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Denying the linkage between human rights and the CSCE, the Soviet Union decided to 
harden the repression of human rights activists at home just before the second CSCE 
meeting in Belgrade in 1977. The aim was to eliminate the leaders of the opposition. 
Later on, in late 1979, the attack against the dissidents hardened further.141 This time the 
authorities did not settle for arresting the most well-known figures, but committed itself 
to rooting out all underground activism from the Soviet Union. On the whole, the 
change in Soviet policy signalled that it had decided to ignore western criticism and all 
the implications that such action would have for its international reputation.142
The final blow for detente was soon to come: in December 1979 the Soviet army 
invaded neighbouring Afghanistan. The official explanation was that the legitimate 
Afghan government had asked for military help from the USSR against foreign military 
groups.
After the war in Afghanistan had started, it was clear to everybody that detente had 
come to the end of its road. The turn of the decade witnessed growing fear of 
superpower conflict. This general feeling was reflected in the presidential election 
campaigns in 1980. The election of Ronald Reagan and his speeches about the "evil 
empire" further increased the tension between the two superpowers.143
Daniel C. Thomas claims the CSCE process pushed the development in the socialist 
states from the phase of simple repression towards a more active denial of human rights 
norms.144 The Soviet Union had adopted the Helsinki Accords with simply strategic 
calculations in mind. The leadership was unprepared for the developments that 
followed. Unprecedented social mobilisation abroad and in the socialist countries, 
transnational activism and sustained pressure from the groups and western governments 
took the Soviet leadership by surprise.
141 See Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and 
Human Rights, p. 372.
142 Ibid., p. 367.
143 Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, pp. 317-18.
144 Daniel C. Thomas, "The Helsinki Accords and Political Change in Eastern Europe," in The 
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The leadership's reaction to the social mobilisation around human rights was to activate 
its own propaganda efforts and, when it became clear that this was not enough, to 
suppress all independent activism in the SU by force. Soviet propaganda claimed that 
western standards of human rights were not applicable to its case: it insisted that it 
implemented "socialist human rights" which were different from western ones. When 
words proved insufficient, hard repression was used against the activists: they were 
sentenced to years in prison or, in a few cases, exiled abroad.145 Even if the SU claimed 
that human rights criticism was a violation of the norm of non-intervention, it did not 
pull out of the CSCE process, but instead attacked the western governments by accusing 
them of human rights violations. It thus paradoxically started to talk -  even if perversely 
-  the "human rights talk".
The harsh action by the state against the dissidents made their cases well-known abroad 
and increased transnational activism. This had an impact on the opinion of at least the 
more liberal-minded members of the elite. The leading Soviet expert on superpower 
relations describes the situation in his memoirs:
The campaign against the dissidents involved only a relatively small number of people. 
But it had a noticeable negative effect abroad, and it poisoned the political atmosphere 
at home, worsened the already repressed circumstances in culture, in social thought, and 
in the attitudes of all thinking people.146
Paradoxically, by crushing the marginal opposition, the state made them martyrs of 
freedom and their message became well-known. Against the backdrop of hard 
repression and cruel human rights violations, the Soviet rhetoric about humane, socialist 
interpretation of human rights sounded shallower than ever. Despite the massive 
propaganda campaign that the Soviet Union launched, the international appeal of Soviet 
socialism weakened dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s.
The significance of the CSCE process lay in the fact that it offered a forum around 
which transnational contacts could develop, and an arena within which the issues were 
periodically discussed internationally. The review sessions underlined the 
inconsistencies in Soviet rhetoric and practice, and the CSCE provided an arena where
145 In the special case of Andrei Sakharov, internal exile and cutting contacts with the outside 
world were used.
146 Georgi Arbatov, The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics (New York: Times Books,
1992), p. 232.
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western governments could act publicly according to their "convictions". New forms of 
cooperation also developed: many western diplomatic missions started to use the NGO 
material as their source information when preparing negotiations, and at least the US 
mission included some NGO activists in their mission so they could participate in the 
CSCE meetings.
Even if the impact of the practical, concrete achievements of the CSCE and detente was 
much greater in countries like Eastern Germany, Hungary or Poland, their impact in the 
SU should not be altogether disregarded. This period witnessed a considerable increase 
in human contacts (tourism, correspondence, etc.) across the iron curtain, and general 
knowledge of the western societies grew considerably in the socialist states during this 
period. The more privileged members of Soviet society in particular -  usually party 
members, credited foreign political experts and academics -  could travel more widely in 
the western states than ever before. During their trips, many of them could not help but 
notice that things were not as bad in the west as Soviet propaganda commonly 
claimed.147
Evaluation
The prospect of the Soviet Union becoming socialised to western interpretations of 
human rights looked fairly gloomy in the 1970s and 1980s. The scope conditions on 
both the international and domestic levels, as well as norm-specific and environmental 
conditions, all showed preference for non-socialisation and avoidance of cooperation. 
First and foremost, the asymmetry between the actors was not strong enough. The 
Soviet Union was one of the superpowers and could define its own terms of 
engagement. It controlled the socialist bloc in eastern Europe and could defend its 
socialist conception of human rights in the name of the whole socialist bloc. Secondly, 
the Soviet Union did not see the European organisations as authoritative actors. The EC 
and the CoE were considered bastions of reactionary forces, and their norms were 
considered bourgeois and therefore not applicable to socialist states. The CSCE was the 
fruit of the Soviet Union's action and therefore the Soviet Union regarded it positively. 
Nevertheless, the CSCE was not seen as an independent authoritative body, but instead
147 Gordon B. Smith, Soviet Politics: Struggling with Change, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martins's 
Press, 1992), pp. 102-03.
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as a workhorse for pursuing Soviet interests. Because of the Soviet Union's 
independence from the system, the organisations had very limited bargaining power. It 
is true that the SU suffered from poor economic performance, and was thus interested in 
developing economic relations, trade and exchange of technology in particular within 
the CSCE process. Its willingness to make concessions in order to secure gains in other 
fields nevertheless proved to be rather limited. The fact that the Soviet state could not 
compete with the capitalist world was becoming clearer by the day, but at the time there 
was not a great sense of urgency which would have pushed the Soviet leadership to look 
for other solutions. The extent of the problems remained hidden from the public (and 
possibly from the leadership, too).
Even if the Soviet Union claimed to respect human rights and freedoms, it explicitly 
resigned from the western interpretation of human rights norms. Although there existed 
modest human rights cooperation between the parties, the very concept of human rights 
was, nonetheless, contested. The concept of human rights was seen as inherently 
political by the Soviet Union. The norm and issue specific conditions were, 
consequently, not particularly encouraging for further cooperation. Needless to say, the 
domestic conditions were particularly hostile towards the adoption of western norms.
Democratisation theory would categorise the Soviet Union as an authoritarian state. 
Despite some manoeuvres, there were no signs of democratisation taking place in the 
Soviet Union: there were no significant concessions, there were great numbers of 
political prisoners, no opposition was allowed, there was only one legally recognised 
party, no independent associations or trade unions were allowed and there was no 
independent press. The socialisation model would define the pre-Gorbachev Soviet 
Union as being in the state of denial. Despite the fact that no significant progress was 
made in practical terms, the international and transnational actors succeeded in placing 
the topic of human rights on the international agenda. There was a growing international 
awareness of the human rights violations committed by the Soviet Union. The 
transnational network engaged in both shaming the Soviet state and in moral 
consciousness-raising of western governments with some success.148
148 See, for example, Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process and 
American Foreign Policy, pp. 21-59.
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3 Liberalisation in the Soviet Union
In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union's future prospects were starting to look hopelessly 
gloomy. International tension was high, and the Soviet economy and international 
reputation was in ruins. General pessimism was highlighted by two successive leaders 
who were hopelessly old and sick, and who both died in office soon after their 
nomination to the post. Andropov died of kidney failure in February 1984 and his 
successor Konstantin Chernenko died in March 1985.
After Chernenko's death, the Politburo decided to change the course by electing the 
much younger Mikhail Gorbachev to become the new Soviet leader. Even if it was 
already evident that Gorbachev represented something of a change, the contents or the 
final goals of this change were not clear -  not even to Gorbachev himself.149 From the 
early 1980s onwards, Gorbachev had regularly consulted a group of more liberal experts 
on economy, law and international politics. The challenge was to apply this academic 
discussion to practice.150
The term perestroika (restructuring) was launched already during Gorbachev's first year 
in office. Perestroika was the general term for reforms in various policy areas. The goal 
for the reforms was uskorenie (acceleration) -  that is, rapid growth, both in quantity and 
in quality, of the Soviet economy. Perestroika was comprised of four different 
strategies: the formation of an interest-based society and economy, the practice of 
public criticism and new openness, democratisation of political processes and the 
formation of a state based on the rule of law.151 However, liberalisation took shape 
gradually and unevenly in different issue areas.
149 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1996), pp. 401-04.
150 See Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford 1996: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
pp. 59-61; Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, Voices o f Glasnost: Interviews with 
Gorbachev’s Reformers (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989), pp. 41-42, 118-22; Robert G. 
Herman, "Identity, Norms and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution," in The 
Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed., Peter J. Katzenstein 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 298.
151 David Lane, Soviet Society under Perestroika, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 13.
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The big break came only after the serious accident at a nuclear power station in 
Chernobyl, Ukraine in April 1986.152 The accident confirmed that the old culture of 
hiding the facts, avoiding responsibility and general disregard of human suffering was 
still prevalent in the Soviet Union. After the accident, a new emphasis was put on 
human rights, openness and the democratisation of society. Human rights violations 
were admitted for the first time in full-scale. Political prisoners were freed, and 
emigration from the Soviet Union was allowed on a bigger scale.153
It was only at this stage that the Soviet leadership fully accepted and acknowledged the 
universality and inviolability of human rights. Its attitude towards democracy was, 
nevertheless, more ambivalent.154 Gorbachev believed that the principles of democracy 
could be fostered within the socialist one-party system. However, the process of 
liberalisation eroded the whole basis of the system, and its legitimation rapidly 
weakened. Particularly following the deepening of the economic crisis, and the drop in 
standards of living in the Soviet Union, socialism seemed to have less and less to offer. 
Now that the old enemy propaganda had been abandoned and it was admitted that 
socialism needed to borrow "some external structures from the bourgeoisie 
democracy"155, it was ever more difficult to find a justification for the socialist system in 
general.
An important step in the process of Soviet democratisation was the creation of a new 
parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies (S"ezd narodnyh deputatov) of the Soviet 
Union. Its elections took place in 1989. The elections were free and competitive but 
they were not multi-party elections: alongside party candidates there were some 
independent ones. A large proportion of seats were reserved for party candidates and 
candidates of state-supported organisations.
152 Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 189.
153 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea o f the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End o f  
the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 220. One of the very first 
political prisoners to be freed was Nobel Prize Winner Andrei Sakharov in December 1986. 
Gorbachev made him a personal phone call encouraging him to "go back to your patriotic 
work". Cited in English, Russia and the Idea o f the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End 
o f  the Cold War, p. 223.
154 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 380.
155 Anatoli Adamishin, "Humanity's Common Destiny," International Affairs (Moscow) (1991):
p. 11.
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Liberalisation also meant that those hostile to reform could have their say. Their ranks 
grew as the national tensions and separatism spread in the republics, the economy got 
worse and the Soviet empire abroad started to crumble. People became increasingly 
disillusioned with democracy and reform. This resulted in some hesitation at the top 
level, but more conservative moves did not help either -  it seemed to drive away 
Gorbachev's liberal and conservative allies alike.156 When the policy was corrected back 
to the liberalisation course, it was already too late and the spiral towards the collapse of 
the Soviet Union had already begun.
Soviet foreign policy changed dramatically as well. The main thesis of new thinking 
(novoe myshlenie) was that the world should not be divided into competing camps 
according to their social systems, but that security was in essence common and global 
by nature. Interdependence tied states to one another. Peace should be understood as an 
active process of cooperation, not just lack of conflict.157 The Soviet Union sought to 
join the community of democratic states and to become a "normal" state. Human rights 
and humanitarian cooperation were claimed to be at the centre of the new foreign 
policy.158 The new Soviet emphasis gave renewed hope for the eastern European states 
for freedom.
Many researchers credit international contacts for this reformulation of Soviet thinking. 
Thanks to detente -  and the CSCE -  international contacts between Soviet academics 
and their western counterparts had increased considerably. Increased human contacts, 
the possibilities for travel and tourism, and research cooperation between eastern and 
western institutes gave new and fresh insights to scientists, researchers, party officials 
and some fortunate Soviet citizens.159
156 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the Ussr and the Successor States 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 457.
157 English, Russia and the Idea o f the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End o f the Cold 
War, pp. 147-57.
158 Smith, Soviet Politics: Struggling with Change, p. 313.
159 English, Russia and the Idea o f the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End o f the Cold 
War, pp. 151-53; Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold 
War; Herman, "Identity, Norms and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution," 
pp. 295-96; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, 
Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," International Organization 48, no. 2 
(1994): pp. 196-200.
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The Soviet behaviour at the 3rd CSCE meeting in Vienna (1986-1989) reflected this 
fundamental rethinking underway at the top. During the course of the meeting, the 
initial reserved attitude of the Soviet delegation was soon replaced by reform euphoria 
and positive enthusiasm. After the Vienna meeting, the human rights question in east- 
west relations changed its character: in the new meetings of human dimension, 
questions concerning dissidents and the right of expression were replaced by minority 
and nationality questions.160
Evaluation
Perestroika and Gorbachev's new thinking shook the balance of the international system 
and the whole outlook of Europe. Negative scope conditions for deepening cooperation 
and shared norms turned into positive ones: asymmetry between Russia and the 
European organisations started to grow, and Russia made it known that it wanted to be 
judged by the common European standards. It gradually renounced the promotion of the 
idea of different, socialist interpretation of human rights and democratic freedoms and 
agreed that there was only one set of standards on these issues, namely the western one. 
This strengthened the moral authority of the European organisations. The Soviet policy 
highlighted the importance of multilateralism and this gave the organisations more 
material bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia. Also, as the dreadful state of the Soviet 
state and economy was brought into the light, the western actors' material bargaining 
power increased. The Soviet Union became increasingly dependent on western 
economic assistance.
The environmental conditions were also apt to encourage socialisation to western 
norms. First of all, the crisis of the Soviet state was rapidly accelerating and there was a 
great urgency to find new solutions. The magnitude of the problems the Soviet Union 
faced was unprecedented and made its leadership more open towards western norms. 
The western model was readily available for the Soviet Union, and western actors 
actively encouraged the SU to follow its example.
160 Harm J. Hazewinkel, "Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow," in The Human Dimension o f the 
Helsinki Process: The Vienna Meeting and Its Aftermath, eds. A. Bloed and P. van Dijk, 
International Studies in Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), pp. 128- 
42.
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The democratisation model would classify the SU during the perestroika period as a 
state amidst liberalisation. The Soviet leadership started making considerable 
concessions on human rights: the political prisoners were freed, and tolerance of 
opposition grew enormously during these years. There were still shortcomings with 
regard to the requirement of recognised political parties, but civil society associations 
were relatively well tolerated. Perhaps most impressively, the once rigidly controlled 
media became increasingly independent and the pluralistic atmosphere was 
strengthened. The Soviet Union would thus rate fairly highly when judged against the 
criteria of liberalisation.161
The socialisation model would argue that after the denial phase of the early 1980s, the 
Soviet Union had entered the so-called phase of tactical concessions. In practice, this 
implies that a state would start by making some cosmetic changes in order to pacify 
international criticism. These cosmetic changes would encourage both domestic and 
international criticism and lead to growing pressure. This pressure would again push the 
government for more changes. Gradually the processes of argumentation both 
internationally and domestically, as well as domestic coalition-building, would take the 
liberal reforms to a new level. Subsequently, the domestic government would not deny 
the validity claims. The development is likely to lead to the change in the government.
Developments during the Gorbachev years fit the socialisation model in broad outline, 
though some minor clarifications must be made. It is probable that Gorbachev acted, at 
least to some extent, out of ideological conviction from the start, although his reforms 
became more far-fetching and ambitious from the latter half of 1986. The process of 
argumentation and persuasion was clearly present, in particular on the international 
level. The domestic liberal opposition, on the other hand, remained weak, and the 
strongest pressure came from the nationalist and hard-line communist camps. The 
liberal reforms and increased protection of human rights were essentially elite-initiated 
and the pressure to make more concessions from below remained weak throughout the 
period. The domestic structure of the Soviet Union was elite- and state- dominated and 
societal structures were -  and remained -  underdeveloped (in contrast to what the
161 Schneider and Schmitter, "Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the 
Components of Democratization," p. 64.
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socialisation model suggests). Nevertheless, as long as the liberal government stayed in 
power, the prospects of state socialisation to human rights remained fairly positive.
Spiral towards the end
By the turn of the decade, it was evident that democratisation was not possible in a one- 
party system and that it was time to make a decision whether to maintain the system or 
democratise the country without it. The liberal reform-minded members abandoned the 
party in 1991. The Baltic declarations of independence triggered the spiral of events 
leading to the end of the Soviet Union. Soviet troops were sent to Vilnius where they 
seized a television tower and killed 13 unarmed protesting civilians in summer of 1991. 
The tension was high across the Baltic States.
The democratisation process was having a hard time: after the euphoria of an almost- 
democratically elected parliament, the obvious lack of results and bitter political 
confrontation resulted in a sullen atmosphere and disillusionment with pro-democratic 
reform policies. Democratisation efforts were failing the credibility test in the eyes of 
the Russian people. The coup was the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union.162
The conservative hard-liners of the CPSU decided that their time to seize power had 
arrived. A group of old hard-line communists launched a coup attempt in order to 
restore the CPSU's monopoly and save the SU in August 1991.163 Gorbachev was kept 
under house arrest in his datcha in Yalta where had been in enjoying his summer 
holiday.
The democratically elected president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic 
(Rossiiskaia Sovetskaia Federativnaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika, RSFSR), Boris
162 Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 78.
163 The plotters included important figures: Vice President Gennadyi Ianaiev, Prime Minister 
Valentin Pavlov, Interior Minister Viktor Pugo and Minister of Defence Dmitri Yazov, 
Politburo Member Egor Ligachev, KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov. See Graeme Gill and Roger 
D. Markwick, Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 108.
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Yeltsin164, led the opposition forces in Moscow. He became the leader and icon of the 
democratic protest that took to the streets of Moscow. Finally, the army tanks that were 
sent to take control of the unrest in Moscow turned against the communist plotters. The 
coup attempt ended peacefully in 21 August 1991, and Gorbachev returned to Moscow.
The power balance between Gorbachev and Yeltsin shifted as a result of the coup crisis. 
Gorbachev never quite succeeded in regaining his position and authority. Yeltsin, the 
hero of the resistance, became ever more clearly the leading figure at the top.165 The 
Baltic states seized the moment to pull out of the Union. As most western states backed 
Baltic independence, the weakened Soviet Union had to let them go.
The final blow to the unity of the Soviet Union was the Ukrainian referendum on 
independence in December 1991. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians backed full 
independence of the Ukrainian republic. After the referendum, the leaders of Russian, 
Ukrainian and Belarusian Republics met in Belovezhskaia Pushcha where they declared 
the end of the Soviet Union. They formed a new, looser Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). Later in December eight other newly independent states joined the CIS. 
Four days later Gorbachev announced his resignation and the Soviet Union ceased to 
exist.166
Evaluation
According to the democratisation model, the final years of the Soviet Union witnessed 
growing signs of the state moving towards the phase of transition. Despite the fact that 
the party system remained non-existent, opposition forces entered politics and started 
negotiating with the government (Gorbachev and Yeltsin). There existed open conflict 
within the state apparatus over public policies, and this was acknowledged by the 
government. It could not, though, be resolved. Legal reforms which were intended to 
limit the arbitrary use of power by the state were introduced, and constitutional changes
164 According to the transliteration system used in this thesis (Library of Congress system 
without diacritics), Yeltsin’s name should be written El’tsin but as the form 'Yeltsin' is so 
commonly used an exception will be made in this case. The same applies to other widely known 
figures and movements. Examples include Empress Elizabeth (Elizaveta), Viktor Yushchenko 
(Iushchenko), Grigory Yavlinsky (Grigorii Iavlinskii) and Yabloko (Iabloko).
165 Peter Juviler, Freedom's Ordeal: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in Post- 
Soviet States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 52-62.
166 Gill and Markwick, Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin, p. 109-11.
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were made in order to guarantee that non-accountable powers would progressively be 
eliminated from the decision making process. Gorbachev gradually became the only 
major player without any degree of authorisation from the people. There were major 
steps towards democracy: the president of the Russian Federation was elected in 
completely free and competitive elections, and the Supreme Soviet was also elected in 
free but only partly competitive elections. If one disregards the fact that the party 
system remained underdeveloped, the Soviet Union could be considered to have entered 
the stage of transition.167
Just as the socialisation model would suggest, the events took over and Gorbachev was 
ousted from power. This time, however, the challenge against the federal government 
came from the elites of the republics who were not necessarily pro-human rights liberal 
reformers. In the end, the centre completely forewent its legitimacy, and the republics 
seized the momentum and gained control.168 Human rights norms did not play a 
significant role in the regime change. Instead of demands from below to defend human 
rights, it was the prolonged insistence on a one-party system and the handling of the 
national question that proved fatal for the Soviet Union. The socialisation model would 
assert that the final years of the Soviet Union constitute a move from the tactical 
concessions towards the prescriptive status of the forthcoming Yeltsin era.
The socialisation model explains relatively well how the transnational links were 
formed, and how the transnational network activated the western public opinion and 
governments to act in defence of human rights in the Soviet Union. It also explains the 
processes of shaming, arguing and persuasion involved in the international cooperation 
between the European actors and Russia. The significance of the dissident groups, for 
example the Helsinki groups, in the Soviet Union was to do with the fact that their 
activism and tragic fates roused liberal western actors. This then resulted in tension in 
international relations. The aggravation of the international situation, on the one hand, 
and the international discussion on human rights, on the other hand, made the liberal 
elite more prone to start the liberalisation programme in the Soviet Union.
167 Gill, The Dynamics o f Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process, p. 
193.
168 Ibid, pp. 210-11.
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What the model does not grasp particularly well is domestic developments in Russia. 
Liberalisation did not lead to a popular movement for democracy and human rights. To 
this day, calls for democracy and human rights have not resonated with the masses, but 
instead have remained the preserve of a small, urban group of people. The strongest 
opposition gathered around national independence movements in the republics. The 
speed of the dismantling of the Union bypassed democratically structured organisations 
which were only just starting to take shape. There was certainly freedom, but the change 
of power took place before democratic institutions -  such as the formation of political 
parties, multi-party elections, the development of relations between civil society and the 
state -  had been properly developed.169
4 Post-Soviet Russia and Human Rights and Democratic Norms 
A distressed society in search of national identity and interests
”1 have met with dozens of my fellow [foreign] ministers [...] and I often ask them: Do 
you have what is always demanded of me -  a conception of national interests, a 
conception of foreign policy? The first reaction is that no one can understand the point 
of the question, and the second reaction is to ask: A conception of what?"170
The period from the end of the Soviet Union until the end of 1993 was characterised by 
a search for national identity, and for a definition of national interests that was 
congruent with that identity. This was no easy task amid the huge structural challenges 
facing the nation: the economic and political, as well as social, systems had to be 
transformed completely. The search commenced with a considerable degree of 
continuity with Gorbachev's pro-western liberalisation discourse, only it was tuned to a 
higher level: Russia was part of Europe; it was seeking full integration into western 
institutions and it wanted to be judged by western values and norms. The desire to see 
Russia a "normal", "civilised" state was so great that the issue of being patronised by the 
western states and institutions did not play a great role in Russian foreign policy 
thinking.171
169 Linz and Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation, pp. 387-90.
170 Foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev's reply to a question on Russian national interests in 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1 April 1992.
171 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 351.
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State o f political transformation
In the early years, the economic transformation was put first on the list of priorities; 
political and constitutional transformation was to follow.172 This decision had major 
implications for the development of Russia. The "shock therapy" of rapid market 
liberalisation and privatisation of state enterprises, and their dramatic consequences 
unfolded before there were clear rules on the division of power and labour between the 
state structures, many of which were inherited from the Soviet era without any major 
changes.
An example of a Soviet-inherited institution was the parliament of Russia -  the 
Congress of People's Deputies and its sitting chamber, the Supreme Soviet of the 
RSFSR. The congress had been elected in relatively free and competitive elections in 
March 1990. Also, Boris Yeltsin had been elected as the head of the Russian Republic 
in democratic elections in June 1991, still during the Soviet reign. The constitution in 
force was still the constitution of the RSFSR which had been adopted in 1978 and 
amended a great many times since then. In November 1991, the Congress and the 
Supreme Soviet had temporarily given up their right of executive control and given 
Yeltsin the status of head of government and the right to issue decrees.173
As the impact of the economic shock therapy began to be felt by Russian society, 
political tensions between the Supreme Soviet and the president -  who was in charge of 
the economic policy -  rose, and the situation started to escalate. The social, and even 
economic, costs of the monetarist policy, which fitted the Russian realities badly, were 
extremely high: price liberalisation led to the withering of industrial production; by 
November 1992, consumer prices had risen 22-fold, and between 1990 and 1995 
Russian GDP fell by some 50 per cent.174 Standards of living fell, and the state and 
many enterprises were unable to pay wages to their employees. As a result of the chaos 
created by the economic policy, the Supreme Soviet and its chairman, Ruslan 
Khasbulatov, sought to re-establish its authority over the government. Khasbulatov's 
role as prime minister of a sort was backed by the Russian Constitution of 1978, still in 
force. Yeltsin, on the other hand, relied on his undisputable democratic credentials.
172 Linz and Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation, pp. 390-97
173 Presidential decrees were the equivalent to law.
174 Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, pp. 284-85.
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The relationship between the president and parliament deteriorated gradually into a 
deadlock during 1993. In April, Yeltsin's position was strengthened by a referendum in 
which the majority of Russians showed confidence in him and called for new legislative 
elections. There was considerable shilly-shallying over possible compromises on both 
sides over the months. However, neither side was ready to back down in the end. The 
crisis escalated into a full-blown conflict in late September 1993. On 21 September, 
Yeltsin terminated the activities of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's 
Deputies in a television address. All legislative functions would be transferred to the 
new Federal Assembly consisting of the State Duma (Gosudarstvennaia Duma) and 
Federation Council (Sovet Federatsii). The elections for such a body -  which so far only 
existed in the draft constitution -  would be held in December 1993. Until the elections, 
Russia was to be ruled by presidential decrees and government resolutions.175 The 
Constitutional Court was also suspended.176
The Supreme Soviet and the emergency meeting of the Congress responded by adopting 
a series of counter-decrees. Yeltsin was suspended and vice-president Rutsoi was 
declared to be in power. What followed was a hostile stand-off between the president 
and the parliament with deputies seizing the parliamentary building. This situation 
turned into a violent confrontation on 3 October. Rutskoi called his supporters to attack 
the Moscow's mayor's office and the Ostankino TV centre. Yeltsin declared a state of 
emergency and, on 4 October, sent tanks and armed forces to empty the parliamentary 
building by force. An estimated 146 people died in the violent conflict and several 
opposition publications and organisations were suspended. Nevertheless, more than 
anything else, the conflict was an intra-elite struggle, in which the Russian people were 
bystanders.177
The new constitution -  which was accepted through a narrow majority in a referendum 
in December 1993 -  confirmed the supremacy of the presidential rule. The president 
appointed the prime minister and formed the government. He also formed and headed
175 The constitution later confirmed this presidential right to issue decrees which are equivalent 
to law unless overriden by a law passed by both the upper and lower chambers of the Federal 
Assembly.
176 •Gill and Markwick, Russia’s Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin, pp. 140-66.
177 Ibid., pp. 164-65.
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the Security Council, and determined the course of domestic and foreign policy. He had 
the right to initiate laws and issue decrees which have the force of law. The Duma had 
only little powers to oversee the strong executive.
The first multi-party parliamentary elections were held simultaneously with the 
constitutional referendum. The election results were a surprise to the president's camp. 
The opposition to radical market reforms showed their strength in the elections by 
gaining a majority, and the popularity rates for Yeltsin personally started their 
downward spiral. This suggested that people had grown tired of the downward- 
spiralling economy, growing economic inequality and social problems, and the general 
feeling of insecurity. The politics of the president shifted more clearly towards the 
centre. There was less talk of liberal values and market reforms, and foreign policy 
towards the west became both more assertive and more active towards the "near 
abroad", in other words the former Soviet Republics.
The changes in the domestic structure were typical for the Russian tradition: the head of 
state became stronger at the expense of the legislature. As a result of weak material 
capabilities, the power of the centre was not absolute by any means. Russian regions 
continued to enjoy considerable freedom and hold considerable power. At this point, 
Russia's material capacities were extremely weak, a fact which was reflected in the 
reform programme. Yeltsin considered economic reforms a priority over political, 
legislative and institutional reforms. These economic reforms, however, failed to bring 
any short-term benefits to the people, and therefore endangered the whole reform 
process.
According to the democratisation theory outlined in the previous chapter, Russia was 
making progress in its transition to democracy. The party system had begun to develop, 
even though -  apart from the Communist Party -  parties remained weak coalitions. 
Gradually, after the constitutional crisis, the opposition entered into negotiations with 
the ruling elite. The new democratic constitution and the so-called founding 
parliamentary elections were major steps in the process of democratisation. The 
constitution confirmed not only the democratic system, but also the rights and freedoms 
of citizens. The results of the founding elections were widely accepted, and after the 
elections a time of relative political stability emerged. However, despite the
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constitution, which eliminated the role of non-accountable powers of veto-groups, the 
unofficial networks of the rich and powerful started to develop during this period. 
Nevertheless, Russia seemed to rate fairly highly on the democratisation scale, and 
appeared to be progressing expectedly towards the consolidation phase.
The socialisation model would interpret the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence 
of the new, democratic Russia as a transition to so-called prescriptive status. A 
democratically elected leadership introduced new standards of human rights protection 
through legislative and constitutional reforms. They sought to institutionalise human 
rights norms throughout society and the state system. The leadership attempted to 
introduce institutional mechanisms for citizens to lodge complaints about human rights 
violations (the constitution promised the establishment of a human rights ombudsman as 
well as independent judicial channels). The discursive practices of the government on 
human rights were consistent regardless of the audience. Both international and 
domestic audiences were promised further reforms to further both democracy and 
human rights. The government engaged in deepening cooperation and dialogue with 
international actors on human rights and engaged in dialogue with their critics. 
Although implementation of the European norms of human rights was still far from 
European standards, it seemed at the time that there was a sustained effort to implement 
the norms, however slowly that may happen.
Foreign policy
The Russian Federation became the "continuer state" of the Soviet Union. It took the 
responsibilities and privileges of the former superpower -  including its seat at the UN 
Security Council and nuclear arsenal. Russia seemed to follow in the footsteps of the 
Soviet diplomacy. The orientation of Russian foreign policy was pro-westem, and 
Russia emphasised the importance of abandoning the Cold War mentality and 
structures.178 Russia clearly wanted to integrate into western institutions and be judged 
by the same standards. It applied for CoE membership in 1992.
178 Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, pp. 352-53.
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The primary goal for Russian foreign policy was to secure favourable external 
conditions for domestic reforms. Global questions and Russian foreign policy interests 
were of secondary importance.
However, as the horrific implications of the shock therapy recommended by western 
actors became evident, the popularity of a pro-western liberal policy began to sink 
rapidly. There was increasing wistfulness about the old Soviet times that had at least 
offered order and certainty about the future. A great many people also found Russia's 
dwindling international role hard to accept. Russian newspapers often painted a picture 
of rich western states taking advantage of Russia's weakness.
The international scope conditions remained highly favourable to socialisation to 
European norms. The relationship was highly asymmetrical as Russia was dependent on 
foreign assistance for its reforms programme. Russia had to do its best to meet the 
conditions set by international institutions funding the reforms. The material bargaining 
power of even the European organisations was high. Russia wanted to join the CoE 
which gave the organisation the upper hand with Russia. Russia also hoped that the 
CSCE would develop into a stronger security organisation, and was thus ready make 
concessions in other questions, such as human rights. The authority of the CoE in 
particular was strong and strengthening constantly as new members joined the club, and 
thus strengthened the European consensus on the norms.
The environmental conditions remained similar to those prevailing in the Gorbachev 
era. There was still a sense of urgency to reform the state, and the western model was 
the one that international actors encouraged Russia to follow. It was both possible, and 
desirable, for Russia to become socialised to European norms.
Disenchantment and normative hesitation
"Those who had a hand in the emergence of "buccaneer capitalism" in its truly 
unbridled forms and in an entire class of the super rich through the impoverishment of 
millions of people, have no moral right to consider themselves defenders of human 
rights."179
179 Aleksei Kiva, member of the Commission on Human Rights of the President of Russian 
Federation in Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 21 February 1997.
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In the period following the constitutional crises, the president consolidated his power, 
and different political and economic elites became increasingly intertwined. The period 
also evidenced the birth of a new class of superrich, the so-called oligarchs. Political life 
was characterised by relative stability. Gradually, the ruling elite became also more 
skilled at manipulating elections and negotiating with each other off the scene.
Despite the fact that Russia's engagement with the European organisations increased 
and institutionalised during this period, its policies became less liberal. Its foreign 
policy became more assertive, and more emphasis was put on Russia's claimed status as 
a great power and its geopolitical interests in the near abroad. The foreign policy had a 
clear ideological spin: in international relations, Russia often insisted on issues which it 
knew could never materialise. The war in the Russian republic of Chechnya and 
Russia's disregard of human rights created constant tensions with western actors.
During and after the presidential elections of 1996, the non-democratic features of 
Yeltsin's rule became increasingly apparent. In order to finance his election campaign 
and to stay in power he made deals with the rich business elite: in return for loans, the 
businessmen obtained a privileged position in the targeted sales of shares of the most 
profitable state enterprises.
State o f political transformation
The new constitution of 1993 contained formal guarantees of democracy, even if the 
president was extremely strong and the checks on executive power were rather weak. In 
reality, however, democratic structures continued to be ill-functioning.
The ruling elite attempted to consolidate its power and stabilise the political situation 
after the crises of 1993. One sign of this was Yeltsin's Civic Accord -  a political 
initiative whose aim was to consolidate the centre's power, promote social compromise 
and civic reconciliation. The accord was accepted by the Duma in April 1994 and it was 
in effect for two years.180 Yeltsin's grip on power was weakened by his ill-health and his 
control of the regions of Russia remained limited.
180 Gill and Markwick, Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin, p. 182.
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In December 1994, the conflict in the Russian republic of Chechnya escalated into a 
full-blown war. The war demonstrated that the Security Council, headed by the 
president, had become a central actor in Russian political life. Russian armed forces 
showed gross disregard for humanitarian law by indiscriminate bombardment and the 
establishment of so-called filtration camps. Most crimes were handled with impunity. 
The war was hugely unpopular in Russia, and the human rights violations in Chechnya 
raised wide international criticism. The EU suspended the signing of the Interim 
Agreement on trade181, and the CoE suspended consideration of Russia's membership 
application.182 The Russian Foreign Ministry replied by issuing a statement 16 January 
1995. In the statement, the ministry accused western actors of overreacting, and claimed 
that due to the nature of the Chechen question, human tragedies and losses were 
virtually inevitable. The statement claimed that the decision was a mistake and 
demonstrated long-standing stereotypical ways of reacting to Russian events. However, 
the statement also assured that Russia was ready to cooperate in the question of human 
rights protection in Chechnya with international organisations. The statement applied 
pressure on the organisations by drawing parallels between the European action and the 
rise of Russian opposition to liberal reforms, and claimed that the European criticism 
jeopardised the restoration of constitutional order in Russia.183 This claimed link 
between strengthening domestic illiberal opposition and criticism levelled at the 
government for human rights violations has been invoked many times since by the 
Russian representatives when faced with western criticism. Nevertheless, despite 
tensions and fiery debate surrounding Chechnya, Russia became a CoE member in 1996 
-  while the war was still ongoing. It was hoped that membership would strengthen 
Russia's commitment to the European norms and values. Russia ratified the European 
Convention of Human Rights in 1998, and submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights.
181 The suspension of the signing of the Interim Agreement on trade lasted from January to July
1995. It was finally signed on 17 July 1995. European Union, European Commission, Press 
Release: Interim Agreement with Russia, 5 July 1995, IP/95/696.
182 The CoE suspended the procedure for consideration of Russia's membership application on 2 
February 1995 and resumed the consideration on 27 September 1995. Council of Europe, 
Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion on Russia's Request for Membership in the Council of 
Europe,No. 193.
183 The statement was published in Rossiiskie vesti, 17 January 1995.
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There were two elections during this period: first, the 1995 parliamentary elections and 
in 1996 the presidential elections. The parliamentary elections witnessed a 
fragmentation of the liberal opposition and the general polarisation of politics. The 
shares-for-loans scheme, which secured a practically limitless budget for the Yeltsin re- 
election team, created a group of overwhelmingly rich and powerful "oligarchs" who 
were highly influential in Russian economic and political life. Instead of democratic 
structures, it was these unofficial networks which held the true power in Russia. The 
system was designed to serve elite interests -  not the interests of impoverished Russians 
struggling to get by.184 One of the few concessions was Yeltsin's presidential election 
promise to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict in Chechnya. The hostilities ceased in
1996.
Despite the fact that Yelstin was re-elected in 1996, public opinion viewed him and his 
politics in an extremely negative light. His reforms that were carried out in the name of 
liberal democratic values earned a bad name for human rights and democratic values: 
they were commonly seen as serving the interests of the west and Russian economic and 
political elites, rather than increasing the well-being of ordinary Russians. Human rights 
defenders were increasingly seen as "fifth columnists". The real Russian interests were 
framed in terms of stability, order and security.185
Although it became increasingly evident that the interests of the people and their 
opinions played only a limited role in Russian political life, open criticism was 
generally well tolerated by the regime. However, towards the end of Yeltsin's rule, there 
were attempts to gain greater control over the media. Nevertheless, the general 
atmosphere remained pluralistic.
The Russian economy remained very weak during Yeltsin's regime. The worst crisis hit 
in August 1998, when the Russian currency was devalued and millions of people lost all 
their savings. The state was effectively bankrupt. The effects of the crisis were reflected 
in political life in the form of instability. After the crises, Yeltsin constantly switched 
prime ministers, blaming them for the misfortunes. That is, until Security Council
184 Boris Kagarlitsky, Russia under Yeltsin and Putin (London: Pluto Press, 2002), pp. 107-08.
185 See, for example, Viatcheslav Morozov, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy Discourse in 
Today's Russia: Romantic Realism and Securitisation of Identity," (Copenhagen: Copenhagen 
Peace Research Institute, 2002).
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Secretary and FSB (Federalnaia sluzhba bezopasnosti, Federal Security Service) head 
Vladimir Putin was nominated as the prime minister in August 1999.
There were considerable shifts in the domestic environment during this period. The 
ruling elite at the centre attempted to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the regions and 
legislature by behind the scenes manoeuvring with powerful business elites, artificially 
created political parties and similar tactics to those of the so-called political 
technologists. The counterbalance to the centre's efforts was only its own weakness and 
inability to implement its plans fully.186 It was characteristic of the development that the 
rhetoric remained relatively liberal, and the European norms were not challenged as 
such. But behind the liberal facade, illiberal, undemocratic changes took place (for 
example, related to elections). Also, the European model and the norms the European 
actors were promoting in Russia received less resonance in Russia than they had earlier. 
The western-inspired reforms had not brought the desired results, and therefore the 
general atmosphere developed into one of a more reserved nature.
The formal criteria of the democratisation model do not identify the problems that 
emerged in Russia's democratic transition. The media was still free of state control, 
different parties negotiated with each other, debate on public policy existed within the 
state apparatus, elections were held and declared free and fair by international 
observers, and no political player challenged the results of the elections. Everything, it 
seemed, went according to the democratisation plan.
The more nuanced model of socialisation tracks some of the bumps in the socialisation 
process, but only minor ones with regard to the consistency of the discourse. The gap 
between domestic and international discourse seemed to be gradually widening. Since 
Russia was, however, actively engaged in European normative cooperation and never 
openly challenged the norms, it still seemed from the outside that Russia was doing its 
best to implement the norms. Otherwise, Russia seemed to be meeting the criteria of 
prescriptive status rather easily. It had ratified all major human rights conventions, and 
had promised to adopt the optional protocols too, human rights were guaranteed in its 
constitution and there were several institutionalised mechanisms for Russians to lodge
186 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 93-95.
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complaints concerning human rights violations (human rights ombudsman, domestic 
legal remedies, ECtHR). Thus, when analysing the Russian development through the 
prism of the socialisation model, Russian general development looked positive. As with 
the democratisation model, everything seemed to be going according to the grand plan 
of state socialisation. However, as the empirical Chapters 4, 6, 7 demonstrate, this 
conclusion was premature.
Foreign policy
Russian strategic goals remained more or less the same as in the previous "romantic" 
period in foreign policy: while it wanted to establish itself as a regional great power, the 
domestic transformation still came first. During this period, however, the substance and 
rhetoric of its foreign policy changed.187 Its national interests were defined in more 
conservative geopolitical terms. Russia craved for international recognition of its great 
power status. First and foremost, its allies in the near abroad should recognise Russia's 
leadership and its legitimate interests in the region. Also, western allies should have 
granted Russia special status as a great power. The call was a principled one, and not 
backed by Russia's power and abilities in international relations. Russia did not 
withdraw from cooperation with the west, but bargaining became tougher: Russia 
wanted more political and material concessions from its western allies. A greater 
emphasis was placed on state sovereignty, and references to European values became 
fewer.188
Despite this general trend -  or perhaps, indeed, as a result of it -  Russia's relations with 
the European organisations were institutionalised during this period. This trend was best 
exemplified by Russia's accession to the CoE in 1996. In security policy, there were 
many problematic questions which created tensions in Russia's relations with the west. 
At the forefront was NATO enlargement. In 1999 Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic joined NATO despite Russia's fierce opposition. A further difficult issue was 
the Kosovo war in 1999 with NATO's bombing of Serbia, Russia's traditional ally in the 
Balkans. Russia's rhetoric was strong on these issues, although it was clear from the 
beginning that concessions from the other side were not forthcoming.
187 Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, pp. 352-53.
188 See, for example, Matz, Constructing a Post-Soviet International Political Reality: Russian 
Foreign Policy Towards the Newly Independent States 1990-95.
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The scope conditions on the international level started to shift during this phase. The 
material bargaining power of the European organisations grew weaker during this 
period. After Russia gained membership in the CoE, the material bargaining power of 
the institution shrank. As it became evident that the OSCE was not going to become an 
alternative security organisation to NATO, Russia's enthusiasm for the OSCE also came 
to an end. As a result of growing disagreements over issues of Chechnya, Kosovo and 
NATO, as well as the poor results of the western-inspired reforms, the moral authority 
of the European organisations started to diminished gradually in the eyes of Russian 
representatives.
Illiberal stability and pragmatism
"This may be the first time in recent years that Russia hasn't caved in to pressure from 
abroad. In light of what happened during the Balkan war, using this tactic in conducting 
a dialogue with the west about an internal Russian problem is justified."189
The subsequent period commenced with Vladimir Putin's quick rise to the position of 
the man in charge in Russian politics. He was first nominated as prime minister in 
August 1999. He then became acting president at the beginning of 2000, and in March 
2000 was elected to become the second president of Russia.
From the beginning, Putin's image has been a tough one: he had once been a KGB 
officer, and more recently the head of the FSB and of the presidential Security Council. 
His background was not in politics, and it is probable that this constitutes one of the 
reasons that the Russians chose to trust him. His toughness came into demand as a 
series of bombs exploded in Moscow and Dagestan in late August and early September 
1999 killing hundreds of Russians. The targets were mostly blocks of flats.190
189 Article by Dmitri Gornostaev commenting on a meeting between Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin and American President Bill Clinton in Oslo where the US president voiced 
concerns about human rights in Russia. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 3 November 1999.
190 The first bomb exploded on 31 August in a Moscow shopping centre, the second was a car 
bomb in front of a block of flats of Russian solders in Dagestan, the third bomb exploded on 8 
September in block of flats in Moscow and the final bomb exploded in another block of flats on 
13 September, also in the suburb of Moscow. It is not entirely clear who was behind the 
bombings. The Russian officials accuse Chechen rebels but all attempts at independent inquiry 
have been forcefully obstructed.
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Because of the bombings, Russians now wholeheartedly supported the launching of the 
second Chechen war. Putin's popularity rates rose with the war and his calls for western 
states to mind their own business and ease their criticism on the issue. For many 
Russians, Putin symbolised an internally and externally stronger Russia.
Putin's attempts to consolidate his power were helped by the fact that the Russian 
economy has developed extremely favourably. This is partly because the devaluation of 
the currency in 1998 revived national industrial production. Most of all, however, the 
economic revival has to do with the simple fact that world oil prices have been on a 
steep and steady rise in the 2000s.
After 9/11, Russia seized the moment and announced its support for the US-led fight 
against terrorism. This strategic opportunism seemed to work fairly well at the 
beginning, with western actors embracing Russia for its new-found pragmatism. 
Gradually however, western actors have become more critical of Russia and its illiberal, 
undemocratic tendencies, such as restricting the space for independent, non­
governmental action, for selective use of the law, for the running down of independent 
media and for manipulating elections, just to name a few of the areas that have stirred 
debate.
State o f political transformation
In 1999 the war in Chechnya recommenced after a series of explosions of blocks of flats 
were carried out in the name of Chechen rebels. The new Russian prime minister, 
Vladimir Putin, was the face of the new Chechen campaign and he very much identified 
himself with the plea for an externally stronger and internally unified Russia. It soon 
became evident that power was increasingly in the hands of the prime minister and his 
allies associated with the security complex, and less and less with physically weak 
Yeltsin and the business oligarchs. His tough image appealed to a growing body of 
Russians, and popularity rates for the war and Putin himself rocketed.
President Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned in his New Year's speech at the turn of 
the millennium. As the prime minister, Vladimir Putin became the acting president for
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three months before the presidential elections. In March 2000, he won the presidential 
elections overwhelmingly.
The main mission for Putin's first term in office was to strengthen the federal 
administration and its control of the republics. He wanted to cut back the political 
autonomy of the regions and establish his own "power vertical" in the regions.191 The 
plan was unveiled in a presidential decree in May 2000. The decree effectively 
reorganised the administrative structure of Russia by creating seven federal super­
districts to supervise the 89 subject territories of the federation and stripping the 
provincial executives of their representation in the Federal Council, and strengthened 
the president's powers to remove provincial executives from office.192 These initiatives 
increased Putin's powers immensely in the regions.
Putin has also sought to impose control on the once powerful oligarchs and cut short 
their political ambitions. A central tool in controlling the oligarchs and civil society, as 
well as regional leaders, has been the selective application of law and the power of 
administrative reorganisation.193
Putin's domestic policies have been labelled as "managed" -  or more recently 
"sovereign" -  democracy. The overriding idea of such a way of thinking is that "too 
much" pluralism and freedom weakens society. The characteristics of a managed 
democracy include an extremely powerful president and weak institutions, state control 
of the media and civil society, and manipulation of elections in order to legitimise 
decisions made by the elite.194 Despite the fact that Putin's policies are aimed at 
strengthening the state, the long-term implications are likely to be the opposite. The
191 Kagarlitsky, Russia under Yeltsin and Putin, pp. 271-72.
192 Eugene Huskey, "Political Leadership and the Centre-Periphery Struggle: Putin's 
Administrative Reforms," in Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia's 
Transition, eds. Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2001), pp. 115-16.
193 Archie Brown, "Evaluating Russia's Democratisation," in Contemporary Russian Politics: A 
Reader, ed., Archie Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 565-66.
194 Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov, "Introduction," in Between 
Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post Communist Political Reform, eds. Michael McFaul, 
Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2004), pp. 14-21.
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system encourages ineffectiveness, and there are no guarantees of what the future brings 
as so much depends on one person.
In many ways, Putin continued enforcing the same policy, but more effectively and in a 
slightly harsher manner than Yeltsin had since about 1996. However, the general 
political atmosphere changed. Russians were less and less interested in politics, and the 
political language of the elite changed. Lilia Shevtsova describes the change in political 
discourse:
"Just a few years earlier, everyone had spoken of reform, progress, renewal, 
modernization, and democracy. [...] Now completely different words filled the air -  
stability, statehood, order, sovereignty, greatness, power, patriotism. The change in 
symbolic words and rhetoric in general signified the new content of politics."195
The increasing state control, particularly over the media, did deviate from European 
norms in such a manner that international actors and transnational civil society have 
become increasingly worried. In a short time, Russia seemed to have regressed back to 
the pre-liberalisation phase of the democratisation model in several fields. The 
Communist Party was the only real opposition party left in parliament, there were 
hardly any independent trade unions in Russia, independent media was under 
considerable threat and access to alternative information became increasingly restricted 
in many regions. Despite the fact that elections were held at regular intervals, they failed 
to meet European standards and thus could not be considered as fair. In the new 
situation, virtually no debate over public policies took place within the state apparatus. 
Nevertheless, the system still retained features of democracy, and therefore it was 
difficult for foreign observers to categorise the changes taking place in Russia.
The analysis based on the socialisation model is doomed to underplay the significance 
of the changes in Russia. There were constitutional guarantees for human rights and 
institutionalised mechanisms for complaining about human rights abuses. There were 
only doubts concerning the discursive practices, which became more defiant and less 
apologetic over the years. The sustained effort to implement the norms was also 
increasingly in doubt. There were relatively few signs of a habitualisation of European 
norms in Russia. There was a degree of institutionalisation, in particular Russian
195 Shevtsova, Putin's Russia, p. 164.
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involvement in the European cooperation itself became well-established practice, but 
otherwise the performance was uneven.
The development of domestic conditions was mixed. Putin strengthened his grip on 
power, and the domestic structure became strongly state-dominated. The state, however, 
became more hostile towards European organisations and norms, presenting new norms 
which challenged the European ones. Thus the domestic salience of the norms 
weakened. On the other hand, the material capacities to carry out desired reforms 
increased significantly as the state control and economic performance grew.
Foreign policy
When the international war on terror was declared by the US following the terrorist 
attacks in September 2001, Russia was quick to seize the opportunity by giving its 
strong support to the US and framing its own war in Chechnya in similar terms. The 
Russian leadership emphasised that it was now high time to let go of Cold War 
geopolitical thinking, and fight against the common enemy of international terrorism 
together, united.
Putin emphasised pragmatism and a realistic evaluation of the international situation in 
his foreign political decision-making. His goals in the area of foreign policy were to 
establish Russia as a respected international player, to change and improve relations 
with the west and open up real -  not illusory -  foreign policy options, and to restore 
national self-respect.196
Putin has proved able to manoeuvre adeptly in international relations. He made a virtue 
out of necessity by accepting NATO enlargement in 2000 and the sending of US solders 
to Central Asia. Russia has attempted to establish itself as an important player and 
constructive contributor in developing a new global security. Its reactivation and 
deepening of relations with NATO and sober analysis of the situation improved its 
reputation in the international arena. Tie declaration of international war against terror 
in 2001, and the huge increase in world oil prices following that, strengthened Russia's
196 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evoluion o f Russian Foreign Policy (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs and Blackvell Publishing, 2003), p. 123.
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new-found confidence that it will be accepted to the international society of civilised 
states on the basis of shared interests instead of liberal humanistic values of the west.197
Recently, however, the tensions between the west and Russia have started to grow 
again. These tensions have grown from ideological differences: it has been more 
difficult than Russia may have thought for the western actors to accept Russia's 
deviation from democratic norms and growing illiberalism. Furthermore, Russia's direct 
interference in the elections in Ukraine (and before that in Georgia) has raised severe 
criticism. Russia has grown increasingly wary of any western political influence in the 
CIS states. Russia has engaged in an offensive; it has claimed that the west plays by 
double standards and thus these standards should be reformed.198
There were major shifts in the international and environmental conditions which had 
ramifications for Russia's openness to European socialisation efforts. First of all, the 
asymmetry between the actors diminished as the Russian economy got back on its feet 
and oil prices continued to rise. The authority of the organisations became increasingly 
challenged by Russia, and the material bargaining power of the organisations became 
increasingly limited. With regard to environmental conditions, the sense of urgency 
eased with the Putin regime. The state seemed to be developing and prospering, and 
there was no major pressure from below to change policies.
5 Conclusion
To sum up, both the democratisation and the socialisation theories seem to describe 
developments fairly accurately until 1996. The Soviet Union and then the Russian 
Federation liberalised rapidly. Certain dynamics suggested in the socialisation model 
did not match the development in Russia, but with minor corrections concerning the 
socialisation pathways, the model seems a fairly useful tool of analysis.199
197 Ibid.
198 Jennifer Moll and Richard Gowan, "Losing Ground? Russia's European Commitments to 
Human Rights," (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005), p. 8. These claims are studied 
more in detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
199 See, for example, Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization," ARENA 
Working Papers, no. 5 (1999).
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The problems with explanatory power of the socialisation model start with the latter half 
of Yeltsin's era. During this time the dualist approach developed and matured: on the 
one hand, Russia was pledging its commitment to European norms and values, but, on 
the other hand, it was simultaneously acting in ways which were contradictory to them. 
Real decision-making procedures were non-transparent, as the power was actually held 
by unofficial networks of money and power. The liberal reforms which were introduced 
were often superficial, and everyday business was carried out through informal 
channels.
The contradictory, misleading policies continued and strengthened during Putin's time 
in power. The fact that the administration's aim was not the consolidation of democracy 
but the consolidation of its power became gradually more evident.200 The socialisation 
model, however, sees hardly any deviation from the prescriptive status phase even now. 
As the evaluation sections demonstrated, the criteria were by and large met, yet that fact 
hardly grasps the true state of affairs in Russia today. Despite general claims supporting 
democracy and human rights, many of the more specific, secondary human rights norms 
are not met in Russia. The following empirical chapters examine these dynamics in 
greater detail.
Russia's structural position vis-a-vis the European organisations has strengthened in 
recent years. However, despite improvements in the state of Russia's economy, and a 
considerable reduction in its dependency on international assistance during the time 
under scrutiny, changes in international or domestic scope conditions do not explain the 
change of heart towards European norms. Active political choice, not change in 
structural conditions, seemed to be behind the changed approach.
One may also contemplate the potential role of Soviet heritage: the collective good was 
easily prioritised over individual rights, and human rights were often regarded in an 
instrumental fashion; they were commonly seen as serving the interests of someone. It is 
true that human rights democratic norms have less domestic salience in Russia than, for 
example, in many CEES. A whole generation had been brought up and grown old in the 
Soviet system, and thus no one had experienced even limited freedom or democracy
200 Shevtsova, Putin's Russia, pp. 225-28.
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before the mid-1980s. The fact that terms such as human rights and democracy were 
actively used and perversely cultivated by the Communist Party further added to the 
general confusion on the content of the concepts. The Soviet rhetoric was always in 
stark contrast with reality, and this practice had already seriously discredited the 
concepts.201 A reason for weak civil society activism can be found in the fact that the 
Soviet society had created a flattened social structure and paternalistic culture that 
encouraged general societal passivity.202 It was accustomed to allowing a detached elite 
rule while it minded its own business. The regime change brought little change to this. 
However, Soviet heritage does not tell us why the traditional model became gradually 
more appealing to Russian leadership than the European one.
201 However, according to opinion polls, most Russians do want democracy. See Ibid., p. 353. 
Also, interestingly, 71 per cent of respondents believed that Russia should improve relations 
with the west in May 2005. See opinion poll by Levada Center; available at 
<http://www.levada.ru/nadezhdy.html>.
202 On Russian discourses that reproduce this absence of civic engagement, see Tatiana 
Rogovskaia, "Russia," in Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses across 
Thirteen Countries, eds. John S. Dryzek and Leslie Holmes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), pp. 92-113.
91
CHAPTER 3
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COOPERATION IN EUROPE
This chapter provides a general picture o f the European framework for human rights 
cooperation. It looks at the human rights policy strategies and mechanisms o f the 
OSCE, CoE and EU. It also contemplates the structural imbalance between the actors, 
and how that is reflected in their relationships and the dynamics o f cooperation.
1 Construction of the European Human Rights Framework
European institutions represent the most effective and far-reaching framework for the 
protection of human rights in today's world. Since the end of the Second World War, 
western Europe has in many respects been the trailblazer for broader international 
institutionalisation of human rights norms.
Prior to the Second World War, human rights were not considered to be an appropriate 
topic in international relations, but instead a violation of the principle of sovereignty of 
states. Human rights were considered an internal affair of each and every sovereign 
state. There were few exceptions to this general rule: for example, the international ban 
on slave trade and later on slavery, the Hague Convention on rules of war, the work of 
the League of Nations on minority issues and the early work of the ILO on the rights of 
workers. Nevertheless, these issues are best seen as restricted deviations from the 
international norm of non-interference in human rights issues in other states.203
Immediately after the Second World War, there was a strong common political will to 
enhance international human rights protection multilaterally, but the spirit faded as the 
Cold War began to advance. One of the first steps towards international human rights 
protection was the post-war tribunal in Nuremberg. It considered cases of crimes against 
peace, war crimes and -  for the very first time in modem history -  crimes against 
humanity. The charter of the tribunal affiimed the principle that in some instances, 
citizens had a duty not to obey the orders of the national authorities in the name of 
universal humanitarian principles.204 This principle has often been seen as a
203 Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, p. 21.
204 United Nations, International Law Commission, Principles o f International Law Recognized 
in the Charter o f the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment o f the Tribunal, no. 82. Text 
available at <http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-nurem.htm>.
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groundbreaking move towards the internationalisation of human rights norms -  even if 
the application of the norm was selective and only defeated parties were tried for their
205crimes.
Other important steps strengthening human rights internationally followed: the 
establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the acceptance of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The text of the UN Charter is still wary of the 
sovereignty implications of human rights norms and makes reference only to 'promoting 
and encouraging' respect for human rights. The Declaration of Human Rights is not a 
legally binding document; it only sets out the objectives for governments to pursue.206
At the European level, the development to protect human rights internationally was 
swifter. The Council of Europe was created in May 1949 in London. The main goals of 
this western European organisation were to defend human rights, parliamentary 
democracy and the rule of law, develop continent-wide agreements to standardise 
member countries' social and legal practices and to promote awareness of a European 
identity based on shared values.207
The first big success of the CoE was the adoption of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights) in 1950.208 The Convention set up a mechanism for the enforcement of 
the obligations set by the treaty. The European Court of Human Rights -  which was 
established after eight ratifications in 1958 -  considered complaints made by other 
member states. Individuals, groups of individuals or NGOs, could apply to the European 
Commission of Human Rights which could launch a case in the ECtHR on an 
individual's/a group's behalf. States could opt out of this procedure when signing the
205 See, for example, Held, Democracy end Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance, pp. 101-02.
206 The declaration is nowadays widely considered to constitute a part of customary international 
law and thus binding on individuals and states alike, even if states have not signed the 
document. The declaration has also served as the basis for two legally binding international 
human rights covenants: the Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Covenant 
for Economic, Social and Cultural Righls (1966).
207 See Council of Europe, Statute o f the Council o f Europe, 5 May 1949, CETS No. 001. Text 
available at <http://conventions.CoE.int'treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001 .htm>.
208 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection o f  Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1 §50, CETS No. 005. Text available at 
<http://conventions.CoE.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm>.
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Convention. This arrangement was later replaced by Protocol No. 11 which makes 
direct individual complaints possible. The idea that individuals could take their states to 
an international court for failing to respect their human rights was revolutionary. Even if 
individual petitions could only be made against those states that had not opted out from 
the appeals procedure, it was an important step towards the recognition of individuals as 
legal subjects of international law. By now, all CoE member states have voluntarily 
limited their state sovereignty by signing the Protocol No. II.209 The nature of their 
internal human rights policy thus became multilateral. During the Cold War years the 
CoE was characteristically an organisation focused on the codification of the European 
values through the creation of a common western European legal framework.
In addition to the strengthening trend of states committing themselves to international 
human rights obligations, some European states started to move towards the adoption of 
explicit external human rights policies towards other states.210 From the very beginning 
these policies embraced multilateralism. In fact, external human rights policy was 
already made possible by the ECHR, which made it possible to make state complaints 
about human rights violations in other states. However, states turned out to be rather 
conservative in their use of this right in practice. This attitude started to give away to a 
more active attitude towards human rights violations in other states: after the military 
coup d'etat in Greece in 1967, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden filed a 
case at the ECtHR against the military government in Greece for violations of human 
rights (of Greek nationals) during the coup.211 The Council of Europe was ready to expel 
Greece in 1970, but the Greek government decided to withdraw from the organisation 
(and denounced ECHR) just a couple of hours before the decision was to be taken. 
Greece resumed its membership only after democratic rule had been restored in 1974.212 
A number of liberal European states revised the interpretation of the norm of non-
209 Protocol No. 11 became valid in 1998 after all CoE member states had ratified the protocol. 
Thus all citizens of CoE member states can appeal to ECtHR.
210 See Sikkink, "The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and 
Europe."
211 First, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands filed individual cases against Greece on 
24 January 1968. Later, on 16 July 1970 Denmark, Norway and Sweden filed a joint case 
against Greece. The cases are commonly referred as the Greek cases. See Clovis C. (Jr.) 
Morrison, "The European Human Rights Convention System as a Functionalist Enterprise," 
Universal Human Rights 1, no. 4 (1979): p. 84.
212 Information provided by the CoE at <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/crises.asp>.
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interference in internal affairs of states. Human rights were increasingly seen as an issue 
of international concern.
Another important phase in the development of the European human rights protection 
framework started with the Helsinki Process in 1975. The Participating States 
comprised socialist, neutral and non-aligned states, as well as NATO states from Europe 
and North-America. The formative idea of the CSCE was to look at security from a 
wider, more comprehensive perspective. This perspective comprised military, 
economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects, and underlined mutual gains of the 
competing camps.
The CSCE’s contribution to the European development was that it placed the issue of 
human rights explicitly on the east-west agenda. The human rights dialogue that took 
place within the framework of the CSCE was naturally very different from the efficient 
human rights cooperation within the CoE structures. Concrete, practical results in the 
humanitarian field were modest improvements in the exchange of information or human 
contacts. Even if very little was achieved in terms of lessening the repression by the 
socialist governments, several researchers have suggested that the CSCE process was a 
major factor in the development leading to the reconstruction of Soviet identity in the 
late-1980s and ultimately to the collapse of communism.213
Until the early 1990s the CSCE remained a negotiating body, which lacked all 
permanent institutions and all its decisions were adopted by consensus among the 
participating states. The initial conference of 1975 was followed by review conferences. 
These meetings reviewed the implementation of CSCE commitments and negotiated 
further commitments between participating states. Smaller-scale expert meetings on 
specific themes were also organised within the CSCE framework. The CSCE process 
was essentially about institutionalised high-level multilateral dialogue, which attracted 
much more publicity and NGO activity than normal bilateral contacts between heads of 
state.
213 See, for example, Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, "Piecing Together the Democratic 
Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the "Construction" of Security in Post-Cold War Europe," 
International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999); Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the 
Helsinki Process and American Foreign Policy; Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International 
Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism.
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The EU was also an international human rights actor already during the Cold War. Its 
external human rights policy started to develop with the start of foreign policy 
cooperation in the early 1970s -  even if its founding documents do not actually mention 
human rights. The EU's early external human rights policy consisted of human rights 
promotion, and its typical tools were assistance programmes, low-key persuasive 
diplomacy and occasional joint declarations. It has deployed stronger instruments of 
pressure only since the late 1980s.214
To sum up, during the Cold War years the human rights regime in Europe suffered from 
the politicised atmosphere and the dominance of superpower relations. The ideological 
confrontation divided the continent and made human rights cooperation extremely 
difficult. In the spirit of detente, some institutionalised dialogue emerged within the 
CSCE framework and human rights became an "allowed" topic in east-west relations. In 
practical terms, however, very little was achieved. In essence, the real achievement of 
the east-west human rights cooperation and dialogue in the 1970s and early 1980s was 
simply to put the issue on the international agenda. In the light of the socialisation 
theory described in Chapter 1, this can be considered a major achievement even though 
it did not lead directly to any positive concessions by the Soviet Union.
Perestroika and European human rights cooperation
When the reform programme launched by Mikhail Gorbachev truly started to penetrate 
state structures and society in the Soviet Union, human rights cooperation -  and 
gradually the whole institutional framework -  in Europe started to change. After years 
of frustration and doubts about the whole mission, western policy-makers and diplomats 
were finally greeted with enthusiasm and a willingness to make significant concessions 
on a great many policy fronts by the Soviet Union: disarmament and military reform, 
economic cooperation, human contacts and human rights and security cooperation. The 
Soviet Union's talk of a "common European home" based on shared values 
demonstrated its willingness to accept the European interpretation of human rights. New 
significant steps enhancing the shared normative basis between the competing blocs 
were taken, the most significant of them being the CSCE Charter of Paris for New 
Europe signed in November 1990. The Charter aimed at overcoming Cold War political
214 Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, pp. 101-02.
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divisions and to unite Europe and the west as a united value-based society stretching -  
as the CSCE has often argued since then -  from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The Charter 
of Paris also established the new permanent CSCE structures, namely the Office for 
Free Elections (since 1992 the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) in 
Warsaw, a Conflict Prevention Centre, and a secretariat in Vienna.
The Soviet Union also reached out for closer ties with the CoE and the EU. The 
organisations were supportive of the reforms taking place within the Soviet Union but 
set limits to their engagement. Although the Soviet Union was talking about 
demokratizatsia (democratisation), its vision of political pluralism was still far from 
European standards.215 The Soviet leadership still believed in the one-party system and 
the guiding role of the Communist Party at all levels of society. The engagement was 
primarily in the form of publicly expressed political support and goodwill towards the 
reformist leadership.
These changes within the Soviet Union shook the balance of the international system 
and opened doors for increased cooperation. The prospects for internalisation of the 
western norms of human rights and democracy were looking increasingly positive. First 
of all, the Soviet Union gave up its position as an alternative source of norms and 
agreed to be bound by western ones. This meant that the asymmetry between the actors 
grew. The Soviet Union also acknowledged the moral authority of the organisations. 
The organisations, in particular the CSCE, had considerable bargaining power in 
normative matters. The CSCE could link issues of hard security to issues of human 
rights and human contacts. The Soviet Union seemed to be open to persuasion by the 
European organisations.
The environmental conditions also favoured the organisations. There was a growing 
sense of urgency in the Soviet Union. The magnitude of the crises only started to unfold 
as the reforms started. Faced with the massive crises, the Soviet leadership showed a 
new openness to European norms and standards as way of resolving the legitimacy 
crises both at home and abroad. The European institutions, in particular the CSCE, did 
their best to accommodate the need for deepening cooperation in Europe.
215 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 380.
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Post-Soviet era and European human rights cooperation
Huge political changes taking place in Europe at the turn of the decade created both new 
opportunities as well as threats for the regional organisations, and pushed them to 
review their focus, membership, institutions and working mechanisms.
The Conference/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
After the Cold War, the CSCE changed its institutional outlook in two phases, first in 
1992 and then in 1995. New offices include th<e permanent Secretariat and its Secretary- 
General, the Parliamentary Assembly (1991), the rotating Chairman-in-Office (1991), 
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights216 (1990, 1992), the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (1992) and the Representative on Freedom of the 
Media (1997). Reflecting its institutional transformation, its name was changed to the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995. 
Currently, its decision-making bodies consist of Summits and the Ministerial and 
Permanent Councils. In short, each Summit is preceded by a Follow-up Conference 
where the OSCE commitments are reviewed and future summit documents are 
negotiated. The Ministerial Council is convened in those years when no Summit takes 
place. The Permanent Council consists of senior diplomats and meets weekly in Vienna. 
Decisions are made unanimously at all levels.
After the Cold War, the "human dimension" (which was formerly known as the third 
basket) became the main area of OSCE activity alongside conflict prevention and 
resolution activity. Its human dimension is often approached from a security angle -  for 
example, in active work against human trafficking.217
Despite its institutional restructuring, the OSCE still relies mostly on "quiet diplomacy" 
and confidence-building through high-level, in-camera diplomacy and dialogue. The 
OSCE has been also particularly active in flexibly combining various types of 
preventive and post-facto measures in conflict-ridden places. Its main human rights
216 Originally it was called the Office for Free Elections (1990). Its name changed to ODIHR in 
1992 when its mandate was widened. The mandate was further enhanced in 1994.
217 In December 2003 the Ministerial Council decided to establish a post of OSCE Special 
Representative on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. The first Special Representative 
started her work in May 2004.
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policy instruments are norm development and standard setting, political action (which is 
fairly "soft" in its nature), monitoring and technical assistance.218 Standard setting means 
that the OSCE first invites discussion on norms and tries to formulate documents based 
on these common norms. A good example of this is the Copenhagen document of 1990 
in which the states outlined agreed standards for free and fair elections. This document 
is used as the basis for OSCE election observation and other cooperation in the field.
Political measures in human rights promotion means, first of all, a variety of political 
dialogue taking place at various levels. In the case of the OSCE, this mainly happens in 
Summits and in Council meetings. Fairly open-ended discussion also takes place in the 
Parliamentary Assembly between the parliamentarians of the Participating States. The 
dialogue thus continues to be mainly high-level, confidential discussion. Secondly, 
political action can also take the form of pressure and even coercive action by the other 
participating states. The OSCE prefers soft measures to harder pressure instruments. 
Political bargaining through the offering of material incentives is in practical terms also 
not relevant in its case. Political pressure can be exercised in confidence (for example in 
the form of in camera diplomatic consultation) or publicly by invoking the so-called 
Vienna and Moscow Mechanisms. These mechanisms allow states to raise questions 
relating to human rights in another participating state and the establishment of ad hoc 
missions of independent experts to assist in the resolution of a specific human 
dimension problem. However, states are usually rather cautious in their exertion of 
pressure on other OSCE participating states.219 The ultimate punitive measure is a 
suspension of membership. There are no exact rules on this question -  as the OSCE is 
by its nature inclusive and does not have entry conditions, problems in implementation 
need to be very serious before this option is considered. The only precedent is 
Yugoslavia whose membership was suspended from 1992 until November 2000.
Monitoring can be considered the middle ground between political pressure and 
technical assistance. Human rights monitoring and election observation keep mild
218 See Maxime Tardu, "The European Systems for the Protection of Human Rights," in Human 
Rights: International Protection, Monitoring, Enforcement, ed., Janusz Symonides (Aldershot: 
Ashgate and UNESCO Publishing, 2003), pp. 135-64.
219 Until now the Moscow Mechanism has been established five times. The most recent case 
was in December 2002-March 2003 when it was invoked by ten participating states in relation 
to Turkmenistan.
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pressure on a state and often raise international awareness on the issue at hand. The 
purpose is also to educate the target state on the standards and the best ways to achieve 
them. Monitoring reports often include recommendations for domestic policy-makers. 
In the OSCE context, monitoring is usually carried out by states themselves and these 
reports are mostly confidential. In case there is a threat of growing tension and human 
rights violations, the High Commissioner for National Minorities and the Representative 
on Freedom of Media may exercise early-warning mechanisms such as consultations 
and the issuing of a report to the Chairman-in-Office and the Permanent Council. The 
ODIHR also monitors human rights in participating states and assists states in 
protecting human rights. The OSCE may also establish ad hoc field missions and 
special representatives of the Chairman-in-Office in various regional "hot spots" before 
or after violations of human rights have taken place. The establishment of OSCE field 
missions takes place only with the approval of the state in question. Mission mandates 
vary from case to case, but they usually combine technical assistance, monitoring and 
early-warning or fact-finding functions.
Technical assistance is often conceived as the least controversial instrument in human 
rights promotion. This is not necessarily the case, as many political decisions are 
involved even for supposedly "technical" cooperation; for example, are the resources 
directed to state institutions, political parties or NGOs? The OSCE's human rights 
technical cooperation includes human rights education, training of key professions, 
national institution building and action for strengthening civil society and non­
governmental organisations.
The Soviet Union was one of the founding members of the CSCE process, and Russia 
has also actively participated in OSCE activities. It has taken part in all negotiations on 
the OSCE norms and standards, and agreed with the outcomes. The OSCE currently has 
around 30 technical cooperation programmes or projects with Russia (none of these 
programmes is dealing exclusively with Russia). These programmes are organised 
through the ODHIR and seek long-term results in the prevention and protection of 
human rights.
Despite the consensus principle in OSCE decision-making and the fact that Russia has 
been among the Participating States defining the principles, Russia has challenged the
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core mission and the norms of the OSCE. The attack began in 2004 when Russia’s 
OSCE delegation presented a statement on behalf of nine CIS states, accusing the OSCE 
of double standards and interference in the internal affairs of some of its member 
states.220 It claimed that human rights and democracy promotion had become too 
dominant an issue in the work of the OSCE. Since then, Russia has renewed its criticism 
several times and threatened the organisation, for example by withholding its budget 
contributions to the organisation. It has openly called for renegotiation of some OSCE 
norms, particularly those relating to elections.221 Reflecting the pressure to restructure 
and streamline its activities, the organisation established the Panel of Eminent Persons 
to review the work of the OSCE in December 2004.222 The current crises of the OSCE 
will be studied in more detail in Chapter 6, which focuses on the issue of free and fair 
elections in Russia.223
The Council o f Europe
Since the end of the Cold War, the Council of Europe has profoundly refocused its 
activities. The CoE transformed itself from essentially a western European organisation 
into a heterogeneous organisation of 46 European member states. It promotes and 
provides assistance for human rights, the rule of law and democracy in its new member 
states, alongside the traditional tasks of developing continent-wide agreements to 
standardise its member states' social and legal practices, as well as encouraging 
educational and cultural cooperation between the member states. The main decision­
making body of the CoE is the Committee of Ministers, which is composed of the 
foreign ministers of its member states (or their Strasbourg-based deputies). Modest 
institutional redevelopment has taken place since the end of the Cold War: the post of
220 The document was signed by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The bloc has crumbled away since the statement was 
issued, as there have been popular uprisings in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Also Moldova is 
increasingly looking towards the west.
221 Most recently these claims were echoed at the OSCE meeting in Brussels on 5 December 
2006 in a discussion on Kazakhstan's chairmanship in 2009. Despite the fact that no western 
organisations have ever endorsed elections held in Kazakhstan, Russia backed Kazakhstan's bid. 
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov further claimed that if the OSCE were to choose to 
concentrate on humanitarian issues, the organisation should change its name, which might lead 
many states to reconsider whether they want to remain part of such an organisation. See 
Financial Times, 5 December 2006.
222 The panel published its final report and recommendation on 27 June 2005. So far, the process 
has not proceeded much further than this.
223 "Fundamental crises" was the phrase used by an OSCE PA member interviewed on 12 
December 2006.
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Commissioner for Human Rights was established in 1999. Other human rights-relevant 
institutions include the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), Secretary General and the 
Secretariat’s Directorate General II, which deals with human rights questions. PACE has 
advisory powers and is an important agenda-setter within the CoE.
The CoE's policy has been described on occasion as more "principled" than the OSCE's 
or EU's human rights policy due to its normative, even moral, emphasis.224 The CoE is 
particularly active in norm development and standard setting. It has traditionally 
attempted to develop continent-wide, legally binding agreements and its authority in 
developing consensus on and codifying European values is indisputable. In addition to 
this, the CoE has been increasingly active in political engagement and the application of 
pressure on various levels. The establishment of the Commissioner for Human Rights is 
an example of this multi-level engagement approach. The Commissioner has actively 
brought up issues that he has considered worthy of international attention, and also tried 
to get states more actively engaged with the organisation by visiting CoE member 
states. The Secretary General may also exercise political pressure by, for example, 
issuing authoritative public comments. An important part of the dialogue between 
Russia and the CoE happens within the Committee of Ministers, PACE, and the CoE 
Secretariat (DGII).
The most efficient political instrument that the CoE has deployed has without any doubt 
been the membership application process. The Parliamentary Assembly plays a crucial 
part in the application process, although the Statute of the Council of Europe has no 
special provision relating to the involvement of the PACE in the process. However, in 
practice the Committee of Ministers refers membership applications to the PACE.225 
Due to the vagueness of the membership condition in the Statute, the PACE has drawn 
up a more specific doctrine for admission. The PACE set up a system which involves 
visits to the applicant countries, election observation, consideration of legal systems,
224 Jurado, "Complying with ’European’ Standards of Minority Protection: Estonia's Relations 
with the European Union, OSCE and Council of Europe", p. 10.
225 The PACE's significance in CoE decision-making has strengthened over the years
considerably and there have been suggestions to make its involvement more an official one. For
more details see Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation on the 
Institutional Balance at the Council of Europe, 2 October 2006, Rec 1763.
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expert studies, appointment of special rapporteurs and extensive committee work. The 
Assembly also controls the timetable o f the application procedure.226
During the membership bid, the states commit themselves to CoE norms, some of which 
are considered essential preconditions for the membership. The requirements are not 
cast in stone: the CoE bodies may agree that declared goodwill and intention to 
implement the norms in the future are sufficient, and they can grant membership. If the 
progress towards the implementation of the norm is not considered sufficient, the 
application process may be suspended or the application can be declined.227 The 
membership application process involves a great amount of political bargaining, 
shaming and possibly even coercive political measures.
There are two different official monitoring mechanisms within the CoE. The first 
monitoring mechanism was launched in 1994 and involves the Committee of Ministers. 
It reviews specific issues and takes place behind closed doors in an atmosphere of 
confidence. The second monitoring procedure was established a year later and takes 
place at the PACE. This system involves only new member states, and is ended when 
there is enough evidence of consistent compliance with the membership requirements. 
The PACE reporting system was strengthened in 1997 with the establishment of the 
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of 
the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee). The decision to close or to re-open the 
monitoring mechanisms is clearly a major political decision and has raised debate 
within the organisation. In order to bridge the gap between monitored and non­
monitored states, periodic reports of all member states' implementation of CoE norms 
from 2006 will be attached to the annual progress reports of the Monitoring 
Committee.229
Other CoE monitoring is treaty or ad hoc based. Many European conventions that the 
CoE has drafted include a specific monitoring mechanism. For example, the European
226 Speech by former Secretary General of the PACE Bruno Haller in September 1998. Text 
available at < http://www.asgp.info/Publications/CPI-English/1998_176_03-e.pdf>.
229 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on the Progress of the Assembly's 
Monitoring Procedure, 29 June 2006, Res 1515.
103
Convention for the Prevention of Torture established a monitoring committee, which 
visits member states and issues reports on their implementation. Also the human rights 
commissioner may issue reports based on his visits that are more ad hoc by nature. He 
can also address early-warning reports on any relevant question to the Committee of 
Ministers or PACE. The commissioner’s mandate is very flexible: in addition to 
monitoring, the commissioner may contact governments and provide advice and 
information on protection of human rights.
The failure to implement CoE norms may result in coercive action by the organisation. 
The Charter of the CoE does recognise the possibility of suspension or abolition of 
membership (Greece was about to get suspended in 1970 but resigned before the 
decision was carried out). Less harsh punitive measures include the suspension of 
voting rights in the PACE (Russia's voting rights were suspended for 9 months in 2000). 
The CoE may also in principle suspend cooperation and assistance programmes with a 
particular state. However, the employment of coercive methods is exceptional. The CoE 
mainly relies on moral condemnation and shaming of the state, rather than political 
sanctions.
Many of the political dialogues taking place at the lower levels of the CoE framework 
are relatively technical by nature. They form an integral part of various technical 
assistance programmes. The aim of these dialogues is first and foremost to offer know­
how and advise local actors on the ways in which to implement European standards in 
national legislation and practices. In the post-Cold war era, the CoE and the EU have 
worked closely together for the promotion of European values in democratising post- 
Soviet states. One of the instruments of the partnership is the network of so-called joint 
programmes. Some of the programmes are thematic, whilst others are country-specific 
(for example, a joint programme for Russia). The country-specific programmes consist 
of technical assistance projects aimed at facilitating institutional reform and support for 
the legal system. The majority of these technical assistance programmes are directed 
specifically towards key professionals, such as judiciary and ombudsmen. At the 
moment, Russia takes part in the legal assistance and the freedom of expression and 
media programmes.
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Russia applied for CoE membership in 1992, and became a full member following 
prolonged negotiations in 1996. The negotiation process was suspended for a year in 
1994 due to gross human rights violations in the republic of Chechnya. At the time of 
the admission it was commonly acknowledged that Russia did not meet the formal 
requirements for membership, but the decision was made on the basis that membership 
would encourage the Russian government to carry out the planned reforms and enhance 
the implementation of Russian human rights commitments. Problems did not cease to 
exist even after Russia's accession. Russia's voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly 
were suspended for nine months in 2000 -  again due to human rights violations in 
Chechnya.
Russia has signed several human rights treaties under the CoE. The most important of 
these is the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Currently, there are over 30 000 applications lodged against Russia.230 Other important 
human rights-related conventions, which Russia has signed, include the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
Russia has recently raised similar criticism towards the CoE as it did earlier towards the 
OSCE. When Russia took the chairmanship of the CoE Committee of Ministers in May 
2006, its representatives declared that Russia would use its chairmanship to fight against 
the perceived western bias against Russia. It was also suggested that the PACE should 
renounce its monitoring of the implementation of Russian membership obligations.231 
These claims will also be studied in more detail in Chapter 6.
230 According to ECtHR statistics during the period of 1 November 1998 to 30 June 2005 there 
had been 31 426 applications lodged against Russia. 22 976 of those had been allocated to a 
decision body, of which 14 178 had been declared inadmissible or struck off. 664 applications 
had been referred back to the government and only 138 had been declared admissible. 
Altogether 52 judgements had been given on Russian affairs. The numbers tell a sad story of the 
incapability of the Court to manage the growing flow of applications from the new CoE member 
states. European Court of Human Rights, Official Statistics for the Period 01.11.1998 to 
30.06.2005, Strasbourg, 11 July 2005.
231 Mikhail Kamynin according to Interfax, 17 May 2006. See 
<http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/0.html?id_issue=l 1518020>.
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The European Community/Union
During the Cold War, the Soviet attitude towards the EC was always sceptical and 
suspicious. Gorbachev's desire to reform the Soviet economy and increase trade with 
western states was soon reflected in a new Soviet policy on Europe. The EC was, 
however, essentially seen as an economic organisation -  despite the fact that "our 
common European home" became the catch phrase of the late 1980s.232 The changed 
Soviet attitude led to negotiations between the EC and Russia that resulted in a joint 
declaration in 1988, and the conclusion of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 1989. 
The EC's, and later the EU's, response to the break-up of the SU was reactive, and the 
EU seemingly lacked a clear strategy or vision as to the way in which Russia might fit 
into the grand European integration plan. Also Russian policy towards the EU was 
weak: the EU occupied a much less prominent place in Russian foreign policy than 
other European institutions. The policy towards the EU was at the beginning positive, 
but rather low-key.233
Since then the relationship has intensified and become more institutionalised. Currently 
Russia "easily comes first in the time and energy that the EU has devoted to developing 
relations with outside partners".234 The degree of political dialogue and institutional 
frameworks between the EU and Russia are unique. EU-Russia cooperation comprises 
various fields such as trade, economic cooperation, justice and home affairs issues and 
external security, as well as cultural and educational cooperation. EU-Russia relations, 
including human rights and democracy promotion in Russia, fall mainly within the 
remit of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.
EU-Russia relations differ remarkably from the relations between the CoE and OSCE 
and Russia. First of all, as Russia is not a member of the EU -  and it does not appear 
likely that it will become one -  but it has close, institutional and multi-level relations
232 Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia’s Attitudes Towards the EU: Political Aspects (Helsinki: 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Institute fur Europaische Politik, 2002), pp. 101- 
02.
233 Hiski Haukkala, "The Making of the European Union's Common Strategy on Russia," in The 
EU Common Strategy on Russia: Learning the Grammar o f the CFSP, ed., Hiski Haukkala, 
Programme on the Northern Dimension o f the CFSP (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs and Institut fur Europaische Politik, 2001), p. 25.
234 Rolf Schuette, "EU-Russia Relations: Interests and Values -  a European Perspective," 
Carnegie Papers, no. 54 (2004): p. 1.
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with the EU. The EU's political agenda is much wider than the OSCE or CoE 
frameworks and this means, at leasit in principle, that the EU has more tools at its 
disposal. On the other hand, as Russian membership of the organisation is not on the 
cards, it has less leverage regarding the issue of human rights and democracy. 
Nevertheless, the EU claims that a precondition for the current "strategic partnership" 
between Russia and the EU is shared values (as defined by other organisations such as 
the OSCE and the CoE). Stepping up cooperation is conditional on Russia's 
implementation of shared norms based on the common values.
The EU's external relations have had a human rights dimension almost from the very 
beginning.235 The EU human rights promotion traditionally leaned towards soft 
measures, such as assistance programmes and declaratory diplomacy.236 External 
democracy promotion has deployed more robust instruments since the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.237 The main actors in the EU's external human rights policy are the Council 
of the EU and the Commission, the Presidency and the High Representative for the 
CFSP. In 2005, the High Representative, Javier Solana, nominated a Special 
Representative on Human Rights. Furthermore, the European Parliament actively 
promotes and monitors human rights internally, as well as in third states.238
The EU has set clear criteria for its new member states on many issues, including 
democracy and human rights. Also in relations with Russia, the EU emphasises the 
importance of common values and norms as set out by the UN, Council of Europe and 
the OSCE, and later confirmed in the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
235 Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, p. 101.
236 For an overview of this "soft approach", see Richard Youngs, "European Union Democracy 
Promotion: Ten Years On," European Foreign Affairs Review 6 (2001): pp. 355-61.
237 The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) considerably strengthened the role of 
human rights and democratic principles in the policies of the EU. The treaty considers respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms to be one of the objectives of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and development cooperation. Article J.l (Article 11 since the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997) states that one of the objectives of the CFSP shall be to "develop 
and consolidate democracy and rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms". European Union, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), 1 February 1992, 92/C 191/01. The 
Commission's action in the field of external relations is also guided by compliance with the 
rights and principles contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (which was officially 
proclaimed at the Nice Summit in December 2000) in order to promote coherence between the 
EU's internal and external approaches.
238 See the general information provided by the EU's website at 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_relations/human_rights/doc/com01_252_en.pdf>.
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which entered into force on 1 December 1997. The PCA's Article 1 states that the 
objectives of the partnership include the strengthening of political and economic 
freedoms, and supporting Russian efforts to consolidate its democracy.239 The PCA also 
includes the now standard "essential element" clause whose violation may give grounds 
for the termination or suspension of the agreement:
"Respect for democratic principles and human rights, as defined in particular in the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, underpins the internal and 
external policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of partnership and of 
this Agreement."240
Although the provision has never been invoked by the EU towards Russia, the EU 
suspended the signing of the Interim Agreement between the EU and Russia 
(concerning trade provisions of the PCA) for six months in January 1995.241 The EU has 
also adopted declarations and issued statements on the Russian human rights situation 
and has redirected TACIS technical assistance to human rights for a year in 2000 (again 
due to human rights violations in Chechnya).
The PCA created an institutional framework for political cooperation and dialogue 
between the EU and Russia. It established official semi-annual summits between Russia 
and the EU troika242 and an annual Cooperation Council, which was replaced by a 
Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) in June 2003. The Permanent Council can meet 
in different ministerial formations as often as is considered necessary. The PCA also 
created bodies at senior official and expert levels, namely the Cooperation Committee 
and its subcommittees, but Russia has refused more subcommittee meetings (apart from 
customs matters) since 2003, and no Cooperation Committee has taken place since 
2004.243
239 Article 1, European Union and the Russian Federation, Agreement on Partnership and 
Cooperation between the European Union and the Russian Federation, 24 June 1994, 
L/CE/RU/en 3.
240 Article 2, Ibid. The EU has included similar clause to all its major external treaties since 
1995.
241 See European Union, European Commission, Press Release: Interim Agreement with Russia.
242 According to the Amsterdam Treaty the EU troika consists of the representatives of the 
current presidency, the Council of the EU, the European Commission and usually, at the current 
presidency's request, also the next, incoming presidency.
243 Information provided by the EU at
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/extemal_relations/russia/intro/index.htm>.
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In addition to the PCA, other important documents defining the EU-Russia relations 
include the EU's Common Strategy on Russia (1999-2004) and the corresponding 
Medium-Term Strategy on EU relations (1999-2009) by Russia, documents on Four 
Common Spaces between Russia and the EU, joint summit statements, the EU's TACIS 
programme and internal EU policy papers.244 The common spaces between the EU and 
Russia include the Common Economic Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, the Common Space of External Security, and the Common Space of 
Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects. In May 2005, the parties agreed 
on Roadmaps outlining the short- and medium-term instruments for the creation of the 
four spaces.
The European Parliament is also involved in EU-Russia cooperation. It has an active 
parliamentary cooperation committee, which is composed of members of the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Duma. The function of the committee is engage in political 
dialogue and cooperation. The parliament can also apply pressure by issuing 
declarations.
Six main instruments are deployed in the EU's promotion of human rights in third 
states: 1) country-specific common strategies and other internal documents, 2) human 
rights clauses in bilateral agreements (such as Article 2 of PCA), 3) political dialogue 
(in meetings and summits) and diplomatic means (such as demarches and declarations), 
4) special human rights dialogues with some states, 5) monitoring in the form of human 
rights reports and 6) technical assistance in human rights issues. All these instruments 
are deployed in Russia-EU cooperation.245
The primary methods by which EU human rights policy is conducted in the case of 
Russia are high-level political dialogue and political pressure. The EU can link human 
rights to other issues, which -  at least in principle -  accords a degree of leverage to the 
EU in its policy also towards non-members. The EU's main weakness in pursuing an 
efficient human rights policy -  and general policy over all -  towards Russia has been 
the lack of coherence among the positions between the Union itself and its individual 
member states. Big member states (such as the Germany, France, Italy, sometimes the
244 Schuette, "EU-Russia Relations: Interests and Values -  a European Perspective," p. 2.
245 Ibid.
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UK and most recently Poland) and the immediate neighbours of Russia in the EU often 
formulate their own positions on Russian matters, which sometimes contradict the 
common positions taken by the EU.246
The issue of human rights in the CFSP has strengthened over the years, as was 
demonstrated by the appointment of a personal Representative for Human Rights in the 
area of CFSP in January 2005. The EU also started a practice of regular, semi-annual 
human rights consultations with Russia in 2005.
The EU's human rights monitoring is conducted within its political framework without 
any special monitoring mechanisms or institutions. The European Parliament has 
published an annual report on human rights in the world since 1984. The Council has 
published its own annual report on human rights development, and how the EU has 
developed its human rights policy to meet the challenges, since 1999.
The EU also has various assistance programmes in Russia, some of which deal with 
human rights questions. The aid and its aims are outlined in the Indicative Programme 
for Russia, and are carried out through the EU-Russia Cooperation Programme within 
the TACIS framework. The European Union established the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 1999 in order to streamline its human rights 
and democracy promotion assistance.247 This aid, channelled through EIHRD, is 
directed primarily to NGOs and international organisations, and it is complementary to 
governmental assistance programmes. A special Human Rights and Democracy 
Committee was established in 1999, which supervises and coordinates the EU aid for 
human rights and democratisation. The Committee is headed by the Commission and 
composed of member states.248
The organisations have paid increasing attention to coordinating their policies and 
cooperating with each other in order to reach the common goals since the end of the
246 For example, general frustration over a lack of harmony led to a major review of the EU’s 
policies in 2004. Ibid.: p. 1.
247 The EIHRD will be replaced by a new financial instrument from 2007 onwards. See 
European Union, European Commission, Press Release: A New Financial Instrument to 
Promote Democracy and Human Rights, 29 June 2006, IP/06/891.
248 See EIHRD website at <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/eidhr/index_en.htm> .
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Cold War. In particular, the CoE and the EU have been consciously developing a more 
effective coordination of policies and closer cooperation.249 They have a network of 
joint programmes aimed at facilitating institutional reform and support for the legal 
system. Such a programme has covered Russia since 1996.250 The EU and CoE also 
cooperate in other areas, and coordinate positions to defend and promote democratic 
principles, the rule of law and human rights in political and senior official level 
meetings.251 Coordination between the OSCE and EU also takes place; there has been an 
increase in EU support for OSCE-led activities, and the organisations have created some 
joint technical assistance programmes and projects in the field of human rights and 
democracy promotion.252 There is a special unit for the OSCE and CoE relations in the 
Multilateral Relations and Human Rights Directorate within the DG External Relations 
of the European Commission.
Table 4: Summary of policy instruments and main characteristics of the human rights policy of the OSCE, 
CoE and EU towards Russia
OSCE Council of Europe European Union
Membership
(as of 1 January 
2007)
55 participating states from 
Europe, Central Asia and 
North America: CSCE was 
originally a Russian initiative 
and it was included from the 
beginning of negotiations in 
1973
46 members states from Europe 
and near-by areas; Russia 
applied for membership in 1992 
and was accepted in 1996
27 European states; Russia has 
not applied for membership
Basic documents 
organising 
relations with 
regard to Russia
- All major OSCE documents - Statute of the CoE
- ECHR (ratified by Russia 
1998) and its additional 
protocols
- PCA (signed in July 1994, 
entered into force December 
1997)
- Documents on Four Common 
Spaces
- Joint Summit Declarations
- Internal documents on EU- 
Russia relations (e.g. Medium- 
Term Strategy by Russia or 
Commission Communication from 
9 February 2004)
Decision-making
institutions*
- Summits
- Ministerial Council
- Permanent Council
- Committee of Ministers - European Council
- the Presidency
- the High Representative for 
CFSP
249 See, for example, Jean-Claude Juncker, "Council of Europe - European Union "a Sole 
Ambition for the European Continent"," (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 11 April 2006).
250 There are 35 such programmes and joint activities and they involve currently over EUR 30 
million (the EU's contribution is EUR 19.3 million and CoE's is EUR 11.5 million)
251 The top level summit meetings between the Secretary General of the CoE and the Chairman 
of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE and the President of the Council of the EU and the 
President of the European Commission are organised twice a year. For example, in March 2000 
they coordinated their positions in a quadripartite meeting between the EU and the CoE on the 
question of Chechnya. See European Union, Council of the EU, Press Release: 15th 
Quadripartite Meeting EU/Council of Europe, 14 March 2000, PRES/00/68.
252 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights Annual Report 2005," (Warsaw: ODIHR, 2005). See also speech "The EU 
and the OSCE: the Shape of Future Cooperation" by High Representative for the CFSP Javier 
Solana on 25 September 2002. Available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/72254.pdf>.
I l l
OSCE Council of Europe European Union
Institutions 
dealing with  
human rights 
issues**
- Decision-making bodies
- Chairman-in-Office
- Parliamentary Assembly and 
its president
- ODIHR
- Representative on Freedom 
and Media
- High Commissioner for 
National Minorities
- Decision-making bodies
- Secretary General and 
Directorate General of Human 
Rights (DGII)
- Commissioner for Human 
Rights (since 1999)
- PACE and its chairman
- CFSP framework (see above)
- Commission, and relevant DGs
- EP and its president and 
relevant committees and 
subcommittees
- Personal Representative of the 
High Representative on Human 
Rights
Special structures 
with regard to  
Russia
- OSCE Assistance Group to 
Chechnya during 1995-2002
- PACE Rapporteur on 
Chechnya
- CoE Human Rights Experts to 
Chechnya during 2001-2004; 
now ad hoc -based)
- Semi-annual summits b/w EU 
troika and Russia
- Permanent Partnership Council 
(+ Cooperation Committee and its 
subcommittees)
- Parliamentary Cooperation 
Committee
Special human 
rights frameworks
- Human Dimension 
(Vienna arid Moscow 
mechanisms)
- ECHR and ECtHR - European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights
- Semi-annual bilateral human 
riqhts consultations (since 2005)
Human rights 
policy
instruments
1) HR assistance:
- Assistance and cooperation 
programmes (now around 30 
with Russia)
- Election assistance
- Field missions (field mission 
in Chechnya 1994-1999)
2) Monitoring:
- Fact-finding and rapporteur 
missions (mission in 
Chechnya)
- Personal representatives of 
the Chairman-in-Office
- Ad-hoc steering groups
3) Political measures:
- High level exchange of 
information on questions 
relating to HD
- Suspension or abolition of 
membership
4) Norm-setting:
- adopted documents since 
1975 (only "politically", not 
legally binding)
1) HR assistance:
- cooperation programmes (two 
currently with Russia)
- ad hoc advisors
- election Assistance
2) Monitoring (CM, PACE,
CHR)
3) Political measures:
- in camera consultation by 
CHR or CM
- resolutions, recommendations, 
statements
- suspension of voting rights in 
PACE (suspension of Russia's 
voting rights for 9 months in 
2000)
- suspension or abolition of 
membership or cooperation 
programmes (the postponement 
of the consideration of Russian 
membership application in 
1995)
4) Norm-setting:
- formulation of legal binding 
human rights treaties (e.g. 
ECHR)
- membership conditions
1) HR assistance:
- TACIS, ECHO and EIDHR (with 
Russia)
2) Monitoring of human rights by 
PACE and the Council
3) Political measures:
- conditionality (Ratification of 
Interim Agreement delayed for 6 
months in 1995)
- political and economic sanctions 
(TACIS aid redirected to human 
rights projects for 6 months in 
2000)
- diplomatic measures and 
political dialogue
- human rights consultations 
since 2005
4) Norm-setting:
- agreed common values as 
essential elements in PCA (Art. 2)
*ln the case of the EU: decision-making structures within the CFSP framework; in the case of the OSCE: decision­
making structures in the areas of political cooperation (excluding economic and security issues).
**The EU: Institutions dealing with external human rights policy
2 International Human Rights and Democracy Promotion Strategies
The previous section outlined the instruments available to the OSCE, CoE and EU when 
attempting to influence the human rights and democratisation policies of Russia. This 
section explains the types of considerations that underpin the selection of particular 
human rights instruments and the kind of impact they are likely to have, according to
112
the theories of democratisation and socialisation models outlined in Chapter 1. This 
section begins by outlining the general policy options and then proceeds to the 
European human rights strategies towards Russia.
Selection of human rights policy instruments
Human rights instruments are often divided into soft (or positive) and hard (or negative) 
instruments. Soft measures are designed to engage the target state and its society 
positively in human rights cooperation. Typical measures include assistance and 
educational programmes at various levels of society, and confidential human rights 
monitoring and dialogue with the government and administration. It is hoped that 
confidential dialogue and monitoring will invoke normative suasion and persuasion, and 
that technical assistance will invoke learning, institutionalisation and habitualisation.
Even though soft measures can target domestic actors at many levels, they do not 
challenge the authority of the government. Confidential dialogue and technical 
assistance are used when the government is considered to be open towards normative 
suasion and/or has already accepted the norms in principle, but is still failing to 
implement them due to insufficient resources.253 Technical assistance is often 
considered to be apolitical capacity building because it does not directly challenge the 
legitimacy of the government in question at any level.
On the other hand, hard measures attempt to invoke the mechanisms of shaming, 
material pressure and bargaining. Typical "hard" instruments include coercive action 
based on membership and treaty conditionality, linking unrelated political issues 
together and public criticism. The pressure instruments can thus be material or 
discursive.
The extreme pressure instrument is military intervention, which often openly challenges 
the entire legitimacy of the government of the target state. More conventional pressure 
methods hope to invoke the mechanisms of strategic calculation, instrumental
253 On mechanisms at play in socialisation, see Risse and Sikkink, "The Socialization of 
International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction," pp. 11-12; Zum and 
Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the 
Nation State," pp. 1051-54.
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adaptation, arguing and persuasion.254 It seems logical to expect that after the norms 
have been accepted and internalised, there is less need for pressure from the outside. 
Once the government is pro-democracy and pro-human rights, the outside actors 
interested in supporting democracy and human rights often shift to political support and 
engagement. Liberal governments, which are aspiring to carry out difficult reforms in 
order to secure the consolidation of democracy, are often faced with populist, illiberal 
opposition. In situations like this, international actors often find it necessary to openly 
support the liberal government, and thus ease political pressure on the government. The 
"high-end" political pressure is changed to political support and "low-end" technical 
assistance programmes in order to support the liberal government against domestic 
illiberal forces.255
Most states and international organisations interested in promoting democracy and 
human rights use both soft and hard measures towards the target state. These measures 
usually target several levels simultaneously: for example, government, regional and 
local administration as well as civil society actors. The particular combination of 
instruments and agency levels reflect the institutional traditions of the organisations, as 
well as their evaluation of the situation in the target state.
The democratisation literature is quiet about the role of the international actors and their 
possible impact on developments in the target state. The socialisation literature, on the 
other hand, makes several predictions about the causal mechanisms in the socialisation 
process, and the ideal policy for international actors. At the start of the process (during 
the phases of repression and denial), the most efficient strategy is one that supports 
opposition and dissident groups in the target state and shames the repressive 
government. The international shaming and pressure on the government, and material 
and moral support for dissident groups will empower non-governmental forces striving 
for change. This pressure from below and outside will eventually push the government 
into tactical concessions. The democratisation model describes the following phase
254 Ibid.
255 Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, p. 12.
more neutrally as liberalisation. The liberalisation phase will, according to the 
democratisation model, witness a "resurrection of civil society".256
Civil activism will grow and flourish which is likely to lead to changes in the political 
scene. Democracy and human rights programmes at the liberalisation/tactical 
concessions stage should mainly target civil society and the independent media, because 
these will push for further liberalisation and empowerment of civil society, as well as 
encourage societal debate. These programmes should be combined with sustained 
public pressure and coercive action when needed against the undemocratic and human 
rights violating government.
After the regime has been overthrown or it has started "controlled transformation", the 
state is considered to have entered the phase of transition, during which human rights 
have a prescriptive status. The starting point for programmes should now be that the 
regime in power is pro-democracy, and pro-human rights, and whose intention is to 
further strengthen democracy and respect for human rights. It may still lack knowledge 
and resources, but its acceptance of the requirements and norms is clear. The practical 
consequence of this is that international actors should ease the "high-end" pressure. 
Instead they should show support for the friendly government by being patient and 
flexible with their demands. This encouragement may mean the acceptance of the target 
state into the organisation or giving other political and/or economic carrots to the target 
state's government. During the transition/prescriptive status phase, the assistance is 
geared towards exchange of institutional know-how and education for NGOs, political 
parties and administration, election-observation and assistance. The programmes are 
usually low-end projects that aim at making newly established institutions more 
efficient through assistance and education.257
The mode of social action is now argumentative debate within the state. In addition to 
this, institutionalisation and habitualisation play an increasing role. With international 
support and encouragement, the target state slowly moves towards the 
consolidation/rule-consistent behaviour phase. International programmes now should
256 ODonnell and Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies," p. 26.
257 Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, p. 197.
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concentrate on further strengthening the rule of law and democratic institutions, as well 
as civil society. The policies remain supportive of the government, but it may be slightly 
easier for the international organisations to engage in constructive criticism now as the 
conditions are more stable in the target state. Risse and Sikkink argue that it is important 
to keep up the pressure from below and from the outside during this phase, in order to 
guarantee the full institutionalisation of the norms.258 Finally, the norms will be 
internalised by a state, and the rule-consistent behaviour will be habitual, fully 
institutionalised practice.
European multilateral human rights policies vis-a-vis Russia
Contrary to the generalisation of the socialisation model and the general categorisation 
of instruments into soft and hard ones, practical external human rights policies tend to 
mix soft and hard measures and target various levels of society. They often both 
pressure and support the government. International actors often have democratisation 
considerations in mind when they plan their strategies; sometimes instrumental 
considerations and their own material interests influence the particular policy choice 
more.
When considering the European multilateral human rights policies towards Russia, one 
can distinguish some shifting trends. During Gorbachev's perestroika, the European 
organisations welcomed and encouraged the development. The EU and the CoE did not 
have institutions to engage with the Soviet Union, so they settled for discursive and 
limited economic support. The OSCE, on the other hand, started restructuring its whole 
institutional structure in order to engage with the liberalising socialist states. The 
western states kept the pressure high throughout Gorbachev's time in power, and at 
times the tension was almost palpable, for example during the Baltic states' struggle for 
independence.
The collapse of the Soviet Union appeared to follow a path that the democratisation and 
the socialisation models would have predicted: liberalisation lead to growing activism, 
and the Gorbachev regime was soon replaced by the more liberal and democratic Boris 
Yeltsin. Russia seemed to have shifted from Gorbachev's liberalisation towards the
258 Risse and Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction," p. 33.
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prescriptive status phase. Increasingly as the 1990s progressed, Yeltsin's position was 
threatened by the communists. Yeltsin was considered to represent the democratic, 
liberal forces, which needed western political and financial support. Russia was granted 
membership in the CoE and treated as a strategic partner by the EU.
Throughout the 1990s, the western leaders supported the Yeltsin regime in spite of 
growing evidence of institutionalised deviation from the western-supported norms. 
Since the late 1990s there have been clear signs that Russia has decisively moved away 
from the western norms of democracy and human rights.
In recent times, the European organisations have been ill at ease over Russia. On the 
one hand, they have attempted to pressure Russia, and the CoE and EU have even used 
mild coercive methods on occasion in order to get their message through. These 
attempts have not brought any significant results, and now the trend seems to be 
towards more discreet engagement programmes and the avoidance of political conflicts 
with Russia, although recently there have been more calls to tighten policy towards 
Russia.259 Nevertheless, the European strategies emphasise engagement above all else.
Evaluation o f international scope conditions
The relationship between Russia and the European organisations can be evaluated 
through the prism of basic international and environmental scope conditions outlined in 
Chapter 1. The relationship between Russia and European society embodied in these 
organisations is clearly asymmetrical. On the most basic level, European organisations 
are the norm-makers and Russia is left with the role of a norm-taker.260 Russia has 
acknowledged the legitimacy of this asymmetry by seeking a closer relationship with 
them and agreeing to be judged by their standards.
The European organisations do have relatively high moral authority. This is particularly 
the case with the CoE which is often seen as the most "moral" and principled one of the
259 See, for example, Moll and Gowan, "Losing Ground? Russia's European Commitments to 
Human Rights."
260 See, for example, Hiski Haukkala, "A Norm-Maker or a Norm-Taker? The Changing 
Normative Parameters of Russia's Place in Europe - a Historical Analysis" (paper presented at 
the "Russia's European Choice?" Conference, St. Petersburg, September 2006).
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three organisations.261 This attitude is a reflection of the CoE's narrower, normative 
focus. Most importantly, the organisations set the standard of legitimacy in Europe.262
The material bargaining power of the institutions is also fairly high. In particular, this 
was the case with the CoE before Russia's accession to the organisation. It was the only 
one of the organisations, which could offer membership in a respected club to Russia 
after its liberalisation had started. After Russia's accession, the CoE's conditionality has 
been mainly moral condemnation, and material bargaining has been a secondary 
method. The EU is a strong actor and therefore has a relatively high material bargaining 
power. Russia is interested in the EU and dependent on its policies. Trade to Europe 
constitutes more than 50 per cent of Russia's overall exports. In reality, however, this 
dependency is downplayed for example by the fact that the European states are 
dependent on Russia's oil and gas supply. Nevertheless, the EU could in principle use 
issue linkage more effectively than the other organisations. The OSCE's material 
bargaining power is relatively modest, since all of its major decisions are adopted by 
consensus. Therefore, Russia can block its decisions and, as a major budget contributor, 
Russia can also threaten the organisation by withdrawing its budget contributions.
The wider context: Russia's place in Europe
As a way of concluding this chapter, a general consideration of the specific nature of the
relationship between Russia and the European organisations is in order. The OSCE,
CoE and the EU are all value-based intergovernmental organisations. For the purposes
of this study, they can be conceptualised as forming a European "international society".
According to Hedley Bull, society of states (international society), exists when:
"[...] a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form 
a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of 
rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common 
institutions".263
International society is thus different from an anarchical international system. An 
international system is a looser framework where states engage with each other without
261 Jurado, "Complying with ’European’ Standards of Minority Protection: Estonia's Relations 
with the European Union, OSCE and Council of Europe", pp. 9-10.
262 Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the Central and 
Eastern European States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," pp. 8-9.
263 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 13.
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the acceptance of a common set of rules and common institutions. However, even in 
international societies, order rests on a tension between power, common interests and 
common values.264
Although Bull and other members of the English School were mostly referring to a 
global international society, the discussion can be applied on a European level. In fact, 
Barry Buzan has suggested that the neglect of the regional dimension is one of the most 
obvious shortcomings of the English School.265 In recent years there have been efforts to 
bridge this evident gap. Diez and Whitman, for example, define the European 
international society as being founded upon more informal norms, rules, institutions and 
boundaries than a more formal "EU international society". Their definition comes very 
close to the understanding of the European international society this thesis promotes: 
namely, the overlapping circles of norms, values and institutions of the OSCE, CoE and 
the EU.
Hedley Bull further differentiated between solidarist and pluralist international societies. 
In a pluralist society, the common values that states share are mainly procedural and no 
substantive value consensus is needed. A pluralist society is built around the idea of 
coexistence and reflects an ethic of difference.266 The common rules and norms provide 
a structure of coexistence, built on the mutual recognition of states as independent and 
legally equal members of society, the unavoidable reliance on self-preservation and self- 
help, and the freedom to promote their own ends subject to minimal constraints. The 
function of international institutions in a pluralist society is to mitigate conflicts, not to 
solve and end their existence altogether. The pluralist society of states aptly depicts 
relations between the European international society and the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War years. There existed common norms and rules about state conduct, such as 
non-proliferation treaties, respect for non-interference in international affairs and so on, 
but the scope of these common rules was restricted and wary of any implications to
264 See Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," pp. 95-124.
265 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? The English School Theory and the 
Social Structure o f Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 206.
266 Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell, "Bull's Conception of International Society," in Hedley 
Bull on International Society, eds. Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (Basingstoke and London: 
Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 7.
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traditionally understood sovereignty. The norms were procedural rather than 
constitutive in character.267
On the other hand, a solidarist international society is a more far-reaching framework of 
cooperation where the independence of the members is more restricted for the benefit of 
the whole. According to Andrew Hurrell, there are four distinctive features of 
solidarism. The first feature refers to the content of norms. The norms are constitutive 
rather than merely procedural. They involve more extensive schemes of cooperation, 
which try to guarantee peace and security, to solve common problems and to sustain 
common values -  such as the promotion of human rights and political democracy. 
Secondly, the process of norm creation is open to a wider range of actors, both states 
and non-state actors. The sovereignty of states is interpreted in a more liberal way, and 
there is a move away from explicit consent to consensus. Thirdly, in a solidarist society 
norms and state behaviour are to be judged against some shared notion of a common 
good, or some generally acknowledged set of shared values or moral purposes. Finally, 
the implementation of these shared norms is more effective than in a pluralist society. In 
a solidarist society, common norms are more effectively implemented as coercive 
intervention is possible in the name of common goals and/or values.268 This solidarist 
vision is what Bull means by the "Grotian conception" of international society in his 
writings. Bull himself believed that there is an inherent tension between inherited 
pluralist conceptions of international society and aspirations towards more solidarist 
schemes.269
The post-Cold War relationship between the European international society and Russia 
can well be characterised by this solidarist framework. The degree of institutionalisation 
is much higher than during the Cold War years, the interaction takes place on many 
levels, and non-state groups actively participate in defining the normative agenda 
between the actors. Coercive instruments have been created in order to better implement 
the norms in Russia and elsewhere in Europe. The creation of the European Court of 
Human Rights, and the fact that Russian individuals are able to file complaints against
267 James Mayall, World Politics: Progress and Its Limits (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), p. 14.
268 Andrew Hurrell, "Order and Justice in International Relations: What Is at Stake?," in Order 
and Justice in International Relations, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew 
Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 39-40.
269 Alderson and Hurrell, "Bull’s Conception of International Society," p. 15.
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their own state using the European channel is illustrative of the high degree of 
solidarism between the parties. The concept of sovereignty is clearly more restricted, 
and the goals of the cooperation more ambitious than they previously were. The shared, 
constitutive values are officially considered to be the very basis of the relationship.
Thus, in principle, the nature of the relationship appears relatively clear-cut. Russia is a 
member of the European solidarist state society, and neither Russia nor the European 
organisations are seriously advocating anything else. Yet, in practical terms there are 
major tensions surrounding the implementation and interpretation of these common 
norms and values.270 The next three empirical chapters explore in detail where these 
tensions stem from and how they are dealt with on a practical level.
270 See, for example, Neil MacFarlane, "Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice," in Order 
and Justice in International Relations, eds. Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, and Andrew 
Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 176.
CHAPTER 4
NORM OF A HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
This chapter looks at the ways in which the European organisations have interacted 
with Russia on the question o f a national human rights ombudsman, and analyses the 
development o f the ombudsman institution in Russia. Finally it evaluates the 
effectiveness o f the European action, and links up developments with the discussion on 
scope conditions and the socialisation model outlined in Chapter 1.
- "What associations does the word 'ombudsman' bring into your mind?
- An exotic dish 
-Abus"271
1 Background to the Norm of a Human Rights Ombudsman
The origins of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) can be tracked to early 19th 
century Sweden. The basic task of the modem ombudsman institution is to investigate -  
on his or her initiative or on a citizen's complaint -  unlawful action by state authorities 
towards citizens. In addition, the tasks may include human rights education and 
promotion, and other related activities. The crucial point is that the ombudsman is 
guaranteed such resources and institutional arrangements that he or she can work 
independently without any political interference.
The ombudsman institution is generally considered to be an efficient way to promote 
good governance and human rights protection -  particularly in states whose judicial 
system is still weak.272 Complaining about human rights violations to an ombudsman is 
more accessible, cheaper and faster than judicial channels of complaint. International 
organisations, such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe, and international 
non-governmental organisations have therefore actively supported the proliferation of 
NHRIs and NHRI standards around the world.
The UN has acted as a standard-setter on the question: it has addressed the development 
of national human rights institutions since 1946. In 1978 the UN Commission on
271 Answers by Russian public to a question by a seminar speaker in an international conference 
funded by the CoE on the ombudsman institution in Moscow on 31 October-November 1999, 
quoted in Advokat, 17 December 1999.
272 See Linda Reif, "Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection," Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 13, no. Spring (2000): p. 3.
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Human Rights published international guidelines for national and local human rights 
institutions, and in 1991 it adopted the Principles Relating to the Status of National 
Institutions (the so-called Paris Principles). These principles were passed as a General 
Assembly resolution in 1993.273
The Paris Principles urge that NHRIs’ independence should be guaranteed by a 
constitution or a statute, and they should have complete autonomy from the government, 
a broad mandate, adequate powers to investigate and sufficient material resources at its 
disposal. The document recommends that NHRIs should be allowed to submit opinions, 
recommendations, proposals and reports based on their investigations either on their 
own initiative or on a citizen's complaint to relevant state authorities and to publish 
them. Common areas of competence include investigation of any human rights 
violation, unlawful administrative practice and shortcomings of national legislation. 
Human rights education and the promotion of international cooperation and treaties are 
typical additional tasks.274
Some observers have criticised international organisations for promoting the adoption of 
very similar types of national human rights institutions even in cases where these types 
do not fit into the domestic culture. Because most assistance programmes are tied to 
these international standards, governments are eager to establish such institutions, even 
in cases where political will is otherwise lacking. The establishment of the ombudsman 
does not guarantee proper functioning or true independence of the institution.275
However, although NHRIs may be similar to each other, they are not identical. Linda 
Reif has divided the most common types of national human rights institutions into the 
categories of classical ombudsmen, human rights commissions and hybrid human rights 
ombudsmen?16 These types reflect the national characteristics and tradition, as well as 
the times when the institution was established.
273 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution on National Institutions for the Promotion 
and Protection o f Human Rights, 85th Session, A/RES/48/134.
274 Ibid.
275 See Sonia Cardenas, "Adaptive States: The Proliferation of National Human Rights 
Institutions," Carr Centre for Human Rights Working Papers, no. 1 (2004): p. 3.
276 Reif, "Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in 
Good Governance and Human Rights Protection," pp. 7-16.
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Classical ombudsman institution
The modem ombudsman institution started to spread outside Scandinavia in the 1960s 
and 1970s. This "classical" form of ombudsman monitors the conduct of public 
administration. The ombudsman is elected by a legislature and it has the power to 
launch investigations upon receipt of a complaint or on his (or her) own motion, 
investigate and make recommendations and report to the government and legislature on 
the activities of the office. The classical ombudsman does not make legally binding 
decisions but relies on persuasion, recommendation and publication. The classical 
ombudsman does not have an explicit human rights mandate, but human rights 
questions form a central part of his or her tasks in practice.277
Human rights commissions
Human rights commissions or complaints offices have become more common over the 
past thirty or forty years. Some states have adopted both a human rights commission 
and an ombudsman, but most states have just one NHRI. Human rights commissions 
have an express mandate to protect and promote human rights. The commission may be 
appointed by the executive, the legislature or some combination of the two. Typically 
the powers of human rights commissions include some or all of the following: providing 
advice to the government on human rights law and policy, conducting research, 
undertaking human rights education and investigating complaints made by members of 
the public on human rights violations. Commissions have the right to make 
recommendations, but they also often function as a conciliator between the parties to 
resolve the matter or refer the dispute to binding forms of settlement such as tribunals 
and courts.278
Hybrid ombudsmen
Most recent NHRIs have typically been hybrid offices, combining the roles of 
commissions and ombudsmen. They are often called human rights ombudsmen and they 
usually have extensive mandates. A hybrid ombudsman institution undertakes a dual 
role: it protects and promotes human rights and monitors administration. The office
277 Linda Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance, and the International Human Rights 
System (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), pp. 2-4.
278 Reif, "Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in 
Good Governance and Human Rights Protection," pp. 10-11.
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resembles the ombudsman institution in that it is more common for one person to hold 
the office, and that it usually does not have the power to examine complaints in the 
private sector. It is also usually appointed by the legislature. On the other hand, they 
resemble the commission model in that their role often includes human rights education, 
advice and protection.279 The hybrid ombudsman institution started to take root with the 
so called third wave democratisation in Southern Europe in the 1970s, then spread to 
Latin America and, most recently, to CEES.
2 The Ombudsman Institution as a European Norm
The European institutions have taken the UN definition and recommendations as a 
starting point for their regional action. At the European level, the Council of Europe has 
been the most important institution promoting the ombudsman institution in Europe. It 
has urged all its member states to establish such institutions in the recommendations by 
the PACE (1975 and 2003)280 and the Committee of Ministers (1985 and 1997)281. It has 
also organised meetings and training for the European ombudsmen since 1970s. Almost 
all European states have a NHRI but they vary in form and focus.282 For example, 
Finland and Sweden have classical ombudsman offices without explicit human rights 
mandates. Their offices do, however, take care of human rights matters.283
The other European organisations have also supported the proliferation of the 
ombudsman institution. The CSCE adopted declarations calling the participating states 
to establish NHRIs in Human Dimension Meetings in Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow
279 Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance, and the International Human Rights System, pp. 
7-11.
280 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation on the Conclusions o f the 
Meeting o f the Assembly’s Political Affairs Committee with the Ombudsmen and Parliamentary 
Commissioners in the Council o f Europe Member States, 29 January 1975, R 757; Council of 
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation on the Institution o f Ombudsman, Rec 1615 
(2003).
281 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation on the Establishment o f  
Independent National Human Rights Institutions, 30 September 1997, No. R (97) 14; Council of 
Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation on the Institution o f the Ombudsman, 23 
September 1985, No. R (85) 13.
282 Italy is the only EU member state without a national ombudsman institution. Nevertheless, it 
has an extensive network of regional ombudsmen. Of CoE member states, Switzerland does not 
have national NHRI either, but it too has regional ones at the canton level.
283 More information at the Finnish Ombudsman’s site at
<http://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/Resource.phx/eoa/english/index.htx> and at the Swedish site at 
<http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?Language=en>.
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(1991). In 1998, the OSCE dedicated its annual Human Dimension Seminar to the topic 
of NHRIs. The ODIHR has provided assistance in coordination with the CoE and the 
UN to numerous NHRIs. There exists a certain division of labour between the CoE and 
OSCE: the CoE provides general technical assistance for the establishment and running 
of ombudsman institutions, and the OSCE provides specialised assistance to some of 
them through its field missions in particular states.284
The EU promotes the NHRIs in its member and accession states, and also established 
the supranational post of a European Ombudsman in 1995. Its support for ombudsman 
institutions in third states has, however, been more modest and taken place through joint 
action with the CoE. The EIDHR has provided assistance for strengthening democracy 
and human rights. One of the EIDHR programmes with Russia is a joint programme 
with the CoE to promote the institution of an ombudsman in Russia.285
In summary: there is a consensus among the European organisations that the institution 
of an ombudsman is an essential requirement for a rule of law society based on the 
respect of human rights. Judicial procedures are often both time-consuming and 
expensive, and therefore alternative channels are fundamentally important.
3 European Promotion of an Ombudsman Institution in Russia
After Russian membership in the CoE, the organisation has been monitoring the 
ombudsman question in its Honouring of Obligations and Commitments Reports and 
offered suggestions on ways in which to develop the institution further. The question of 
NHRI falls within the priorities and the field of expertise of the CoE, and thus it is only 
natural that it has been the most active institution cooperating with Russia on the 
question. It presumably possessed greater leverage over the matter while the 
membership negotiations were still ongoing. Even if the establishment of the 
ombudsman institution was hardly the most burning issue on the agenda, it was 
important and mentioned in every review report by CoE institutions, alongside other 
legislative issues. The establishment of NHRI could also be interpreted as a sign of
284 In particular, the OSCE has been helping to establish, and assisting the functioning of, 
ombudsman institutions in the Balkans.
285 See European Commission European Union, "Supporting the Development of Civil Society 
in Russia: European Union Support for Strengthening Democracy and Human Rights in Russia 
at Grass-Roots Level," (Brussels: 2001), p. 10.
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political will to comply with European standards by the Russian authorities, as the 
establishment of the institution does not require vast resources.
The CoE has cooperated actively with the Russian ombudsman by providing assistance 
and including the Russian ombudsman into the European network of national 
ombudsmen, first under the Directorate General II and after 1999 under the CoE 
Commissioner for Human Rights. The network meets in various seminars and at the 
Round Table with the European Ombudsmen organised every second year. 286 In reality, 
the interaction between the ombudsmen is even more frequent since they meet each 
other at various seminars that are not officially organised by the CoE -  for example, at 
the meetings of the European Ombudsman Institute.287 However, the CoE serves as the 
main point of exchange between the national ombudsmen in Europe. This kind of 
continuous and close interaction, it is hoped, will facilitate the processes of persuasion 
and learning.
In summing up the basic characteristics of the European norm on the institution of a 
national ombudsman, it is helpful to refer back to the norm specific scope conditions 
outlined in Chapter 1. The norm is a strong one with regard to textual clarity of the 
standards. There is a collection of both European and UN documents backing the 
requirements, in addition to the historical experience of dozens of European states. 
There is some variation with regard to the practical interpretation of the norm; the form 
of national human rights institution varies from country to country. The basic principles 
are nevertheless clear. There is no international treaty on the ombudsman institution 
which would be required to be signed. Therefore, the symbolic validation is not as high 
as it could be. However, the symbolic validation of the norm became stronger in 1994,
286 See Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, Conclusions o f the Meeting 
between the Western European Ombudsmen and the Commissioner for Human Rights, 1 
December 2000, CommDH(2000)5.
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.j sp?id=983691 &BackColorIntemet=99B5AD&BackColorIntrane 
t=FABF45&BackColorLogged=FFC679>.
287 The European ombudsman institute is an independent association domiciled in Innsbruck, 
Austria. It was established in 1988 to promote and study the ombudsman institution in the 
European context. Today, virtually all European ombudsmen are members of the association. 
Other members include academics and officials with keen interest in the ombudsman issue. See 
<http://members.tirol.com/eoi/index.htm> for more information.
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when the Council of Europe made the ombudsman institution a requirement for 
membership.288
Despite some variation in the form of NHRIs in Europe, there is, however, a consensus 
that such an institution is a requirement for a human-rights protecting rule of law 
society. The call to establish an ombudsman institution is a specialised, secondary norm. 
The grundnorm behind it is efficient human rights protection; it must be ensured that 
there is an independent body considering the complaints of ordinary people. Therefore, 
the adherence of the norm was also propitious for socialisation to take place. The norm 
has a fairly low political profile and can thus be considered as a relatively technical one, 
which in the literature is presumed to constitute a favourable condition for smooth 
implementation. Furthermore, the fact that relatively speaking the fulfilment of the 
norm does not require vast resources contributes positively towards the likelihood of 
implementation.
4 Developments in the Soviet Union and Russia 
Early aspirations and a bitter end 1990-95
The early ombudsman dialogue took place within the CSCE framework and influenced 
Russian intentions to form such an institution in the early 1990s. The topic of NHRI 
was discussed in a series of human dimension meetings in 1990-1999. The first concrete 
reference to the ombudsman institution can be found in the first draft for the new 
constitution of the RSFSR in 1990, prepared by a constitutional commission's working 
group under the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. This article was included in 
all later versions of the draft constitution.289
288 These criteria were outlined in an experts' report in 1994 and later confirmed by the PACE's 
opinion on 25 January 1996. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion on Russia's 
Request for Membership o f the Council o f Europe, No. 193 (1996); Council of Europe, 
Parliamentary Assembly, Report on the Conformity o f the Legal Order o f the Russian 
Federation with Council of Europe Standards, 7 October 1994, AS/Bur/Russia (1994) 7.
289 See information provided by the official website of the Russian human rights ombudsman 
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/institut/a-history.shtml>.
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In November 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR adopted The Declaration of 
Human Rights and Civil Liberties.290 This document mentioned the aim of establishing 
the institution of the representative on human rights, and the first draft bill on the 
representative was prepared in the Committee on Human Rights of the Supreme Soviet 
of the RSFSR. This was all conducted in the throes of the Soviet Union's collapse that 
culminated on 25 December 1991 when Mikhail Gorbachev relinquished his presidency 
of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation emerged as an independent state, and the 
regional Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies were transformed into 
the national legislature of a new independent Russia.
The Russian Federation became involved in CoE cooperation in January 1992 when it 
was granted special guest status in the Parliamentary Assembly. The CoE had several 
assistance and cooperation programmes with Russia in the field of human rights and 
legal reforms. The Russian Federation applied for membership of the CoE in May 1992. 
In 1994, legal experts evaluated whether or not Russia met the basic membership 
requirements outlined by the Statute of the CoE, namely genuine democracy, respect for 
the rule of law and human rights. Their comprehensive report also highlighted the 
question of the ombudsman institution after which it was considered to be one of the 
membership requirements.291
Soon the policies of the Congress of People's Deputies -  a body inherited from the 
Soviet times -  and the more reform-orientated president clashed, and a political 
deadlock developed between them. As the Parliament refused to accept the president's 
economic reforms, the legislative process became chaotic: the president issued decrees 
that contradicted the written laws, many of them inherited from the Soviet Union. The 
regional organs, for their part, ignored the presidential decrees or made up their own
290 See the 1998 annual report by the Russian human rights ombudsman: Upolnomochennyi po 
pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po 
pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1998 godu," (Moskva: 1998). Available at 
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/doc/ezdoc/98.shtml>.
291 This requirement was confirmed upon Russia's accession. The PACE noted in its opinion 
(paragraph 7, point v.) that it was required that "new laws in line of Council of Europe standards 
will be introduced: on the role, functioning and administration of the Procurator's office and the 
Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights according to the document "the Russian 
Federation shares fully its understanding and interpretation of commitments entered into as spelt 
out in paragraph 7". Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion on Russia's Request 
for Membership of the Council of Europe.
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laws. In December 1992, the parliament refused to extend the president's special decree 
powers. Despite the fact that the new Constitutional Court backed the parliament, 
President Yeltsin announced the assumption of emergency powers and his intention to 
hold a referendum on the people's support of him and his policy in April 1993. To the 
surprise of many, the president won the vote of confidence. After the vote, Yeltsin was 
able to convene a convention to draft a new constitution that would hopefully settle the 
division of power in Russia. As could be expected, the draft constitution clearly 
favoured the president and the federal level over the parliament and regional level.292
Meanwhile, the democratic deadlock continued and practically no normal legislative 
functions were carried out. Finally in September 1993 the president issued a decree, 
which ordered the disbanding of parliament and set parliamentary elections under the 
new constitution yet to be voted on. Yeltsin justified his move by referring to the April 
referendum and the fact that the new parliament would be elected democratically, 
whereas the old parliament had been elected only semi-democratically (a certain 
proportion of seats had been reserved for the Communist Party candidates). The 
decision violated the 1978 Constitution of RSFSR, which was still in place. However, 
the legitimacy of the Constitution was very weak and it had already been amended 
hundreds of times. Under these circumstances, all major western states gave their 
support to President Yeltsin, whom they saw as the guarantor of democracy and liberal 
reforms in Russia. A great part of the Duma deputies opposed Yeltsin's action and 
refused to leave the parliamentary building. The power struggle continued for several 
days until the resisters and their supporters decided to seize control of the Ostankino TV 
centre. The attempt was unsuccessful and the next day the Russian army emptied the 
parliamentary building by force.293
The power struggle revealed the fragility of Russian society: the nation stood divided in 
the midst of great disarray and uncertainty about the future. In an attempt to consolidate 
the nation, the president established a presidential Human Rights Commission 
(Komissiia po pravam cheloveka pri prezidente Rossiiskoi Federatsii), headed by a 
chairman in November 1993. President Yeltsin appointed Sergei Kovalev, a well-known 
human rights activist and a former Soviet dissident, as its chairman (Predsedatel'
292 Gill and Markwick, Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin, pp. 163-65.
293 Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, pp. 45-53.
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komissii po pravam cheloveka). The institution resembled an ombudsman institution: 
the Chairman of the Commission saw himself as the guarantor of citizens' rights and 
accepted complaints from the citizens, investigated them, issued reports, suggestions 
and appeals to relevant state bodies. However, the institution did not meet the standards 
of a NHRI because the commission was part of the presidential administration and its 
independence was not institutionally guaranteed.
Kovalev's first report mainly dealt with human rights violations which had occurred 
during the seizure of the parliament. The report "On the observance of human and civil 
rights in the Russian Federation", prepared in July 1994, was based on materials 
obtained from law-enforcement agencies, complaints and petitions from citizens, and on 
the commission's own investigations -  some of which were conducted in cooperation 
with non-governmental and international organisations. For a while, Kovalev as the 
Chairman of the Human Rights Committee acted as de facto ombudsman.294
In December 1993, the new Russian Constitution was approved by a referendum. It 
mentioned the ombudsman institution, that is, national representative for human rights 
(Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii) which was to be 
elected by the legislature.295 However, before coming into being, a federal law needed to 
be passed on the exact conditions of the ombudsman institution. A federal constitutional 
law requires a two-thirds majority in the Duma and the approval of Federation Council, 
which can also make amendments to the text and send it back to the Duma. As with all 
laws, it further requires final approval by the president. In a state as divided as Russia 
was in the 1990s, the adoption of the law was doomed to be a time-consuming process.
Despite the fact that there was no law on the ombudsman, the newly-elected Duma 
decided to elect an ombudsman in January 1994. The election was carried out on the 
basis of a "constitutional norm". The problem was, however, that without a proper law,
294 In November 2004 this institution was changed into the Council for Facilitating the 
Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights (Sovet pri Prezidente Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii po sodeistviiu razvitiiu institutov grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravam cheloveka). 
The institution is now more clearly under the presidential administration and its main task is to 
draw up proposals for the president on questions concerning civil society and human rights. The 
Council is chaired by Ella Pamfilova. See <http://sovetpamfilova.ru/> for further details.
295 See Chapter 5, article 103 (e). Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993), 12 December 
1993.
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the independence of the institution could not be guaranteed. Confusing all institutional 
divisions, the deputies agreed to elect the Chairman of the President's Human Rights 
Commission, Sergei Kovalev, to become the first national Human Rights Ombudsman. 
The whole episode was somewhat obscure, and the practical significance of the decision 
proved to be limited. Kovalev had already interpreted his role as the chairman of the 
presidential commission along the lines of a human rights ombudsman: he was 
investigating specific violations of human rights by federal agencies on the basis of 
citizens' complaints, and attempting to act as independently as possible.296 Kovalev thus 
continued working as before, only now with an additional title. Kovalev's tasks were 
difficult to carry out in the prevailing circumstances: the ombudsman-cum-chairman 
had no guarantees of his independence and, adding to his dependency, he had very 
limited resources at his disposal.297
By the end of the 1994, the conflict in the Chechen Republic had escalated into a full- 
scale war. The human rights ombudsman and the chairman of the human rights 
committee, Sergei Kovalev, became one of the most prominent and outspoken critics of 
Russian military action in Chechnya. His uncompromising criticism of the war and 
action to expose human rights violations committed by the military forces in the area 
brought him many enemies, particularly within the political elite.
Kovalev was not the only critic of the war in Chechnya. International organisations 
including the OSCE, CoE and EU expressed serious concern over the issue of human 
rights violations in the area -  even if none of the organisations challenged the claim that 
the Chechen question was otherwise Russia's internal affair. As noted in Chapter 2, the 
conflict created major tensions between the European organisations and Russia. The war 
also reflected negatively on the ombudsman question.
Later, in January 1995, Russia issued an official statement to the PACE in which the 
Russian leaders solemnly vowed to comply with all the recommendations of the Council 
of Europe in the field of human rights. The document was signed by President Yeltsin, 
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, the President of the Federation Council Ivan
296 See Kovalev's interview in Izvestiia, 22 January 1994. His office did not, however, perform 
any educational functions.
297 Ibid.
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Rybkin and the Duma Chairman Viktor Shumeiko.298 The document was a direct appeal 
to the CoE to reconsider their decision to suspend the consideration of Russian 
membership. The chairman of the PACE, to whom the special message was sent, replied 
by stating that although it was necessary to suspend the process, the Council’s 
leadership had no fundamental objections to admitting Russia.299
The ombudsman-cum-chairman, Sergei Kovalev, infuriated the Russian leadership by 
demanding that the CoE should not admit Russia before the military action in Chechnya 
had ended and law-based order restored. Kovalev's outspoken opinions were too much 
for many Russians. National-patriotic Duma deputy, Sergei Baburin, proposed a motion 
for Kovalev's dismissal from the post of the ombudsman and the motion was successful 
(240 to 75 with 3 abstentions).300 There was an attempt by some of the representatives to 
overrule the decision by voting again but the appeal was refused.
Kovalev's dismissal demonstrated all too vividly how easily the ombudsman institution 
could be politicised in Russia. All international documents outlining the basic principles 
of NHRIs underline the importance of its independence and autonomy from political 
actors and state structures. During these early years, the institution lacked all guarantees 
of independence: there was no fixed term, secured funding or legislation. This confusing 
episode demonstrated a burning demand for legislative guarantees of institutional 
independence. The desire to create the ombudsman institution without the necessary 
legal guarantees turned into a political farce. In the end, very little changed with 
Kovalev's dismissal -  he continued working just as before, now only as the chairman of 
the presidential human rights commission.
Despite its continuing brutal military action in Chechnya, Russia did make some 
concessions to international pressure. Russia agreed to establish a special human rights 
commission for Chechnya and to work with an OSCE assistance group in the conflict
298 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Appendix to the High-Level Russian Message 
of 18 January 1995 (Addendum II to the Report Russia's Request for Membership of the Council 
of Europe), 2 January 1996, Doc. 7443.
299 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Effects of Russia’s Accession on the 
Organisation (Addendum IV to the Report Russia’s Request for Membership of the Council of 
Europe), 2 January 1996, Doc. 7443.
300 Segodnia, 11 March 1995.
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zone in March 1995.301 In September 1995, the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe recognised Sergei Kovelev's work for human rights in Russia and awarded 
him with the European Human Rights Prize.302 This, however, did not help Kovalev at 
home. In the increasingly hostile atmosphere, and without any autonomy from the state 
bodies, his tasks became practically impossible to carry out. Acknowledging this, 
Kovalev resigned from his post in an open letter to President Yeltsin that was published 
in January 1996 in Izvestiia.303 Kovalev's resignation led to a mass exodus from the 
human rights commission. With only three remaining members, in practical terms the 
commission ceased to exist.304 Despite these developments in Russia, the CoE was 
nonetheless making preparations to accept Russia as its 39th member. Kovalev thus 
seemed to have lost his fight.
A brief summary of the achievements in the development of the institution of a human 
rights ombudsman in Russia from 1991 to January 1996 is in order. The greatest 
achievement was the fact that the new constitution of 1993 made a reference to the 
establishment of such an institution. This was a major step toward the implementation 
of the European norm. Constitutional guarantees are part of the European standard. 
There was also some early experimentation with the institution without legislative 
guarantees, but this experiment proved to be a miserable flop. The question of the 
ombudsman institution became increasingly politicised in Russia, and the prospects of 
adopting the federal law were dim. The election of an ombudsman without proper 
legislative and financial guarantees ultimately did more harm than good to the goal of 
adaptation, by further politicising the institution and blurring the institutional lines 
between the presidential human rights commission and an independent ombudsman.
301 See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Permanent Council, Decision on 
the Establishment o f an OSCE Assistance Group to the Russian Federation, 1995, PC .DEC/35. 
Its main tasks included the promotion of peace and respect for human rights, fact-finding, 
assistance to institution-building and democratisation, advice on legal issues and election 
assistance. It also provided and coordinated humanitarian aid to the region. The assistance group 
consisted of six OSCE experts who were appointed by the OSCE Secretary General.
302 The prize was given to Kovalev and posthumously to Raoul Wallenberg. See Council of 
Europe, Committee of Ministers, Resolution on the Award o f the European Human Rights 
Prize, 22 June 1995, RES(95) 5.
303 Izvestiia, 24 January 1996.
304 Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1 February 1996; Izvestiia, 25 January 1996.
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Evaluation
The scope conditions were primarily favourable for the socialisation to the norm of an 
institution of an ombudsman by Russia. As previously noted, the norm was high on 
determinacy and adherence, and it was considered to be a relatively uncontroversial, 
low-politics issue. There was a Europe-wide consensus on the norm: there were no 
challenges to it.
The international conditions were also highly favourable to straightforward norm 
implementation. First of all, there was significant asymmetry between the players -  
Russia was seeking to join the European club, and therefore open to the socialisation 
efforts of the European organisations, in particular those of the CoE. The CoE's 
authority on the issue was unquestionable in Russia and elsewhere at the time. Due to 
Russia's membership application, the CoE had superior bargaining power on the issue. 
There were many big problems between Russia and the European organisations, such as 
the war in Chechnya, and one might therefore have expected Russia to adopt less 
controversial membership conditions, such as an ombudsman institution, quickly in 
order to show its general commitment to comply with the European requirements.
The environmental conditions were propitious for socialisation, too. Russia was 
building its system anew and modelling itself on the western and, in particular the 
European, example. After the socialist experience had gone wrong, it was open to new 
information on state-society relations. The European institutions were eager to guide 
Russia in its reforms and provide information and education on institutional questions, 
such as the establishment of an ombudsman institution.
The domestic conditions were perhaps more controversial than the scope conditions on 
other levels, but they were not exclusively negative either. The institution as such fitted 
the Russian traditions of personified institutions very well.305 One person, an 
ombudsman, embodied the institution, and thus it may have been easier for Russians to 
approach an ombudsman than a faceless commission or a board. At the beginning, it 
seemed that there was political will to implement the norm as quickly as possible -  the
305 See Yuri Pivovarov, "Russian Political Culture and Classical Political Culture," Pro et 
Contra 10, no. 3 (2002): pp. 23-40.
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Duma elected the ombudsman even if the legislation was still lacking. Nevertheless, the 
domestic situation became gradually less favourable to the implementation of the norm, 
as human rights became a major issue of divergence between the European institutions 
and Russia. As mentioned earlier, the controversy over the war in Chechnya reflected 
negatively on the ombudsman question.
With regard to the question of impact and effectiveness of European action, the 
organisations seemed successful in placing the requirement of a human rights 
ombudsman institution on the Russian reform agenda. Russian discourse consistently 
supported the European goal and there was progress in the legislative field, too: the 
article on the human rights ombudsman in the new constitution was a necessary step 
towards implementation of the norm. Nevertheless, practical implementation, 
institutionalisation and even essential legislation were still lacking. Thus, the European 
organisations were partly successful in meeting their stated goals with Russia. Russia's 
inability to meet the norm did not have any major impact on European cooperation or 
the interpretation of the norm. The norm did not hold such political significance that 
would have attracted public attention or made the lack of implementation a symbolic, 
political act.
The socialisation model's take on Russian development on this issue would be that 
Russia had recently moved from the phase of tactical concessions to prescriptive status. 
The development was still to some extent hesitant and uncertain, but there was general 
political will to implement the human rights norms advocated by the European 
institutions. Russia did care about international public opinion and it did want to 
become a member in the Council of Europe. The government thus did its best to 
implement the norm. The difficulties with the implementation arose primarily from 
inexperience and lack of knowledge on the issue. The Russian official discourse on the 
issue was consistent, and it was willing to bind itself to the norm internationally. The 
norm was institutionalised in the constitution, only the federal law and practical 
implementation was lacking. The model would expect that as long as no dramatic 
change of power took place, and international pressure continued as before, 
socialisation to the norm would be no more than a question of time.
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CoE membership as an incentive for compliance 1996-98
Despite Kovalev's proposition that Russia ought not to be admitted before the war in 
Chechnya had finished, the Russian Federation was officially accepted as a member of 
the Council of Europe on 28 February 1996, while the war was still ongoing.306 
Ultimately, it turned out that Russia's human rights record in general was not a decisive 
factor in the process: the CoE decided that Russia had shown sufficient evidence of 
good faith and willingness to implement the requirements in future.307
The CoE's decision must be evaluated against the background of Russian political 
reality in the mid-1990s. The CoE's refusal of membership would have run the risk of 
marginalising the liberal, pro-European strand in Russian politics. Even a liberal- 
minded politician, pro-western (and the human rights ombudsman of the Russian 
Federation since February 2004) Vladimir Lukin, interpreted CoE's postponement 
decision as "insulting and discriminatory" against Russia, especially while countries 
such as Ukraine and Moldova were being admitted to the organisation. He even went so 
far as to suggest that Russia should withdraw its application for membership in 
protest.308 This was precisely the kind of reaction that the CoE did not want to cause. 
More negative developments followed: the Duma elections in December 1995 showed 
all too clearly that pro-western attitudes were becoming marginalised Russia: The 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, KPRF) won in 70 of Russia's 89 regions, and further took a considerable 
share of the single-seat election districts. Vladimir Zhirinovskii's ultranationalist Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (Liberal'no-Demokraticheskaia Partiia Rossii, LPDR) came 
second with 50 seats and 11 per cent of the total vote. The liberals were clearly pushed 
permanently to the margins.
As the threat of the turning of domestic opinion against the CoE and international 
marginalisation of Russia became more apparent, the CoE concluded that more could be 
achieved by engaging Russia instead of excluding it from the cooperation. It was also
306 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Invitation to the Russian Federation to Become 
a Member o f the Council o f Europe, 8 February 1996, RES(96) 2.
307 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, On Russia's Request for Membership in the 
Light o f the Situation in Chechnya, Resolution 1055.Resolution 1055 (1995), point 11. 
<http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta95/eresl055.htm>.
308 Segodnia, 7 September 1995.
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hoped that the membership offer would strengthen the more liberal-minded political 
groups in Russia.309
Russia was expected to fulfil a significant part of these requirements within a year after 
becoming a member of the Council of Europe. Most importantly, Russia had to ratify 
the ECHR,310 reform the Prosecutor's Office (the Procuracy), adopt a law on the 
ombudsman on human rights, make amendments to laws on national minorities, 
fundamental political freedoms, freedom of religion, and remove all obstacles to the 
freedom of movement and the right to choose one's place of residence. It also promised 
to improve the conditions of convicts, transfer the institutions of appeal to the authority 
of the Ministry of Justice and impose a moratorium on capital punishment from the day 
of accession to the Council of Europe, and to abolish the death penalty totally within 
three years.311
Despite the fact that there was neither a law on the ombudsman nor an acting 
ombudsman,312 some degree of clarification started to develop between the posts of the 
chairman of the presidential human rights commission and the ombudsman institution 
to-be. In May 1996, Yeltsin issued a decree "On the Russian President's Human Rights 
Commission", establishing the makeup and mandate of the body.313 It was formally a 
standing committee of the presidential administration whose task was to assist the 
president as the guarantor of citizens' rights. Even if Yeltsin's step was politically 
motivated, it brought needed clarification to the tasks and differences between the 
commission's chairman and the ombudsman.
309 Interview with a member of CoE Parliamentary Assembly and a member of the working 
group on Russia, 24 May 2005.
310 Including protocols 1,2,4, 7, 9,10 and 11 to the Convention.
311 This was to be done by ratifying protocol 6 to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion on Russia's 
Request for Membership of the Council of Europe. At the time there were also those who 
seriously doubted the advisability of taking Russia in. See, for example, Peter Smithers, "Why 
the Council of Europe Should Put Conglomerate Russia on Hold," International Herald 
Tribune, 2 February 1995. Smithers was Secretary General of the CoE from 1964 tol969.
312 The Law on the Ombudsman was drafted and even approved by the Duma April 1996 -  only 
to be returned from the Federation Council with amendments that the Duma did not agree with. 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 18 April 1996 and 11 July 1996; the law finally passed by the Duma 
again in December 1996 and it was signed by President in February 1997. Kommersant, 26 
December 1996.
313 Rossiiskie Vesti, 23 May 1996.
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At the same time, Yeltsin named new members to the commission, including a new 
chairman. The new chairman could not have been more different from Sergei Kovalev: 
Vladimir Kartashkin was a professor of law who had published several books on human 
rights during the Soviet regime in an attempt to justify the Soviet Union's human rights 
policy against western critics. Kartashkin promised to view the Chechen problem more 
"objectively" than his predecessor and seek more constructive cooperation with the 
authorities.314 The commission resumed its work in November 1996, and the topic of the 
first meeting was that of measures to protect the rights of Russian citizens abroad. The 
agenda of the meeting even included the question of creating a special reaction force to 
protect the lives of Russian citizens abroad.315 The general attitude towards the question 
of human rights had clearly changed.
On 25 December 1996, after three years of consistent efforts, the Federal Constitutional 
Law "On the Representative of Human Rights" was finally accepted.316 The law created 
a typical "hybrid ombudsman" with an express and relatively expansive human rights 
mandate. His activities were to be guided by the Russian Constitution, the Federal 
Constitutional Law on Representative of Human Rights, and by the norms and 
principles of international law. The law on the ombudsman met all the formal European, 
and UN, standards of independence of the institution.317
The Representative is elected by the State Duma upon a nomination by the president, 
the Federation Council, any Duma deputy or a Duma coalition. A candidate needs the 
support of two-thirds of the Duma deputies (300 votes out of the total 450) in order to 
become the ombudsman. His term of office is five years -  a year longer that the terms of 
the president or Duma. According to the mandate of the ombudsman, the role of human 
rights protector is complemented with the tasks of supporting the improvement of 
human rights legislation of the Russian Federation and its consistency with the norms
314 See Kartashkin's interview in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 25 May 1996.
315 Pravda, 6 November 1996; Segodnia, 6 November 1996.
316 The law Ob Upolnomochennom po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Federal'nyi 
konstitutsionnyi zakon ot 26 Fevralia 1997 g. N 1-FKZ.) is available at 
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/institut/a-fkz.shtml>.
317 See United Nations, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment 
and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
(Center for Human Rights, 1995).
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and principles of international law, promoting international human rights cooperation 
and providing human rights education.318
Significantly for the human rights protection function, no area of administration is 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the office. The Representative is able to investigate the 
armed forces, the police, the prison system, and security forces. Even the proclamation 
of a state of emergency does not limit his competences or mandate. In keeping with the 
international NHRI standards, the ombudsman considers cases based on individual 
complaints, or may upon his own initiative initiate investigations on suspected human 
rights violations of a more general nature. On finding a violation of rights and freedoms, 
the Representative may issue recommendations to state bodies, address the Duma and 
request the organisation of special hearings on the issue. He is also entitled to publish 
his findings, issue reports on questions he considers important or take the case to court 
or a competent administrative body, General Prosecutor or the Constitutional Court and 
participate in the court proceedings himself.319
Overall, the law painted a picture of a capable ombudsman institution with an efficient 
working apparatus at his disposal. A broad mandate is helpful in a state that is emerging 
from a long repressive regime and that suffers from widespread corruption. Both human 
rights education and effective human rights protection functions are vital for the 
consolidation of society based on democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. 
However, the efficiency of the NHRI always depends on the domestic political culture 
and concrete socio-economic situation in which it is embedded. A comprehensive 
mandate does not always guarantee effectiveness, and a more limited one does not 
necessarily preclude it.320
318 See the Federal Constitutional Law Ob Upolnomochennom po pravam cheloveka v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii.
319 See Chapter IV in Ibid. The mandate of the ombudsman has been widened and specified 
since the passing of the law. The most recent change concerned the right to initiate the 
establishment of a parliamentary investigative commission on reported massive human rights 
violations. Interfax, 18 October 2006.
320 John Hucker, "Bringing Rights Home: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions," in 
Human Rights Protection: Methods and Effectiveness, ed., Frances Butler (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), p. 35.
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However, even the law was unable to solve the problem of the politicisation of the 
ombudsman issue in Russia. Despite the fact that the law stated that the ombudsman 
should be elected a month after the legislation was approved, the Duma proved unable 
to agree on any of the candidates. To be elected as an ombudsman, one candidate has to 
receive absolute majority, which meant 300 votes out of 450, and the quarrelsome 
Duma simply could not reach a consensus on the issue.
Around 1996-97 a wider debate on human rights and the role of human rights activists 
started to emerge in Russia, and this debate partly explains why agreeing on the 
ombudsman became so problematic. The so-called human rights movement appeared to 
be splitting into two parts: the "democrats", that is the former Soviet-era dissidents 
(such as Sergei Kovalev) became increasingly marginalised while a new group of pro­
state actors were promoted to leading positions. One of the most active promoters of 
this pro-state approach was researcher and political commentator, Aleksei Kiva, who 
wrote several articles on the subject during the year.
In his articles -  most of them published in the government's official newspaper 
Rossiiskaia Gazeta -  Kiva argued that old dissidents such as the former chairman of the 
presidential human rights committee and ombudsman, Sergei Kovalev, were doing more 
harm than good to the cause of human rights. His main claim was that the old 
generation of human rights defenders (zazhitniki) did not know how to work 
constructively towards the realisation of human rights and that they were consistently 
opposed to whoever was in power -  despite the fact that they had been democratically 
elected -  simply as a matter of principle. According to him, this attitude stemmed partly 
from the traditional utopianism of Russian intelligentsia, partly from their personal 
experiences as dissidents during the Soviet era. In his view, their radicalism and distaste 
for any compromises was akin to religious fanaticism. Kiva claimed that this irrational 
extremist policy of the older generation of activists had in fact led to a drastic narrowing 
of the field of activity and discredited them in the eyes of the Russian people.321
There is no question about the tendentious and populist nature of Kiva's attack. He had 
recently been appointed as a member of the Presidential Human Rights Commission,
321 See NG-Stsenarii, 29 April 1997. NG-Stsenarii is a monthly supplement to Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta.
141
and in his articles he promoted the commission's new agenda, which highlighted the 
issues of the rights of Russian citizens living abroad (meaning, of course, first and 
foremost Russians living in the former Soviet Republics, particularly in the Baltic 
States) and the social and economic rights of "ordinary Russians".322
In summary, the biggest achievement concerning the question of the ombudsman 
institution was the passing of the Federal Constitutional Law on the Ombudsman in 
December 1996. The formal legislative requirements for the norm implementation were 
now, finally, officially met. A touchstone for the socialisation proved not to be the 
formal legislation, but its practical implementation. The Duma members were unable to 
reach a consensus on the person to hold the office. This inability to reach an agreement 
reflected the shifts in the general atmosphere and in the discourse on human rights 
defenders in Russia. The general discourse became increasingly hostile towards 
"western-minded" liberal human rights defenders who were seen as a hostile force 
acting against Russian interests.323
Evaluation
There were no major changes in the general norm-specific conditions during the period 
from 1996 to early 1998. They remained positive for implementation of the norm. There 
were, however, more fundamental changes with regard to the international and 
environmental conditions to socialisation. The asymmetry and the material bargaining 
power of the CoE diminished considerably with Russia's accession to the organisation. 
It was hoped, however, that the positive decision on membership would encourage 
other, softer socialisation mechanisms such as persuasion and institutionalisation. This 
strategy relied on the supposed moral authority of the organisation in Russia.324 The 
decision to admit Russia reflected the CoE's fear that further postponement of Russian 
membership would erode the CoE's authority in Russia. The general discourse in Russia 
implied that the openness to western models and norms of human rights was losing its 
popularity among Russians. Human rights were increasingly seen as something foreign 
and, respectively, Russian human rights defenders were seen as "fifth columnists"
322 Izvestiia, 4 June 1997 and 5 June 1997.
323 See Morozov, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy Discourse in Today's Russia: Romantic 
Realism and Securitisation of Identity."
324 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion on Russia’s Request for Membership of  
the Council o f Europe.
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representing the interests of foreign powers. Instead of looking up to the European 
example, the Russian leadership started to emphasise the special nature of the Russian 
system. The Russian leadership was increasingly disappointed with the modest results 
of the pro-European approach and was now looking for other, more home-grown 
solutions to its problems. Domestically, the desirability of the norm adoption thus 
weakened. The domestic conditions overall changed discouragingly for norm 
socialisation. First of all, the fairly technical norm of a human rights ombudsman 
became increasingly politicised, which had a negative impact on the prospects of 
implementation of the norm. Both the president and the legislature seemed unwilling to 
attempt to solve the stalemate over the issue. This was not attributable to any lack of 
resources, rather a simple lack of political will.
The European organisations seemed to have very little impact on the Russian 
willingness to implement the norm on a practical level. The European pressure and 
example had been fundamentally important in the legislative work, but once that was 
carried out, the effectiveness of the organisations seemed to stall. The CoE’s repeated 
appeals for implementation had little impact on the quarrels in the Duma.
Russia's hesitation over the implementation did not have an impact on European norms 
or cooperation at large. This was likely to have been because most European states saw 
the norm in a fairly technical light; the norm was regulative rather than constitutive. 
Hence the implications of non-conformity were also less harmful to the larger 
community.
Although progress towards implementation of the norm seemed to be exasperatingly 
slow in Russia, the development could still be explained by the socialisation model. 
Russian discourse did not challenge the norm of the ombudsman as such, but merely 
could not come to terms with any of the potential candidates. The discourse on the 
obligation to implement the norm was positive and consistent. The official discourse 
and the formal, legislative adaptation to the norm were positive and reflected the 
prescriptive status of the norm. The practical implementation was still lacking, but as 
the European institutions maintained the pressure for Russia to accelerate the process, 
the practical breakthrough was likely to take place at some point. The
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institutionalisation of the formal requirements had thus taken place, but 
institutionalisation of the practical implementation was nowhere in sight.
Institutionalisation of the norm or a case of individual learning? 1998-2003
The split over the human rights issue within the political elite became even deeper when 
the first human rights ombudsman was finally elected in May 1998.325 Oleg Mironov 
was a lawyer by education but had not taken any interest in human rights questions prior 
to his election. Mironov was a communist Duma deputy in favour of a strong state and 
the war in Chechnya. His election was generally interpreted as a move backwards in 
human rights protection and several human rights NGOs expressed their concern over 
the issue. Mironov did make some half-hearted attempts to cooperate with human rights 
NGOs at the start of his term but the well-know human rights organisation Memorial, 
for example, refused to work with Mironov claiming that they did not want to be 
complicit in creating the "illusion that there actually exists a human rights ombudsman" 
in Russia. Altogether 12 organisations signed a complaint letter against Mironov’s 
conduct.326
Mironov’s early comments on the war on Chechnya, the death penalty, the priority of 
socio-economic rights and the need for a more "constructive" approach towards the state 
raised suspicion among outside observers. He also urged, rather precariously, that his 
office should not be seen as a "main complaints office" for private citizens.327 After all, 
this was exactly what the office was meant to be for. At first Mironov's office was also 
severely under-funded which made it difficult to act even on questions in which he was 
interested.
By surveying the available documents by the Russian human rights representative, it is 
possible to draw a general picture of the main fields and methods of the ombudsman's 
activity during Mironov's tenure, his shifting foci and priorities as well as the changes in
325 Kommersant, 21 May 1998; Segodnia, 23 May 1998; Novye Izvestiia, 23 May 1998.
326 Moskovskii Komsomolets, 22 June 1999.
327 Mironov's interview in Novye Izvestiia, 2 December 1998.
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the body of citizens' complaints.328 This will help in evaluating the degree of 
institutionalisation and socialisation to the norm in Russia.
As envisaged by the Federal Constitutional Law on the Ombudsman, the methods at the 
ombudsman's disposal consisted of investigating complaints, monitoring practices by 
the authorities, reporting and making suggestions on laws and practices, providing 
human rights education and cooperating constructively with domestic and international 
actors in order to encourage human rights protection in Russia. He did not, however, 
possess the right to make legal initiatives or ask for opinions or interpretations on 
existing laws from the constitutional court.329 He brought up the limitations in his 
mandate in the 1999 report, and also requested that the law should provide some 
enforcement measures to make politically responsible persons reply to his appeals and 
take action on the questions.330
The number of individual and collective complaints has increased steadily. In 1999 the 
ombudsman received 22 815 complaints, while in 2005 the number had risen to over 54 
000 complaints per year.331 There are various factors influencing the increase: first and 
foremost it shows that Russians have learned about the institution and how to use its 
services, and that his activity has increased and the service provided has improved. In 
addition to receiving written complaints, the ombudsman has also offered consultation 
for citizens over the telephone, as well as personal consultation at the office in Moscow 
from 2000 onwards. This has been possible due to a significant increase in the number 
of employees -  in 1998 the ombudsman had approximately 10 employees under him, 
whereas at the beginning of 2004 the number of employees had reached 176.332 The
328 Annual and special reports by the ombudsman 1998-2003 and published letters, appeals, 
opinions and statements from years 2000-2003. All available in Russian at 
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru>.
329 See the law Ob Upolnomochennom po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii.
330 See 1999 annual ombudsman report: Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v 1999 godu," (Moskva: 1999).
331 See 2003 and 2005 annual ombudsman reports: Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2003 godu," (Moskva: 2003); Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2005 godu," (Moskva: 2005).
332 See Lukin's interview, RIA Novosti, 25 March 2004. Text available at 
<http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2004/AGENCIES/040325_2_ria_novosti.html>.
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organisational structure of the office has also evolved: currently the ombudsman 
institution includes Office of Citizens' Rights, Office of Human Rights Education, 
Information and External Relations, Press Service Department, Financial Department 
and Administrative Office. The ombudsman also has an extensive Expert Council at his 
disposal. Its members consist of legal experts, other specialists, and political actors 
within the human rights field as well as representatives of human rights non­
governmental organisations.333
Table 5: Complaints to the ombudsman office 1998-2005
Year Complaints received
1998 (22 Mav onwards) 6 978
1999 22 815
2000 24 985
2001 30 056
2002 33 455
2003 36 634
2004 48 231
2005 54 617
Total 257 771
Generally, the complaints have come from across Russia, and complaints from distant 
districts have increased with the ombudsman's regional visits. Most complaints have 
concerned human rights violations due to criminal activity and civil rights violations. 
Other significant problem areas are social and economic rights, violations of labour 
rights and the human rights violations of military servicemen. The relative shares of 
these categories have remained rather similar from year to year.
Reflecting Mironov's outspoken claims in the press, the 1998 and 1999 reports gave a 
clear priority to social and economic problems, in particular the right to work.335 Against 
the background of the economic crises in 1998 and widespread practice of unpaid wages 
and lost savings, the focus is understandable. Nevertheless, there were later at least three 
important shifts in his annual reports: the reports considered a greater variety of
333 See the website <http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/apparat/a-struct.shtml> for further details.
334 Sources: Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o 
deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2003 godu."; 
Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti 
Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2005 godu."
335 Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti 
Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1998 godu."; 
Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti 
Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1999 godu."
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problems, the priority areas shifted, and the reports started to use human rights NGO 
material as a source and make positive remarks on their actions. Many observers took 
note that during his tenure, Mironov became much more critical towards the state 
authorities than was expected at the beginning.336
337Table 6: Complaints by issue area
1999 2001 2003 2005
Criminal law 31.3%
Civil rights 21.8%
Labour law, work 14.1% 
Problems related to dwelling 
place 10.7%
Social security and pensions 
6.7%
Judicial system 5.6%
Armed forces 5.4% 
Refugees and forced 
migrants 1.6%
Criminal cases 50.1% 
Dwelling place 23.3% 
Work, labour law 7.6% 
Social security, pensions 
6%
Maladministration 3.7% 
Armed forces, military 
servicemen 5.5% 
Refugees and forced 
migrants 1.7% 
International law 1.3%
Civil rights: 57.8% 
Social rights 24.2% 
Economic rights 
16%
Political rights 1.5% 
Cultural rights 0.5%
Civil rights 44.73% 
Social rights 34.9% 
Economic rights 
16.41%
Political rights 3.6% 
Cultural rights 0.36%
One of his newer priority areas was arbitrary rule and torture by the interior ministry 
officers and human rights violations within the "criminal-executive" system (meaning 
the Interior Ministry officials and the correction system under the Justice Ministry).338 
Other important topics were the rights of military servicemen and other socially
336 See comments by a representative of a US-based ombudsman organisation at 
<http://www.usombudsman.org/ServicesActivities/2001_Conference/Intemational_Updatel.PD 
F>.
337 Sources: Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o 
deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1999 godu."; 
Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti 
Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2001 godu," (Moskva: 
2001); Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti 
Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2003 godu."; 
Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti 
Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2005 godu."
338 See special report by the ombudsman on human rights violations by the officers of the 
Interior Ministry and the correction system under the Ministry of Justice: Upolnomochennyi po 
pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Spetsial'nyi doklad o narusheniiah prav grazhdan 
sotrudnikami Ministerstva vnutrennih del Rossiiskoi Federatsii i ugolovno-ispolnitel'noi sistemy 
Ministerstva iustitsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii," (Moskva: 10 Oktiabr 2000).
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vulnerable groups339, human rights violations connected with the Chechen conflict and 
the closely related problem of internally displaced persons in neighbouring areas. These 
themes were all discussed at length in annual and special reports, statements and 
opinions, and in manifold personal appeals. Some serious and widespread human rights 
problems appeared on the pages of his reports fairly late: it was only in 2003 that he 
mentioned at any length the worrisome restrictions of press freedom and wide-spread 
use of violence and threats towards critical journalists, as well as the problems in the 
freedom of religion.
International cooperation is also a central part of the ombudsman's tasks. International 
bodies with whom the ombudsman cooperates on permanent basis include the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
the UN Development Programme, the European Commission, Council of Europe, the 
PACE, the ECtHR, the CoE's Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), the 
ODIHR, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The Russian ombudsman 
meets with his European peers on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. Multilateral 
cooperation takes mainly place within the structures of the CoE, the CBSS or the 
European Ombudsman Institute.340 Mironov was immediately taken into the European 
ombudsman cooperation. Despite the fact that Mironov's office suffered from severe 
under-funding at the beginning of his term, he was able to travel abroad to international 
ombudsman meetings and other CoE related events due to CoE funding.341
Domestically the ombudsman cooperates and coordinates his activities with the network 
of regional ombudsmen. Their number has increased only slowly, as the legislation only
339 See special report by the ombudsman on violations of the rights of persons suffering from 
mental disorders: Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Spetsial'nyi 
doklad o sobliudenii prav grazhdan, stradaiushchih psihicheskimi rasstroistvam," (Moskva: 16 
Iiuni 1999). See also special report on violations of the rights of military servicemen 
Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Spetsial'nyi doklad o 
narushenii ustavnyh pravil vsaimootnoshenii mezhdu voennosluzhashchimi pri otsutstvii 
mezhdu nimi," (Moskva: 17 Iiuni 2000).; and special report on the rights of disabled people, 
Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Spetsial'nyi doklad: Prava i 
vozmozhnosti invalidov v Rossiiskoi Federatsii," (Moskva: 10 Sentibria 2001). All available at 
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/doc/a-sp_doclad.shtml>.
340 See 2002 annual ombudsman report: Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v 2002 godu," (Moskva: 2002).
341 Itogi, 6 July 1999.
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encourages but does not oblige regional governments to establish them. Currently there 
are 33 regional ombudsmen in the 89 regions of Russia.342 This state of affairs naturally 
adds a considerable amount of extra work to the workload of the federal ombudsman. 
Other cooperation partners include the General Prosecutor, Ministries, the President and 
the Presidential Human Rights Commission (since 2004 the Council for Facilitating the 
Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights).343
The European technical cooperation seemed to bear fruit as Mironov's cooperation with 
both domestic and international non-governmental human rights organisations gradually 
deepened. Mironov himself singled out the year of 2001 as a particularly significant 
year in which cooperation between NGOs and the office of the ombudsman was 
consolidated. His partners include the International Red Cross, Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch, Memorial and the Helsinki Moscow Group. He coordinated 
his trip to Chechnya with the Moscow Helsinki Group in 2002, which can be interpreted 
as a sign of growing mutual trust and appreciation.344
Mironov's reorientation did not go unnoticed by Russian societal groups and leaders. In 
October 2000, Mironov published a critical special report on human rights violations by 
the officers of the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Justice. In the report he studied 
torture by the police and serious defects in the judicial system. He also criticised the 
new criminal code for consisting of overtly police state methods. In December, the 
government-owned newspaper Rossiiskaia Gazeta published an open complaint letter to 
President Putin signed by Mironov's ten employees. The main arguments of the letter 
were that Mironov had displayed double standards and a manipulative political mind in 
his work -  for instance by "declaratively criticising Russian authorities of mass 
violations of human rights in Chechnya while shunning debate on the anti-Russian 
action in the Council of Europe", by stamping down the rights of his own employees 
while declaring his determination to protect labour rights, and by discrediting Putin's 
new leadership. They further claimed that Mironov did not care about Russian problems 
and only wanted to please western public opinion. Echoing the practices of old Soviet 
"kompromat", the letter even claimed that some of his innumerable trips abroad had
342 As of 1 November 2006. The list of regional ombudsmen is available at 
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/links/a-sub.shtml>.
343 See footnote 294.
344 Mironov's interview in Moskovskie Novosti, 5 September 2002.
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even been financed by groups connected with the CIA.345 Simultaneously with the 
publication of the letter, Duma deputy Vladimir Semenov from the pro-government 
Unity Party (Edinstvo) suggested that the mechanism of the removal of the ombudsman 
outlined in the law on the Representative should be simplified.346
Mironov replied to the attack by claiming that the letter was evidently a custom-made 
attack on behalf of some quarters of the Russian administration which were displeased 
with his report on human rights violations committed by the officers of the Interior 
Ministry and Ministry of Justice.347 Interestingly, human rights activists -  who had once 
protested against his election to the post of the ombudsman -  spoke now in Mironov’s 
defence. They even published a letter of "unconditional support" for Mironov in which 
they dismissed the letter as completely groundless. They claimed that despite their 
earlier differences, Mironov had grown as a professional and begun to act for the 
protection of human rights in a more balanced manner.348 They wrote that the 
denunciation letter was so groundless that they would not have even bothered to take 
action against it, had it not been published in the official governmental newspaper. All 
characteristics of the attack against Mironov tally with the old Soviet tradition that had 
taken ground anew in Russian politics (see Chapter 6). During the Soviet times, the 
kompromat campaigns always began with a tendentious open letter or article in Pravda 
and soon after the disclosure, the person was discredited and removed from his office.
However, the letter did not stop Mironov from cooperating actively with the European 
structures and criticising the Interior and Justice Ministry's actions. In December 2001, 
Mironov welcomed the visit by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
to Russia by publicly claiming that torture by authorities continued to flourish in Russia, 
as the state authorities had completely disregarded his report's suggestions and personal 
appeals. All in all, Mironov showed remarkable independence of opinion given the low 
expectations at the start of his term. This attitude had its drawbacks: in autumn 2002
345 Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 2 December 2000.
346 Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 16 December 2000.
347 Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 2 December 2000.
348 The letter was published on 16 December 2000 in Rossiiskaia Gazeta and it was signed by 
Ludmila Alexeeva, B. Borshchev, M. Poliakova, S. Pashin and L. Ponomarov -  all well-known 
human rights activists.
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Mironov complained in an interview that president Putin had only agreed to meet him 
once shortly after he had been elected president in 2000.349
It seemed that the targeted ombudsmen collaboration was successful in socialising, if 
not the whole of Russia, at least the ombudsman Mironov. Mironov, for his part, was 
clearly a novice entering an established institution with older members. His reports and 
comments also indicate that he truly wanted become an established member in the 
network and was, for instance, ready to interpret his membership on the board of the 
European Ombudsman Institute in May 2002 as a sign of his "growing authority within 
the network".350
This did not mean that they were like-minded on every question, but simply that there 
was a growth of shared meaning. Mironov also criticised international organisations. 
For example, the 2002 report of the human rights ombudsman takes a closer look at the 
evolving international human rights cooperation. In addition to many positive 
developments mentioned in the report, the ombudsman claims that there still exist a 
number of problems in the relationship. Mironov claims that the Russian ombudsman 
has supported countless suggestions by the CoE, but when he has made suggestions to 
the CoE -  for instance on organising seminars on the development of democratic 
institutions in North Caucasus and issuing joint publications in the field of human rights 
-  a "constructive reaction from the part of the Council of Europe has not followed".351 
The report urges that European cooperation should be more reciprocal and more 
institutionalised by nature. One cannot help but wonder if these words are a serious 
point of criticism or just directed to appease the domestic audience -  especially when 
the ombudsman was a year before publicly accused of yielding to western demands. 
Nevertheless, the 2002 report mentions legal issues, the introduction of CoE norms and 
standards as well as established working methods in the field of human rights as the 
main areas of constructive cooperation.352 The ombudsman has actively supported the 
introduction of European standards and ratification of many European human rights
349 Mironov's interview in Moskovskie Novosti, 5 September 2002.
350 See 2002 annual ombudsman report: Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v 2002 godu.".
351 Ibid.
352 t i  • j
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documents -  including the abolition of death penalty and the ratification of European 
Social Charter -  in his annual reports since 1999.
In summary, the highlight of the period between May 1998 and April 2003 was the fact 
that finally, after years of trying, the norm of the ombudsman institution was 
implemented on a practical level too, and institutionalisation of the practices could 
finally start. The norm was fulfilled formally by adopting constitutional guarantees and 
Federal Constitutional Law on the practical implementation of the norm. It was also 
enforced by consistent official discourse which never cast doubt on the goal of 
implementing the norm. The norm was also implemented in practice after Mironov was 
elected to become the first ombudsman recognised by law in May 1998. His term 
demonstrated that there were significant hurdles for the effective implementation of the 
norm, but also that significant results could be achieved through cooperation.
Evaluation
After the 1998 economic crises, Russia’s economic performance started improving 
considerably and this was further boosted by rising oil prices from the year 2000. 
Russia’s structural position vis-a-vis the west and general self-esteem thus improved, 
and the asymmetry between Russia and the European organisations consequently further 
diminished. Otherwise the scope conditions remained the same as before.
European active involvement, mostly technical cooperation, close scrutiny and 
occasional pressure, appeared to finally have bome fruit. Russian policies were 
consistent at all levels now: legislation, discourse and practical implementation of the 
norm all met the European standards. The institutionalisation was still modest, and the 
implementation and independence of the institution were occasionally contested by 
political actors in Russia. Nevertheless, there was considerable progress on the matter. 
The European organisations were effective in reaching the goals they had set for 
themselves on the question of the institution of the ombudsman. The development in 
Russia reflected positively back to the European level: its implementation strengthened 
the European consensus and coherence of the norm. The process seemed clear-cut and 
there were no unintended effects.
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The election of the ombudsman was the final missing piece in the puzzle of socialisation 
to the norm of the human rights ombudsman institution. Russia seemed to be on its way 
towards internalisation of the norm. Due to the lack of institutionalisation and 
habitualisation processes, Russia could not be considered to be at the stage of rule- 
consistent behaviour. The European non-confrontational, inclusive strategy seemed, 
nevertheless, to be bearing fruit.
Finally institutionalisation? 2004-06
Mironov's five-year term ended officially in May 2003. The hope that the ombudsman 
institution had finally overcome its teething problems and become a non-politicised 
institution proved to be too optimistic a view. Once again, the election of the 
ombudsman reached a deadlock which could not be solved for almost a year, and the 
decision was eventually postponed to another Duma.
Finally the new Duma received a recommendation from President Putin to elect 
Vladimir Lukin, a liberal from the Yabloko party, as the new ombudsman in January 
2004. The President's intervention was in conformity with the law on the ombudsman in 
which it is stated that the president, any member of the Federation Council, Duma or a 
Duma coalition may introduce candidates for the post of the ombudsman.353 After 
Putin's intervention, the Duma managed to pull together on the matter and secure the 
required 300 votes for the election of Lukin. He was elected in February 2004 as 
Russia's second official ombudsman. This result was hardly a surprise since the newly- 
elected Duma was composed overwhelmingly of deputies from the party of power 
United Russia (Edinaia Rossiia) and other president-minded groups.354
The public speculation inspired by the election reflected the common mistrust, but also 
nascent hope, that many liberals felt towards Putin's leadership. On the one hand it was 
interpreted as a gesture of good will towards the liberals, who had just suffered a bitter 
defeat in the Duma elections in late 2003. Their leaders, including Vladimir Lukin 
himself, had lost their seats and found themselves totally marginalised in Russian
353 He should have, however, made the proposal within a month following the expiration of the 
previous ombudsman's term. See law Ob Upolnomochennom po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii.
354 See, for example, Izvestiia 14 February 2004 and Rossiiskaia Gazeta 14 February 2004.
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political life. On the other hand, Putin's decision was interpreted as proof that the 
president dominated every single political issue in Russia, and that nothing really 
happened without his initiative or approval. Some observers also feared that Putin may 
have been aiming to tame the opposition by means of a "divide and rule" strategy.355
Lukin's aims and values were much closer to CoE norms than Mironov's had been at the 
beginning of his term. However, observers were now more concerned that the teacher 
would be Putin and not the human rights commissioner in Strasbourg.356 The first annual 
report of the ombudsman in 2004 seemed to confirm some of these fears. The new 
ombudsman was careful not to touch upon sensitive, political issues in his reports that 
could irk the authorities. A well-known human rights activist, Lev Ponomarov, claimed 
that Lukin "failed to address several key human rights issues and had apparently 
avoided giving his own view because he wanted to avoid political controversy"357 
Alongside major human rights concerns, the report complained about high oil prices and 
the commercialisation of national television.358 This was widely interpreted as a populist 
attempt to reflect public concerns on non-political issues. The greatest share of 
complaints lodged by citizens concerned social issues, while one-third of complaints 
concerned illegal behaviour on the part of law-enforcing agencies. Unlike Mironov 
before him, Lukin has managed to develop close ties with President Putin. Reflecting 
new times, he presented his annual report first to Putin and only later to the Duma.359
However, the worst of the fears have not materialised. In fact, Lukin's second annual 
report was much firmer in its claims against the authorities, and it did not avoid more 
sensitive political questions either.360 Lukin highlighted police violence, the growth in 
xenophobia and racist attacks, and state control of television in his second report. He 
even firmly stated that he would oppose any unfair restraints on campaigning in
355 The Moscow Times, 25 June 2004.
356 Robert Coalson, "Analysis: Russia's Ombudsman Speaks Out," RFL/RL, 20 July 2004.
357 The Moscow Times, 1 April 2005.
358 See 2004 annual ombudsman report: Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v 2004 godu," (Moskva: 2004).
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/doc/ezdoc/04.shtml>.
359 Itar-Tass, 1 March 2005.
360 See 2005 annual ombudsman report: Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v 2005 godu.", <http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/doc/ezdoc/05.shtml>. For 
commentary, see for example The Moscow Times, 25 April 2006.
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advance of the 2007 parliamentary elections.361 Once again, one-third of the complaints 
concerned abuse by the police.362 Despite the firmer line, Lukin has managed to 
maintain good relations with President Putin and other authorities. Although he has 
actively participated in the European ombudsman cooperation, he has constantly 
downplayed the significance of the international dimension, and responded coldly to 
western accusations regarding Chechnya, claiming that he cannot concentrate 
exclusively on the question of human rights violations in Chechnya.363
To sum up the progress on the issue: the ombudsman institution has succeeded in 
securing greater resources and its working appears to have developed positively in the 
direction of genuine professionalism. The institution has functioned in a smoother 
manner than during the tenure of Mironov, but it is difficult to judge the degree of 
institutionalisation: many of the steps forward might be due to the personality of 
Vladimir Lukin and not necessarily signs of long-term, institutionalised progress. 
Nevertheless, more and more Russians know about the institution and use its services, 
which is indeed a positive development and indication of institutionalisation gaining 
strength. The ombudsman institution is making progress in terms of independence, 
accessibility, cooperation and operational efficiency and its reputation among the 
populace.
Evaluation
As before, the scope conditions for the implementation remained stable. There were 
only minor changes in environmental and domestic conditions when compared with the 
earlier period (of 1998-April 2003). The asymmetry and bargaining power of the 
European institutions diminished as a result of Russia's stabilisation and improving 
economic performance due to record-high oil prices. Also the domestic environment 
became increasingly unpluralistic, and defending human rights in an independent 
manner an even more delicate balancing act. Nevertheless, these changes did not seem 
to have a major impact on the implementation of the norm. The most significant steps 
had been taken before and now the train of the ombudsman institution remained running 
on its tracks. This may have been because the ombudsman holding the office was
361 Coalson, "Analysis: Russia's Ombudsman Speaks Out."
362 Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "Doklad o deiatel'nosti 
Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2005 godu."
36 Coalson, "Analysis: Russia's Ombudsman Speaks Out."
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extraordinarily capable of carrying out the tasks even in an increasingly difficult 
atmosphere.
Once the norm was implemented in all respects, European pressure eased. The 
ombudsman network and technical assistance was kept in place, but political statements 
and pressure grew weaker. There did not seem to be any major threats to the norm, and 
European organisations could congratulate themselves for effective action. The 
continuous Russian implementation of the norm kept the Europe-wide consensus 
unbroken and further enhanced the coherence of the norm.
The development of the ombudsman institution in Russia continued to comply with the 
socialisation models' description. Russia had successfully adopted the norm both 
rhetorically, formally and practically. Russia was at the prescriptive status phase with 
institutionalisation and habitualisation already under way. It would be premature to 
claim that Russia had internalised the norm completely -  only if the next round of 
ombusman elections go smoothly can one begin contemplating the possibility of gradual 
internalisation of the European norm of the ombudsman institution.
5 Conclusion
The development of the national human rights ombudsman institution has been an 
exasperatingly slow process with occasional lulls and standstills, yet it has been 
developing in the right direction. At the beginning the scope conditions for socialisation 
looked promising. The norm-specific conditions were relatively positive with high 
determinacy and adherence to this clearly specified norm. The norm enjoyed a low 
political profile which also pointed towards relatively easy implementation.
There was a growing asymmetry between the struggling Russia and the strong European 
institutions with high moral authority and superior bargaining power. Russia was 
actively looking for European examples and guidance on how to reform its domestic 
system. The European organisations, on the other hand, were eager to show the way and 
provide information and assistance for Russia. The international structure thus favoured 
the quick implementation of the norm of the ombudsman institution.
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There have been some changes in the initial scope conditions for socialisation and -  
according to the literature -  all of them have been mildly discouraging for socialisation. 
Domestically, the human rights issue has shown signs of severe politicisation, and the 
ombudsmen have needed extraordinary diplomatic skills to survive in the post. The 
atmosphere of growing statism and shrinking pluralism are unfavourable for the 
independence of the institution. In general, Russia has stopped looking exclusively 
towards Europe for inspiration, and started to emphasise its uniqueness as an 
international actor.
Despite these negative changes in scope conditions, the development in question has 
been slow but positive. European action seems to have been effective with very few 
unwanted consequences. The Russian ombudsman institution fulfils the European 
criteria and has been socialised to the European cooperation on the question. This has 
without a doubt contributed to the professionalism of the current ombudsman.
The development adheres to the socialisation model described in Chapter 1. The norm 
has been implemented in Russia with the encouragement and pressure from the 
European institutions. The discourse on the issue has developed in a manner that has 
been consistently supportive of such an institution. This discourse has led to major 
legislative reforms and, slowly but surely, to the practical implementation of the norm. 
Gradually, Russia moved from the phase of tactical concessions to the phase of 
prescriptive status. The process of tactical concessions and the processes of arguing and 
persuasion have been present in the norm adoption process with the latter taking over. 
Even when the scope conditions became unfavourable for norm implementation, 
progress on the implementation continued. This would imply successful socialisation to 
the norm and a gradual progression towards the internalisation of the norm through 
institutionalisation and habitualisation.
The potential problems outlined in Chapter 1 do not emerge with regard to the norm of 
the human right ombudsman in Russia. The norm’s socialisation has been, despite its 
slow pace, straightforward: Russia has adopted the European norm as defined by the 
European institutions. Despite some problems, such as the politicisation of the human 
rights question, the norm has taken root in Russia. All sides of the development fulfil 
the criteria of prescriptive status of the norm: the legislation and constitutional
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guarantees are there; the official discourse has never doubted the commitment to the 
norm, and even the practical implementation has overcome the hurdles in its way and 
fulfilled the European requirements for independence and effectiveness. The whole 
process has been about a one-way process of adaptation; the norm has been transferred 
from the international level to the Russian domestic level. The interpretation of the 
norm has been consistent and followed the European parameters. The process has 
progressed systematically through clearly defined stages of tactical concessions and 
prescriptive status. The internalisation of the norm and the stage of norm-consistent 
behaviour is likely to loom somewhere in the relatively near future. Hence the 
developments on the question of human rights ombudsman fit the socialisation model 
rather well.
The development in the case of the institution of an ombudsman presents a fairly 
uncontroversial picture of Russia as a member of the solidarist society in Europe. The 
norm of the ombudsman is a constitutive one; there is an extensive scheme of 
cooperation on the issue and the actors involved in the interaction comprise many non­
state actors. The ombudsman meetings on a European level, country visits of CoE 
officials and public seminars promoting the norm are all examples of solidarism 
between Russia and European actors. There is a notion of the common good, and shared 
values are the very basis for European cooperation on the issue. There is naturally some 
tension between power and interests and the common European norm of the 
ombudsman institution, yet for the time being, solidarist consensus over the norm seems 
to prevail.
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CHAPTER 5
NORM OF ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
This chapter looks at the ways in which the European organisations have promoted the 
European norm o f abolition o f the death penalty in Russia, and what kind o f impact the 
cooperation has had since the late 1980s. The development is analysed against the 
theoretical discussion on scope conditions, impact and effectiveness o f international 
cooperation, and the socialisation model outlined in Chapter 1.
1 Background to the Norm of Abolition
The death penalty, or capital punishment, is commonly defined as the legally authorised 
killing of someone as punishment for a crime.364 States are divided into four groups 
according to their approach to the issue of the death penalty. The first group of states 
consists of abolitionist states whose law does not provide for the death penalty for any 
crime. There is considerable consensus on the norm: all European Union member states 
have abolished the death penalty for all crimes apart from Latvia. The second category 
consists of states, which are abolitionist for ordinary crimes. Their laws provide for the 
death penalty only for exceptional crimes such as military crimes or crimes committed 
during wartime.365 The third group consists of de facto abolitionist states: their law 
retains the death penalty but in practice they have not applied capital punishment during 
the past ten years or more, or they have made an international commitment not to carry 
out executions. The Russian Federation is currently the only CoE member state which 
belongs to this group of states. The fourth group of states is retentionist with regard to 
the death penalty. These states retain and use the death penalty for ordinary crimes. 
However, there is great variation within this group as regards the frequency of the 
application of the death penalty. It may be part of the common judicial practice or it 
may be a highly rare measure reserved for truly exceptional crimes.366
364 This is the definition of capital punishment in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary at 
Oxford Reference Online, Oxford University Press <http://www.oxfordreference.com/>.
365 Latvia belongs to this group of states. The categorisation outlined here is a standard one in 
the literature on the death penalty and used, for example, by Amnesty International. See up to 
date lists of abolitionist states and states in categories at 
<http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng>.
366 Carsten Anckar, Determinants of the Death Penalty: A Comparative Study of the World 
(London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 4-5.
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The movement to abolish the death penalty has its roots in the humanistic ideas of the 
Enlightenment in the second half of the 18th century. The abolitionist ideas of 
Montesquieu and Cesare Beccaria were highly influential in Russia. Beccaria's essay On 
Crimes and Punishment (1764), in which he advocated the replacement of criminal 
systems based on vengeance with a fairer, graded system of penalties based on 
proportionality and greater certainty, led to the abolition of the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes in Tuscany and Austria. The Russian empress Elizabeth, who 
suspended the application of the death penalty during her rule, was also known for her 
great admiration of Montesquieu's Spirit o f Laws (1748).367
Nevertheless, it was not until the late 19th century that the abolitionist movement 
gathered ground on a larger scale. Latin America and Europe became the two centres of 
the abolitionist movement which saw the use of the death penalty as uncivilised and 
cruel practice. Venezuela was the first state to abolish the death penalty for all crimes in 
1863. In the following years Costa Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay and Columbia also all 
abolished the death penalty. In Europe, San Marino became the first completely 
abolitionist state in 1865. Romania soon followed its example.368 For decades these two 
states were the only completely abolitionist states in Europe. A few countries -  the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Norway, Sweden and Iceland -  abolished the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes before the Second World War.369 Outside Latin America and Europe the 
abolitionist movement has gained strength only from the 1980s.370
In general, there are clear regional patterns in the attitude towards, and the use of, 
capital punishment. It is widely in use in Asia and Africa, whereas Europe is by and 
large abolitionist. Most Latin American states have abolished the death penalty for all 
crimes, but many small states in the Caribbean are still retentionist. Oceania has 
traditionally had a restrictive attitude towards the application of the death penalty; some 
of the smaller states still retain death penalty in law but none of them do so in practice. 
North America has been split on the issue: Canada is proud to be an abolitionist state,
367 See, for example, Roger Hood, "Capital Punishment: A Global Perspective," Punishment and 
Society 3, no. 3 (2001): p. 332.
368 Capital punishment was reinstated in Romania in 1939.
369 The Netherlands abolished the death penalty in 1870, Portugal in 1867, Norway in 1905, and 
Sweden in 1921. Iceland became an abolitionist state for all crimes in 1928.
370 Anckar, Determinants of the Death Penalty: A Comparative Study of the World, pp. 17-20.
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but in the United States the death penalty is even more widely in use today then it was 
twenty years ago.371
Despite regional differences, there is a fairly global long-term trend towards more 
restrictive use of the death penalty and its abolition. The number of abolitionist states 
has significantly increased since the mid-1980s. During the period from 1991 to 2003, 
35 states abolished the death penalty. In 2006, there were altogether 88 abolitionist 
states for all crimes and 11 for ordinary crimes in the world.372
2 Abolition of the Death Penalty as a European Norm
Since the mid-1980s, Europe has acted as a global pioneer in the development of the 
norm of abolition of the death penalty. The current European abolitionist norm includes 
abolition of the death penalty both in practice and in law.373 There is a strong trend 
towards complete abolition of the death penalty, without any exceptions. However, the 
formal, regional judicial norms lag slightly behind. In 1983, the CoE accepted the 
Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR concerning the abolition of the death penalty for ordinary 
crimes.374 The protocol did not rule out the possibility of using death penalty during war 
for military crimes. Ratification of the Protocol No. 6 is required by all CoE member 
states.375 However, in 2002 the CoE accepted Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR concerning 
the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances.376 This means that the law does 
not provide for the death penalty for any crime, not even for military crimes or crimes
371 Ibid.
372 In addition there are 30 states which have been abolitionist in practice for 10 years or more 
and/or have signed international agreements banning the death penalty. See 
<http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng>.
373 See Renate Wohlwend, "The Efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe," in The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1999), p. 
56.
374 The protocol was opened for signatures on 28 April 1983. Twelve of the then 21 members 
signed the protocol on that day. It entered into force with five ratifications on 1 March 1985.
375 Hans Christian Kruger, "Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights," in 
The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1999), pp. 70-71.
376 Council of Europe, Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All 
Circumstances, 3 May 2002, CETS No. 187.
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committed during wartime. 36 of CoE's 46 member states have already ratified it and 8 
member states are expected to ratify it soon.377
The European norm is thus tied to the formal abolition; de facto abolitionism is not 
considered enough. The norm is based on the idea that the death penalty is not an issue 
o f the criminal justice system of every sovereign state, but an international issue of 
human rights. It is often also compared with torture, and seen as an inhuman and 
degrading punishment within the meaning of the Article 3 of the ECHR.378
However, this norm has only emerged in earnest since the end of the Cold War. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), ECHR (1950) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1960) all recognised the right to life, but before 
the 1980s, the death penalty was still considered to be an internal matter of sovereign 
states. The original text of the ECHR explicitly states that the death penalty may be 
applied by states under certain conditions.379
NGOs and parliamentarians played an important role in the emergence of the European 
norm of abolition of the death penalty. The traditional sovereignty-based interpretation 
began to be questioned by international non-governmental human rights organisations 
such as the Amnesty International and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1973, the PACE presented a motion for 
a resolution on the abolition of capital punishment. It was followed by the establishment 
of the post of Special Rapporteur on the issue but the work was later suspended. Only in 
1979 the Legal Affairs Committee took the question into consideration and appointed a 
new rapporteur. Based on this report, the PACE passed a resolution and 
recommendation on the issue on 22 April 1980. The decision led to the drafting of the 
Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR concerning the abolition of the death penalty for ordinary 
crimes. The protocol was opened for signatures on 28 April 1983. Twelve of the then 21
377 The current situation can be checked on the web pages of Amnesty International, 
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engACT500032006>.
378 See, for example, Wohlwend, "The Efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe," p. 55. Wohlwend is a member of the Liechtenstein delegation to the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe.
379 See Article 2 (1), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.
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members signed the protocol on that day. It entered into force with five ratifications on 
1 March 1985.380
Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR is the first agreement under international law containing a 
legal obligation to abolish the death penalty during peacetime. It does not oblige states 
to introduce national legislation, but instead directly prohibits capital punishment. States 
are not allowed to make reservations when ratifying the Protocol. Furthermore, the 
protection against capital punishment is unconditional and cannot be suspended by 
Article 15, which allows measures derogating from its obligations under the ECHR on 
the basis of war or public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Protocol 6 is 
also subject to the formal conditions of denunciation: the denunciation is possible only 
after the expiry of five years from the date on which it became a party to it, and after six 
months’ notice to the Secretary General of the CoE.381
This early discussion on the abolition of the death penalty within the CoE involved only 
its western European member states. However, with the new thinking and the easing of 
the Cold War, the socialist states also began to engage in the debate on capital 
punishment that took place within the CSCE framework. The topic was included on the 
agenda of the 1989 Vienna Follow-up Meeting, and the concluding document 
mentioned that the participating states should use capital punishment only for the most 
serious crimes and in accordance with the law and not contrary to their international 
commitments. The issue was further considered in the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension in which the states promised to publish and 
exchange information on the application of the death penalty. The following 1991 
Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension and the Helsinki and Budapest CSCE 
Summits mentioned the topic of the death penalty. Reflecting the C/OSCE's 
heterogeneous nature, the OSCE is even today more lenient on the issue of the death 
penalty than the CoE and the EU. The OSCE encourages discussion on the topic, 
requires more a transparent and humane application of it and promotes the goal of 
abolition. Since 1999, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
has published an annual review on the use of the death penalty in which the 
international standards and the use of the death penalty by OSCE states are studied. The
380 Kruger, "Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights," p. 70.
381 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
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data in the report comes from the participating states themselves.382 Nine of the OSCE's 
55 member states continue to retain the death penalty in some form.383
After the collapse of communism, the CoE has played a significant role in promoting 
the international norm of the abolition of the death penalty in Central and eastern 
Europe. The abolition -  or at least immediate moratorium and a commitment for its 
legal abolition by ratifying the Protocol No. 6 -  of capital punishment became a pre­
condition for joining the CoE in June 1994. At that time, the CoE also called for all its 
de facto abolitionist member states to abolish the death penalty in law.384 Legal 
guarantees -  and in particular the ratification of the Protocol No. 6 and Protocol No. 13 
-  naturally makes the change in national policies less likely. In addition to this practical 
justification, the formal, legal abolition of the death penalty holds significant symbolic 
value. It is not only a practical question of a state not applying the death penalty, but 
essentially a question of identifying oneself with the European abolitionist states and the 
values and norms that they uphold.385
The development of the norm within the EU structures also reflects these general trends. 
When Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR entered into force on 1 March 1985 only nine of the 
then fifteen EU member states had abolished the death penalty for all crimes. However, 
with the end of the Cold War, human rights became one of the cornerstones of European 
policy, both internally and externally.386 After the Cold War, the European Parliament 
also started to push for greater respect for human rights and campaigned for the 
abolition of the death penalty by member states. The new commitment to human rights 
was reflected in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Its final act included a declaration on 
the EU commitment to the abolition of death penalty.387 Today, all the EU member 
states apart from Latvia have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, and most of
382 See information at <http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_2_224.html?print=l>.
383 Only Belarus, the US and Uzbekistan are completely retentionist. The figure includes de 
facto abolitionist (such as Russia) as well as partly abolitionist states (such as Latvia and 
Albania, which have adopted protocol no. 6 to the ECHR). More information available at 
<http://www.osce.org/odihr/13754.html>.
384 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation on the Abolition of Capital 
Punishment, 1246 (1994).
385 Rick Fawn, "Death Penalty as Democratization: Is the Council of Europe Hanging Itself?," 
Democratization 8, no. 2 (2001): p. 69.
386 Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," p. 247.
387 Ibid. See also Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, p. 106.
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them have done so through ratification of Protocol No. 13. The EU adopted Guidelines 
for EU Policy toward Third Countries on the Death Penalty in June 1998 and has also 
actively campaigned for the ratification of CoE protocols on the abolition of the death 
penalty in the EU member states and outside the EU.388 The EU's statement in 2003 is 
an illustrative example of the common efforts of the European organisations in the 
question of abolition of the death penalty. The Union urges:
"Member States of the Council of Europe, who have not yet done so, to sign Protocol 13 
and to ratify Protocol 6 which abolishes the death penalty in times of peace. [...] The 
European Union reiterates its longstanding and firm position against the use of the death 
penalty in all circumstances -  a punishment, which we believe impairs the human 
dignity, increases the level of brutality and provides no added value in terms of 
deterrence."389
The current European norm -  as defined by the CoE and the EU -  is thus the complete 
practical and legal abolition of the death penalty. However, for Russia the formal 
requirement remains the ratification of Protocol No. 6, although most European states 
are experiencing growing pressure to abolish the death penalty for all crimes by 
ratifying Protocol No. 13.
Evaluating the scope conditions around the case of abolition of the death penalty, one 
may note that the norm-specific conditions are generally favourable for norm 
adaptation. The norm has been defined in a clear manner in various legal documents. 
There are two legally binding documents (Protocol No. 6 and No. 13) which both the 
EU and the Council of Europe actively promote in CoE states. Hence the determinacy 
of the norm is very strong. Clearly-worded, legally binding documents also imply that 
the requirement for symbolic validation is high. Likewise, the coherence and consensus 
on the norm are high in today's Europe. The requirement for abolition is the same for all 
CoE members. Also, the practical implementation of the norm is coherent: all other CoE 
states have ratified protocol No. 6 to the ECHR at the very least; most of them have also 
abolished the death penalty completely from their national law, and have in many cases
388 European Union, Council of the EU, Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on 
the Death Penalty, 3 June 1998.
389 European Union, Council of the EU, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the 
European Union to Mark the Entry into Force of Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, 14 July 
2003, Doc. 11249/03, P 83/03. Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union 
to Mark the Entry into Force of Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances.
165
ratified Protocol No. 13. Finally, adherence to the norm is strong; a clear norm 
hierarchy has been established. Practical abolition of the norm is considered insufficient 
- it must be done following certain, formalised procedures, that is, the ratification of the 
Protocols No. 6 and 13. Hence, according to Franck's criteria, there should be a strong 
pull to adopt and implement the norm in practice by the CoE member states.390 Even 
though executions are cheaper than long prison sentences, the implementation of the 
norm would not require extensive resources from a country like Russia where the death 
penalty was applied restrictively in any case.391 The only condition that implies potential 
difficulties in the socialisation process is the high political profile of the norm.
3 European Promotion of Abolition of the Death Penalty in Russia
As described earlier, the early post-Cold War east-west discussion on abolition of the 
death penalty took place almost exclusively within the CSCE. However, the CoE and 
the EU later took the lead on the abolition of the death penalty campaigning and the 
C/OSCE has moved into the background. The abolition issue is not a high priority one 
for the OSCE and its modest strategy attempts to invoke primarily argumentative 
rationality. Russia is vaguely expected to socialise the norm through regular discussion 
on the topic and gradually becoming socialised to the normal practices of the majority 
of the OSCE states. The methods are very delicate and soft, persuasion being the 
strongest of the methods used. Pressure and coercion are not used and, in general, the 
engagement level on the issue is low. The low level of engagement is justifiable on the 
basis of low leverage on the issue. Action against the death penalty is difficult in an 
organisation whose members include strongly retentionist states such as the US.
By applying for CoE membership in 1992, Russia committed itself to the requirements 
that came with it. The abolition of the death penalty was on the membership agenda 
from 1994 onwards, but in 1995 the CoE announced that it would request Albania, 
Moldova, Ukraine and Russia to enter the same commitment regarding the death 
penalty: namely, "to sign within one year and ratify within three years from the time of
390 Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, pp. 91-134.
391 According to the CoE, in 1993 Russia executed 3 persons and in 1994 10 people. See 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion: Russia's Application for Membership of 
the Council of Europe. The last year of executions was, however, exceptional. According to 
Anatolii Pristavkin, Russia executed 139 prisoners from 1995 to 1996. Pristavkin, "A Vast Place 
of Execution - the Death Penalty in Russia," p. 133.
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accession Protocol No. 6" to the ECHR.392 Russia's progress towards the implementation 
of the membership conditions was scrutinised closely by the CoE. Russia was accepted 
to become a CoE member state in February 1996 although it still applied the death 
penalty. It was nevertheless fundamentally clear to all parties that no executions were to 
be carried out after the accession. On the day of the accession, the Russian leadership 
promised to comply with the CoE requirements: to suspend executions from that date 
onwards and to ratify Protocol No. 6 in three years time.393
Thus, in the early 1990s, the CoE was in a very good position to influence Russian 
policies on the death penalty (and on human rights in general). Russia wanted to 
become a member and was willing to be judged by the same standards as everyone else 
in the CoE. There was a strong asymmetrical relationship between the actors. The 
organisation was an authoritative institution, and Russia wanted its recognition and to 
become a member in the organisation of European democracies. The CoE had strong 
bargaining power on human rights, and its engagement level was high on the issue. Its 
policy on the death penalty aimed at invoking all three mechanisms of change: 
bargaining and instrumental rationality, persuasion and argumentative rationality, as 
well as the institutionalisation of norms in Russia. The CoE lost its most efficient 
material bargaining tool, namely pre-membership conditionality, with Russia's 
accession. After 1996, the organisation employed instruments such as monitoring, 
discussion and debate, moral shaming and in practice limited post-membership 
conditionality. In principle, it can still adopt coercive methods but they are always 
difficult to employ in practice.
The CoE's more specific policy instruments target many levels. Through its assistance 
and education programmes, the CoE has aimed at convincing Russian authorities that 
abolition is in Russia's own interests and that it is possible also in financial and practical 
terms. The CoE's educational and informational work has revolved around the provision 
of information to Russian officials about research on the death penalty and engaging in 
dialogue with them. It has organised conferences and seminars in which it has tried to 
convince Russian officials and public opinion over the fact that capital punishment has
392 Opinion: Russia's Application for Membership of the Council of Europe; Wohlwend, "The 
Efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe," p. 57.
393 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion on Russia's Request for Membership of 
the Council of Europe.
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statistically insignificant deterrence value and that no abolitionist state has experienced 
a sudden and serious change in the curve of crime following its abolition.394
The CoE and the EU launched a joint public awareness campaign on the issue of the 
death penalty at a cost of EUR 670 000 over two years to provide information for the 
general public, legal experts and parliamentarians in Albania, Turkey, Russia and the 
Ukraine in 1999. Assistance for initiatives aimed at abolition of the death penalty is one 
of eight key priorities of the EIHRD in Russia.395 The Common Strategy of 1999-2004 
mentioned the death penalty as one of the main areas of EU assistance. The EU sought 
to:
"[...support] Russian efforts to meet its international human rights commitments 
including those to the Council of Europe, the UN and the OSCE, and by promoting joint 
EU-Council of Europe activities regarding Russia in the fields of the rule of law and 
human rights; by giving assistance in safeguarding human rights, including those of 
women, children and minorities, and by enhancing programmes to promote the abolition 
of the death penalty."396
The PCA does not mention the death penalty, nor does it contain any references to CoE 
obligations for the simple reason that Russia was not a member of the CoE when the 
treaty was negotiated. Nevertheless, the EU has called Russia to abolish the death 
penalty by ratifying Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR many times.397 The EU has established 
confidential human rights consultations with Russia, and has tried to convince Russia on 
the fundamental importance of ratifying Protocol No. 6 in these confidential semi­
annual meetings.398 The first such meeting took place in March 2005.
The EU thus attempts to invoke the logic of arguing through moral shaming, discussion 
and political pressure. It has few instruments at its disposal, and has therefore opted to 
collaborate with the CoE on the issue. Although the EU is clear on the issue and is
394 Wohlwend, "The Efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe," pp. 58- 
60.
395 European Union, "Supporting the Development of Civil Society in Russia: European Union 
Support for Strengthening Democracy and Human Rights in Russia at Grass-Roots Level," p. 7.
396 European Union, Council of the EU, Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 4 
June 1999,1999/414/CFSP.
397 See for example European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on President Putin's 
Statement Supporting the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the Russian Federation, 17 July 
2001, PESC/01/127.
398 This was confirmed by a Finnish foreign ministry official who had taken part in the human 
rights consultations three times (as a representative of the EU troika). Private correspondence 
with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 8 December 2006.
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active, its position on the question of abolition vis-a-vis Russia is weak. There is an 
asymmetrical relationship between the actors, but the EU still has very little bargaining 
power as Russia is not a member, nor does it want to be a member of the EU. Russians 
often view the EU as an external actor who should not have any say in Russian matters. 
Its attempts to influence internal developments in Russia are often met with suspicion.
In summary, the European institutions have required (CoE), actively promoted (the EU 
and the CoE), and encouraged (OSCE) Russia to abolish the death penalty in practice 
and in law through various means since the early 1990s. According to the EU and CoE, 
this should be done by ratifying Protocol No. 6 or No. 13 to the ECHR. The EU and 
CoE have made their stance on the issue well known: Russia should adopt the European 
norm of abolition in order to show its commitment to common European values. Russia 
is to be treated as any other European state that is an applicant or member of the CoE 
and a close strategic partner with the EU.
The scope conditions at the international level were initially very promising for norm 
adaptation. There was a strong asymmetry between Russia and the organisations, and 
the moral authority of the Council of Europe in particular was high on the issue. The 
material bargaining power of the CoE was similarly superior after the Russian 
Federation's application for its membership in 1992.
4 Developments in the Soviet Union and Russia 
Historical roots
The death penalty has long historical roots in Russia. It has been included in all written 
law collections ever since the 14th century. Traditionally, the death penalty was used 
against thieves, while homicides were customarily dealt with through blood vengeance 
by the relatives of the victims. The function of the death penalty was to maintain order 
in society and respect for property, and to warn other subjects of the consequences of 
misbehaving. The system of punishment and the process of execution became 
increasingly harsh with the consolidation of the centralised Russian state and the 
introduction of written laws.399
399 Alexander S. Mikhlin, The Death Penalty in Russia (London: Simmonds & Hill Publishing
and Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp. 10-13.
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The legal norms were further developed in the Military Articles of 1715. This was the 
first attempt to systematise criminal law norms in Russia, and Peter I supervised the 
work himself. The collection developed the ideas of vengeance further, and expanded 
the application of the death penalty: more than one hundred types of crimes could be 
punished by the death penalty.400
However, the time of the enlightenment reversed the harshening trend in the application 
of the death penalty. Its application was suspended during the reign of Empress 
Elizabeth (Empress 1741-62), marking Russia as the first country in Europe to do so. 
The courts continued to apply it, but no executions were -  at least officially -  carried 
out during her rule.401
Catherine II (Empress 1762-96) was similarly drawn towards the liberal ideas of the 
enlightenment. She was a great admirer of Montesquieu and, while she was not ready to 
abolish death penalty altogether, she did call for limitation in the application of the 
death penalty. She published a book laying out her vision of the ideal state, and set up a 
legislative commission to work on the basis of the book. The commission was, 
however, disbanded in 1768 without any concrete results, and Catherine's progressive 
ideas had no impact on prevailing practices.402
The 19th century witnessed a downward trend in the application of the death penalty, a 
development which corresponded with general European developments at the time. The 
1832 Digest of Laws allowed death penalty as a punishment for grave crimes against the 
state and certain other types of crime. Its application was relatively restricted, but at the 
same time harsh corporal punishments continued to be used widely and in practice these 
punishments often led to the death of the convicted person. Nevertheless, by the mid- 
19th century, a lively debate on the death penalty existed among Russian intellectuals 
and scholars. This discussion closely followed wider European philosophical trends of
401 Corporal punishment was used in overcrowded prisons and a big proportion of the convicts 
did not survive the punishment and hence non-execution was more formal than practical.
402 It did not stop the crimes against the state being harshly punished and more than twenty 
thousand participants of the Pugachev Uprising (1773-74) being sentenced to death. See 
Mikhlin, The Death Penalty in Russia, pp. 13-14.
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the day. The advocates of abolition referred to general principles of humanity and the 
idea of Russia as a civilised state that needed a criminal system based on the 
correctional nature of the punishments.403 There were increasing restrictions in the 
application of the death penalty. The Statute on Criminal Procedure (1864) laid out 
specific procedure for the appeal of death sentences, the pardoning of convicted persons 
and the execution of judgements. Reflecting ideas of humanity and "civilised 
behaviour", the death penalty was carried out as a rule by non-public hanging. The 
figures decreased significantly over the years: in the late 19th century only 10-50 people 
were sentenced to death annually.404
The trend towards greater regulation and limitation of the application of the death 
penalty continued in the 20th century. The Criminal Code of 1903 retained capital 
punishment for a limited number of political crimes. It also introduced "humanistic" 
limitations to its execution -  pregnant women and adolescents were excluded from its 
application.
However, the downwards trend was soon interrupted by turbulent political events. The 
use of the death penalty increased during the revolution of 1905-06: the figures are 
likely to have risen up to thousands annually.405 Despite this, the progressive ideas and 
abolitionist spirit was strong in Russian society. Both the first and the second State 
Duma adopted laws on the abolition of death penalty (in 1906 and in 1907 respectively) 
but on both occasions the more conservative Senate Council refused to confirm the 
abolition.
New momentum for the abolition arrived with the bourgeois revolution in February 
1 9 1 ? 4 0 6  ^  March 1917, the Provisional Government abolished the death penalty for the 
very first time in Russian history. However, the government decided to restore the death 
penalty as early as July of the same year in order to retain some order in a state on the
403 See Ibid.
404 Ibid., p. 15.
405 See Ibid.
406 February comes from the Julian calendar (O.S.) that was used in Russia at the time. The 
revolution took place in March by the Gregorian calendar (N.S.) in use today.
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verge of collapse. This did not prevent the October Revolution from taking place later 
that year.407
The Soviet rule
The death penalty was always a controversial issue for the Soviet state. It was 
considered to be incompatible with socialist ideals hut remained widely in use in 
everyday practice. Due to this contradiction, its provisional character was constantly 
stressed in law. During the Soviet rule, capital punishment was abolished altogether 
three times but was quickly reinstated each time.408
The first attempt to abolish the death penalty came as early as 26 October 1917 (O.S.) 
by the Decree of the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets. However, the abolition was 
reversed very soon: in February 1918 (N.S.) the Council of People's Commissars issued 
a decree entitled "The Socialist Fatherland in Danger" which authorised the Cheka409 to 
carry out shootings even without a court for a wide range of crimes: for the commission 
of crimes by enemy agents, speculators, pogrom organisers, hooligans, counter­
revolutionary agitators, and German spies, to name just a few. In practice, the vague 
formulations gave the Cheka unlimited powers to carry out arbitrary killings. The 
application of the death penalty was further specified in a decree of the People's 
Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR on 16 June 1918. It stated that death sentences 
could be passed by troikas or five-person boards of the Cheka on the basis of 
"revolutionary consciousness". These sentences were not subject to appeal.410
The second attempt to renounce the death penalty came in January 1920 in the Decree 
of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's 
Commissars of the RSFSR.411 Once again, only seven months later the abolition was 
cancelled and dangerously open-ended rights were given to revolutionary tribunals.
407 October (O.S.) and November (N.S.).
408 Mikhlin, The Death Penalty in Russia, pp. 17-18.
409 Cheka stands for the Soviet secret police called All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for 
Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage (Vserossiiskaia chrezvychainaia komissiia po 
borbe s kontrrevoliutsiei i sabotazhem, VChK) that existed from 1917 to1922.
410 Mikhlin, The Death Penalty in Russia, pp. 17-18.
411 In Ukraine the death penalty was retained.
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In the first RSFSR Criminal Code of 1922, the death penalty was declared to be a 
provisional measure that would operate "until its repeal by the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee" (Article 33). The provisional nature of the death penalty was also 
stressed in the 1924 Fundamental Principles of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and 
the Union Republics (Article 13 [2]) and the 1926 RSFSR Criminal Code (Article 21).412 
The 1926 Criminal Code narrowed the scope for the application of the death penalty and 
can be seen as sign of gradually increasing stability in society.
Despite growing stability, extrajudicial shootings were applied extensively in the 1930s. 
The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD)413 is infamous for executing 
hundreds of thousands people during the repression of the 1930s. Alongside 
extrajudicial killings, the judicial application of the death penalty was expanded. This 
mass repression was based on the theory of intensification of the resistance of the 
overthrown classes, which did not reflect the Soviet reality.
On 29 May 1947, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet passed an edict "On the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty". In the letter, it abolished capital punishment during 
peacetime and replaced the death penalty by the deprivation of freedom for 25 years. 
The sincerity of this proposal is doubtful: even during the period of formal abolition, a 
secret directive secured the behind the scenes application of executions by a special 
court of the Ministry of State Security.414 The abolition is perhaps best interpreted as a 
classic case of Soviet propaganda; it served the goal of attracting positive international 
publicity for the "progressive" nature of Stalin’s Russia. In a most peculiar episode, the 
Soviet delegation submitted a proposal to abolish the death penalty in all states at the 
UN General Assembly in 1949. Nevertheless, even the fa?ade of the abolition crumble 
soon: in 1950 the formal prohibition of the death penalty was repealed.415
The 1960 Criminal Code retained the death penalty but stressed its provisional 
character. It claimed that the death penalty was "a temporary and exceptional measure 
of punishment which is temporarily applied pending its complete abolition and only for 
specific and extremely dangerous offences, which threaten the foundations of the
412 Mikhlin, The Death Penalty in Russia, p. 17.
413 Narodnyi komissariiat vnutrennih del.
414 Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti.
415 Mikhlin, The Death Penalty in Russia, p. 21.
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structure of the state and society and which are committed under especially aggravated 
circumstances".416
Since the October Revolution, the Soviet legislation reflected the ideological and 
propagandist desire to abolish the death penalty, but the repressive state system clearly 
needed such an extreme measure in order to survive in power. Therefore, the numerous 
bans were always short-lived and their practical application was always weak.
Some debate on the death penalty existed in the margins of society from the 1960s 
onwards. Liberal dissidents such as Andrei Saharov and Sergei Kovalev spoke out 
against capital punishment in the 1960s, but their views were little known outside the 
dissident circles. Even the statistics on its application were classified at the time.417 This 
state of affairs began to change gradually during the perestroika years of the late 1980s. 
Glasnost made public debate possible on the issue, and there were also attempts to limit 
the application of capital punishment. The Soviet Union excluded economic and other 
non-violent crimes from the list of crimes, which could be punished by the death 
penalty. However, the list still remained rather long with 24 different crimes. In 
practice, nonetheless, it was already the norm that capital punishment was considered 
only for homicides and some especially grave infringements on the life of a person.418
In the public domain, many members of the so-called intelligentsia started to actively 
promote the idea of a more civilised criminal system and the abolition of the death 
penalty. References were regularly made to the European abolitionist example.419 The 
liberal discourse highlighting humanistic ideals was dominant for a while, but as the 
debate heated up, the general public’s distaste for abolition became increasingly 
apparent. In 1987, the Soviet State granted a general amnesty for nearly all convicts on 
death row in the name of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. The event
416 Criminal Code, Article 23. Cited in Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide 
Perspective, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 28.
417 According to the records published at the beginning of the 1990s, about 21000 people were 
executed in the Soviet Union from 1962 to 1990. See Pristavkin, "A Vast Place of Execution - 
the Death Penalty in Russia," p. 131.
418 Mikhlin, The Death Penalty in Russia, pp. 21-22.
419 See for example Nedelia, 19-25 October 1987, Moskovskaia pravda, 17 May 1987, Ogonok, 
no. 33, August 1987.
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stirred up emotions and ordinary people wrote passionately to papers in defence of 
harsh punishments and against the measure taken by the government.420
At the turn of the decade, the views expressed in newspapers started to reflect 
increasingly the concerns of the public, rather than the ideals of the liberal elite. The 
fight against organised crime was often given as the reason for the retention of the 
practice of capital punishment. New information appeared in the form of opinion polls 
on the issue, as well as statistics on the application of the death penalty in the Soviet 
Union.421 In the concluding document of the 1990 Copenhagen Human Rights Meeting, 
the participating states promised to "exchange information on the question of the 
abolition of the death penalty and to make available to the public information regarding 
the use of the death penalty".422 In April 1991, the statistics on the application of the 
death penalty in the Soviet Union were finally published in their entirety. The statistics 
indicated a clear decrease in the number of executions in the late 1980s.423 To 
summarise, there was a clear trend towards the restriction of, and openness on, the use 
of the death penalty during the final years of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also 
showed willingness to cooperate with the European organisations on the issue.
Evaluation
During the Soviet rule, the international scope conditions were not particularly 
favourable for socialisation to European norms by the Soviet Union. The international 
system was based on the competition of the east and the west, and even though the 
Soviet-led eastern bloc was arguably weaker than the US-led western bloc, there was 
insufficient asymmetry to encourage socialisation. The Soviet Union had a distinctive 
identity based on socialist ideology and an acknowledged status as one of the two 
superpowers. The prospects for cooperation were weak. In addition to the UN, the 
CSCE process was the first institution to encourage dialogue on norms such as abolition 
of the death penalty. Nevertheless, the CSCE had very limited leverage on such 
sensitive issues as the death penalty, in particular because it lacked a common view on 
the issue. Within the CSCE, the US position on the death penalty was in stark 
contradiction with the European abolitionist aspirations.
420 Ogonok, no. 33, August 1987 and Ogonok, no. 49, December 1987.
421 Pristavkin, "A Vast Place of Execution - the Death Penalty in Russia," p. 131.
422 See Izvestiia, 1 October 1990, 17 January 1991 and 5 April 1991.
423 Mikhlin, The Death Penalty in Russia, p. 65.
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The international structure started to change in the late 1980s when a new asymmetry 
started to emerge as the Soviet Union sought to join the "common European home". 
There was a growing sense of urgency to find new solutions to the chronic problems of 
the state systems in the eastern bloc. Since socialism itself seemed to be unable to meet 
the modem challenges, it was only natural to look to western Europe for guidance. The 
European organisations were quick to adapt themselves to the new situation and were 
soon both willing and capable to assist the Soviet Union/Russia in its reforms.
However, the cooperation on the question of the death penalty remained modest during 
these early years. This was due to fact that the European norm was still weak in many 
respects. The determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, consensus and even the 
adherence were all modest. Neither the CoE nor the EU had started their campaign for 
the abolition norm before the 1980s. The CoE's Protocol No. 6 had only been opened 
for signatures in 1983, and it entered into force in 1985. At the time, this norm was 
considered to be an emerging western European norm with no direct impact on the 
Soviet Union. There existed a European abolitionist tradition, but the formal, explicit 
norm was still weak. There were no international, legal documents on the issue and the 
European practices were still incoherent. Whilst there may have existed some vague 
notion of a European norm of abolitionism, there were no specific requirements on the 
form of abolition. Thus, both coherence and the norm hierarchy were weak at the time.
The domestic scope conditions in the Soviet Union pulled in different directions. The 
topic as such was not new. Russia has a strong abolitionist tradition, but abolitionism 
had never really become a firmly established, stable practice. The Russian leadership 
adopted a stance of gradual abolition in the late 1980s, which the general public 
strongly disagreed with. The domestic structure within the SU was nevertheless strongly 
state-dominated, which gave the ruling elite an upper hand in the debate. This structural 
balance did not change even with the introduction of modest democratic reforms.
Despite the gloomy prospects, the European institutions proved to be fairly effective in 
introducing the topic to the Russian discourse. Contrary to the expectations found in the 
literature on the scope conditions, the effectiveness seemed to stem from the high 
political and symbolic significance of the question. The Soviet Union wanted to frame
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itself as a "normal" European state, and this "normalness" was taken to include some 
abolitionist tendencies. The discussion within the European institutions thus influenced 
the Russian discourse, even though the CoE and EU had no stated goals with regard to 
Russia on the issue. Only the CSCE had some modest stated goals on the issue vis-a-vis 
Russia. The Soviet Union succeeded in complying with the conditions of publishing 
information on the use of the death penalty and engaging in dialogue within the CSCE 
framework. The CSCE policy was thus effective in achieving its goals.
The socialisation model described in Chapter 1 would argue that the Soviet Union was 
in the phase of tactical concessions during its last years of existence. The tactical 
concessions were beginning to turn into true commitments as a result of arguing and 
persuasion. The change in the policy on the death penalty did not emerge as a result of 
civic activism in the Soviet Union or elsewhere. The socialisation pathway was to be 
found on the elite level, rather than "from below". The concessions on the issue of the 
death penalty were elite-initiated, and therefore the term "tactical concessions" seems 
far-fetched. In addition to the material considerations, the Soviet reform programme had 
an ideational, normative dimension from the very beginning.424 There was no major 
pressure from the European side either, yet the Soviet Union agreed to exchange and 
publish information on its use of the death penalty and to restrict its application. The 
Soviet leadership independently chose to use the abolitionist language. The source of 
Russia's rapprochement with the European values was identity- and culture based, rather 
than the norm-led process that the socialisation model would suggest. Without 
Gorbachev, the development might have gone differently. The Soviet leadership made a 
decision to change its policies before it was driven to do so. Even with all the systemic, 
structural reasons, a clear political choice was made.
Early commitments after the Cold War 1991-94
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, two mutually contradictory trends strengthened in the 
Soviet/Russian scene, which were both reflected in the debate on the death penalty. The 
first one was the general growth of both perceived and real insecurity in a society 
undergoing dramatic transition. The rise of economic uncertainty, corruption and social 
problems hardened public opinion, and there was increasing pressure to make the
424 English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold 
War, pp. 3-4.
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punishments harsher in the name of restoring order and respect for rules. The general 
public had never supported the abolition of the death penalty, and these developments 
made their opposition for the abolition even stronger.
The second trend was that Russia became a target of growing international pressure to 
limit and eventually to abolish capital punishment. In 1994, the Council of Europe 
decided to make abolition of the death penalty one of the key conditions for 
membership of the organisation.425 The CoE's status as a club of civilised European 
states was authoritative. Its normative criteria were the same for all applicant states, and 
there was an internal consensus on the norms. Many of them had been codified into 
Europe-wide binding agreements. The CoE thus enjoyed a high moral standing vis-a-vis 
Russia. The CoE was also in a position to offer membership of the organisation to 
Russia, which gave it superior bargaining power. As an applicant state, Russia was 
sensitive to coercive action by the CoE, and was likely to react in the desired way.
The new constitution of 1993 confirmed the limited use of the death penalty. 
Nevertheless, it also stated that it was only a temporary measure, and that it would be 
abolished in the future. Article 20, Paragraph 2 allows the establishment of the death 
penalty "until its abolition thereof'.426 The constitution also confirmed that capital 
punishment could only be used in the case of especially grave crimes against life.427 
Article 20 Paragraph 2 continues "[...] the accused shall be granted the right to have his 
case examined by trial with jurors".428 However, at that time only a fraction of the 
Russian regions had created such a court.429 Article 6 of the Constitution states that the
425 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, On the Abolition of Capital Punishment, 4 
October 1994, Resolution 1044.
<http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA94/ 
ERES1044.HTM>. The more specific criteria in Russia's case were decided in 1995. See 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion: Russia's Application for Membership of 
the Council of Europe.
426 See Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993). Text is available at 
<http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01 .htm>.
427 The then prevailing criminal code allowed for much wider application of death penalty but 
the practice followed the constitution. The new criminal code was passed in 1996.
428 See Article 20 of Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993).
429 Jury courts existed in 9 out of 89 regions of the Russian Federation. Gradually the situation 
has changed: since April 2003 only one region did not have a jury court (Chechnya).
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previous procedure should be retained until a new federal law, which ensures a new 
procedure for the consideration of cases by the juror courts is established.430
Meanwhile, the trend towards limitation of the application of the death penalty 
continued in Russia. The strategy of the Russian authorities seemed to be a gradual 
change towards complete abolition. The European organisations welcomed the 
development and politically supported the action. The President of the Russian 
Federation and the Presidential Pardons Commission under him were seen as the most 
important advocates of abolition of the death penalty. The Pardons Commission was 
created in 1992 in an attempt to expand the use of clemency, particularly in the case of 
the death penalty. Both the character and the composition of the Pardons Commission 
were unique: it was headed by a well-known novelist, Anatolii Pristavkin, and its 
members included other well-known figures -  poets, academics, priests -  and experts 
such as jurists and psychologists. It met weekly on a voluntary basis and considered 
thousands of sentences annually -  among them over a hundred death sentences. The 
chairman of the Pardons Commission spoke actively in public, criticising the judicial 
system and the application of the death penalty.431
The early steps towards abolition were thus taken by the liberal elite and not supported 
by the public. This is not surprising for two reasons. First of all, in most abolitionist 
states abolition had not been supported by a majority of people at the time the decision 
was made (and often later too). The decision is a principled, identity-related decision 
with which the state communicates to other states its dedication to humanistic values. 
Secondly, Russia's liberalisation overall was not a result of growing demands and 
activism from the public. It, too, was an elite-led project. Russian state-society relations 
were -  and are -  such that public opinion matters relatively little; the state, in particular 
the president, sets the agenda and implements the policy with little public 
interference.432 Despite the fact that the norm of abolition did not resonate with the 
public at large, it did resonate with the liberal-mined intelligentsia and the ruling elite. 
The ruling elite may have supported abolition based more on instrumental calculations,
430 See Article 6 of Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993).
431 Pristavkin, "A Vast Place of Execution - the Death Penalty in Russia," pp. 132-33.
432 See, for example, William V. Smirnov, "Democratization in Russia: Achievements and 
Problems," in Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader, ed., Archie Brown (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 524.
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but for the intelligentsia it was an important, identity-based value. There was a long 
tradition of abolitionist thought in Russia, starting with the times of Empress Elizabeth. 
Given the state-society relationship of Russia described earlier, the prospects of 
successful socialisation were hardly grim.433
Thus, the greatest achievement in the question of abolition of the death penalty during 
the period of 1991-94 was that the Russian republic unquestionably committed itself to 
the goal of abolition. The strategy to achieve the goal was gradualist: first the limitation 
of its use, and ultimately the total abolition through ratification of Protocol No. 6, as 
was required by CoE membership. This strategy was confirmed in the constitution 
approved in December 1993, as well as by agreeing to the membership criteria set by 
the CoE. The European organisations -  first in particular the OSCE and then the CoE 
and the EU -  played a significant role in the process that led to the placement of 
abolition on the practical, political reform agenda in Russia. The issue developed into a 
clearly pronounced political goal with an implementation plan with the start of the CoE 
application process.
Evaluation
The norm-specific scope conditions changed significantly during the time under 
scrutiny. The European norm strengthened considerably during these years as Protocol 
No. 6 was adopted and more states ratified it. The culmination of the development was 
when the CoE made ratification of the protocol an explicit prerequisite for membership 
in 1994, and called for its ratification by all its existing members. After this, the 
European norm could be explicitly defined in terms of the ratification of Protocol No. 6. 
Thus the norm coherence and its symbolic validation as well as the norm hierarchy 
(adherence) and textual clarity (determinacy) all strengthened during this period. The 
norm was now applied consistently and backed by a well-institutionalised framework. 
The fact that the norm had a high political profile does not seem to have played a 
negative role at this point. On the contrary, the norm soon gained symbolic value as a 
sign of "Europeanness" of states, which seemed to encourage states to adopt the norm. 
The Russian discourse suggested that this was also the reason why Russia should
433 On state-society relations and its impact on socialisation, see Schimmelfennig,
"Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the Central and Eastern European 
States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," pp. 14-15.
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implement the norm as soon as it was possible. The lack of implementation was, on the 
other hand, often explained by the budgetary constraints in the country. In reality, 
however, it is doubtful whether the resources needed for the implementation were so 
great that the lack of implementation could be explained by budgetary constraints. The 
prison system was in bad shape but the number of executions was, all in all, relatively 
small.434
The scope conditions at the international level were positive for norm implementation. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the likelihood of European organisations really 
affecting Russia grew significantly. First of all, a clear asymmetrical relationship 
emerged in Europe, which helped the diffusion of international norms to Russia. During 
these early years, the European organisations actively influenced the Russian policy 
agenda by setting the norms and standards that Russia was expected to meet. Russia 
seemed to be willing to accept the norms and their applicability to Russia without much 
hesitation. The desire to see Russia as a "normal", "civilised” state was so great that the 
issue of being patronised by the organisations did not yet raise high emotions among the 
elite.435 The issue of the abolition of the death penalty was removed from the OSCE 
agenda to the CoE membership agenda, which was backed by the EU. The CoE became 
the institution with high moral standing on the issue. The CoE also had superior 
bargaining power after Russia had applied for its membership in 1992.
The environmental conditions were also positive for socialisation to the norm of 
abolition of the death penalty. The Russian state was in a new situation and open to the 
new ideas and values offered by the European organisations. Russia was searching for a 
new identity following the miserable end of the Soviet Union and socialism in Europe. 
The European society of states seemed to be willing and able to engage with, and assist, 
Russia in its search. Russia was faced with major challenges without precedent, and 
new solutions were desperately needed.
The domestic conditions were also partly supportive for the adoption of the norm of 
abolition of the death penalty. Firstly, the state-dominated state structure would suggest 
that the ruling elite's abolitionist goals would override the general public's more
434 See footnote 391.
435 Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, p. 351.
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conservative views. The question of domestic salience of the norm was fairly 
controversial. There existed a long abolitionist tradition in Russia, and already since the 
last years of the Soviet rule, the official goal had been gradual abolition of the death 
penalty. However, the abolitionist experiments had always ended with the 
reintroduction of the death penalty. Also, the abolitionist aspirations had commonly 
been linked to the notion of "Europeaness" and not seen as an absolute "Russian" value. 
At first this feature seemed to be an asset, but later when the political atmosphere 
changed, it became more of a burden.
The European organisations appeared to be effective in framing the issue and setting the 
goals for Russia. The socialisation to the norm of abolition of the death penalty seemed 
fairly straightforward: Russia was to adopt the European norm, just like the rest of the 
eastern European states transforming themselves. The issue was framed in the context 
of European identity and Russia's membership in the Council of Europe. After the 
Soviet Union's collapse, Russia moved from the phase of tactical concessions to the 
phase of prescriptive status (or from the liberalisation phase to the transition phase, as 
democratisation models would have it). The development in the case of abolition of the 
death penalty confirmed this general trend. The official Russian discourse was 
consistently supportive of the goal of abolition but in practice, executions continued to 
be conducted. However, some positive legislative steps were taken: the constitution 
confirmed the goal of abolition and attempted to restrict its use. The abolitionist project 
continued to be an elite-initiated project. This feature does not fit the socialisation 
model particularly well but, all in all, the explanation provided by the socialisation 
model is fairly descriptive.
Emerging irregularities in the phase of prescriptive status 1995-98
As was described in Chapter 2, the war in Chechnya which started in late 1994 put a 
great strain on relations between Russia and the CoE. Nevertheless, Russia was still at 
the time sensitive to the CoE's coercive action, and made concessions when faced with 
coercive pressure.436
436 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, On Procedure for an Opinion on Russia’s 
Request for Membership of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1065.
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In November 1995, the CoE and the EU initiated a comprehensive two-year assistance 
programme aimed at helping with constitutional arrangements, institution building and 
legal reform, and a month later the PACE's Political Affairs Committee adopted a draft 
opinion in favour of Russia's membership. The report mentioned the death penalty as 
one of the most pressing issues. At the time, Russia had not yet ratified the new criminal 
code, and the prevailing legislation allowed the death penalty for 20 crimes. On the 
other hand, the constitution did rule that it should be considered only for the gravest 
crimes against life. The report included a detailed advisory and control programme that 
was aimed at guaranteeing Russia's swift compliance with the CoE norms.437 These 
measures were a sign that Russia was already at the doorstep of the organisation and 
would soon be invited in. By the end of the year, Russians seem to grow tired of waiting 
in the line and being constantly scrutinised and pressured by the CoE. The fact that 
Ukraine was accepted to become a member before Russia was seen as a slap in the face 
and a sign of double standards by the organisation.438 It seemed that pressure and pre­
membership conditionality had its limits and could not be used indefinitely.
Finally, on 28 February 1996, the Russian Federation became the 39th member of the 
CoE -  despite the fact that it still failed to meet a number of the official membership 
conditions.439 At the time of the accession, President Yeltsin declared that Russia would 
cease executions, and that a moratorium on the executions would be passed. As noted 
above, there was an understanding that Russia was to abolish the death penalty within 
three years of the accession by ratifying Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR.
The CoE gave up a degree of its material bargaining power by granting Russia 
membership, but it was hoped that persuasion aimed at triggering the logic of arguing 
would now be more efficient vis-a-vis Russia with regular, institutionalised 
engagement. Now that Russia was part of the in-group, the ideational, cultural side of 
socialisation was also expected to gain strength. Membership -  the legally binding 
commitments, regular meetings and reporting that came with it -  was expected to 
invoke the mechanisms of norm institutionalisation and habitualisation. It is probable
437 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report: Developments in the Russian 
Federation in Relation to the Situation in Chechnya, 23 April 1996, Doc. 7531.
438 See, for example, Vladimir Lukin's comments in Segodnia, 7 September 1995.
439 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Invitation to the Russian Federation to Become 
a Member of the Council of Europe.
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that the CoE wanted to show its support for the liberal forces in Russia who were 
preparing for the first presidential elections since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
liberal camp, which President Yeltsin was taken to represent, was strengthened by the 
CoE's recognition of Russia as a liberal and democratic European state. The granted 
membership was a sign of political will on both sides to integrate Russia with the 
European structures. The visions of how this should be done may naturally have 
differed already at this point.
However, the members of the ruling elite were mistaken if they thought that CoE 
membership was just about positive, unconditional support. As early as April 1996, the 
PACE reprimanded Russia publicly on the basis of human rights violations in 
Chechnya. The criticism was not welcomed by Russia, and tensions started to emerge. 
Nevertheless, a few positive steps were taken on the question of the death penalty. The 
new criminal code of 1996 confirmed the principles laid out in the constitution, and 
allowed the death penalty only in three cases: homicide under aggravating 
circumstances, genocide and terrorist attack. In May, the president issued a decree, "On 
Stage-by-Stage Reduction of Execution of Death Penalty in Connection with the 
Russian Federation Joining the Council of Europe". After the presidential elections, 
Yeltsin issued a decree on the official moratorium on the execution of death penalties in 
August 1996.440
A considerable blow to Russia's credibility as a CoE member occurred in December 
1996 when it was revealed that Russian authorities had been carrying out executions 
during the first half of 1996 despite its CoE membership. In January 1997, the CoE 
published a report 'Honouring of the Commitment Entered into by Russia upon 
Accession to the Council of Europe' which concentrated exclusively on the question of 
the violation of the declared moratorium on the death penalty. It confirmed that at least 
53 executions had taken place in Russia since Russia's accession. The report argued that 
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights "feels that the Assembly needs to 
take action in accordance with its monitoring procedure to sanction this particular 
violation of an important human rights commitment by Russia, lest the credibility of the
440 The Moscow Times, 17 May 1996.
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Council of Europe be damaged".441 The PACE held an urgent debate on the issue 
during its part-session in January 1997. However, this was first and foremost a warning 
for future reference as Russia had already ceased to carry out executions by the time the 
information became public.
In March 1997, the State Duma considered a bill on the moratorium on executions but 
rejected the proposal by a clear majority: 177 votes against and 75 in favour with 6 
abstentions. At the time of the vote, 688 prisoners were on death row in Russia. Despite 
the Duma's decision, President Yeltsin signed Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR in April
1997442
In Europe, the action against the death penalty strengthened. In October 1997, the 
Council of Europe held a Summit where the heads of government called for universal 
abolition of the death penalty and outlined the main elements of its anti-death penalty 
policy. It was to consist of a combination of several elements: general demarches, action 
on individual cases, human rights reporting and other initiatives including assistance 
programmes. That same year, the European Union signed the Amsterdam Treaty, which 
confirmed its devotion to abolition of the death penalty. The strengthening of European 
action to abolish the death penalty continued the following year. In June 1998, the EU 
issued practical guidelines for its anti-death penalty policy towards third states.443
The Duma considered the question of legislation on a moratorium once again with the 
ratification of the ECHR in February 1998. The session was preceded by a heated 
debate in the newspapers. In the end, the Duma ratified the European Convention on 
Human Rights but refused to ratify Protocol No. 6 to the treaty.444 At the same time, it 
also ratified the Anti-Torture Convention and the European Charter of Local Self- 
Government. Despite the fact that Protocol No. 6 did not pass, this was an indication
441 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, On the Honouring of the Commitment Entered 
into by Russia Upon Accession to the Council of Europe to Put into Place a Moratorium on 
Executions, Resolution 1111. The source of the information on executions was the head of the 
presidential clemency committee Anatoly Pristavkin. See Pristavkin, "A Vast Place of 
Execution - the Death Penalty in Russia," pp. 129-30.
442 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 6 May 1997.
443 Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty. 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_relations/human_rights/adp/guide_en.htm>.
444 Novye Izvestiia, 21 February 1998.
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that the CoE's integrationist policies had in general succeeded. More concessions -  
including ratification of the protocol -  were expected to follow soon.
In June 1998, the CoE published its first comprehensive Honouring of Obligations and 
Commitments Report on the Russian Federation. The tone was fairly optimistic: it 
stated that the ratification of the ECHR, the Anti-Torture Convention and the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government, and the respect of the presidential moratorium 
represented historical steps in the enshrinement of Russia in the 'system of values' 
fostered by the Council of Europe. It was, however, clear on the issue that Russia should 
make further efforts to fulfil the obligations and commitments, including the complete 
abolition of the death penalty.445
However, negative trends strengthened in Russia where the debate grew increasingly 
critical of abolition of the death penalty and the policy of international organisations on 
the question.446 In June 1998, Minister of Justice Pavel Krasheninnikov made a public 
case for maintaining the death penalty on the basis of a growth in crime and strong 
public support for maintaining it.447 The recently elected human rights ombudsman, 
Oleg Mironov, responded to Krasheninnikov's comments positively by suggesting that 
Russia should explain to the CoE that "the crime situation in our country is very bad and 
that having the death penalty for especially heinous crimes against human life serves as 
a deterrent".448 Krasheninnikov was far from the only representative of the executive 
who defended the death penalty. In fact, in November 1998 even the prime minister, 
Evgeny Primakov, criticised the official goal of abolition by claiming in a populist 
fashion that the Russian government should be talking about "physically eliminating 
those who kill women and children and that is what we will do".449 A few days later, 
Vladimir Kartashkin, who had recently become the chairman of the Presidential Human 
Rights Commission, eagerly interpreted Primakov's comments as evidence that the
445 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Information Report: Honouring of Obligations 
and Commitments by the Russian Federation, 2 June 1998, Doc. 8127.
446 Izvestiia, 15 March 1996 and 31 January 1997.
447 Segodnia, 4 June 1998.
448 Mironov's interview in Novye Izvestiia, 2 December 1998.
449 See Segodnia, 7 December 1998.
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moratorium on the death penalty would be lifted and punishments would be made 
tougher.450
These pro-death penalty comments by major political figures and high state officials 
created confusion and raised serious doubts about Russia’s intentions in the European 
human rights institutions. Given the wide-spread practice of behind-the-scenes 
manoeuvring so typical of Russian political life then and today, one cannot help but 
wondering if -  in addition to being populist advance campaigning in the approaching 
Duma elections -  these high-level comments were a clever strategy to ease the 
international pressure to abolish the death penalty. The "standard" reason given by 
Russia why the west should not criticise Russia over human rights violations, was the 
claim that irresponsible critique of the government would strengthen illiberal opposition 
in Russia. This was used rather effectively for example when the CoE membership and 
its conditions were discussed. Once again, the mixture of domestic pressure and some 
positive steps -  though more modest than the CoE expected -  that were taken by the 
president made it almost impossible for the CoE to challenge the president's policy on 
the question of the death penalty. Still, in June 1998 the CoE warned Russia, Latvia and 
the Ukraine that they would be expelled from the organisations if they failed to ratify 
Protocol No. 6.451
The biggest achievements in the development on the norm of abolition of the death 
penalty in Russia during 1995-98 were, first, the suspension of executions following the 
news on the CoE membership and, second, the president-imposed moratorium the 
following August. Nevertheless, there was no proper law on a moratorium of executions 
which made the institutionalisation of abolitionist practice weak. Also, the official 
discourse partially deviated from the norm, and the consensus among the Russian 
leadership on the issue grew weaker.
Evaluation
The norm-specific scope conditions for state socialisation to the norm of abolition of the 
death penalty grew increasingly positive. The coherence of, and consensus on, the norm
450 Ibid.
451 See Fawn, "Death Penalty as Democratization: Is the Council of Europe Hanging Itself?," p. 
86 .
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strengthened considerably. First of all, as more and more states and, in particular, new 
member states became abolitionist and ratified Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR, the 
European norm and practical implementation of the norm grew stronger and more 
consistent. The norm also became one of the comer stones of the EU's external policy, 
which contributed towards consensus on the issue. The practices in European states 
became transparent and closely scrutinised, which further increased the determinacy of 
the norm. The symbolic validation and adherence of the norm were similarly strong, as 
the primary European norm of abolition had been attached to the secondary norm of 
ratifying Protocol No. 6.
The biggest change in the international conditions was that Russia became a member of 
the Council of Europe. The CoE hoped that membership would encourage norm 
socialisation by Russia to the European norms by strengthening the moral authority of 
the organisation and evoking processes of persuasion and institutionalisation.452 After 
Russia’s accession the CoE, the organisation lost its biggest bargaining tool. Material 
bargaining power and asymmetry between the organisation and Russia thus diminished 
during this period. There were some changes in the environmental conditions during 
these years that were likely to influence the outcome. First of all, the relations between 
Russia and Europe became more strained as NATO air strikes bombarded Serbia and as 
former socialist states sought to join NATO with European support. There was also a 
growing feeling of disappointment with the western-minded reforms and their results in 
Russia. Russia became less open to the European norms and values during these years. 
The engagement with the European institutions began to be seen in merely instrumental 
terms based on gaining concrete material benefits.
The general atmosphere was reflected in domestic scope conditions. The norm of 
abolition became increasingly politicised in Russia. It had always been a certain symbol 
of "Europeaness" and in the new domestic atmosphere this quality became increasingly 
unpopular. Yeltsin's grip on power was not particularly strong during this period, which
452 The report by the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, for example, 
contemplated in its report ’’Russian Federation does not yet fulfil the conditions of membership 
[...h]owever, the question could be asked whether the accession of the Russian Federation might 
in itself help to create conditions of conformity with the Council of Europe standards[...]. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion: Russia's Application for Membership of 
the Council of Europe.
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diminished the structural advantage he had enjoyed during his early years. It was 
difficult for him to carry out unpopular reforms, such as the abolition of the death 
penalty. The parliament consistently voted down the proposal on a moratorium. The 
norm salience between the international and the domestic norms appeared to be 
decreasing during this period.
Despite many discouraging shifts in scope conditions, there seemed to be considerable 
progress on the issue. The initial goal of the CoE had been the abolition of the death 
penalty prior to accession. This goal was later reassessed and degraded to the 
ratification of Protocol No. 6 in three years time and the suspension of executions from 
the day of accession. The organisation was fairly successful in meeting the latter goal: 
President Yeltsin declared a moratorium on the day of accession and later confirmed it 
in a decree. Despite the fact that some executions were carried out in 1996, this practice 
soon ceased altogether and the practical implementation of the norm has been consistent 
since. However, the protocol was not adopted within the deadline given by the CoE. 
Another issue that diminished the degree of European effectiveness was the fact that the 
official discourse showed increasing signs of inconsistency. The goal of the abolition 
was occasionally challenged by the ones in or close to power. Nevertheless, after 1996 
the European institutions were successful in ensuring that the practical implementation 
of the norm was consistent in Russia.
Russia's modest hesitation over the issue did not stand out during this period in Europe. 
Russia was far from the only state struggling with the implementation of formal 
requirements of the norm. Russian discourse clearly did not contribute towards 
strengthening the consensus on the issue, but otherwise its impact on the European level 
or on the interpretation of the norm was modest during these years.
The socialisation model outlined in Chapter 1 still describes the development during this 
period reasonably accurately. Russia's progress in the practical implementation of, and 
official commitment to, the norm confirmed its status as a state in the phase of 
prescriptive status. The progress was still relatively weak with regard to the legislative 
reforms and institutionalisation of the norm, but there nevertheless seemed to be 
advancement on this issue. One indicator of development gone wrong was the direction 
in which general discourse on the issue progressed. The problem seemed to be that
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following Russia's accession, the effectiveness of the CoE gradually shrank. The 
processes of arguing and persuasion, and the processes of institutionalisation and 
habitualisation did not take over as the model would expect. Instead, the loss of 
superior bargaining power and the lack of material incentives reflected negatively in the 
achievements.
Russia's request for an exception 1999-2006
The fragile moratorium on the death penalty was, however, soon unexpectedly 
strengthened. In February 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that Russian courts 
should cease to impose death sentences until a law on jury trials had been passed in all 
federal subjects. At the time, jury courts existed in nine (out of 89) regions. Even 
regions where jury courts existed had to cease passing new death sentences, in order to 
guarantee the principle of equality of all Russian citizens before the law. This was an 
important step because there is a qualitative difference between a moratorium on 
executions and a moratorium on passing death sentences by courts. After the ruling, 
Russia could be classified as a de facto abolitionist state -  at least temporarily.453 The 
problem lay in the fact that the Russian courts could recommence the issuing of death 
sentences once the jury court system had been established in all the regions.
The court decision was followed by a sudden rush of anti-death penalty measures. The 
Pardon Committee had decided to seize the moment and divest itself of death row 
altogether. During the first five months of 1999, the Pardons Commission considered a 
record-breaking 700 cases. A good point of comparison is that in the previous seven 
years it had reviewed altogether 555 death sentences.454 In June, Russian authorities and 
the CoE organised a major conference on the abolition of the death penalty in Moscow. 
Interestingly enough, justice minister, Pavel Krasheninnikov -  who had criticised the 
goal of abolishing the death penalty just some months earlier -  made a statement 
supporting the ban on capital punishment: "The President and the government have 
already determined their position on the death penalty: it should be completely 
abolished".455 On the opening day, the president announced that he had signed a decree
453 Kommersant, 3 February 1999. See also Hood, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide 
Perspective, p. 31.
454 Kommersant, 5 June 1999.
455 Ibid.
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commuting all remaining death sentences into prison terms ranging from 25 years to life 
imprisonment. These developments were a positive sign that the despite earlier 
hesitation, there still might be enough political will to abolish the death penalty in the 
near future.
Nevertheless, the positive wave of abolitionist spirit soon came to an end. With the start 
of the second Chechen war in 1999, terrorism became more predominant on the Russian 
political agenda. The official immediate reason for the reopening of hostilities was the 
explosion of apartment buildings near Moscow, in Dagestan and Volgodonsk. Terrorist 
attacks against civilians considerably strengthened the support for the death penalty in 
Russia. The Russian media launched a populist pro-death penalty campaign and many 
public figures and politicians gave their support for the campaign. This pro-death 
penalty camp included figures such as the chess world champion Anatoli Karpov and 
Nobel Prize winner Zhores Alferov.456 Many also feared that new Russian president, 
Vladimir Putin, might foster pro-death penalty sympathies.457 This fear has not 
materialised, and the goal of abolition has continued to be supported officially by the 
Russian president.
The resumption of hostilities also created an extremely volatile situation in the CoE and 
Russia-CoE relations rapidly deteriorated. In December 1999, the Secretary General of 
the CoE sent a letter to the foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, requesting information on the 
situation in the Chechen Republic. The second exchange of letters took place in March 
2000 with as few results as the first one.458 The replies received from the Russian 
authorities were deemed unsatisfactory by the Secretary General and PACE alike, and 
tensions started to build up between the parties. The Political Affairs Committee under 
the PACE submitted a report on the situation in Chechnya and recommended 
suspension of the Russian delegation's voting rights in the PACE if no progress in 
solving the crisis was made by Russia.459
456 Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 20 March 2002.
457 President Yeltsin resigned on 1 January 2000 and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin became the 
acting president. The presidential elections were held in March 2000.
458 See Council of Europe, Secretary General, Conflict in Chechnya: Reply from the Russian 
Federation to the Council of Europe's Request for Further Explanations, 22 March 2000, Doc. 
8671.
459 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report: Credentials of the Delegation of the 
Russian Federation, 4 April 2000, Doc. 8698.
191
The tension led to coercive action by the PACE. In April 2000, the PACE decided to 
suspend Russia's voting rights in the Assembly.460 This time around, the Russian 
reaction to the coercive action was not the desired one. The Russian State Duma 
responded to the suspension decision by adopting a declaration "On the Position of the 
Parliamentary Assembly Concerning the Situation in the Chechen Republic". The 
Duma stood firmly behind the Chechen war. It "deeply regretted" the position adopted 
by the Assembly. It considered the PACE's decision both unjust and unfounded, and 
claimed that a full-scale cooperation could only resume if the Assembly reversed its 
"discriminatory" decision.461 Russia decided to keep away from the PACE altogether 
until it changed its line. The Russian side offered no concessions on the issue but 
challenged the decision directly. The reaction by Russia left the CoE in an awkward 
position: it seemed that the Russian side was not going to give in on the issue, but the 
CoE could not suspend Russia's voting rights forever. The CoE had little choice but to 
yield.
On 23 January 2001, the Political Affairs Committee commented again the situation in 
Chechnya. The Committee regretted that the Russian delegation had decided not to 
participate in the work of the Assembly and its committees.462 It seems that the tables 
had unexpectedly turned: what had started as CoE pressure on Russia had become 
Russian pressure on the CoE.463 The PACE had to admit that if Russia was actually 
expelled from the CoE, the organisation would have to invent a completely new role for 
itself in the new Europe. It thus became apparent that the CoE needed Russia just as 
Russia needed the CoE. The rapporteur suggested to the Assembly that "we must not 
give up our critical evaluation of the situation in the Chechen Republic, but I believe 
that the State Duma has increasingly become a partner in our efforts for change. 
Therefore the rapporteur proposes that the assembly should ratify the credentials of the
460 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Conflict in the Chechen Republic - 
Implementation by the Russian Federation of Recommendation 1444 (2000), 6 April 2000, 
Recommendation 1456 (2000).
461 State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Statement on the Position of 
the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly on the Situation in the Chechen Republic. 12 
April 2000.
462 This would have been possible as the decision only concerned the voting rights. Council of 
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report: Credentials of the Delegation of the Russian 
Federation, 23 January 2001, Doc. 8949.
463 Interview with a PACE member, 24 March 2005.
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new Russian delegation".464 The PACE decided to grant full voting rights for Russia 
without any major concessions having been made by the Russian side. This was how it 
was interpreted from the Russian side. A foreign ministry official commented on the 
events in the media: "The delegates [of PACE] realistically looked at the situation and 
understood that Russia is not a pupil who can be sent out from the classroom".465
The status of the death penalty also caused debate within the CoE. In May 2001, the 
PACE President Lord Russell-Johnston saw it necessary to make a declaration on the 
death penalty debate in Russia. In it he stated that
"recent statements made by high-level Russian officials in favour of suspending the 
moratorium on the executions are therefore highly regrettable. These statements come 
against the background of serious concerns with regard to Russia's human rights record 
in Chechnya and its commitment to the freedom of media. They are worrying signs of 
either ignorance of, or blatant disregard for Russia's commitments and obligations as a 
member state of the Council of Europe."466
Further, he claimed that a decision to end a moratorium would be challenging "the 
credibility of Russia's commitment to our organisation's values and principles [...] this 
would inevitably lead to the questioning of whether Russia is to continue as a member 
of the organisation".467 These harsh words nevertheless had little impact on Russian 
policy.
In December 2001, Putin signed a package of bills including a new Russian Criminal
Code. It confirmed the use of the death penalty, but the president-imposed moratorium
was left untouched. A few months earlier, Putin backed the goal of the abolition of the
death penalty by claiming that no one -  not even the state -  had a right to "grant itself a
divine right".468 The statement was received enthusiastically by the EU, who attempted
to positively influence Russia's socialisation to the abolitionist norm:
"The European Union welcomes the comments made on 9 July 2001 by President Putin 
opposing the reestablishment of the death penalty in the Russian Federation. The 
European Union calls on the Russian Federation to abolish the death penalty both de
464 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report: Credentials of the Delegation of the 
Russian Federation.
465 Interfax, 25 January 2001.
466 See Lord Russell-Johnson's declaration on Russia and the death penalty, 31 May 2001 PACE 
Document 387a (2001) at <http://press.coe.int/cp/2001/387a(2001).htm>.
467 Ibid.
468 Interfax, 9 July 2001.
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facto and de jure, and to ratify [...] Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights as soon as possible."469
However, the president's approach to punishment can hardly be described as soft. He 
dissolved the Pardons Commission by a presidential decree in December 2001 and the 
Commission was set to be replaced by regional commissions. After the restructuring, 
the pardons figures plummeted. The measure had only indirect relevance to the death 
penalty. For the time being, at least, there are no convicts on death row and no court is 
issuing death sentences. Nevertheless, many observers were alarmed by the measure, 
especially since the judges could start issuing capital punishment after jury courts had 
been established in all Russian regions.470
In February 2002, the State Duma once again rejected the ratification of Protocol No. 6 
by a large majority, with some members of the parliament even going so far as to 
introduce an appeal to the president to reintroduce capital punishment.471 This was 
shocking news to the PACE. In March, it commented on these developments in a 
monitoring session: "The assembly is shocked by the vote in the State Duma on 15 
February 2002, asking President Putin to reintroduce the death penalty [...] the assembly 
nevertheless urges the Russian authorities to abolish the death penalty de jure and to 
conclude the ratification of the Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights". In 2002 the CoE Council of Ministers decided to discuss the question of the 
abolition of the death penalty at six-month intervals until de jure abolition was effected 
in all member states.472 Also, the General Secretary of the CoE wrote an article in
469 See European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on President Putin's Statement 
Supporting the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the Russian Federation.
470 The PACE did, however, voice some concerns after the disbandment of the commission but 
there was very little it could do about the situation. The Council of Ministers approved the 
measure but allocated more resources on cooperation, technical assistance and education of the 
inexperienced staff of the regional commissions. The CoE organised a three-day workshop in 
March 2002 and contributed to the first all-Russian conference on clemency issues in December 
2002. By 2003 there were 89 regional commissions with some 1200 staff. The clemency 
numbers nevertheless fell significantly: during the eleven months following the reorganisation 
only 182 decisions led to clemency by the president (out of total 6628 requests and 1117 
recommendations for pardon). Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Presidential 
Pardon Commission of the Federation of Russia, 2 February 2002, Written Question No. 407, 
Doc. 9354. <http://assembly.coe.int/DocumentsAVorkingDocs/doc02/EDOC9364.htm>
471 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 March 2002.
472 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Honouring of Obligations and 
Commitments by the Russian Federation, 23 April 2002, Resolution 1277 (2002). 
<http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA02/EREC 1553.htm>
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defence of abolition in the Rossiiskaia Gazeta in March 2002.473 Thus, the CoE's 
response was to increase monitoring and attempts to convince the Russian 
representatives of the importance of the measure.
All this did little to prevent pro-death penalty comments from Russian officials. The 
most serious of these attacks was Deputy Prosecutor Vladimir Koleshnikov’s advocacy 
of the cancellation of the moratorium in February 2005. His comments were sent to the 
Federation Council which was considering anti-terrorist legislation. These comments 
were even more worrisome as the Constitutional Court ruling on the application of the 
death penalty was about to become void. The only region without a jury court was now 
Chechnya. The episode was renewed in February 2006 when the deputy prosecutor 
general of the Russia Federation, Nikolai Shepel, publicly expressed his wish that the 
only terrorist behind the Beslan school attack still alive, Nurpashi Kulaev, should be 
executed. Pavel Krasheninnikov -  this time as a chairman of the legislative committee 
of the Duma -  spoke against exceptions to the moratorium, and President Putin has also 
now and again expressed his conviction that death penalty should not be re­
introduced.474 In keeping with the CoE commitments, Nurpashi Kulayev was sentenced 
to life imprisonment with a reference to the moratorium on the death penalty in force in 
May 2006. On the other hand, nothing has been done to abolish the death penalty in 
law.
In May and June 2005, the Council of Europe published a report by the human rights 
commissioner and PACE rapporteurs. Both reports listed some positive developments, 
such as the adoption of a new criminal code and a reduction of the number of prisoners 
on death row. However, they remained firm in their criticism on the failure to abolish 
the death penalty in law, and to bring to justice those found responsible for human rights
473 Article by Walter Schwimmer in Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 20 March 2002.
474 Moscow News, 10 February 2006.
<http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/02/10/penalty.shtml>
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violations in Chechnya.475 The issue did not, however, succeed in making it onto the 
action agenda, and no-one questioned Russia's position as a member on the basis of 
these shortcomings.476
The EU has also increasingly paid attention to human rights and the issue of the death 
penalty in EU-Russia relations. In 2001, the Commission confirmed in its 
communication that human rights are a priority area in its relations with third 
countries.477 The EU and Russia held their first human rights consultation round in 
March 2005. The issue of capital punishment has been discussed in the meetings, and 
although there was some initial enthusiasm surrounding this new, more confidential 
policy instrument, very little has been achieved and a gradually more sceptical and 
frustrated attitude has gained ground among the EU and its member states' officials.478
To sum up the main developments on the question of abolition of the death penalty: 
despite the fact that the practical adherence to the norm of abolition was strengthened by 
the Constitutional Court decision in 1999, the Russian Federation seemed increasingly 
resistant to the socialisation efforts of the European organisations. Russia showed 
blatant disregard of its initial promises to ratify the Protocol in three years time after 
Russia's accession to the CoE. The official discourse did not apologise and make new 
promises, but instead challenged the authority of the European organisations in setting 
technical standards and deadlines. By its action, Russia is requesting that the European 
society make an exception in its case.
475 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report: Honouring of Obligations and 
Commitments by the Russian Federation, 3 June 2005, Doc. 10568.
<http://assembly.coe.int/DocumentsAVorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10568.htm>, and Council of 
Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for 
Human Rights on His Visit to the Russian Federation (15-30 July 2004 and 19-29 September
2004), 20 April 2005, CommDH(2005)2.
<http://www.coe.int/T/E/Commissioner_H.R/Communication_Unit/Documents/pdf.CommDH(
2005)2_E.pdf>.
476 Discussion on draft documents in an interview with a PACE member 24 March 2005.
477 European Union, European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: The European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights 
and Democratisation in Third Countries, 8 May 2001, COM(2001)252 final. 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_relations/human_rights/doc/com01_252_en.pdf>.
478 Interview with a European Commission official, 26 October 2005 and comments by Under­
secretary of State at the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Markus Lyra at a roundtable 
organised by EU-Russia Centre (Brussels) in Helsinki, 22 August 2006. .
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Evaluation
The coherence of, and the consensus on, the European norm on abolition of the death 
penalty became increasingly strong during the period between 1999 and 2006. The 
secondary norms backing the grundnorm of abolition were developed further with the 
adoption of Protocol No. 13 on the complete abolition of the death penalty. Hence, the 
adherence of the norm was strengthened considerably during these years. The coherence 
was enhanced as country after country ratified the protocols. Today, Russia is the only 
CoE member state that has not ratified Protocol No. 6. Almost all CoE member states 
have also abolished the death penalty completely from their national laws, which means 
that the eventual ratification of Protocol No. 13 will not substantially change their 
commitments.
The changes in the international and environmental conditions implied that Russia 
would be less open to socialisation efforts by the European organisations. The 
asymmetry between the European structures and Russia was diminishing after the turn 
of the millennium, attributable to the fact that the Russian state and economy grew 
stronger. Russia was also seen as an important international player in world politics and 
in the "war against terrorism" by many central international players. Russia became 
increasingly self-confident as an international actor, which was reflected in its new 
unwillingness to comply with the European norms. Instead of desiring to be a normal 
European state, Russia claimed more room for manoeuvre, and challenged the authority 
of the European organisations in interpreting the norms and setting deadlines for Russia. 
Europe was requested to apply different norms and standards to Russia in comparison to 
those used with other European states. European material bargaining power was on the 
decrease during this period. Russian development stabilised during the period under 
scrutiny, and there was less sense of immediate crises and urgency to find solutions. The 
high oil prices contributed to the general growth of the Russian economy, and general 
satisfaction with Russian policies by the public. Russia was increasingly closed to 
outside influences and wanted to redefine the rules of the game itself.
The domestic scope conditions remained controversial. The rise of terrorism naturally 
impacted unfavourably on the general discussion on the death penalty, but the dramatic 
decrease in pluralism and the unprecedented dominance of the president in Russian
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political life would have enabled the abolitionist reforms, had he decided to pursue them 
actively. He did not, however, choose this path even if he supported the idea of abolition 
in principle. The non-compliance to the European norm of abolition was not due to a 
lack of political or material resources. After all, Russia already practiced abolitionism 
and only refused to comply with the European legislative requirements on the issue. The 
discourse in the Russian press implies that non-compliance with the European norm 
became a symbolic, principled issue to Russia.479 The non-compliance over the matter 
seemed to contribute to Russian identity formation.
Despite the abolitionist decision by the Constitutional Court in 1999, the European 
organisations have been by and large ineffective in reaching the goals they have set for 
themselves. Russia has disregarded official conditions and timetables set by the 
organisations, and it has failed to so much as pass a proper law on the moratorium. 
Thus, the abolitionist practice is weakly institutionalised in Russia.
Russian policy on the issue, on the other hand, had implications for the wider 
abolitionist development in Europe. First of all, Russia's challenge to the European 
norms led to some rethinking over European strategies. There was pressure to develop 
instruments which would raise less publicity and create less unnecessary confrontation 
with Russia. The aim was to trigger the logic of constructive arguing and persuasion in a 
more confidential setting.
However, Russia's stubbornness may indirectly influence the European normative 
structures: Russian non-compliance weakens the European consensus on the norms and 
the general call for compliance with the membership criteria within the CoE. Russia has 
set a bad example for other states which can make a reference to a precedent in non- 
compliance. Thus, Russia has weakened the determinacy and coherence of the abolition 
of the death penalty.
The descriptive and explanatory power of the socialisation model described in Chapter 1 
is weak when analysing the developments on the question of the norm of abolition of
479 President Vladimir Putin has, for example, many times spoken in favour of abolition but he 
has consistently refused to take orders from the European organisations and claimed that the 
society at large is not yet ready for these radical changes. See, for example, Interfax, 9 July 
2001 and 7 February 2006.
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the death penalty during this period. Russia has challenged the organisations' authority 
indirectly without questioning the norms directly as the model would expect. It has 
never officially declared its denial of the norm, but it does not apologise for its non- 
compliance either.480 Instead of open challenge and a backlash, one can detect an 
indirect challenge to the international organisations and their right to interpret the 
norms. The socialisation model seems unable to detect these dynamics at play on the 
issue of the abolition of the death penalty.
5 Conclusion
Today, the situation regarding the implementation of the European norm of abolition of 
the death penalty in Russia is far from ideal. Despite the fact that Russia has not 
executed any convicts since August 1996, and that there are no convicts on death row, 
Russia has not adopted the European norm on the abolition of the death penalty. It has 
failed to live up to its earlier promises to ratify Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR. Its 
behaviour on the issue is exceptional: all other CoE member states have ratified this 
protocol concerning abolition of the death penalty for ordinary crimes. The 
institutionalisation of even the moratorium on passing death sentences is extremely 
weak: the Constitutional Court ruling could soon become void, and the Duma has 
turned down the bill on the moratorium again and again.
The early development on the question of abolition of the death penalty looked indeed 
promising. Russia unambiguously expressed its will to undertake the commitment to 
abolish the death penalty in law and in practice. After 1994, this requirement was 
explicitly the ratification of Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR. Russia was unable to meet the 
requirement by the time of its accession to the organisation in 1996, but promised to do 
so within three years. There was also progress in terms of practical policies: Russia has 
suspended the application of the death penalty, which was later in 1996 confirmed by a 
presidential decree on a moratorium on executions.
However, after Russia's accession to the CoE progress on the issue came to a halt. Even 
though the practice has remained consistent and even improved, the European norm has
480 See, for example, comments by Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, RIA Novosti, 29 
May 2006.
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not been adopted. The formal requirements on the legislation have not been met, and 
even the goal of implementing the norm has been doubted in the official discourse. 
European pressure weighs very little; Russia has even suggested that there are no 
grounds for close scrutiny of the membership conditions anymore as it has by and large 
met the conditions.481 This view is contrary to the view of the Council of Europe and 
casts serious doubts on Russia's commitment to implement the norm. The Council of 
Europe has recently renewed its activism on the matter vis-a-vis Russia.482 As Russia 
prepared to assume the rotating chairmanship of the CoE in 2006, the PACE president 
pleaded:
"My main plea to you today within the context of values is to take the crucial and 
historic step to abolish the death penalty. In 2006, Russia is the only member of the 
Council of Europe not to have ratified Protocol No. 6. Would it not be the most fitting 
tribute to our common values, to the basis of our cooperation, to abolish the death 
penalty in this centenary year of the Duma and especially a hundred years after it was 
first proposed by the Duma?"483
However, so far the Council of Europe has not succeeded in convincing Russia on the 
fundamental nature of the implementation of the norm. The organisation can only use 
moral shaming and persuasion but Russia has shown resistance to these efforts. In the 
current situation, the moral authority of the CoE is relatively weak in Russia and thus 
coercive instruments are not likely to be efficient. Besides, at this point it is hard to 
imagine that the CoE would expel Russia as a result of its failure to ratify Protocol No. 
6 on the death penalty. 484 Yet, this is exactly what it suggested in 1998.
The issue seems to have gained symbolic significance for Russia over the years. By not 
adopting the protocol, Russia demonstrates to European states and to the Russian public 
that it will engage with the European organisations on its own terms. These terms are 
based on its interests. Russia claims to be an exceptional actor and thus deserves 
exceptional treatment by other actors. Russia has indirectly challenged the European 
norm and whether the norm fully applies to its case. This is a clear regression: at the 
beginning, Russia agreed to the terms of the European organisations. Through the use of
481 Ibid.
482 See, for example, commentary in Kommersant, 27 June 2006.
483 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Rene van der Linden: "Russia Must Strengthen 
Its Role on the European Scene", 27 April 2006, Press release 246(2006).
484 This was confirmed by Rene van der Linden in a press conference on 3 October 2005. See 
Interfax, 4 October 2005.
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uncompromising, interest-based politics, Russia has gained more room to manoeuvre. 
The organisations seemed to count on the efficiency of softer measures of persuasion 
and institutionalisation of the norm.
The changes in the scope conditions do not explain the shifts in the development 
completely. It is true that the asymmetry between the actors has diminished over the 
years, and the sense of crisis and urgency to find new solutions has given way to more 
stable and self-confident behaviour. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable amount of 
asymmetry left, and the norm itself has grown increasingly strong, characterised by 
European-wide consensus and coherence, adherence and symbolic validation. The pull 
toward its implementation is assumed to have grown stronger. Furthermore, the 
development of the domestic structure should give the abolitionist state leadership the 
upper hand in the debate. This has not, however, been the case. Thus the development 
on the subject is better explained by political decisions, than by the changes in structural 
conditions.
European policies played a significant role in framing the issue and putting the issue on 
the Russian reform agenda in the early 1990s. Since then, effectiveness of the European 
policies in reaching the stated goals has faded. The goals have been met in the field of 
practical implementation of the norm, but the legislative requirements have not been 
met and the official discourse has grown increasingly inconsistent and there are serious 
doubts whether the goal of abolition is even on the cards anymore. It seems that 
European engagement is in fact one of the reasons why the discourse is so defiant on the 
issue. The norm of non-compliance has become a symbolic, principled issue for Russia 
and a sign of its independence.
Unfortunately for the organisations, Russian non-compliance has had a negative impact 
on the development of the European norm on abolition. Russian behaviour stands out -  
it is the only CoE member state still refusing to ratify Protocol. No 6. Thus the norm 
coherence of the European abolitionist norm has been weakened, and this could have an 
impact on the eagerness of other states to ratify the Protocol No. 13. Why should states 
hurry with the ratification of Protocol No. 13 if Russia has not even managed to ratify 
Protocol No. 6? This logic may lead to the weakening of European consensus on the 
importance and urgency of the norm. The organisations seem to be between a rock and a
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hard place with Russia. They fear to pressure the Russian leadership too hard on the 
issue, as it might endanger the current abolitionist practice. Putin -  just like Yeltsin 
before him -  has effectively demonstrated that he, and only he, is the one who in 
principle supports abolition. Russia has responded coldly to cases of direct pressure 
from these institutions.
The early years of cooperation seemed to fit the socialisation model relatively well but, 
as Russia’s reluctance to adopt the norm has became more apparent, the model seems to 
have lost its explanatory and descriptive power. Russia did not progress in the stage of 
prescriptive status, nor did turn back to tactical concessions and/or challenge the norms 
upfront. Rather, it has continued working with the European organisations but ignored 
the claims for complying with the European norm consistently. It seems to have been 
fairly successful in negotiating an exception for itself despite the organisations' 
declarations and appeals on the issue.
The development points out several shortcomings in the socialisation model outlined in 
Chapter 1. First of all, the development clearly does not support the assumption that 
once the state starts to liberalise and to "talk the talk", the socialisation process would 
take over and the progress towards implementation of a norm would be somehow 
automatic. After the initial agreement, the political struggle over the issue started again 
and has remained constant ever since. The authorities constantly change discourse 
according to the audience and the norm remains weakly institutionalised. Because of the 
lack of legal guarantees, the uncertainty about future developments is apparent. During 
the first few years, it seemed that Russia was making progress on the road towards the 
implementation of the norm according to the socialisation plan. However, after 
approximately 1997, the development has been more controversial and the norm's 
applicability to the Russian case has been indirectly challenged by Russia.
Secondly, Russia has been relatively successful in its attempt to push for an exception in 
its case. The European organisations naturally do not declare this publicly, but the 
reorientation of their policies would indicate that they are not as adamant on the issue as 
they were some years ago. Despite the fact that Russia once agreed to the norm of 
abolition by signing Protocol No. 6, it does not seem to do so any longer. If the CoE 
allows for an exception in Russia's case, the European norm will weaken. This chapter
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thus argues that norms -  even human rights norms -  are not fixed but may change in the 
process of international cooperation. It is here that the danger lies for the European 
organisations: Russia's resistance may, in the long run, also affect the European 
interpretation of the norms. If exceptions are made, the norms grow weaker and the 
requirement for implementation less absolute. It thus seems that asymmetrical 
relationship and a clearly formulated, high-priority norm has not been enough to trigger 
socialisation. Crucially, the identity-related, cultural side of socialisation has not taken 
off, and therefore the normative change has also remained inconsistent and shallow.
Finally, the assumption that socialisation is about a one-way adoption of a norm is not 
supported by the development on the issue of abolition. There has not been a simple 
diffusion of the European norm to the Russian domestic field in this case. Instead, we 
can see an on-going process of mutual adaptation and re-negotiation of the methods and 
instruments of cooperation, and perhaps eventually even the norm itself. The 
challenging of the human rights norms by Russia has not been direct or absolute, but 
gradual and indirect. Despite tensions and problems, cooperation has continued and it 
has become an institutionalised, everyday practice. What we have here is neither a great 
failure nor a success case of socialisation. This would indicate that greater attention 
should be paid to the study of the cooperation process and the interaction between the 
actors than has so far taken place in the literature. The case demonstrates that norms do 
not operate in vacuum, but the interaction and changes in the relationship often reflect 
back on norms.
On the basis of this case, it thus seems that Russia has been socialised to the practice of 
cooperation with the European organisations, but it clearly has not been socialised to the 
norms and values of the organisations (at least in the way they have been interpreted by 
the organisations and their member states so far). Russia is willing to cooperate with the 
European organisations and has many times called for even closer ties with them. 
However, it is only willing to do so on its own terms which are based on its interests, 
not on shared values and identities.
Russian behaviour over the question of abolition of the death penalty has kindled the 
tensions between solidarism and pluralism. The cooperative framework surrounding the 
norm is clearly solidarist, but Russia has partially challenged the applicability of the
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common standards to its case. Although some shared notion of common good and moral 
purpose still applies, Russia has claimed more room to manoeuvre in the name of its 
unique role and its own interests. Coercive intervention in the name of common good 
has not been -  and will not be -  applied on this issue. Only time will show, whether 
other methods are sufficient to push Russia eventually to change its policy or whether 
the norm itself will be modified.
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CHAPTER 6
NORM OF FREE AND FAIR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
This chapter explores how European organisations have tried to promote their norms 
and standards o f free and fair elections in Russia. This chapter directs its attention 
exclusively to federal -  presidential and parliamentary -  elections. The chapter 
analyses the electoral developments in Russia since the first democratic multi-party 
elections in 1993. The chapter evaluates the effectiveness o f European action on the 
question, and links it to the theoretical discussion on scope conditions and the 
socialisation model outlined in Chapter 1.
1 Overview of International Election Standards
After the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the norm of periodic and genuinely 
democratic elections has spread around the world. Governments may fail to live up to 
the norm, but their behaviour is still judged against the norm. Increasingly, governments 
are not considered internationally fully legitimate if they have not been elected through 
democratic elections. International actors often actively promote the principle of free 
and fair elections because it is seen as an important step in democratisation and 
socialisation to human rights norms. The general acceptance of the international norm 
of free elections is demonstrated by the widespread practice of election observation: 
international and domestic observers on the ground monitor how the elections are 
conducted and whether they meet international standards.485
The UN has played a significant role in defining international standards for democratic 
elections. The principles of democracy and genuine elections were among the central 
values of the UN after the end of the Second World War, despite the fact that the UN 
Charter does not mention the requirement for democracy. Article 21(3) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that "The will of the people shall be the 
basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures".486 The International Covenant on
485 Eric C. Bjomlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy 
(Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and John Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp. 
32-35.
486 Article 21(3), United Nations, General Assembly, Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
10 December 1948, UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (HI).
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Civil and Political Rights (1966) further strengthened the norm.487 Despite these 
documents, free elections were not actively promoted globally by the UN during the 
Cold War years.
As has been the case with human rights and democratic norms in general, the change in 
the promotion of free and fair elections came with the end of the Cold War. The General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 46/137 in 1991, which reinstated the view that the 
"authority to govern shall be based on the will of the people, as expressed in genuine 
and periodic elections".488 The resolution gave the task of establishing an Electoral 
Assistance Unit489 under the Department of Political Affairs to the Secretary General. In 
1996, the UN Committee on Human Rights confirmed the change by adopting a general 
comment on the Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right to 
Equal Access to Public Service. The comment included a detailed interpretation of 
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It lays out the 
standards by which all elections should be evaluated. It also requests states to report on 
the "measures they have adopted to guarantee genuine, free and periodic elections and 
how their electoral system or systems guarantee and give effect to the free expression of 
the will of the electors".490
The practice of international election observation has effectively spread the standards 
for the technical conduct of elections, and strengthens the principle that holding 
genuinely competitive elections on a regular basis is the only way to confirm 
international legitimacy of the government.491 Within the UN system, the coordinating 
body for international electoral assistance is the Electoral Assistance Division (former 
EAU) in the Department of Political Affairs. The EAD undertakes missions to assess 
the needs for electoral assistance and maintains a roster of international experts. It 
coordinates the UN efforts in the field of technical electoral assistance and international
487 Article 25, United Nations, General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 16 December 1966, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI).
488 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the 
Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, 17 December 1991, A/RES/46/137.
489 EAU was established in 1991. In 1994 the name was changed to Electoral Assistance 
Division (EAD).
490 United Nations, Committee on Human Rights, The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, 
Voting Rights and the Right to Equal Access to Public Service, 12 July 1996, General Comment 
25.
491 Thomas Carothers, "The Observers Observed," Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): p. 20.
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observation. It also cooperates with regional and international organisations providing 
electoral assistance.
The practical experience of international election observation has led to a growing 
understanding that elections are much more than formal legislation and election-day 
performance. International bodies and actors increasingly emphasise that elections are 
part of a wider political process that unfolds gradually during weeks and months before 
the actual election day.492 International actors engaged in election observation start from 
the presumption that there is "no single political system or electoral method equally 
suited to all nations".493 This approach means that international standards do not deal 
with questions of the fairest representational system or other system-related questions. 
International standards concern the goal of making sure that the elections and election 
campaigns are conducted freely and fairly, and minimum standards of representation are 
ensured.
2 Free and Fair Elections as a European Norm
European regional intergovernmental organisations have been major election standard 
setters alongside the UN. The Council of Europe, OSCE and the EU have all played a 
part in the development.
The standards were first developed by the liberal western European states within the 
Council of Europe. The statute of the Council of Europe declares its devotion to genuine 
democracy. This belief is reinstated in the preamble of the ECHR, which mentions 
"effective political democracy" as the best guarantee for the respect for human rights. In 
Protocol 1 (1952) to the ECHR, the signatory states undertook "to hold free elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure that free 
expression of the opinion of the people in choice of the legislature".494 All members of 
the Council of Europe were liberal democracies. This is a defining feature of the 
organisation: its members were ready to expel Greece from the organisation in 1969
492 Bjomlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy, p. 13.
493 This quote is from the EAD website at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/ea_content/ea_context.htm>.
494 Council of Europe, Council of Europe, Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952.
207
after a military junta had taken control of the country (Greece decided to resign before 
the decision was adopted).
Since the end of the Cold War, the norm has been further enhanced within the CoE. The 
Vienna Declaration of 1993 made the requirement of democratic government and 
elections even more explicit. It states that a precondition for membership is that the 
country in question has brought its institutions and legal system into line with the basic 
principles of democracy which include "free and fair elections based on universal 
suffrage".495
The CoE published a Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters in 2002. The 
document was a product of cooperation between a working group of the Venice 
Commission (that is, the European Commission for Democracy through Law),496 PACE 
and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe.497 This document sets 
out the underlying principles of European electoral systems and lays out conditions for 
their application. The document summarised Europe's electoral heritage as universal, 
equal, free, secret and direct suffrage in elections which must be held at regular intervals 
of no more than 5 years. According to the document, equal suffrage entails equal voting 
rights, equal voting power, equality of opportunity for parties and candidates alike -  in 
particular with regard to the elections campaign, coverage in the media and public 
funding of parties and campaigns -  and equality with regard to national minorities as 
well as sexes.498 The declaration was further endorsed by a PACE resolution and
495 Council of Europe, Final Declaration of Heads of State, Vienna Summit, 9 October 1993.
496 The Venice Commission is an advisory body of the Council of Europe that meets four times 
a year. It is composed of independent experts in democratic institutions and persons known for 
their contribution in law or political science. The Commission focuses mainly on constitutional 
law and related fields such as electoral law. The Venice Commission was established in 1990 to 
assist the European transition states. For more information, see <http://www.venice.coe.int>.
497 The cooperative body was called the Council for Democratic Elections. Representatives of 
ODIHR and Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission as well as ACEEEO (Association of Central and East-European Elections 
Officials) were granted observer status in the Council.
498 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Code of Good 
Practice in Electoral Matters: Adopted Guidelines and Draft Explanatory Report, 9 October 
2002, Opinion no. 190/2002.
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Committee of Ministers declaration. 4 9 9  The CoE and its Venice Commission are 
currently working on the transformation of the Code of Good Practice into a European 
Convention on Election Standards, Electoral Rights and Freedoms. The work is ongoing 
but the document is hoped to eventually further harmonise electoral legislation and 
codify the standards in Europe.
The OSCE has actively participated in the development of European election standards. 
Its participating states committed themselves to the idea of free and fair democratic 
elections in the Copenhagen Document of 1990. The commitments were extensive. 
Paragraph 6  of the document states:
"The participating States declare that the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed 
through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all 
government. The participating States will accordingly respect the right of their citizens 
to take part in the governing of their country, either directly or through representatives 
freely chosen by them through fair electoral processes. They recognize their 
responsibility to defend and protect, in accordance with their laws, their international 
human rights obligations and their international commitments, the democratic order 
freely established through the will of the people against the activities of persons, groups 
or organizations that engage in or refuse to renounce terrorism or violence aimed at the 
overthrow of that order or of that of another participating State. " 5 0 0
With this goal in mind, the participating states promised to invite international and 
domestic observers to all elections and to : 5 0 1
7.1 - hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law;
7.2 - permit all seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature to be freely 
contested in a popular vote;
7.3 - guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens;
7.4 - ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, 
and that they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public;
7.5 - respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as 
representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination;
499 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on 
the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, 13 May 2004, Doc. 10220; Council of Europe, 
Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, 30 January 
2003, Resolution 1320.
500 Paragraph 7 and 8, Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, 29 June 1990.
501 Paragraph 7, Ibid.
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7.6 - respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own 
political parties or other political organizations and provide such political parties and 
organizations with the necessary legal guarantees to enable them to compete with each 
other on a basis of equal treatment before the law and by the authorities;
7.7 - ensure that law and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be 
conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence 
nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting their views 
and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from 
casting their vote free of fear of retribution;
7.8 - provide that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded 
access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and 
individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process;
7.9 - ensure that candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required by law 
are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in office until their term expires 
or is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity 
with democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures.
An important step in the development of common European standards and practices was 
the establishment of the Office for Free Elections by the Paris Charter in 1990. The 
office was later in 1992 turned into the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights. 5 0 2  Through these offices, the OSCE has facilitated dialogue, assisted states and 
provided practical information on elections in its participating states. The ODIHR 
promotes free elections through election observation and assistance projects. 5 0 3
The EU shares the European norms that CoE and the OSCE have outlined. A good 
example of the intertwined nature of these organisations' efforts in the field of elections 
is the fact that both the ODIHR and Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, as well as 
the European Parliament and the European Commission took part in the Council for 
Democratic Elections under the CoE which drafted the Code of Good Practice in 
Election Matters in 2002. In recent years the organisations have attempted to form 
common international election missions and carefully coordinate their action and
5 0 2  Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Summit of Heads of State of
Participating States, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 19-21 November 1990.
503 See information at ODIHR website <http://www.osce.org/odihr/13421.html>.
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statements on observed elections in order not to send mixed messages on elections. 5 0 4  
The EU's activity in the field of the promotion of free and fair elections is informed by 
the central documents of the Union. The Treaty on EU (1992) confirmed the EU's 
support for democratic values and human rights. Article 6  (originally Article K) 
reaffirms the commitment to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedom and Article 11 (originally Article 
J.l) reaffirms their centrality in the conduct of CFSP, too. The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights also highlights the idea that the EU is based upon the principles of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Commission Communication on EU 
Election Assistance and Observation states that while elections do not equate to 
democracy, they are an essential step in the democratisation process and an important 
element in the full enjoyment of a wide range of human rights. 5 0 5  Democracy is thus the 
core value of the Union, and consolidation of democratic institutions, such as genuine 
elections, is one of the tools in the promotion of that European value.
To sum up, the most important documents defining the European norm of genuine 
elections are the Vienna Declaration and the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters 
by the CoE, and the Copenhagen Document and Charter of Paris by the OSCE. The 
documents provide a detailed description of how the organisations define European 
election standards, and they will be used as a reference point when looking at Russian 
developments. These principles are shared by all three organisations. The norm of free 
and fair elections is clearly defined and institutionalised in the OSCE and CoE 
structures. The ODIHR is especially designed to promote and monitor developments in 
the OSCE member states. The norm is clearly of fundamental importance and one of the 
defining features of the so-called society of European states, as discussed in Chapter 3.
The norm-specific scope conditions are apt for norm socialisation. First of all, as a result 
of the development of European documents, the textual clarity was strong. Systemic 
validation of the norm is currently evolving through the drafting of a legally binding 
CoE convention on the issue. Despite the lack of systemic validation for the time being, 
the coherence and consensus in the implementation and interpretation within Europe is
5 0 4  Interview with an OSCE PA member, 12 December 2006.
5 0 5  European Union, European Commission, Communication on the EU Election Assistance and 
Observation, 11 April 2000, COM(2000)191 final.
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high. This is due to the high degree of institutionalisation of election observation and 
assistance in Europe. A considerable hierarchy of norms has also already developed on 
the issue. The primary norm of free and fair elections has been backed by dozens of 
more exact secondary norms on the specific interpretation of the primary norm. The 
final characteristic of the norm is its very strong political, identity-based profile that, 
according to the literature on the scope conditions, may render the socialisation to the 
norm a more difficult and time-consuming process.
3 European Promotion of Free and Fair Elections in Russia
The OSCE has actively promoted the idea of free and fair elections and assisted the 
organisation of genuine elections in its member states in many ways. The OSCE 
monitors the implementation of these commitments through its election observation 
missions, which operate in the member states during elections. In addition to monitoring 
the implementation of election-related commitments, the OSCE observer missions offer 
recommendations and advice on electoral matters. The ODIHR also provides assistance 
for the organisation of elections and conducts legislative reviews.
As a participating state of the OSCE, Russia is politically -  but not legally -  bound to 
OSCE commitments. The legally binding character of the OSCE commitments is, 
however, strengthened by the fact that the EU-Russia PCA mentions OSCE 
commitments as the "standard" of common values. 5 0 6  In the Copenhagen Document, 
states agreed to abide by democratic principles in elections and the practice of election 
observation was institutionalised. The OSCE has sent observation missions to all of 
Russia's federal elections since 1993. The first observation mission consisted solely of 
the members of the Parliamentary Assembly. Since 1994, OSCE election observation 
has become a more long-term, in-depth exercise. This means that the missions consist of 
well-trained observers, and the missions also observe the campaigning period prior to 
the election day. The comprehensive OSCE strategy was developed within the ODIHR, 
and the first handbook for OSCE election observation was published in 1996. The
5 0 6  European Union and the Russian Federation, Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation 
between the European Union and the Russian Federation. See, in particular, the joint 
declaration in relation to Articles 2 and 107.
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ODIHR has been in charge of election observation missions to Russia since the 
parliamentary elections of 1995.
The CoE also works actively with Russia in the field of election assistance and 
observation. All its member states are committed to democracy as a fundamental 
principle. The practice of holding genuine, democratic elections is one of the most 
important of its membership conditions. The Russian Federation has internationally 
committed itself to the European norm of democratic elections not only through OSCE 
documents, but also by applying for CoE membership in 1992 and ratifying the ECHR 
and its first protocol in 1998.
The CoE started working with Russia on democracy promotion in the early 1990s, 
before Russia had even applied for a CoE membership. The CoE reacted to the dramatic 
changes in eastern Europe by launching the Demosthenes Programme, which offered 
transition states in eastern and central Europe expertise in building democratic 
institutions, guaranteeing the rule of law and protecting human rights. The Demosthenes 
assistance projects concentrated mainly on constitutional and legislative reforms, as 
well as the training of key officials and experts. The Venice Commission was 
established in 1990 in order to assist transition states in Europe in the field of 
constitutional law and related issues, such as electoral law. 5 0 7  One of the thematic goals 
of the joint programmes between the CoE and the EU is democracy through free and 
fair elections and to improve the quality of electoral legislation and practice in transition 
countries. The institutions have organised education, seminars and round tables on 
election related matters for NGOs and state officials alike. The CoE has also sent 
observer missions for all Russian federal elections since the first parliamentary elections 
in 1993. Observation is not just passive observation of whether the standards are met, 
but also includes post-election reporting and making recommendations for 
improvements.
The EU actively promotes free and fair elections in Russia through its assistance 
programmes and foreign policy instruments. The EU played an active role in 
cooperation on electoral matters with Russia in the early 1990s. It gathered a large
507 See footnote 496.
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election observation mission for the first multi-party elections in 1993, and monitored 
the media coverage of these elections through the European Institute for the Media 
(EIM). The Media Monitoring Unit assessed the legal framework within which the 
media were reporting the election process, and evaluated the independence and fairness 
of the actual election coverage. It has also provided technical assistance to the Russian 
Central Electoral Commission (Tsentralnaia izbiratelnaia komissiia, TsIK). The EU 
was actively involved in election monitoring in Russia until the election in Chechnya in 
1 9 9 ? 5 ° 8  j joweverj sinCe 1 9 9 7  it has focused on observing elections held in non-CoE 
member states. It does, however, provide technical assistance on election-related issues 
through its joint programmes with the CoE.
4 Developments in the Soviet Union and Russia 
Soviet elections
Traditionally, popular elections in the Soviet Union were merely a silly play that was 
performed at regular intervals. Hardly anyone took official election results seriously in 
or outside of the Soviet Union. The system did not allow any challenges to the party 
monopoly. The Communist Party nominated candidates for the elections and there was 
only one candidate for one seat. However, even if voting constituted nothing more than 
an act of political theatre, people were nonetheless harassed to hand in blank papers as a 
sign of "support" for the system. 5 0 9
The Soviet election culture started to change with the introduction of perestroika in the 
latter half of the 1980s. As was explained in Chapter 2, democratisation was one of the 
slogans of the reform programme, but Gorbachev's understanding of democratic 
government was still far from the western norm of democracy. 5 1 0  Gorbachev believed 
that democracy was somehow possible in the one-party system and with limited
5 0 8  The EU sent an observer unit to Russian elections in 1993 (EUR 346 000) where it also 
monitored media coverage through the European Institute for the Media (Grant of EUR 200 
000). The EU was also present at election observation in 1995 and technically assisted TsIK. In 
the 1996 presidential elections the EU created an Election Unit and allocated EUR 294 000 for 
this purpose. See European Union, European Commission, Communication on the EU Election 
Assistance and Observation.
5 0 9  Stephen White, "Russia, Elections and Democracy," Government and Opposition 35, no. 3 
(2000): pp. 302-3.
5 1 0  Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 378.
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competition. Essentially this meant that the Communist Party was still the only legal 
party, but the electorate could now choose between several candidates.
A new election law established a new system of limited competition in December 1988. 
In March 1989, the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the Soviet Union was elected by 
this method: there were both communist and independent candidates and more than two 
candidates for every seat. The Congress consisted of 2250 deputies who were elected in 
three different ways in order to guarantee the representation of regions, the communist 
party and public organisations. Even if the elections were only partly free, the new 
Congress consisted of members from different backgrounds and of many, even 
conflicting, opinions. A new political culture that was more open to debate started to 
take shape. The Congress convened twice a year and elected the Supreme Soviet, which 
consisted of fewer deputies. The Supreme Soviet was the day-to-day legislature, whilst 
the Congress only considered amendments to the constitution. The RSFSR created an 
almost identical regional structure with biannual meetings of the Congress and a more 
permanent Supreme Soviet. The Russian Congress elections, which were held in March 
1990, were also competitive but only partly free.
The Soviet approach to democracy gradually crawled closer to the western 
comprehensive understanding of democracy. This happened within the European 
framework. The Soviet government committed itself internationally to the goal of 
democratic elections in the CSCE Human Dimension meeting in Copenhagen in 1990. 
The local elections held in 1991 throughout Russia reflected this democratisation trend. 
The RSFSR held the first-ever presidential elections in June 1991. These were the first 
free and democratic elections in Russia. Boris Yeltsin, an independent candidate 
running against the Communist Party candidate, won the elections with a clear margin. 
In December 1991, the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist as Gorbachev stepped 
down from his office.
The democratic election of Yeltsin and the collapse of the Soviet Union were 
interpreted widely as a breakthrough of western liberal values and democratic ideals in 
Russia. There was talk about the end of competing ideologies -  the "end of history" -  as 
democratic liberal ideas became the only internationally legitimate source of power for
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any political system. 5 1 1 The situation appeared similar to the suggestions of the 
democratisation theory. Both the general framing and the democratisation theories 
reflected the general atmosphere of the post-Cold War era. This general framing was 
also reflected in the attitude of the European organisations towards Russia. International 
cooperation and pressure was widely believed to have played a crucial role in the rise of 
liberal and democratic ideas in Russia. 5 1 2
Evaluation
The European norm of free and fair elections changed its character with the end of the 
Cold War. The initially western European norm started to be applied also to former 
socialist states as the notions of "socialist democracy" were gradually relinquished. 
There was a common European desire to develop the norms further, to make the 
requirement for democracy more explicit and binding for all European states. The norm 
quickly gained determinacy and transparency with the adoption of the Copenhagen 
Document in 1990 and as more states in eastern Europe applied for CoE membership. 
The symbolic validation of the norm was -  as it is today -  relatively weak. 
Nevertheless, the adherence and coherence of the norm started to improve quickly with 
the wave of democratisation in eastern Europe, and the adoption of new common 
documents on the issue. The fact that the norm was resource-consuming and had a high 
political profile did not seem to influence the norm adoption negatively. In fact, it 
seemed that these two features cancelled each other out. The political significance of the 
norm encouraged states to overcome the practical hurdles of a lack of material 
resources. Besides, due to the political and symbolic significance of the first democratic 
elections in former socialist states, the European organisations were eager to show 
support by providing technical assistance and education for the eastern European states.
The international conditions became more favourable to the norm socialisation during 
these years. First of all, the asymmetry between the organisations grew deeper. The 
Soviet Union/Russia became the norm-taker, instead of being an independent norm- 
maker and a challenger of western values and norms, as was the case during socialism. 
The European organisations became more authoritative as the socialist system proved to
5 1 1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
5 1 2  MacFarlane, "Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice," p. 197.
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be incapable of accommodating radical transformation. As the downward economic 
spiral deepened in the Soviet Union, the material bargaining power of the western 
institutions also grew immensely. Many western assistance programmes were 
conditional to the introduction of liberal democratic reforms.
The environmental conditions should have made the Soviet Union/Russia particularly 
prone to norm socialisation. As the story of the Soviet Union came to an end, Russia 
was in a completely new situation without many domestic normative traditions to draw 
from. Hence it was open to European norms and assistance. Russia was also faced with 
major challenges under severe time pressure.
The domestic conditions were first highly controversial. Even though the word 
"democracy" was often used in the Soviet speeches, the country had no experience of 
true democracy. There was a contradiction between the domestic norm of party 
dominance and the European norm on democratic elections. Later, the domestic norm 
gave way to the European norm, and the domestic salience of the European norm grew 
positively. The introduction of the goal of free and fair democratic elections was elite- 
led, who were, in turn, significantly influenced by international pressure and debate. 
The Soviet state was dominated by the ruling elite, and the public had very little impact 
on the political processes -  even after the introduction of a degree of democracy. The 
Soviet Union had to overcome the old traditions and mind-sets in order to fully 
implement the norm of democratic elections. The re-education of election officers and 
voters alike was not a small task.
However, the European institutions -  apart from the CSCE -  had only few stated, 
specified goals vis-a-vis Soviet democratisation at the time. The European organisations 
were quick to reformulate their policies in order to engage with the former socialist 
states more fully on the issue. The CSCE was highly successful in introducing the 
standards for Russian reforms and framing the debate in Russia.
The socialisation model outlined in Chapter 1 would suggest that the Soviet Union was 
in the stage of tactical concessions with regard to the question of free and fair 
democratic elections. The pressure from the outside and the public shaming of the 
oppressive Soviet government contributed towards the introduction of democratic
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reforms including democratic elections. The reforms were gradual, and it was thus 
important for the western NGOs, governments and international organisations to 
maintain the pressure. This strategy proved to be very successful. However, contrary to 
the predictions of the socialisation model, the activation of the transnational network 
and the empowerment of wide dissident forces were not crucial in the initial decision to 
introduce democracy. The westem-minded liberals were a small minority who gained 
influence only because the ruling elite were willing to listen and voluntarily gave them 
positions of responsibility.
All in all, the socialisation model’s explanation seems, however, to provide a fairly 
descriptive picture of the development. 5 1 3  Once some liberal reforms had been 
introduced, the "events took over" and the situation escaped from the leadership's 
control. This general trend was also evident in the case of democratic elections: 
Gorbachev had to give up his notions of limited democracy in a one-party system fairly 
soon after the initial limited reforms. The democratically elected Yeltsin soon replaced 
him as the man in charge and the whole Soviet Union ceased to exist.
First post-Soviet elections: moving towards prescriptive status?
Russia has held altogether seven federal -  presidential or parliamentary -  elections since 
1993. While technical and administrative capacities have improved significantly over 
the years, an undemocratic, anti-pluralistic election environment has nevertheless 
gained ground. The political system and popular elections are characterised by 
undemocratic, non-transparent political processes, as well as the wide and openly 
acknowledged misuse of both hard and soft administrative resources around elections. 
Both of these claims require further elaboration. Firstly, the Russian political 
environment is characterised by a culture of virtual manipulation. This means that on 
the surface the name of the game is democracy, but in fact the real rules are 
antidemocratic. The aim of the system is "to manage, manipulate and contain 
democracy" by the elite and the experts of political manipulation employed by them 
(known in Russia as the "political technologists", politicheskie tehnologi) . 5 1 4  Examples
5 1 3  Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of 
Communism, p. 267. See, however, also his concluding comments on p. 287.
5 1 4  Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, p. xvi.
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of this unhealthy political process is, for example, the creation of "opposition" groups 
by the ruling elite, buying of parties, deployment of popular TV figures to "assassinate" 
candidates by crude slander attacks, 5 1 5  paying for negative, false stories about unwanted 
candidates and publishing false opinion polls. The old Soviet tactics of kompromat 
(mudslinging; the use of compromising material that is real, manipulated or faked) have 
been revived in the new Russian context. 5 1 6  The overall aim of the system of this so- 
called managed or sovereign democracy is to "establish monopoly of power and 
monopolise the competition of it" . 5 1 7
The second important characteristic of this system of managed democracy is the wide 
misuse of administrative resources in elections and election campaigns. The term refers 
to a blatant and widely accepted form of severe corruption in the public domain, and it 
can vary from hard, coercive methods to softer tactics. The misuse of administrative 
resources has been identified as one of the most important means by which incumbent 
political parties and politicians maintain and consolidate power in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. Administrative resources can be misused at all stages of the 
electoral process, from the formation of electoral constituencies through the election 
campaign to the counting of votes. 5 1 8  The overall tendency is to take the misuse beyond 
the simple stuffing of ballot boxes; the outright fraud is often limited and carefully 
targeted. 5 1 9
A report by the Centre for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative, and Transparency 
International Russia (2004) divides administrative resources and their misuse into six 
categories: coercive, regulatory, legislative, institutional, financial and media resources.
5 1 5  Russians commonly use the anglicism "media-killers" when referring to this practice.
5 1 6  An excellent study of the virtual nature of the Russian political life is Wilson, Virtual 
Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. See, in particular, pp. 1-72
5 1 7  Financial Times, 5 November 2003. On the nature of "managed democracy", see, for 
example, Steven M. Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei 
Ryabov, eds., Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post Communist Political Reform 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004); Wilson, Virtual Politics: 
Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World.
5 1 8  Centre for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative and Transparency International Russia, 
"Final Report: Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during the Campaign for 
December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections," (Moscow: 2004), p. 48.
5 1 9  Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, pp. 73-74.
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Coercive resources refer to law enforcement agencies, customs service, intelligence 
agencies and so on. Coercive resources are used to intimidate, obstruct or even liquidate 
political opponents. 5 2 0  Misuse of regulatory resources means in practice, for instance, 
that election commissions decline registration attempts from a candidate, or impose 
sudden tax inspections on a political party in the middle of elections campaign. These 
methods have been widely deployed in Russian elections. Misuse of legislative 
resources, on the other hand, means that the legislature passes laws that serve the
political interests of the ruling elite. In practice this may manifest itself in the setting of
barriers to limit the participation of independent candidates in elections, for example, or 
changing the system of appointing the election commissions so that the appointment 
facilitates one-party control over the commissions. Institutional resources refer to 
material resources pertaining to public office. Examples of their misuse include the use 
of public premises to hold campaign events, the use of offices and technical equipment 
in campaigning and so on. Financial resources may be abused by transferring public 
money to a party, or used directly to finance election campaigns or to buy votes. Media 
resources include the use of state-owned media to promote incumbent political parties 
and candidates. 5 2 1
In summary, Russia does indeed hold elections at regular intervals but severe 
institutionalised irregularities make talk about functioning electoral democracy
impossible. How is it possible that these irregularities have been able to become 
institutionalised in Russia, despite the fundamental value that the European
organisations attach to free and fair elections, and despite the close monitoring, 
reporting, assistance and political cooperation that they have exercised in the case of 
Russia? The following sections explore how the system developed election by election.
5 2 0  The cases are naturally difficult to prove but candidates have gone missing during election 
campaigns and the FSB has been accused later over the disappearances. This was, for example, 
the case in 2004 presidential elections when Ivan Rybkin who, as a result of the kidnapping, 
withdrew his candidacy and fled to London. Before the kidnapping Rybkin had accused Putin of 
having links with businessmen who were at the time taking over Yukos. See Ibid., p. 111.
5 2 1 Centre for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative and Transparency International Russia, 
"Final Report: Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during the Campaign for 
December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections," pp. 19-20.
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Parliamentary elections o f 1993
As explained earlier, Russian political life suffered from severe dysfunctionality and 
unhealthy rivalry between the legislative and the executive in the early 1990s. The 
president disbanded the Congress of People's Deputies by decree in September 1993. 
Yeltsin's act was unconstitutional, but he justified it by promising parliamentary 
elections and a referendum on the new constitution. He pleaded respect for Russians' 
wishes -  whatever those wishes would turn out to be. The legitimacy of the many-times 
amended Soviet constitution was unquestionably weak and hence many major western 
powers backed Yeltsin's high-handed action. As detailed in Chapter 3, the situation 
developed into a violent confrontation between certain of the deputies and the 
president. 5 2 2  In the end, President Yeltsin stayed in power and ordered the first 
democratic parliamentary elections to be held on 12 December 1993.
The elections were carried out simultaneously with the referendum on the new 
Constitution. The stakes were high for Yeltsin and his allies. If the constitution failed to 
pass, the reforms would be in ruins and instability in the country would continue. 
According to the law, a 50 per cent turnout was required, of which 50 per cent needed to 
be in favour of the constitution in order to enable the new constitution to be passed.
The Russian representational system of the State Duma mixes an absolute and a relative 
voting system. 5 2 3  There are 450 seats in the Duma: 225 deputies are elected from party 
lists and the other 225 deputies are individual candidates elected by single mandate 
vote. Only parties that pass a five per cent threshold (seven per cent since 2004) qualify 
for seats in the party-list ballot. Candidates from single mandate districts do not 
necessarily have party attachments.
These first democratic parliamentary elections were carried out on the basis of the 
presidential decree. The rules and regulations on elections and election campaigning 
were few and insubstantial. The system was later confirmed by the approved 
Constitution (1993, amended in 2001) and the Federal Law on the Basic Guarantees of
5 2 2  Timothy J. Colton, "Introduction: The 1993 Election and the New Russian Politics," in 
Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election o f1993, eds. Timothy J. Colton and Jerry 
F. Hough (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1998), p. 8 .
5 2 3  State Duma is the lower house of the parliament (Federal'noe Sobranie; the Federal 
Assembly). The upper chamber is called the Federation Council.
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Electoral Rights and Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Participate in 
Referendum (Basic Guarantees Law, 2002). In addition, a significant number of more 
specific laws have been passed, such as the Law on the Election of the President of the 
Russian Federation (2003) and Law on the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of 
the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (2002) . 5 2 4  Electoral laws have been 
modified and updated continuously since the first elections.
Results
The official results of the election of 1993 declared that 54.8 per cent of the electorate 
turned out to vote in the referendum and 58.43 per cent of the vote was in favour of the 
constitution. 5 2 5  This was clearly a close call but, given the October events, no one 
expected a rolling victory for the extra-presidential constitution.
The results of the parliamentary election5 2 6  were somewhat surprising: the ultra­
nationalist LDPR led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii emerged as the biggest party with 22.92 
per cent of the vote. 5 2 7  The 'party of the power', Russia's Choice (Vybor Rossii), secured 
only a 15.51 per cent share in the elections, and the Communist Party of Russian 
Federation came third with 12.40 per cent of the vote. Liberal Yabloko got 7.86 per cent 
and the Democratic Party of Russia 5.52 per cent. Also, the Women of Russia (8.13 per 
cent) and the Agrarian party (7.99 per cent) passed the (then) 5 per cent threshold.
5 2 4  All these laws are available in English at 
<http://www.legislationline.org/?tid=57&jid=42&less=false>.
5 2 5  These are the official results by TsIK which have been published in many books, articles and 
web sources.
5 2 6  The figures here are party list figures.
5 2 7  It is most likely that Zhirinovskii's party (established in the final years of the Soviet Union) 
was the very first example of a "virtual" opposition party. Then his Liberal Democratic Party of 
the Soviet Union was a fake liberal party with connections to the KGB; it only adopted ultra­
nationalist slogans later. Even after the Soviet Union's demise, the LDPR's success is widely 
regarded to have been encouraged by presidential policies. Its "function" in the Russian political 
game is to take away votes from the Communists. Its oppositional character can thus be 
legitimately questioned. Centre for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative and Transparency 
International Russia, "Final Report: Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during 
the Campaign for December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections," p. 71; Jerry F. 
Hough, "Institutional Rules and Party Formation," in Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and 
the Election o f1993, eds. Timothy J. Colton and Jerry F. Hough (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998), pp. 52-53; Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post- 
Soviet World, pp. 23-25.
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European involvement
The CoE, the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE all 
sent missions to observe the elections. The European practice of election observation 
was still evolving and at this point the missions were rather small and short-term in their 
nature. The European Commission did, however, ask the European Institute for the 
Media5 2 8  to monitor the coverage of the media in Russia during the election campaign. 
The Commission also provided equipment to the Russian authorities to help in the 
smooth running of the elections. 5 2 9  The international observers reported some 
shortcomings with regard to freedom of the press during the electoral campaign, the 
information of voters, the membership in some electoral commissions and the secrecy 
of the vote. Some features departed from "standard European practices" but they were 
expected to be corrected in future. In general, the elections were considered "free and 
democratic". However, a member of the CoE observation team submitted a lengthy 
dissenting opinion to the report, claiming that the elections were not free and certainly 
not fair. 5 3 0  The dissenting opinion had no official standing, but reveals the politics 
behind every election observation team. The conclusions drawn are always considered 
against the political context in question, as well as the prospects of democratic 
development in the country. Countries are treated differently: those states that are more 
democratic will be judged in a harsher manner than those that are taking their very first 
steps in the transition to democracy. 5 3 1
However, some months after the elections, serious allegations of fraud emerged on a 
bigger scale. The western-minded liberals accused local authorities of direct election 
fraud, which was claimed to explain the surprisingly good performance of small,
5 2 8  EIM is a TACIS-funded institute in Dusseldorf, Germany.
5 2 9  See European Union, European Commission, Press Release: European Commission Aid for 
Russian Elections, 30 November 1993, IP/93/1061.
5 3 0  According to a member of the CoE observation team, far-left representative of Greece 
Efstratios Korakas, issues related to deficient legislation and unconstitutional foundations of the 
elections, biased campaigning and media environment, disinformation and obscurities in the 
number of the total electorate, wide use of administrative resources and pressure made it 
impossible to call the elections free and fair. The submission of this dissenting opinion was a 
unique incidence and nothing like this has happened -  at least with regard to Russia -  since 
then. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Information Report on the Parliamentary 
Elections in Russia 12 December 1993 (Addendum to the Progress Report), 4 March 1994, Doc. 
7038 Addendum.
5 3 1  Interview with an OSCE PA member who has taken part in several election observation 
missions, 12 December 2006.
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marginal parties such as the LDPR, the Agrarian Party and the Women of Russia. The 
argument went that in order to secure the acceptance of the new constitution, the local 
governors stuffed ballot boxes with pro-constitution votes. As the parliamentary 
elections were held at the same time, they had to add extra votes to the other ballot box 
too. These extra votes were donated to parties that were perceived as rather harmless 
middle parties such as the LDPR, Russia's Women and the Agrarian Party. 5 3 2
Quite surprisingly, Yeltsin responded to the allegations by naming a special commission 
to investigate the claims. The commission concluded that it was likely that some 9.2 
million votes had been falsified in order to inflate the turnout figures above the 50 per 
cent barrier. In practical terms, this would have meant that the constitution was not 
legitimately approved by the Russian people. Further, the commission estimated that the 
LDPR might have gained up to 6  million extra votes (that is, 23 extra seats at the State 
Duma). The Agrarians, the Communists and Russia's Women were other relative 
winners in the fraud carried out mainly by the local administrations. 5 3 3  No action was 
taken based on the conclusions, and the European organisations kept quiet on the issue. 
No one seemed willing to raise the issue again and risk the fragile stability that seemed 
to be forming in Russia.
Despite the European endorsement, the elections were rigged. The European observers 
are likely to have given their blessing to the elections for two reasons. First of all, 
politically they wanted to see the volatile situation in Russia stabilising and the 
constitution, which was seen as the key to peaceful, long-term solution of the crisis, 
gain approval. Therefore, it was not in their interests to challenge this development by 
calling the election results fraudulent, which the Russians themselves seemed to accept 
in the end. Even the western-minded Russian liberals did not make official complaints 
on the issue. These were seen by many observers informed by democratisation theory as 
the "founding elections" after which the institutionalisation of democratic institutions 
would follow. Political considerations always play a significant part in the conclusions
5 3 2  Richard Sakwa, "The Russian Elections of December 1993," Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 2 
(1995).
5 3 3  These figures also supported the rumour that, absurdly enough, Yeltsin's supporters had 
taken 2 million votes away from the supposedly establishment party Russia's Choice. Wilson, 
Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, p. 76.
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of election reports. 5 3 4  Secondly, European election observation was still fairly limited in 
Russia and it is plausible that observers did not possess the evidence to challenge the 
results. By and large, Russia was seen as striving towards democracy and these 
elections -  even with all their shortcomings -  were seen as taking Russia one step closer 
to the phase of prescriptive status of democratic norms.
Parliamentary elections o f 1995
The 1995 parliamentary elections5 3 5  were conducted under conditions of relative 
stability following the political storm of 1993 and the newly-found multi-polarity in 
political life. 5 3 6  After the 1993 elections, the political scene had been characterised by 
participation of a number of parties and electoral blocs instead of the traditional 
"communist versus liberals" divide. Once again, the ruling elite tried to form a party of 
power: this time it was called Our Home is Russia (Nash Dom Rossiia). It was headed 
by the prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. 5 3 7
By this time, President Yeltsin had already moved away from the liberal camp of the so- 
called democrats. Just before the elections, the Yeltsin camp further encouraged party 
fragmentation in order to create a "liberal versus the communists" setting for the 
presidential elections, and to keep the Duma weak. The behind the scenes plan was to 
portray him as the only person capable of defeating the communists in the presidential 
elections in 1996.538
Results
The Communist Party emerged as the biggest party from the elections: it got almost a 
quarter of the vote. It also won the majority of the single-mandate seats. Zhirinovskii's
5 3 4  Interview with an OSCE PA member, 12 December 2006.
5 3 5  The Duma elected in 1993 was a so-called interim Duma which sat only half a term, that is, 2 
years. This had been decided before the elections had been carried out.
5 3 6  Michael McFaul, "Russian Electoral Trends," in Russian Politics: Challenges of 
Democratization, eds. Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), pp. 49-53.
5 3 7  Although Ivan Rybkin's bloc was also a Kremlin-led project. Michael McFaul and Nikolai 
Petrov, "Elections," in Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist 
Political Reform, eds. Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov (Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), p. 41. This two-party strategy did not, 
however, go too well partly because the plan was too widely known among the public.
5 3 8  McFaul, "Russian Electoral Trends," p. 51.
225
LDPR came second with 11 per cent of the vote. Despite being the 'party of power' 
Chernomyrdin's Our Home Is Russia got only 10.13 per cent of the popular vote. 
Liberal parties performed modestly: Iavliskii's Yabloko received 7 per cent and Gaidar's 
Democratic Russia 4.9 per cent. 5 3 9
Although the party of power did poorly, the results were no great shock to the Yeltsin 
camp, as the behind the scenes plan had consistently been to polarise the scene in order 
to ensure a victory for him in the presidential elections that were due to take place soon 
after the Duma elections. 5 4 0
European involvement
Once again the CoE, the EU and the OSCE, all sent missions to observe the Russian 
elections. They coordinated their action carefully and both the OSCE and the European 
Union made arrangements for sustained long-term observation of the campaign and of 
the preparations for the elections. 5 4 1 The international observers endorsed the elections. 
The organisations painted a picture of considerable improvements and, technically 
speaking, this was indeed the case. Legislation was firmer, regulations clearer, and the 
electoral officials and domestic observers were better trained and prepared than they had 
been in 1993.5 4 2  The European Parliament's delegation felt confident enough to declare 
the results almost immediately "100 per cent free and democratic" 5 4 3  and the presidency 
claimed that the elections "represent a step forward by Russia in the process of 
consolidating shared democratic values, respect for human rights and compliance with 
the rule of law" . 5 4 4  The CoE found that voting had been conducted everywhere in a calm 
and orderly manner and that local electoral commissions were well-organised and the 
election as a whole was up to international standards. 5 4 5
5 3 9  These are, again, official results by the TsDC.
5 4 0  McFaul, "Russian Electoral Trends," p. 51.
5 4 1 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Information Report on the Parliamentary 
Elections in Russia 17 December 1995 (Addendum V to the Progress Report% 22 January 1996, 
Doc. 7430 Addendum V.
5 4 2  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Press 
Release: Parliamentary Election in the Russian Federation, 18 December 1995.
5 4 3  Stephen White, Matthew Wyman, and Sarah Oates, "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian 
Duma Elections," Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 5 (1997): p. 791.
5 4 4  European Union, Statement by the Presidency Concerning the Russian Legislative Elections 
on 17 December 1995,20 December 1995, PESC/95/105.
5 4 5  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Information Report on the Parliamentary 
Elections in Russia 17 December 1995 (Addendum V to the Progress Report).
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There were reports of election fraud after the elections, but the scale of it was likely to 
have been more modest than in 1993. According to Andrew Wilson, this was not 
because the ruling elite had suddenly internalised the norms of democracy, but simply 
because they had no specific targets to meet this time. 5 4 6  However, the international 
observers could take comfort from the downward trend in rigging. Russian democracy 
seemed to be strengthening and the development seemed to fit the socialisation models 
to a satisfactory extent.
Hence, the European organisations downplayed considerable deviations from the 
positive socialisation model that took place during Russian elections. First and 
foremost, a considerable amount of fraud was committed in the first parliamentary 
elections in 1993. This was mainly attributable to the fact that there was an urgent need 
to get the constitution approved, which probably would have not passed without the 
falsification of votes. Furthermore, the ruling elite's attitude towards democratic 
institutions such as parties was negative. Instead of striving towards the establishment 
of institutionalised, well-functioning parties, the ruling elite encouraged party 
fragmentation in order to secure its own power. 5 4 7
Nevertheless, at the time many outside Russia believed that it was time to show support 
for Russian liberal reforms and make Russia one of the insiders of the European state 
society. In 1996, Russia became a member of the CoE, despite the fact that it had failed 
to meet a number of the membership commitments. It was believed that an 
integrationist, encouraging approach would be more fruitful with Russia. Because of the 
membership process, the CoE was inclined to interpret the development more positively 
than might perhaps have been the case otherwise. 5 4 8
Evaluation
By the end of 1995, Russia had developed its legislation and electoral rules to a point 
which complied with the European election standards. It had officially agreed to
546 Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, p. 77.
547 McFaul and Petrov, "Elections," p. 53.
548 See in particular the explanatory note on the "political significance of the election" in 
Information Report on the Parliamentary Elections in Russia 17 December 1995 (Addendum V 
to the Progress Report).
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implement the norm both in law and in practice. It had also approved a new constitution 
which guaranteed democratic principles and human rights in Russia. There were 
officially approved channels for lodging complaints concerning fraudulent practices in 
elections. The discursive practices of the government acknowledged the validity of the 
European norm of free and fair elections, and seemed to take the claims for fraud 
seriously by setting up a special commission to investigate the matter. All these points 
suggested that Russia was indeed very close to entering the "prescriptive status" of the 
Risse-Sikkink model. Indeed, the European tone was very positive, and the analysis was 
framed on the basis of Russian linear progress towards the consolidation of democratic 
norms.
The norm-specific scope conditions were positive for norm adaptation by the Russian 
Federation in 1993-1995. First of all, the requirements were clearly defined in the 
Copenhagen Document of the OSCE in 1990, and the CoE requirements of free and fair 
democratic elections were explicit for Russia after its membership application in 1992. 
Hence, the determinacy of the European norm of free and fair democratic elections was 
strong. The coherence of, and consensus on, the norm further strengthened with the 
general democratisation process taking place in Europe after the Cold War. There was a 
considerable norm hierarchy and institutionalisation backing the interpretation and 
implementation of the norm. The CSCE's Office of Free Elections was transformed into 
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in 1994 as its mandate was 
widened. This all contributed towards the likelihood of socialisation to the norm of free 
and fair elections by Russia. The symbolic validation of the norm was weaker than it 
was regarding the question of the abolition of the death penalty, for example, but the 
high political profile made the implementation obligatory for all CoE and C/OSCE 
states. The resources needed for the implementation of the norm were massive, yet none 
of the organisations expected a "perfect" performance in the first elections; rather they 
were pressuring for true commitment, an honest attempt at improving the conditions for 
free and fair elections and general good will in pursuing the reforms.
The international conditions were also propitious for socialisation to occur. The 
international asymmetry was evident at the time, and the moral authority of the 
European organisations was strong in the case of election standards. Russia did not have
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a problem with international observers or asking for election assistance from the 
institutions at the time. It thus acknowledged the moral authority of the organisations on 
the matter. Instrumental bargaining also played a role during the early years: Russia was 
aware that its international loans were dependent on its rating in introducing reforms at 
home, including the successful conduct of democratic elections.
The environmental conditions were also positive for norm adaptation. Russia had gone 
through a constitutional crisis, and the only way to solve the situation was to apply new 
standards of democracy. Free and fair democratic elections were the source of 
international legitimacy for the government, and the Russian government was naturally 
fully aware of this. Thus there was a strong desirability to adopt the European norm of 
free and fair elections. There was also a degree of time pressure, new information and 
assistance that was readily available from the European sources.
The domestic conditions, on the other hand, indicated that the implementation of the 
norm could prove to be difficult regardless of the level of commitment of the ruling 
elite. First of all, there was extremely limited experience of democracy in Russia. No 
one in Russia had experience of true democracy with open, pluralistic debate. 
Gorbachev had taken some steps towards democratisation and this was the only 
experience the reformers could draw from. The need for new methods and education 
was immense, but the domestic material resources were limited at the time.
The European organisations seemed to be very effective in introducing the requirement 
and standards of free and fair elections in Russia. The Russian legislation on the issue 
was improved to meet the European norms and requirements. The official discourse 
never doubted the goal of free and fair elections. Thus, the organisations were effective 
in the realm of discourse and formal, legal reforms. However, Russian practice was still 
lagging behind the European standards and, even more worryingly, there were signs of 
considerable election fraud in the 1993 elections. However, due to the downward trend 
in election fraud, the irregularities were explained away as teething troubles of the new 
system. The Russian irregularities and policies in general did not challenge the 
organisations or their norms.
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The socialisation model seems to describe the development in Russia in general and in 
the question of free and fair elections fairly well. The new democratic constitution, new 
elections laws, and the conduct of the elections were all signs of the prescriptive status 
of the norm. Russia had accepted the obligatory nature of the norm and cooperated 
actively towards its full implementation. There were still a number of irregularities, but 
these would fade away with the mechanisms of institutionalisation and habitualisation 
taking over eventually.
Presidential elections of 1996: moving away from the European norms?
The setting for the presidential election in 1996 was polarised. The centrist and liberal 
forces had been fragmented and the political scene was dominated by the Communist 
Party. Just as Yeltsin's team had envisaged, Yeltsin and the leader of the Communist 
Party, Gennadii Ziuganov, were the only serious candidates in the race. At the time, 
Yeltsin was very unpopular in Russia, but his campaign aimed at convincing the 
Russians -  and international actors alike -  that he was the lesser of two evils.
The presidential election of 1996 has been seen as a key turning point in the 
establishment of a virtual, manipulative political system, as well as the mastering of the 
art of misuse of administrative resources. 5 4 9  The elections showed the power of 
manipulation, particularly the manipulation of the media. The state-owned and private 
allied media were extremely biased in favour of the incumbent, and administrative 
resources were used to support him without scruples. Other candidates were arbitrarily 
disqualified and harassed. Yeltsin's massive and unlawfully large campaign spending 
also accelerated the consolidation of a new class of the oligarchs. Yeltsin's strategy 
used the questionable tools of Russian political technologists: false information, 
pressuring of local leaders, slanderous campaigning and behind the scenes manoeuvring 
which was close to ordinary bribery and corruption. 5 5 0  The undemocratic campaign was 
nevertheless highly successful. Just six months before the election, Yeltsin's popularity
5 4 9  Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, pp. 38-39.
5 5 0  Ibid., pp. 76-7. See also McFaul, "Russian Electoral Trends," p. 72.
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rating was as low as six per cent. In the end, Yeltsin won the second round of elections 
with 54 per cent of the vote. 5 5 1
Results
According to the official information on the first round of voting, Yeltsin came first 
with 35.28 per cent and Ziuganov received 32.03 per cent of the vote. General Lebed 
came third with 14.52 per cent and Yavlinsky fourth with 7.34 per cent of the popular 
vote. 5 5 2  The results meant that a second round of voting was to be organised with only 
two candidates on 3 July 1996. The TsIK declared that Yeltsin won the second round of 
elections with 53.82 per cent and Ziuganov received 40.31 per cent of the ballots cast.
European involvement
Despite the fact that there were increasing violations of the norm of free and fair 
elections during the election campaign and in the conduct of the elections, the European 
organisations once again whole-heartedly endorsed them. They dutifully reported the 
irregularities -  such as media bias, politicisation of local election commissions, 
coercion, harassment, election fraud and so on -  but simply noted that "they are not in 
the position to judge whether or not they had any significant electoral effect." These 
doubts did not, however, prevent them from claiming that the elections were a "sign of 
Russia’s deepening commitment to democracy" . 5 5 3
The OSCE "congratulated the voters of the Russian Federation for participating in a 
further consolidation of the democratic process in the Russian Federation" and believed 
that violations of the norm of free and fair elections that may have taken place "did not 
materially affect the outcome" and that the results "accurately reflected the electors 
wishes on election day" . 5 5 4  Bizarrely enough, the CoE congratulated Russia for "steady 
progress in the holding of democratic elections" and complemented Russia further by
5 5 1  Centre for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative and Transparency International Russia, 
"Final Report: Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during the Campaign for 
December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections," p. 65.
5 5 2  Others: Zhirinovskii 5.70%; Fodorov 0.92%; Gorbachev 0.51%; Shakkum 0.37%; Vlasov 
0.20%; Bryntsalov 0.16%. Again, these are the official results by the TsIK.
5 5 3  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Information Report on the Russian Presidential 
Election, First Round (Addendum I to the Progress Report), 24 June 1996, Doc. 7560.
5 5 4  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR International Observer 
Mission, Election for the President of the Russian Federation First Round of Voting: Final 
Statement, 18 June 1996.
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claiming "there is no longer any reason whatsoever to doubt Russia’s ability to hold free 
and fair elections" . 5 5 5  According to the EU, the elections marked "a historic milestone in 
the consolidation of democracy in Russia" . 5 5 6
Despite the European comments, the vote was heavily rigged, particularly in the second 
round of voting. 5 5 7  Indeed, the whole electoral process was less democratic than before. 
Nevertheless, the organisations endorsed the elections on the basis of political 
calculations: Yeltsin's victory over communist Ziuganov was a relief for many 
westerners. 5 5 8  It is also true that Yeltsin did, in all likelihood, receive more votes than 
Ziuganov and would thus have been elected in any case. This, nevertheless, hardly 
constitutes satisfactory grounds for closing one’s eyes to the fraud and undemocratic 
developments taking place in Russia. The European policy of endorsement of fraudulent 
Russian practices semi-legitimised the practice and encouraged the development of an 
electoral culture based on manipulation and fraud in Russia. 5 5 9
After the 1996 presidential elections, it was evident that Russian development in the 
case of free and fair elections had deviated significantly from the European norm. It was 
not due to any lack of experience or resources that Russia failed to meet the norm. 
Instead, it was already building up its own undemocratic version of electoral 
democracy. The system's aim was not to facilitate fair competition, but to elect the 
"right" candidate.
The European policy of endorsing the elections can be backed by four arguments. First 
of all, Reddaway and Glinski have claimed that "while the West could tolerate the 
creeping unspoken victory of market bolshevism over democracy, it would probably not
5 5 5  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Information Report on the Russian Presidential 
Elections, Second Round (Addendum I  to the Progress Report of the Bureau of the Assembly 
and the Standing Committee), 6 September 1996, Doc. 7633.
5 5 6  European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on the Elections in Russia, 5 July 1996, 
PESC/96/55.
5 5 7  In some national republics the vote swings between the rounds were eye-catching. Ziuganov 
managed to receive less votes in the second round than he had received in the first round in 
national republics such as Tatarstan, Dagestan and Kalmykia. Almost all serious experts agree 
that this is highly implausible. See Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open 
Politics, p. 33; McFaul and Petrov, "Elections," p. 45.
5 5 8  Interview with an OSCE PA member, 12 December 2006.
5 5 9  Sarah E. Mendelson, "Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia," 
International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): pp. 72-73.
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go along with a clear-cut, explicit victory by the anti-democratic forces" 5 6 0  These 
political calculations drove the organisations to endorse the results which guaranteed the 
relative stability of the development that was liberal at the surface, yet increasingly 
illiberal in its contents.
Secondly, it may have been that the organisations simply failed to synthesise what was 
going on. The organisations have been accused of analysing the development through 
the prism of the popular democratisation paradigm, and thus failing to recognise 
deviations from it. 5 6 1  Since the challenge was not a direct one, the organisations could 
explain the irregularities away by seeing it as part of the transition process. Yeltsin’s 
liberal discourse made it easy to define him as a liberal force aiming at the consolidation 
of democracy -  which he may have been once but certainly was not at this point. 
Yeltsin naturally exploited this image internationally as much as he could.
Thirdly, it has been claimed that the policy of endorsement has been built into the 
practice of election observation, and the missions are only now finding ways to be more 
critical and constructive in their reports. The problem revolved around the question of 
"how many specific shortcomings must be observed, and how serious they must be, 
before an election can be called 'not free and fair’ " . 5 6 2  For a long time, the biggest 
contribution of international observers was seen to be their mere presence in the target 
state during the elections.
Fourthly, fraud and abuse of administrative resources was only part of the bigger 
picture. The unhealthy political process, such as the invention of "opposition" parties 
and candidates, was by and large outside the scope of the reports. In order to understand 
the significance of the "irregularities" which were dutifully reported, one had to place 
them in this wider context. This wider context was, however, missing from the 
international observer reports.
5 6 0  Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism 
against Democracy (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 492. 
Emphasis in the original.
5 6 1  Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, pp. 12-14.
5 6 2  Carothers, "The Observers Observed," pp. 24-25. Emphasis in the original.
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Evaluation
The scope conditions changed only marginally around the year 1996. Russia became a 
member of the CoE which changed the international structure towards a less 
asymmetrical direction. The material bargaining power of the CoE also weakened. 
Nevertheless, Russia was still weak and sought European acceptance. The European 
organisations were morally authoritative. The norm-specific condition remained 
internationally strong. The European norm on free and fair elections was considered to 
be absolutely obligatory in character. The determinacy, coherence and consensus on the 
norm were strong in Europe. People in Russia supported the idea of democratic 
elections and wanted to vote freely. There was plenty of guidance and assistance 
available on elections internationally. Nevertheless, despite the favourable scope 
conditions, the Russian Federation managed to deviate from socialisation to the 
European norm of free and fair elections. This turn may not be explained through 
structural conditions, but only through conscious, political decisions made by the elite. 
The Russian Federation did not challenge the norm directly but remained rhetorically 
committed to the European norm. It used the norms as empty shells and filled them with 
a different practical meaning. 5 6 3  However, at this point one cannot see that Russia’s 
policy would have influenced the European norms and standards or cooperation. The 
real nature of the Russian policies on the issue was not clear from outside.
In a superficial way, Russia still seemed to meet the criteria of the prescriptive status of 
socialisation: it was actively involved in the international cooperation on the norm of 
free and fair elections, its legislation was in conformity with the European standards, its 
democratic nature was backed by constitutional guarantees, and even its public 
statements were thoroughly consistent with the norm of free and fair democratic 
election. All this suggested that there was commitment to the norm and that there was 
constant progress towards its realisation in Russia. However, the practical deviations of 
the norm in fact grew while legislation and the official discourse were strengthened. 
Thus, the model seems unable to grasp the nature of the changes taking place in Russia.
5 6 3  In a way, this is reminiscent of the discussion on empty signifiers and their contestation. This 
contestation was, however, hidden from the public at home and abroad and it did not concern 
itself with definitions but only with the practice. See Laclau, "Discourse."
234
Elections of 1999 and 2000: institutionalisation of irregularities
In August 1999, Yeltsin appointed a former FSB head, Vladimir Putin, as his prime 
minister. In early September, the violence in Chechnya and Dagestan escalated and the 
Russian leadership quickly sent tanks and troops to crush the Chechen resistance. 5 6 4  
Putin was commonly perceived as being the person behind the decisions and he gained a 
reputation as an efficient and tough leader. The decision to crush the terrorist resistance 
and Putin's leadership became increasingly popular.
Parliamentary Elections o f 1999
Elections to the State Duma took place in December 1999. Prior to the elections, two 
competing parties/electoral blocs emerged in the Russian political scene. The first, the 
Fatherland -  All Russia (Otechestvo -  Vsia Rossiia) electoral bloc was a popular 
challenger to the Yeltsin camp. This bloc consisted of two parties: one formed by 
former prime minister, Evgenii Primakov, and the other one by powerful regional head, 
Mitimer Shaimev. However, just some months before the elections, a new party of 
power was formed. This time around it was called Unity (Edinstvo) and it was chaired 
by the minister for emergency situations, Sergei Shoigu. The party's main ideology was 
unquestioned loyalty to the president.
The systemic problems which were clearly present in the 1996 presidential elections 
grew bigger and more widespread. The elections were characterised by slandering 
tactics in the media; in particular the infamous "media-killers" activities. 5 6 5  The 
principal candidates of Fatherland -  All Russia were practically "assassinated" by 
popular TV journalists. Both of the state-owned TV channels actively supported the 
Unity party. There was also evidence of systematic management of election campaigns 
by the presidential administration. The presidential administration favoured and actively 
supported Unity, and let Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (Soiuz Pravyh Sil,
5 6 4  Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The 
Russian Elections o f1999 and 2000 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 5.
5 6 5  Centre for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative and Transparency International Russia, 
"Final Report: Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during the Campaign for 
December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections," p. 65.
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SPS) campaign without interference. Other parties and their campaigning were harassed 
and campaigned against in the state-owned media. 5 6 6
Results
According to the official statistics, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
sustained its position as the biggest party with 24.29 per cent share of the votes. The 
biggest surprise was that the hastily set up pro-government Unity party managed to 
gather 23.32 per cent of the votes and that the Fatherland -  All Russia bloc received 
only 13.33 per cent. A new liberal party called the Union of Right Forces -  towards 
which Putin had signalled mild sympathy during the campaign -  did well and secured 
altogether 8.52 per cent of the vote. Vladimir Zhirinovskii's bloc ensured representation 
in the Duma with 5.98. Another close call was liberal Yabloko with 5.93 per cent share 
of votes.
European involvement
The OSCE and the CoE observed the elections in Russia and their reports continued the 
policy of endorsement. The reports started by citing positive legal reforms passed before 
the elections. The organisations were particularly pleased since some of the reforms 
followed their recommendations after the 1995 parliamentary elections. 5 6 7
With regard to the campaign, the CoE admitted that the campaign in the media was not 
fair, not clean and not honest. 5 6 8  Also the OSCE reported that "by the end of the 
campaign, legitimate questions had arisen as to whether the administration had stepped 
beyond legal boundaries that dictate a separation of public offices and resources from 
political campaign activities" . 5 6 9  It even acknowledged that a number of questionable 
actions taken by the administration were well-documented.
5 6 6  Ibid.
5 6 7  These changes concerned the official procedure for the registration of candidates for single 
mandate districts. See report Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report: Ad Hoc 
Committee to Observe the Parliamentary Elections in Russia (19 December 1999), 24 January 
2000, Doc. 8623.
5 6 8  Ibid.
5 6 9  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, 
Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma 19 December 1999: Final Report, 13 February 
2000.
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Nevertheless, once again the European organisations were on the whole satisfied with 
the parliamentary elections to the State Duma. The CoE even asserted that the polling 
was "conducted in a satisfactory manner and that high turnout indicates that there is a 
wide spread confidence in the election process". Whatever shortcomings there might 
have been were considered insignificant. 5 7 0  Again, a progressive picture of a state 
making its journey towards the consolidation of democracy was painted: the OSCE saw 
the elections as having "marked significant progress in consolidating representative 
democracy in the Russian Federation" . 5 7 1
Despite the European endorsement, these elections confirmed that Russia's development 
had deviated from the European norm. A considerable amount of institutionalisation 
took place around the elections. However, this did not include the institutionalisation of 
the European norm of free and fair elections, but instead the institutionalisation of 
negative, undemocratic practices. Russia was not moving up on the ladder of 
socialisation: the prescriptive status of the norm was challenged indirectly, not openly. 
The organisations seemed to be giving Russia the benefit of the doubt and tried to 
convince themselves and others that everything was going according to plan, but just 
progressing slower than had been expected.
Presidential elections o f2000
President Yeltsin resigned in his New Year's speech 1 January 2000. His prime minister 
acted as the president until new elections took place in March 2000. The presidential 
elections of 2 0 0 0  marked the start of a new era: namely the period of consolidation of 
the centre's power and the so-called managed or sovereign democracy. 5 7 2  Traits of the 
system had been there during the Yeltsin years, but it was only now that the anti- 
pluralistic system started to function more smoothly, and as had been intended.
5 7 0  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR, OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly, PACE and European Parliament International Election Observation Mission, Russian 
Federation Election of Deputies to the State Duma (Parliament) 19 December 1999, 20 
December 1999.
5 7 1  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, 
Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma 19 December 1999: Final Report.
5 7 2  Centre for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative and Transparency International Russia, 
"Final Report: Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during the Campaign for 
December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections."
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Putin decided to campaign by non-campaigning. This meant that he published no 
political programme, did not turn up to television debates between the candidates, had 
no television spots, and organised no election events. 5 7 3  Instead, he chose to take 
advantage of the manipulative tactics of political technologists. In practice this meant 
media favouritism and misuse of institutional and regulative resources, as well as 
outright fraud and ballot box stuffing. Although Putin was a clear favourite and bound 
to win, the undemocratic manipulative strategy was deployed. This demonstrates that 
undemocratic practices in elections are not just a tool to get the "right" candidate. It is 
also an institutionalised practice which is over-determined in today's Russia. 5 7 4
Results
According to official figures, Vladimir Putin received 52.94 per cent of the vote. This 
result meant that no second round was needed. Gennadii Ziuganov came second with 
29.21 per cent of the vote. 5 7 5
After the elections, plenty of reports of vote fraud emerged. According to many 
estimates, a truer figure in favour of Putin would have been somewhere in the high 40s, 
rather than the low 50s.576 Ziuganov, Yavlinsky, and even Zhirinovskii all spoke of 
fraud. 5 7 7  It is likely that without the fraud, a second round of voting would have been 
needed.
The claims of fraud are naturally difficult to prove, but there are several issues that 
indicate that widespread fraud was likely to have taken place. For example, a report 
published by the Moscow Times noted that there had been an increase of 1.3 million in 
the number of eligible voters between December 1999 (when the parliamentary 
elections were held) and March 2000 (when the presidential vote took place). This 
sudden jump could not be explained by demographical facts (as the Russian population
5 7 3  Colton and McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 
1999 and 2000, p. 175.
5 7 4  Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, p. 75.
5 7 5  Others: Yavlinsky, 5.80, Tuleev 2.95, Zhirinovskii 2.70, Titov 1.47 and Pamfilova 1.01. 
Official results by the TsIK.
5 7 6  Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, p. 34.
5 7 7  Although Zhirinovskii claimed that he had nothing against this practice. Kagarlitsky, Russia 
under Yeltsin and Putin, p. 260.
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is in fact shrinking at an alarming rate) or any other sensible factors. 5 7 8  Several reports 
indicated that nonexistent persons had been added to the voter rolls.
There were also various eyewitness reports on the fraudulent, illegal behaviour of the 
local election commissions. In order to understand these claims better, a brief 
explanation of the basic electoral administration is required. There are electoral 
commissions on four different levels: at the lowest level are the Precinct Commissions 
(94 864) and at the next level up are the Territorial Commissions (several hundred). 
Above these, there are Regional Commissions (89) and finally, at the highest level, the 
Central Electoral Commission (TsIK). The local Precinct Commissions count the votes, 
fill in an official document called a protocol, which records the results and send the 
protocols to the Territorial Electoral Commissions. The Territorial Commissions send 
them further to the Regional Commissions, which report the results to the TsIK in 
Moscow. The protocols should be made public at each precinct immediately after the 
votes have been tallied by law. In practice, this does not, however, happen. 5 7 9  For 
example, the Moscow Times requested all 1550 protocols in Dagestan, but were only 
able to obtain only 245 protocols. The TsIK did nothing to help the reporters to obtain 
the information that should be open to anyone according to the law. The Moscow Times 
compared the received protocols with the Territorial Commission's reports and found 
that there were 87 139 fewer votes for Putin in the original documents. 5 8 0  The Precinct 
Commissions may also "correct" the numbers after the count, or leave some columns 
unmarked so that the numbers can be added later by higher commissions.
After the elections, there were more than 2 000 complaints and 200 hundred lawsuits 
filed in connection with the presidential election. Both the TsIK (whose task is to deal 
with the complaints) and courts proved unhelpful. Very few complaints received a 
response and the TsIK ruled out the possibility of checking the results in advance. The
5 7 8  Also other estimates suspect that the increase in eligible voters indicates that officials 
inflated the electoral rolls by adding non-existent apartments and floors to buildings. See United 
Press International, 11 September 2000.
5 7 9  Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, p. 34.
5 8 0  Special report in the The Moscow Times, 9 September 2000. Available at 
<http://www.themoscowtimes.eom/stories/2000/09/09/l 19-full.html>.
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courts also overruled most of the cases and only one of them was taken up by the public
f O Iprosecutor.
European involvement
Again, the organisations reported the witnessed irregularities dutifully, but still endorsed 
the elections and claimed that the elections were a contribution towards the 
consolidation of democracy in Russia. The CoE admitted that "although the campaign 
cannot be considered to have been as fair as we would have liked to see it happen" the 
results embodied the "the free will of the Russian people" 5 8 2  The OSCE went further 
still by claiming that the 2000 Presidential Election "represented a benchmark in the 
ongoing evolution of the Russian Federation's emergence as a representative 
democracy" . 5 8 3  The organisation stated that the election demonstrated Russia's 
"continuing commitment to strengthen its democratic electoral institutions" . 5 8 4
Many people in Russia felt that the international election observation had become a 
political exercise without any practical meaning. The misuse of administrative resources 
and fraud was widely acknowledged by the public. Vladimir Andreenkov, director of 
the Centre of Comparative Social Research in Moscow, commented illustratively in the 
Christian Science Monitor on 18 September 2000:
"I have no doubt that there was fraud. We're all well acquainted with the scale and 
methods of pressure employed by the president's team during the elections, both direct 
and indirect [...] But, so what? In Russia, fraud is seen as a natural part of the process" 5 8 5
The Moscow Times -  that had cited eyewitness statements and other documents in order
to prove wide vote-buying, ballot stuffing and falsification of election protocols and
election rolls in its special report on elections -  wrote in its editorial in September 2000:
"[T]here is ample evidence that the Russian presidential elections do not deserve the 
legitimacy that an OSCE nod delivers. If this is the best a well-intentioned Western 
mission can do, then perhaps next time they should just stay home [ . . . ] " 5 8 6
5 8 1  Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, pp. 45-46.
5 8 2  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report: Ad Hoc Committee to Observe the 
Russian Presidential Election (26 March 2000), 3 April 2000, Doc. 8693.
5 8 3  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, 
Russian Federation Presidential Elections 26 March 2000: Final Report, 19 May 2000.
5 8 4  Ibid.
585 Christian Science Monitor, 18 September 2000.
586 The Moscow Times, 26 September 2000.
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The head of the Election Section at ODIHR Hrair Balian replied to the editorial and the 
report on election fraud by Yevgenia Borisova the newspaper had published earlier. The 
reply did not add much to the debate, but can be seen as a sign of increasing concern 
over the reputation of the organisation. 5 8 7
The organisations' claim that rigged, non-pluralistic elections contributed towards 
democracy seems odd. The institutionalised undemocratic practices could not take 
Russia further on the road of rule-consistent behaviour towards democracy. The Russian 
elite were not even trying to consolidate democracy -  their aim was merely to 
consolidate their own power. The biggest problem was that the European organisations 
seemed to be failing to understand the source of the problem. They took the leadership 
to be striving towards democracy, as the official Russian rhetoric claimed it was. 
However, under such circumstances, it would be judicious too look beyond what was 
said, to the actual politics. In Russia, the challenge for democracy has been a creeping, 
indirect one. In principle, the norm was approved and its legitimacy was never officially 
in doubt. This normative, formal acceptance did not prevent the elite from abusing the 
process openly and institutionalising questionable practices. The organisations resorted 
to the hope that -  despite growing evidence -  it was just a case of delayed 
democratisation.
To sum up, the development of popular elections in Russia continued on the 
undemocratic course that had been taken in 1996. The illiberal, undemocratic features 
became firmly established and institutionalised during this period. The developments in 
Russia, and the European policy of endorsement impacted negatively on the legitimacy 
of the European norms and practices. The dynamics of this impact are discussed below.
Evaluation
The norm-specific scope conditions do not explain the deviation from the European 
norm during the period under scrutiny. The coherence and consensus on the norm 
remained as strong as before. The normative hierarchy and institutionalisation of the
5 8 7  See Letters to the Editor, The Moscow Times, 28 October 2000. The debate between the 
OSCE and the Moscow Times was reported widely in the international media. See, for example, 
United Press International, 11 September 2000, Associated Press 12 September 2000, Los 
Angeles Times 13 September 2000, Christian Science Monitor, 18 September 2000.
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norm were also considerable. The norm was considered to be of fundamental 
importance, and one of the defining features of the European society of states.
The international conditions had not changed dramatically either. Even though the 
organisations had lost a degree of their structural advantage and much of their material 
bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia over the years, they were generally considered 
authoritative in the question of free elections. Russia still invited European observers to 
its elections, and thus acknowledged that their standards and norms obliged Russia too.
The environmental and domestic conditions had, however, changed considerably since 
the early 1990s. The first presidential transfer of power in the history of the Russian 
Federation was a new type of situation without precedent. This should have made the 
ruling elite more open to new information and norms. However, the situation had been 
carefully orchestrated in order to secure President Putin a clear victory in seemingly 
democratic elections. Domestically, the values of stability, predictability and a strong 
state seemed to have overridden the norm of free and fair democratic elections. The 
domestic structure became increasingly president-dominated after 1999 as the new 
leader Vladimir Putin took over. The Russian goal was not to implement the European 
norm, but to use the norm superficially to legitimise elections without true competition.
European effectiveness turned into a negative mode. The practice of election 
observation seemed to backfire as it indirectly legitimised illiberal and fraudulent 
practices by the Russian authorities. The irregularities became a well-established habit 
in Russia despite -  or indeed because of -  the European efforts. The organisations 
seemed to be implying that the form of institutions, such as elections, is more important 
to them than how they function in reality. 5 8 8  Through the policy of endorsement, they 
discredited the voices calling for true democracy and indirectly helped to legitimise the 
fraudulent practices.
Even more dangerously, Russian policies started to have wider implications for 
European norms and structures. The positive reports by the organisations ate into their 
credibility and authority on the matter. The organisation received a considerable amount
5 8 8  Mendelson, "Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia," pp. 72-73.
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of negative publicity in the international press. 5 8 9  Russian deviation from the norm, and 
the European policy of endorsement seemed to imply that manoeuvring on the question 
was allowed. The practice thus weakened the coherence and consensus on the norm in 
Europe.
The socialisation model outlined in Chapter 1 fails to grasp the essence of the 
developments in Russia on the question of free and fair elections. Russia’s challenge to 
the norm was indirect, and took place while engaging actively in cooperation with the 
European organisations. Russia continued to introduce minor legislative improvements, 
thus pleasing the organisations while simultaneously ensuring that minor things such as 
law did not restrict its manipulation of elections. The European norm of free and fair 
elections was not challenged rhetorically but through actual practices. The socialisation 
model would (just like the organisations did) miss the fundamental nature of the 
changes in the implementation. If anyone was "trapped in their own words", it was the 
structurally strong European organisations and not Russia. Both the phases of tactical 
concessions and the prescriptive status would be framing the developments in a non- 
descriptive and non-analytical manner.
Elections of 2003 and 2004: European authority challenged
Parliamentary elections o f2003
The parliamentary elections of 2003 took place against the background of a rapidly 
growing economy, high oil prices and huge popularity of President Putin. Since the 
1999 parliamentary elections, the political scene had changed significantly. Soon after 
these elections, the three main centrist parties (and the biggest competitors in the 1999 
Duma elections) Unity, Fatherland and All Russia (the latter two had previously formed 
a common electoral bloc) merged. The new coalition party was called United Russia 
(Edinaia Rossiia). The common wisdom is that the merger was overseen by the 
presidential administration. Senior officials were open about the administration's close 
ties with the party.
5 8 9  See, for example, United Press International, 11 September 2000, Associated Press 12 
September 2000, Los Angeles Times 13 September 2000, Christian Science Monitor, 18 
September 2000.
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Other significant developments preceding the elections were President Putin's 
reassertion of federal authority in the regions and state control over the national 
broadcasting media. National TV channels that had been independent or allied with 
opposition forces were closed down or taken over by the state. 5 9 0  These three 
developments made it possible to consolidate the management of political processes and 
the wider and more efficient use of administrative resources. Once again, unexpected 
tax or fire inspections in opposition parties' premises, disqualification of candidates on 
obscure grounds591, spreading of kompromat through the national media, harassment of 
candidates, politicisation of the electoral commissions and out-right vote rigging were 
present in Russian elections. The complaints on abuse filed later once again fell on deaf 
ears.
Results
The elections consolidated the dominance of the party of power, United Russia, which 
received 38.0 per cent. When its single-mandate district seats are added to this number, 
it won altogether 222 seats in the Duma. 5 9 2  The popularity of the Communist Party was 
in dramatic decline. It received 12.8 per cent of the total vote. Zhirinovskii's LDPR 
received 11.7 per cent. A new populist and patriotic bloc called Motherland -  National 
Patriotic Union (Rodina -  Narodno-Patriotichskii Soiuz) 5 9 3  did very well with 9.2 per 
cent of the vote and a total of 37 seats. According to the official results, the liberal 
parties (Yabloko and SPS) did not manage to pass the 5 per cent threshold and received 
no party list seats at all. 5 9 4  In effect, the elections gave Putin almost total control of the 
Duma.
5 9 0  Centre for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative and Transparency International Russia, 
"Final Report: Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during the Campaign for 
December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections," pp. 66-69.
5 9 1 For example, former prosecutor general Iurii Skuratov was a target of kompromat attack and 
was twice refused registration. His "offence" was that he had "concealed" his qualifications as a 
professor. Andrew Wilson cites many more similar instances, see: Wilson, Virtual Politics: 
Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, p. 82.
5 9 2  The figure is, however, bigger in reality as many of the independent members favoured Putin 
and many of then joined United Russia later.
5 9 3  It is commonly believed that the populist Motherland bloc was a creation of the presidential 
administration. The idea was to take away votes from the Communists as well as from 
Zhirinovskii's party. See Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, 
pp. 260-65.
5 9 4  Official results by TsIK.
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However, after the elections the liberal parties (Yabloko and SPS) and the Communist 
Party insisted loudly -  together and separately -  that there had been stuffing of ballot 
boxes and major occurrences of vote rigging. According to various sources Yabloko's 
share of votes should have been closer to 6  than 4.3 per cent and the SPS's share closer 
to 5.1 than 4 per cent. 5 9 5  According to Steven Fish and other experts, the liberals' 
decreased share of votes is almost certainly the result of late padding of the turnout. The 
Communist Party's parallel count carried out after the elections suggested that its own 
performance was about the same as the official figures stated, but that United Russia's 
rate was 33.1 and that Yabloko received 6  per cent. 5 9 6
European involvement
The OSCE and the CoE cooperated actively in these elections and published a joint 
initial report. The tone and message of the European observation reports changed after 
the 2003-2004 election cycle. Most importantly, the organisations finally refused to 
endorse the elections and confessed that they were far from free and fair. The elections 
and their results demonstrated that the ruling elite had succeeded in marginalising all its 
competitors and managed to firmly consolidate its power. The western observers were 
particularly disappointed to see the liberal parties practically wither away.
The ominous results were a final wake up call to the organisations: even though Russia 
still did not officially challenge the democratic norms, its practices were increasingly far 
from the norm and instead of progress there had been a clear regression in election 
standards. The organisations did not, however, completely abandon the democratisation 
paradigm despite their sobering analysis of the situation. For instance, the CoE claimed 
that Russia's progress towards democracy had "slowed down"597, not deviated from the 
model. It has also been suggested that the critical report had more to do with the 
personal characteristics of the chairman of the International Observation Mission rather 
than a thoroughly considered change of policy. 5 9 8
5 9 5  Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, pp. 78-79.
5 9 6  Ibid., p. 78.
5 9 7  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 
Report: Ad Hoc Committee to Observe the Parliamentary Elections in the Russian Federation 
(7 December 2003), 22 January 2004, Doc. 10032.
5 9 8  Interview with an OSCE PA member, 12 December 2006. The Mission was headed by 
president of the OSCE PA, Bruce George.
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Nevertheless, for once the observers were clear about the fact that Russia had 
intentionally broken several European commitments for democratic elections. In 
particular, the OSCE report mentioned the provisions on unimpeded access to the media 
on a non-discriminatory basis, a clear separation between the state and the political 
parties and guarantees to enable political parties to complete on the basis of equal 
treatment as well as secrecy of the ballot, on the right to seek political office without 
discrimination, on a free and fair atmosphere for campaigning without obstacles and the 
obligation to allow domestic observers from any appropriate organisation to observe 
elections. 5 9 9  The OSCE and CoE jointly called "into question Russia’s willingness to 
move towards European standards for democratic elections" . 6 0 0  The EU was, however, 
still hesitating: contrary to established practice, the EU presidency did issue a statement 
on Russian elections. This was due to the fact that Italy was holding the presidency at 
the time, and its prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was more sympathetic to Russia's 
policies than many other EU states. The EU suffered from lack of unity in its Russia 
policy. 6 0 1
Presidential elections o f2004
Despite the fact that it was evident that President Putin was about to win the presidential 
elections with a significant margin, the system relied on increasing misuse of 
administrative resources. The increased state control meant that the misuse of media 
resources was more visible and more efficient. Once again, President Putin officially 
refused to take part in normal campaigning (but, nevertheless, appeared on almost every 
news broadcast aired). Other candidates, Sergei Glazev (from Motherland but running 
independent) in particular, were harassed at every turn of their campaign. This time
5 9 9  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, 
Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma 7 December 2003: Final Report, 27 January 
2004.
6 0 0  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR, OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly and PACE International Election Observation Mission, Russian Federation State 
Duma Elections 7 December 2003: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 8  
December 2003.
6 0 1  Frustration with this incoherence later resulted in a Communication from the Commission of 
EU-Russia relations. See European Union, European Commission, Communication from the 
Commission on Relations with Russia, 9 February 2004, C0(2004)106.
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Communists were favoured by the administration’s manipulative tactics in order to push 
Glazev into third place. 6 0 2
Results
According to the official results, Vladimir Putin won the elections with 71.31 of the 
votes. The communist candidate Nikolai Haritonov came second with 13.69 per cent of 
the votes. Sergei Glazev received 4.10 and Irina Khakamada 3.84 per cent of the 
votes. 6 0 3  Some regional results read like a fairytale for Putin: in Kabardino-Balkariia the 
turnout was 95.9 per cent and 96.5 per cent of the votes went to Putin, in Ingushetia the 
turnout was 91.1 per cent with 98.2 per cent for Putin, and in Chechnya the turnout was 
claimed to have been 89.7 per cent turnout, with 92.3 per cent for Putin. 6 0 4
European involvement
The European organisations viewed the presidential election of 2004 in a negative light,
as with the parliamentary elections a few months earlier. The conclusion of the
European election observation mission was that despite technical professionalism, the
election "process overall did not adequately reflect principles necessary for a healthy
democratic election." It was also noted that "essential elements of the OSCE
commitments for democratic elections [...] were lacking". Even direct falsification of
election results had been observed, and thus elections could not be called free and
fair. 6 0 5  The EU also gave a statement supporting this conclusion:
”[...T]he European Union is concerned by the finding that "the state-controlled media 
displayed clear bias in favour of the incumbent and that the authorities failed to attempt 
to rectify this situation". [...T]he European Union calls on Russia to take steps to ensure 
that future elections meet more fully Council of Europe and OSCE standards, including 
free media" . 6 0 6
6 0 2  Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, pp. 42-43.
6 0 3  Official results by the TsIK.
6 0 4  These are official results by the TsIK, quoted in Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy 
in the Post-Soviet World. The OSCE/ODIHR report also included a Sample of Implausible 
Turnout and Result Figures from 188 territorial election commissions (Appendix 1). See 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, 
Russian Federation Presidential Election 14 March 2004: Final Report, 2 June 2004.
6 0 5  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ODIHR, Russian Federation 
Presidential Election 14 March 2004: Final Report.
6 0 6  European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the 
Presidential Elections in Russia, 17 March 2004, PESC/04/36.
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This time, the reason for fraud was clearly not the result: Putin would have been elected 
in any case and quite likely in the first round of voting. This once again confirms that 
that vote rigging is an over-determined, firmly-rooted and institutionalised practice. The 
organisations offered their help in introducing reforms in order to guarantee fairer 
elections in the future. Unfortunately for the European organisations, the political game 
had already been lost. At this point, it was already extremely hard to reverse the 
development in Russia.
Russia received the European criticism coldly. In 2002, the CIS summit had adopted a 
Convention on the Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights, and Freedoms 
in the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States which established a 
CIS Election Observation Organisation. The organisation observed both the 
parliamentary and the presidential elections in Russia, and declared them both free and 
fair. Russia appealed to its judgement on the issue. No apologies or promises to improve 
the situation in the future were given by the Russian side. On this question, the elections 
proved to be a turning point in relations between the Russian Federation and the 
organisations. It marked the beginning of Russia's fight against the European "double 
standards" against Russia and other Soviet republics.
On 8  July 2004 Russia and eight other CIS member states issued a public statement in 
which they accused the OSCE of failing to respect their sovereignty and applying 
double standards in its treatment of its member states. They claimed that the 
organisation focuses too much on promoting human rights and democracy in certain 
countries and too little on other issues. 6 0 7  The EU mission to the OSCE replied to the 
statement by asserting that human rights and rule-of-law issues cannot be considered 
internal affairs. The presidency claimed that the EU has "serious concerns about certain 
elements of the declaration" . 6 0 8  Foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, renewed Russia's 
criticism by writing an article to the Financial Times in November. 6 0 9
6 0 7  The statement was signed by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. See Eugen Tomiuc, "OSCE: Several CIS States Rebuke 
Democracy Watchdog," RFL/RL, 9 July 2004.
6 0 8  Ibid.
6 0 9  Sergei Lavrov, "Reform Will Enhance the OSCE's Relevance," Financial Times, 29 
November 2004.
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The CIS observers and the European organisations disagreed again over the democratic 
standards during the election crisis in Ukraine in November-December 2004. Before the 
elections, Russia openly backed pro-Kuchma, pro-Russia candidate Viktor Yanukovich. 
The initial elections which were held in November 2004 were, according to European 
and American observers, heavily rigged and many voters were brutally pressured to 
vote for Yanukovich. There were demonstrations and pressure from abroad to hold a re­
run to the elections. Russia and President Kuchma opposed a re-run of elections, but 
after a Supreme Court ruling a re-run was organised. The opposition candidate, former 
prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko, won the re-run elections held on 26 December
2004. This episode led to a cooling of relations between Russia and western democracy 
promoters -  meaning first and foremost the OSCE.
Russia has refined its critique into an action plan: within the CIS system, it is building a 
similar election observation framework to that of the OSCE. This framework is one of 
the tools that Russia uses to back its strategy in the former Soviet republics. While the 
OSCE increasingly condemns fraudulent elections in CIS semi-authoritarian states in 
the international press, the CIS observers' reports declaring elections free and fair are 
cited in the domestic media. This kind of "forum-shopping" is becoming an established 
practice in the semi-authoritarian states in the former Soviet region. 6 1 0
The situation was tense when the OSCE foreign ministers met in Sofia in December
2004. Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, criticised the OSCE for double standards 
and claimed the OSCE could not be trusted to monitor elections in good faith. "In the 
absence of any objective criteria, monitoring of election processes becomes an 
instrument of political manipulation and a factor for destabilisation. " 6 1 1  Lavrov accused 
western states of using the OSCE election missions as a political tool to influence 
internal political events in former Soviet states. Even though he did not mention 
Ukraine by name, the reference was clear. Russia proposed a reform of the whole 
organisation, and threatened to withdraw its budgetary contributions if its suggestions
6 1 0  Interview with an OSCE PA member who has headed several observer missions in CIS 
states, 12 December 2006. See also Mark Baker, "East: Why Do OSCE, CIS Observers Rarely 
Agree on Elections?," RFE/RL, 12 April 2005; Roman Kupchinsky, "CIS: Monitoring the 
Election Monitors," RFE/RL, 2 April 2005.
6 1 1  Lavrov at OSCE meeting in Sofia, Associated Press, 7 December 2004.
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were not seriously considered. 6 1 2  The meeting decided to establish a high-level panel to 
consider the future and reforms of the OSCE. 6 1 3  In February 2005, Lavrov raised the 
issue once more, and suggested that the OSCE, Council of Europe, CIS Election 
Observation Organisation and NATO Parliamentary Assembly should organise a joint 
seminar on election assessment. The OSCE election observer specialists met in Vienna 
in April 2005 in order to discuss the criticism Russia had raised. 6 1 4  The Chairman of the 
TsIK, Aleksandr Veshniakov, claimed in the meeting that OSCE observers were helping 
certain countries to interfere in the internal political affairs of other states. Veshniakov 
claimed that Russia wants both the CIS and the OSCE standards to be used in assessing 
elections. 6 1 5  Thus Russia is now outspokenly aiming at changing the OSCE standards 
which were accepted in Copenhagen in 1990.
The OSCE has been puzzled by the magnitude of Russia's attack. The ODIHR's 
director, Christian Strohal, has tried to convince Russia that the methods it uses are 
clearly defined and the same in the west as in the former Soviet republics. 6 1 6  The 
relations heated up once again with the Belarusian elections in March 2006. Once more, 
the CIS observers endorsed the elections while the European organisations criticised 
them harshly, claiming that they were neither free nor fair. 6 1 7
To sum up, the Russian challenge has potentially dangerous consequences as it has not 
only challenged the authority of the organisations, but recently also the norm of free and 
fair elections directly. In the case of the death penalty, the Russian challenge relates to 
the authority of the organisations in setting up exact standards and timetable for the 
implementation of the norm, but in this case the attack is directed straight at the 
European norm of free and fair elections which Russia wants to redefine. Russia's action 
aims to impact the working of the OSCE in the field of election assistance. Its criticism 
has led to the plans to restructure the organisation. It also threatened to withdraw its
6 1 2  The reform proposal had been outlined in a CIS meeting in October 2004. See Vremia 
Novostei, 6  December 2004. On disagreements see also Vremia Novostei, 8  December 2004.
6 1 3  Breffni O'Rourke, "OSCE: Blunt Russian Criticism Raises Specter of Crises," RFE/RL, 8  
December 2004.
6 1 4  Roland Eggleston, "OSCE: Election Experts Debate Russian Criticism," RFE/RL, 22 April
2005.
6 1 5  Ibid.
6 1 6  Ibid.
6 1 7  United Press International, 21 March 2000.
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share of the budget if nothing was done about the predominance of the human 
dimension.
The Russian criticism against perceived western double standards has since spread to its 
relations with the Council of Europe. The Russian Federation took up the rotating 
chairmanship of the Committee of the Ministers in May 2006. On the eve of its six- 
month term as the chairman, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Mihail Kamynin, argued that Russia will devote its term to fighting the western double 
standards regarding Russia and other former Soviet republics. 6 1 8  In a similar vein, at a 
PACE standing committee meeting in May 2006, Foreign Minister Lavrov claimed that 
he sees a "political subtext in the commitments required of Russia" by the CoE. 6 1 9
Evaluation
The norm-specific scope conditions do not explain Russia’s deviation from the 
European norm. Without Russia's challenge, the norm of free and fair elections would 
have been extremely strong. The overall consensus on the norm, normative hierarchy 
and institutionalisation were all on a high level. There seemed to be new progress even 
in the case of symbolic validation as the Venice Commission finalised its report on the 
Code of Good Practice in Electoral matters in 2002 and the drafting of a new continent- 
wide convention begun.
There had been some changes in the international and environmental conditions, which 
implied that Russia might be readier to question the European norms than before. First 
of all, the structural asymmetry had been diminishing as Russian economy took an 
upward course with the record-breaking increase in oil prices. Since the "war on terror", 
Russia had become a more independent and self-confident international actor in world 
politics. It seemed that Russia was not satisfied anymore with its "novice" status vis-a- 
vis the European organisations. There was also no sense of crisis at the top level in 
Russia anymore. President Putin was more popular than ever and he seemed to have the 
general support for his statist reforms from the people.
6 1 8  The comment was published on the Foreign Ministry web pages <www.mid.ru>.
R1A Novosti, 29 May 2006.
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Domestically, the norm salience of the European norm of free and fair democratic 
elections had diminished considerably. By now, the firmly established practices were 
contrary to European norms. As long as the European organisations allowed that to 
happen, the Russian leadership maintained that its practices complied with the European 
norms. When the organisations finally refused to endorse the elections, the Russian 
leadership was faced with only one option: an open challenge to the authority of the 
organisations and the norms they promoted. The gap between European norms and the 
Russian practices had grown wider with every election since 1996. Now there was even 
deviation from the rhetorical commitment and the discourse became more defiant.
The authority of the European organisations and the European norm of free and fair 
elections are now openly challenged. Russia has even gathered a group of CIS states 
around it in order to strengthen its challenge to the norm. 6 2 0  Hence, only the formal 
requirements and legislation conform to European standards on elections. The practice 
and the official discourse in Russia were contrary to the European norm on free and fair 
democratic elections.
The Russian action had major implications for the coherence of and consensus on the 
norm of free and fair elections in Europe. For the first time since the end of the Cold 
War, the norm has been challenged by a European state. The action challenged the 
determinacy of the norm by claiming that there were other interpretations which should 
be accepted. The Russian opposition may make the increase in symbolic validation of 
the European norm more difficult in the future.
The socialisation model fails to explain the development. Even though there was an 
open challenge, the Russian Federation did not revert back to the stage of denial. This 
was because Russia challenged the norm within, and not outside, the organisations. It 
continued cooperation closely with the organisations, yet at the same time it was 
implementing policies, which were in contradiction with the agreed principles. There 
was a clear regression, but this regression did not take place within the terms of the 
model and escapes the expectations built into the model.
620 See footnote 607.
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5 Conclusion
The development of the norm of free and fair democratic elections in Russia has jumped 
out of the frying pan and into the fire since the "founding elections" of 1993. From the 
very beginning there was evidence of irregularities and rigging, but gradually these 
features have become institutionalised practices. There is no attempt to comply with the 
European norms, and illiberal and undemocratic practices are not apologised for by the 
government. In fact, Russia has challenged the applicability of the European standards, 
which it once agreed with. It expects that the European organisations will continue 
cooperating with it on the question, but strictly on Russia's terms.
The changes in the Russian policies vis-a-vis elections do not seem to flow naturally 
from the changes in scope conditions. The norm-specific conditions are extremely 
supportive for socialisation and have only grown in strength during the period under 
scrutiny. The norm is considered to be a high priority issue by the organisations and is 
high in determinacy, adherence, coherence and overall consensus concerning its 
interpretation and implementation. Although Russia has strengthened considerably over 
the years there have not been any fundamental changes in the international conditions 
either. The initial sense of crisis has gradually passed in Russia, but there are major 
problems still to be solved. All in all, it seems that conscious political decisions by the 
ruling elite explain the development on the issue of the European norm of free and fair 
democratic elections in Russia better than the changes in structural scope conditions. 
The elite have given preference to the consolidation of their own power over the goal of 
consolidation of competitive democracy.
The European intergovernmental organisations seem to have based their policies on the 
presumption that Russia was already a pro-democracy state striving towards the 
institutionalisation of democratic norms. Because of the above assumption, the 
organisations have placed too much emphasis on the declared rhetorical goals of the 
Russian leadership, and too little on the actual electoral practice. This led to the policy 
of endorsement of elections despite growing irregularities taking place in the Russian 
elections. The organisations did not pay attention to the worrisome undemocratic 
developments taking place in Russia in time.
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European policy has not only been ineffective but it has, in fact, been counter­
productive in promoting the goal of free and fair elections in Russia. As Sarah 
Mendelson has pointed out in the case of the US, the policy of endorsement has a) 
indirectly legitimised the fraudulent practices of the Russian authorities and thus 
possibly accelerated the negative developments (if evaluated against its own goals) in 
Russia, b) isolated and discredited the calls for fairness and true democracy, and c) 
discredited the practice of election observation and its objectivity. 6 2 1  Recently, the 
European organisations have shown greater realism in their analysis of Russian 
elections but in many ways this too little, too late.
The Russian practical and ideological challenge to the norm may have had an impact on 
the European norm and cooperation in general. First of all, by challenging the authority 
of the European organisations in interpreting the norm, Russia challenged the 
determinacy of the norm. According to Thomas Franck, the transparency and textual- 
clarity of any international norm is linked to the fact that there is an international body 
that has undisputed authority to interpret the norm. 6 2 2  Russian behaviour also challenged 
the coherence in the application and unbroken consensus on the norm. By gathering a 
group of states and challenging the European norms, Russia made it clear that the 
European criteria were not the only criteria around. Despite all the talk about double 
standards of the European organisations, what Russia really objected to was the equal 
application of the European norms. It remains to be seen whether the Russian behaviour 
will affect further codification of the European norm of free and fair elections that is 
taking place within the Venice Commission.
During the early years, the development on the question of free and fair elections 
seemed to comply with the socialisation modes. Russia was willing to adopt the 
European norms and start working towards their implementation, both formally in law 
and in practice. Russia scored highly in meeting the criteria of prescriptive status of 
norms. First of all, it had declared its commitment to European elections standards 
within the frameworks of the CoE and the OSCE, it had institutionalised the norms in 
the constitution and the election laws, and established all necessary institutions and 
complaint mechanisms. Furthermore, the discursive practices of the government
6 2 1  Mendelson, "Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia," pp. 71-73.
6 2 2  Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, p. 61.
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acknowledged the validity of the norms irrespective of the audience and no longer 
denounced criticism of elections as "interference in international affairs" and engaged in 
a dialogue with their critics. Whenever Russia was criticised and fault was found, it 
apologised and promised to improve the practices in the future. There were sustained 
efforts to implement the norms, in particular with regard to legislation and the 
improvement of electoral rules.
Gradually, however, irregularities during election time grew and became established 
practices. The discourse and the legislative reforms remained consistent with norm 
implementation. The model does not account for such an indirect challenge to the 
norms. The case highlights all the potential problems inherent in the model outlined in 
Chapter 1. The phases of the model do not grasp the essence of the change because the 
model gives preference to structures over active agency after the initial kick-off phase. 
Contrary to the model's expectations, the Russian authorities managed to challenge the 
structural preconditions and went their own way on the question. The process did not 
proceed automatically, but was directed by active political decisions by the ruling elite.
The question of the norm of free and fair democratic elections in Europe became 
contested through an indirect challenge of Russian practices and their gradual 
institutionalisation. The European organisations initially gave their blessing to the 
development, and this proved to be dangerous. Finally, the development culminated in 
an open challenge to the interpretation of the norm by the European organisations and 
their authority. The cooperation on the issue of promoting the norm of free and fair 
elections in Russia ended up having a negative impact on the organisations and their 
norms. The norm grew weaker and the authority of the organisations became 
challenged. Thus, the change clearly was not about a one-way transference of norms 
from the international to the domestic field. Norms can be challenged and norms can be 
changed through the cooperative process; they really are mutually constitutive. The 
organisations made the mistake of taking the interpretation of the norm for granted, and 
failed to see that the decisions they make, and that Russia makes, may influence the 
interpretation of the norm.
The development in Russia on the issue of democratic elections has challenged the very 
basis of the European solidarist society. So far, democratic elections have been
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considered to be a fundamental, defining feature of the European solidarist international 
society. Russia challenged the norm first indirectly through practice and recently more 
directly by both words and deeds. The relationship between the actors is -  and is likely 
to remain -  solidarist due to the degree and depth of the cooperative schemes between 
them. However, Russia has now begun to question the substance of this solidarism. 
How the European organisations will respond to this challenge, is of crucial importance 
for the future of the solidarist society in Europe. These questions are studied in more 
detail in the concluding Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This thesis has studied the interaction between the European intergovernmental 
organisations and Russia on the European norms o f human rights and democracy. It 
has done so by applying theoretical ideas on socialisation to three empirical case 
studies on different sets o f norms: the institution o f a human rights ombudsman, the 
abolition o f the death penalty and free and fair elections. In this final concluding 
chapter, the cases are compared with each other, after which the explanatory power o f 
specific scope conditions and o f the socialisation model will be evaluated against them. 
Finally, the chapter draws several theoretical and practical lessons on European 
democracy and human rights promotion in Russia, and contemplates on the nature and 
future prospects o f the relationship between Russia and the European society o f states.
1 Comparison of the Cases: Scope Conditions
The three empirical chapters highlighted the complexities in the implementation of 
European norms in Russia. The progress towards implementation has not been quick or 
easy in any of the cases, but the norm of a human rights ombudsman has been the most 
successful case of the three. Despite earlier difficulties, the norm of a human rights 
ombudsman has been fully implemented in Russia: there is an ombudsman institution 
working in Russia today, the institution is backed by legal and constitutional guarantees, 
the office has been relatively effective in dealing with citizens' complaints and other 
duties, and occasionally the ombudsman institution has demonstrated surprising 
independence from the state authorities. All in all, the official discourse on the 
institution, its practical functioning and the formal legislative conditions all comply with 
the European standards and expectations on the issue. The European organisations have 
proved effective in supporting and encouraging the implementation of the norm in 
Russia.
However, in the other two cases the European efforts have been far less successful. The 
full implementation of the European norm of abolition of the death penalty and the 
norm of free and fair elections by Russia is still lacking. The shortcomings in 
implementation are different in each of the cases. In the case of abolition of the death 
penalty, there has been considerable progress in practical implementation of the norm 
but the shortcomings concern the low level of rhetorical commitment by the authorities, 
and the failure to meet the formal, legislative commitments set by the European 
organisations. On the other hand, in the case of the European norm of free and fair
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elections, the formal, legislative requirements have been met by Russia. With regard to 
this norm, the defects concern the actual implementation of the norm in practice and, 
again, the low level of discursive commitment. Recently, the norm of free and fair 
elections as defined by the European organisations has even been openly challenged by 
the official discourse. The table below sums up the progress in implementation of the 
three European norms by Russia.
Table 7: Current implementation of the European norms by Russia
Formal,
legislative
reforms
Consistency 
of discourse
Practical 
implementation of the 
norm, institutionalisation
Ombudsman institution + + +
Abolition of the death penalty - - +
Free and fair elections + - -
Why have the organisations succeeded in the case of an ombudsman, but failed in 
different ways in the cases of abolition of the death penalty and free and fair elections? 
In an attempt to answer the question, this chapter starts by looking into the scope 
conditions for socialisation as suggested in the literature. The scope conditions relating 
to the norms themselves, to domestic structures, and to international as well as to 
environmental factors, were outlined in detail in Chapter 1.
The norm-specific scope conditions were positive overall for socialisation in the case of 
the ombudsman institution. According to Thomas Franck's criteria of determinacy 
(transparency and textual clarity of the norm), coherence (norm applied and 
implemented equally among members) and adherence (normative hierarchy), one may 
claim that the pull towards implementation has been high in this case. The pull was 
further strengthened by the general consensus over the norm in Europe, and by the fact 
that the resources required to establish such an institution were manageable for Russia. 
The literature suggests that its technical nature and relatively low political profile should 
be an asset in the implementation. It is true that Franck's "symbolic validation" could 
have been higher (after all, there is no binding international agreement on the issue).
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Nevertheless, the question was listed in the formal CoE membership conditions for 
Russia, which made the requirement a formal one. 6 2 3
The domestic scope conditions were also relatively favourable for implementation to 
occur. Russia had no prior experience on the question, but the form of the institution 
fitted the Russian traditions rather well. Only one person represented the institution in 
public and took care of its relations with state and other bodies. The establishment and 
proper functioning of such an institution can be interpreted as being in the interests of 
the state and the society alike. Taking care of citizens' complaints through the 
ombudsman institution is economical, potentially efficient and lower-key than resorting 
to the judicial channels available to Russian citizens in Russia and in Europe. 6 2 4  Russian 
authorities must have come to the conclusion that these benefits overrode the soft 
"risks" that the ombudsman institution posed for them. These risks included first and 
foremost public criticism, which is in fact low in today's Russia: the state has a strong 
grip on the media, and past experience shows that the authorities can easily marginalise 
the ombudsman if they so wish.
The international and environmental scope conditions have changed from positive to 
neutral over the years. These general structural conditions apply not only to the norm of 
the ombudsman institution, but also to the other two norms alike. During the early years 
of European engagement with Russia, the European organisations enjoyed great 
structural advantages. Russia was economically and politically weak, and it was looking 
for the help of the European organisations in settling its problems. The structural 
asymmetry between Russia and the organisations was thus strong. In the eyes of the 
Russians, these organisations also enjoyed high moral standing. They represented the 
values that the new Russian state wanted to identify with. Additionally, the 
organisations had outstanding material bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia. This was 
particularly markedly the case with the CoE, for whose membership Russia applied in 
1992. Later, these international conditions have levelled down considerably. With 
Russia's accession to the CoE, the organisation lost much of its material bargaining 
power, and post-membership experimentation with coercive methods has not brought
6 2 3  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion on Russia's Request for Membership of 
the Council of Europe.
6 2 4  Russia ratified the ECHR and its Protocol No. 11 in 1998. Russian citizens are thus able to 
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.
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the desired results with Russia. The structural asymmetry has also diminished with the 
improving economic performance and growing political significance of Russia globally. 
The environmental scope conditions were also initially extremely encouraging for 
implementation of the European norms: the European organisations were willing to 
provide new information and assistance at a moment when Russia was faced with a 
completely new situation, which required the reforming and building of new state 
institutions from the ruins of the Soviet Union under severe time pressure. This sense of 
urgency and openness has since passed.
To sum up the discussion on the scope conditions in the case of the ombudsman 
institution: the conditions have been mainly positive for the implementation of the 
norm, and the norm has been implemented fully -  that is, in practice, in law and in 
official discourse -  by Russia. This seems to suggest that the scope conditions do indeed 
explain the progress in the implementation of the norm.
However, the other two empirical cases challenge this premature conclusion. The norm- 
specific conditions were also high in the cases of abolition of the death penalty and free 
and fair elections. Similarly to the case of the ombudsman institution, these European 
norms were also high in determinacy, coherence, adherence, and there was a European- 
wide consensus on the issues. Moreover, in the case of the death penalty the symbolic 
validation is on an even higher level than with the other two norms: a formal, legally 
binding international agreement exists on the issue, and its ratification is required by the 
CoE vis-a-vis all its members. One cannot explain the differences by reference to 
international and environmental scope conditions either, as they are exactly the same in 
all of the three cases.
The only scope conditions that could explain the differences in the degree of 
implementation by Russia are the norm-specific conditions on the technical character of 
the norm, and the domestic salience of the norms combined with changes in domestic 
and international structures. Unlike the ombudsman question, the norms of abolition of 
the death penalty and democratic elections have very high political- and identity-related 
profiles. As long as the pro-westem attitude reigned in Russia, and the environmental 
and international scope conditions were in favour of socialisation, the high political 
profile seemed to be an asset in the process of implementation. Only later, when the
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pro-western attitude faded and asymmetry between the parties weakened did this feature 
turn against socialisation. It seems also, that prior experience was not an asset when it 
came to implementation of the European norms by Russia. There had been some 
experimentation with the norm of abolition of the death penalty as well as with 
"democratic" elections. This earlier experimentation only contributed towards confusion 
over the norms: for example in the case of elections, the Soviet abuse of elections and 
democratic rhetoric only created a dangerous precedent for elections in Russia.
It should also be noted that despite the fact that state-society structures were naturally 
the same in all of the cases, these structures have influenced the developments rather 
differently in each of the cases. They have had a positive, or at least neutral, impact in 
the cases of the abolition of the death penalty and the ombudsman institution. However, 
in the case of democratic elections, state dominance has had a negative impact on 
development: the state representatives have openly misused the formal system in order 
to consolidate their power and eliminate all meaningful competition.
In summary, it seems that the scope conditions which have generally made a difference 
-  at least when combined with other conditions -  have been general changes in 
international structures and environmental conditions. In particular, scope conditions 
which relate to the distribution of material power seem to reflect fairly directly onto the 
degree of norm socialisation. Norms with a high political profile have suffered from the 
fact that Russia's structural position vis-a-vis the European organisations has 
strengthened. This indicates that the European organisations have not been successful in 
evoking softer mechanisms of persuasion, argumentation and institutionalisation, and 
that their success in Russia is still very much dependent on material bargaining and 
instrumental calculations on Russia's side. These instrumental calculations are first and 
foremost based upon political considerations: for example, why is it that the 
independent ombudsman institution is not considered to pose a threat to the ruling elite 
but free and fair elections are? All in all, the scope conditions seem to add to the 
outcome but, as the case studies demonstrated, they do not determine the outcomes.
The scope conditions and their applicability to all of the cases are summarised in the 
tables below. In each of the cells a short description is followed by two symbols which 
indicate whether the conditions are considered to be positive (+ +) or negative (- -) for
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implementation in the literature. Sometimes the conditions have changed, or the 
conditions have been consistently controversial (+ - and - +). The order of the symbols 
refers to the sequence of events (+ - first positive, then negative, or, - + first negative, 
then positive). The evaluation is based on subjective evaluation on the basis of the 
review of theoretical literature in Chapter 1 and the empirical case studies in Chapters 4, 
5 and 6 .
Table 8: Norm-specific scope conditions
Ombudsman Abolition Free Elections
'Determinacy' high + + high + + high + +
'Svmb. validation' lower - + high + + lower - +
'Coherence' high + + high + + high + +
'Adherence' high + + high + + high + +
Technical character relatively technical 
+ -
high political profile high political profile
General consensus high + + high + + high + +
Resources needed for 
implementation
politically no extra effort 
needed, little material 
resources 
+ +
politically a lot, 
materially not so much 
+ -
a lot of material 
resources, politically not 
much 
+ -
Table 9: Domestic scope conditions
Ombudsman Abolition Elections
Norm salience 
domestically
No prior experience, 
society supports + +
Long roots, some prior 
experience, society 
objects, state officially 
supports + -
Confusing prior 
experience, society 
supports, state officially 
supports + -
State-society structure State dominates + + State dominates + + State dominates + +
Capacity to carry out the 
needed changes
Strong, election 
procedure has been 
difficult in the past 
+ +
Ability lower during 
Yeltsin's regime, now 
stronger 
- +
Technical ability weaker 
during first elections, 
now strong 
- +
Table 10: International scope conditions
Council of Europe OSCE EU
Asymmetry vis-ci-vis 
Russia
First high, after 
accession less so + -
Low - - First high, still relatively 
high + -
Moral authority vis-S-vis 
Russia
First high, still relatively 
high + +
First relatively high, 
fading fast + -
Low - -
Material bargaining 
power vis-^-vis Russia
First high, after 
accession less so + -
Low - - When EU consensus, 
relatively high + -
Table 11: Environmental scope conditions
Sense of crisis, urgency High at the beginning, has passed since then + -
A new situation, a new problem At the beginning, has passed since then + -
New information European information actively available, since the early years 
more alternative sources (e.g. the rise of BRIC states etc.) + +
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2 Comparison of the Cases: the Socialisation Model
This section analyses how well the socialisation model outlined by Risse and Sikkink 
describes and explains the development in each of the cases, and what this comparison 
tells us about the model. The section also considers how the model should be further 
developed to better fit the Russian case.
The model claims that in order to engender enduring human rights change, certain types 
of causal mechanisms must be present in the process of socialisation. These causal 
mechanisms for enduring change are: 1 ) instrumental adaptation and strategic 
bargaining, 2) argumentation and persuasion, and 3) institutionalisation and 
habitualisation.
These mechanisms have all been present in the successful case of the ombudsman 
institution. When Russia sought international recognition and financial assistance in the 
early 1990s, the ombudsman institution constantly came up. The institution was put on 
the domestic reform agenda at least partly as a result of strategic cost-benefit 
calculations. The causal mechanisms of argumentation and persuasion are also likely to 
have played a part. The European organisations have been successful in convincing the 
Russian leadership that the establishment and proper functioning of such an institution 
is in the interests of the Russian people and authorities. Also at an individual level, 
ombudsman Mironov changed his views on many issues following active European 
engagement. Finally, institutionalisation and habitualisation are also gradually taking 
place. Institutionalisation is still relatively weak and the situation cannot yet be claimed 
to have stabilised. Nevertheless, this mechanism has been present in the implementation 
process. All in all, Russia has made considerable progress in socialisation to the norm of 
the human rights ombudsman institution.
With regard to the second case study on abolition of the death penalty, these causal 
mechanisms have not been present to the same extent as with the first norm. Based most 
likely on strategic calculations, Russia agreed to be bound by the European norm. This 
was done in order to gain access to the CoE. There have been considerable efforts to 
convince the Russian authorities and public alike that abolition is in their interests and 
the proper thing to do as a human rights-respecting state and CoE member. These
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efforts seem to have been in vain. The Russian authorities and public have not been 
convinced by the arguments and they have disregarded the European efforts. On the 
practical level, there has been some modest institutionalisation. As a result of this 
institutionalisation, it does not seem likely that Russia would revert back to issuing 
death penalties and carrying out executions. Neither, however, does this mean that there 
will be further progress in implementing the norm. The causal mechanism of persuasion 
seems to be low in the case of abolition of the death penalty in Russia today.
In the case of free and fair elections, the causal mechanism of instrumental calculations 
has clearly been the dominant one. First, democratic elections were used as a means to 
gain legitimacy both internally and externally. The question was of extreme importance 
to international actors and the benefits of democratic elections were politically 
enormous. The authorities have, however, been resistant to the persuasive efforts of the 
European organisations. More important than the consolidation of democracy through 
free and fair elections have been the consolidation of elite power and the elimination of 
any meaningful political competition. This desire has led to the institutionalisation of a 
different set of norms concerning the elections to those promoted by the European 
organisations. Thus, in the case of free and fair elections, both the processes of 
persuasion and institutionalisation of the norm have been lacking.
The categorisation of causal mechanisms is useful and it seems to explain the lack of 
progress convincingly. For Risse and Sikkink the categorisation is, however, only the 
starting point for the development of the more ambitious "spiral model" of state 
socialisation. The spiral model claims that there should be a certain sequence in the 
emergence and dominance of these causal mechanisms. It asserts that states internalise 
human rights according to a certain model, which has been drawn up from studies of 
human rights internalisation by Latin American states. 6 2 5  The phases of repression, 
denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule consistent behaviour have all 
been explained in detail in Chapter 1. At this point, it suffices to recall that the model 
highlighted the significance of international factors in norm socialisation by states, and 
that non-state actors were a crucial moving force in the initial stages of the 
development.
6 2 5  Risse and Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction," p. 18.
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At face value, the progress in the case of an ombudsman institution seems to fit the 
socialisation model outlined by Risse and Sikkink rather well. When the goal of 
establishing such an institution was unveiled in the Soviet Union, some may have 
suspected that it was a question of tactical concessions: the leadership may have 
mentioned such an institution in the draft constitutions in order to appeal to the western 
audience. Nevertheless, when the regime changed and Boris Yeltsin became the leader 
of the Russian Federation, few doubted the sincerity of the attempt to establish the 
institution. Russia can be seen to have entered the prescriptive status of this norm and 
human rights norms in general. During the early years, the official rhetoric on European 
values, the measures to implement them in practice and in law seemed to be following 
the path of norm socialisation.
Despite the fact that the changes did not come about as a result of societal action by the 
Russians themselves, there had been considerable activation of international NGOs and 
western governments on the issue of human rights violations in the Soviet Union. The 
developments could be interpreted in the light of the socialisation model: the change 
was, to some extent, the product of international pressure and lack of domestic 
legitimacy.
After the change in power, there was no contestation of the European norm of the 
ombudsman institution by the authorities, and the mechanism of persuasion seemed to 
be easy to trigger. There were plenty of practical hurdles to overcome, but the 
commitment by the Russian authorities as such was never doubted. According to the 
socialisation model, gaps between the implementation and commitment level are typical 
for the phase of prescriptive status if the international pressure does not remain on a 
high level. 6 2 6  The fact that Russia finally managed to push the legislation through and 
elect the first ombudsman in 1998 could be interpreted as a sign of active involvement 
of the European organisations. Today, Russia has implemented the European norm in 
words, in law and in practice. The model expects that in the current situation, the 
mechanisms of institutionalisation and habitualisation will finally take over and Russia 
will move towards rule-consistent behaviour.
626 Ibid.
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Despite the fact that there have been some adjustments to the norm of the ombudsman 
institution (for example, the importance of good bilateral relations between the president 
and the ombudsman), the process has been essentially about adaptation by Russia to the 
European norm as defined by the European organisations. The norm has simply been 
transferred from the international level to the Russian domestic level. The model's 
phases and the sequence of causal mechanisms seem to fit the developments on the 
issue rather well, regardless of the fact that civil society in Russia remains weak and 
marginalised.
Progress in the case of the death penalty also seemed to follow the expectations of the 
socialisation model during the early years of cooperation on the issue between Russia 
and the organisations. The Russian leadership seemed to be committed to the 
implementation of the norm, there was considerable progress in the limitation of the 
death penalty, and the discourse was consistent. The hurdles were believed to be chiefly 
practical in nature, and it was believed to be only a matter of time before Russia ratified 
Protocol No. 6 . 6 2 7  However, while other new CoE members went ahead and ratified 
Protocol No. 6 , progress stalled in Russia. Today, Russia is the only CoE member that 
has not ratified the protocol. In recent years it has even cast doubt over the whole goal 
of ratifying the protocol.
Contrary to the expectations of the model, Russia has proved to be resistant to active 
international pressure and to more positive encouragement alike. Risse and Sikkink 
argue that non-compliance is possible during the early stages of the model if the state is 
independent enough, and does not care about being excluded from international 
cooperation, or, later in the phase of prescriptive status if there is not enough 
international attention to the actual implementation of the norm. This was not the case 
with Russia and the abolition of the death penalty: it was already in the phase of 
prescriptive status and there was plenty of international attention to the state of 
implementation in Russia. Whilst failing to comply with this fundamental European 
norm, Russia was simultaneously engaging and cooperating actively with all of these
6 2 7  Interview with an advisor at the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights Office, 24 October
2005.
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European organisations. Thus, the model fails to explain the developments in the case of 
abolition of the death penalty.
Instead of complying with the model's expectations and being persuaded by the 
international actors, Russia has sought to demonstrate that it will engage with the 
European organisations on its own terms only. Through its use of uncompromising, 
interest-based politics, Russia has gained more room to manoeuvre vis-a-vis the 
organisations. Instead of direct denial of the norm (which could be interpreted as a 
regression to the phase of denial), Russia has challenged the norm and the European 
organisations' authority on the matter indirectly through its ignorance of the European 
calls for implementation.
The failure to explain the developments in this case derives from the potential problems 
that were outlined in Chapter 1. Firstly, the Russian development has not followed the 
general presumption that international factors and structures would suffice to trigger 
development along the lines of the spiral model. In particular, the presumption that there 
would be some semi-automatic process of verbal self-entrapment seems ill-fitted to the 
Russian case. On the contrary, the ruling elite have been skilled in using the discursive 
structures and arguing in order to escape the firm European criteria for implementation. 
Because politics and active political choices are by and large excluded from the model, 
the criteria for each of the stages fail to grasp the essence of the change.
Secondly, the socialisation model assumes that the norms are fixed, given entities. It 
seems that Russia has rather successfully negotiated a partial exception for itself on the 
question of the abolition of the death penalty. An exception to a general norm may 
weaken the coherence and consensus on the norm in Europe and this could have an 
impact on the working of the European organisations (this point will be discussed later).
Thirdly, and related to the previous point, this case study demonstrated that the process 
of socialisation is not necessarily a one-way street. The cooperation process surrounding 
the norms has not simply been about the effective transference of norms from one party 
to another. Russia has indirectly challenged the authority of the organisations. The 
European consensus on the norm has been weakened by Russia's non-compliance. How
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profoundly Russian policies will affect the development of the European norm of 
abolition nevertheless remains to be seen.
Likewise, the developments in the case of free and fair elections in Russia depart from 
the socialisation model. In fact, Russia's behaviour on this issue departs from the 
model's expectations even more dramatically than was the case with the abolition of the 
death penalty. During the early years, the development seemed fairly clear-cut and it 
could be described according to the terms of the socialisation model. However, it soon 
became apparent that instead of implementing and internalising the European norms, 
Russia had been institutionalising very different practices under the misleading label of 
free and fair elections. Today, the Russian leadership does not try to hide its departure 
from the European norm: the illiberal, undemocratic practices are not apologised for 
anymore. On the contrary, Russia has openly challenged the applicability of the 
European standards (with which it once agreed) to its case.
The case confirms the defects of the socialisation model discussed above in the case of 
abolition of the death penalty -  only this time they are more evident still. Firstly, 
contrary to the model, only active political choices, even if well hidden in the midst of 
pro-democracy rhetoric, explain the deviation from the democratic norms. The process 
did not 'entrap' Russia's political elite in its own words. Again, Russia has managed to 
hide its deviation from the norm behind the mask of democratic rhetoric and avoid 
sanctions from the European organisations. Secondly, the model takes the norm’s 
unchanged nature for granted, and does not seem capable of detecting the challenge to 
the norm and the authority of the organisations "from within". For years, the Russian 
challenge was an indirect one. Only when faced with explicit condemnation of its 
practices by the European organisations did the challenge become direct. Thirdly, the 
challenge revolving around a group of CIS states may be changing the nature of the 
norm of free and fair elections in Europe (for example, is it equally applicable to all 
European states in future?) and the practical work done by the European norms (for 
example, outlining new standards for election observation combining CIS and 
OSCE/CoE standards). Again, only the future will tell if these issues are to develop 
along the lines that Russia promotes. What is clear, though, is that the norm 
socialisation in the case of free and fair elections has not ended up being a mere one­
way transference of the norm from the international to the domestic field.
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Thus, this thesis has found that the socialisation model outlined by Risse and Sikkink 
does not explain or describe the dynamics at play in the case of Russia's socialisation to 
European norms. It is not helpful when trying to establish what went wrong with the 
European attempt to socialise Russia. The failure of the model may partly derive from 
the fact that it has been designed on the basis of Latin American cases of normative 
change. 6 2 8  The presumptions that it makes about the societal structures and dynamics of 
change seem to be unfit to describe the post-Soviet reality in Russia. 6 2 9
This study goes further and suggests that the model should be changed in a way that 
takes account of how political decisions are attached to the prevailing structural 
conditions domestically and internationally. Without taking account of active political 
decisions, the socialisation model gives too simplistic and structural a picture of the 
development. These political decisions by states actively shape reality, and they do not 
automatically arrive from the prevailing international structures and transnational 
activism as the model seems to suggest. This also means that the model should be 
changed in order to define the cooperation process underpinning human rights norms as 
a truly interactive process (as the basic tenets of Constructivism would also suggest). 
International society, methods of cooperation and norms may change as a consequence 
of the interactive process surrounding the norms. Norms are constantly contested and 
confirmed by practices and discourse; norms form social reality, but at the same time 
are the very objects of interpretation and reinterpretation. While causal mechanisms 
outlined in the model were indeed helpful, it is more doubtful whether all fundamental 
changes can be fitted to a neat five-phase model. Such a pre-fixed model easily excludes 
certain aspects of development, while overemphasising other, possibly more irrelevant, 
features.
3 Assessing the Policies of the European Organisations
The European organisations are increasingly open about their disappointment with 
Russia's current policies on human rights and democracy. Despite the fact that Russia 
initially agreed with the European norms on human rights and democracy, and the idea
628 Risse and Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction," p. 18.
629 See also Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization," p. 1.
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that these common norms would form the very basis of its relationship with these 
organisations, the norms have not been implemented by Russia. Russia has even started 
to question the applicability of European norms to its case. Its resistance is growing 
stronger and more principled. Illustrative of this principled Russian attitude is a 
statement by President Putin on the eve of the recent EU-Russia summit in Helsinki: "It 
would be useless and wrong to try to force artificial ’standards' [of common values] on 
each other" . 6 3 0
With regard to the specific norms discussed in this thesis, Russia still officially claims 
to be committed to the vague goals of abolition of the death penalty and democratic 
elections, yet it openly questions the requirements -  the secondary sets of norms on 
interpretation and implementation of the primary norm -  of implementation, which the 
organisations have set, and thus the authority of the European organisations in 
interpreting the norms.
What makes the situation unique is the fact that while Russia is downgrading its 
normative commitments, it is simultaneously seeking too deepen cooperation with the 
European organisations. It is promoting the idea that these European organisations 
should make an exception in its case. Confusingly, this notion is wrapped in the claim 
that the organisations should renounce their double standards. In reality, Russia is 
insisting that the organisations give up equal application of the norms by giving Russia 
more leeway than other states. Russia seems to have adapted its strategies -  but not its 
political goals -  to the multilateral European normative environment. Russia has 
become involved in extensive international schemes of cooperation in the fields of 
human rights and democracy internationally, yet its practices have been resistant to the 
socialisation efforts of these organisations. The leadership has pursued its material 
interests by "talking the human rights talk" and using this language to escape European 
pressure and potential sanctions. As the title of this thesis suggests, Russia has agreed to 
the form of European multilateral normative cooperation, but not to its function.
630 Vladimir Putin, "Europe Has Nothing to Fear from Russia," Financial Times, 22 November
2006. Emphasis added.
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How is it then possible, that despite all the European encouragement, assistance and 
pressure, developments in Russia have turned against the European norms? What went 
wrong with the European socialisation strategies?
As this thesis has argued, Russia's creeping challenge has proved to be much harder to 
deal with as it has developed gradually under the surface of "sustained efforts" to 
implement the norm. As the case studies demonstrate, the organisations have placed too 
much emphasis on the declared rhetorical goals of the Russian leadership. Even in cases 
where legislation has been passed and official rhetoric seems to be consistent, the 
change in practices will not necessarily follow -  particularly in a country like Russia 
with a strong tradition of Soviet doublespeak. The European organisations have thus 
been unable to understand the significance of the developments in Russia in time. This 
thesis confirms conclusions by earlier research on the EU's external democracy 
promotion, which suggested that "pseudo-democracies" have confused EU policy by 
pointing to "process", and thus escaped sanctions and secured benefits. 6 3 1
The reasons behind the European organisations' inability to pay attention to the negative 
developments in Russia in time are three-fold. Firstly, the decisions were frequently 
based upon political calculations and the fear that (even more) illiberal forces would 
come to power if the Russian government was criticised. 6 3 2  This card was also eagerly 
played by the Russian government. Secondly, and understandably, it is never easy for an 
institution to admit that it is failing in one of its primary tasks. There is an underlying 
fear that that the public may find the organisations useless and start to question their 
legitimacy. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the European human rights and 
democratisation strategies were based on the over-optimistic expectations of a liberal 
democratic "new world order" and the "worldwide democratic revolution" emerging, 
which was typical of the Zeitgeist of the immediate post-Cold War years. 6 3 3  The belief in 
linear progress towards democracy shines through in the European documents. The 
European expectations of Russian development on issues connected to human rights and
631 Paul J. Kubicek, "Conclusion: The European Union and Democracy Promotion," in The 
European Union and Democratization, ed., Paul J. Kubicek (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 202.
632 See also Mendelson, "Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia," p. 98.
633 These expectations were manifested in the writings of Francis Fukuyama in the early 1990s. 
See, for example, Fukuyama, The End o f History and the Last Man. For critique, see Thomas 
Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 40.
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democratisation resemble the democratisation model described in the transition 
literature. In particular, the idea of a set sequence of democratisation from liberalisation 
to transition and consolidation is commonly employed by practitioners, too. However, 
according to Thomas Carothers, the tendency to cast the development in terms of a 
three-phase democratisation model should be seen in terms of the influence of the 
historical context, that is, the political atmosphere of the early 1990s, rather than direct 
spill-over from research. In the 1980s and early 1990s, one transition after another 
emerged following an easily identifiable pattern: first dramatic collapse of dictatorship, 
then national elections, and gradual democratic consolidation. Societies everywhere 
seemed to be creating similar western-type democratic institutions. These developments 
led democracy promoters and academics alike to think in terms of "natural", almost 
automatic phases of development. 6 3 4
However, Russia represents a hybrid regime that escapes the typical categories of 
liberalisation, transition and consolidation. When measured against the general 
democratisation criteria outlined in Chapter 1, one can observe several conditions that 
are missing even from the liberalisation phase: there are severe shortcomings in the 
realisation of the freedom of the press and the government's ability to tolerate dissenting 
opinions, there are hardly any free, non-state trade unions and the state's control over 
non-governmental associations has strengthened. 6 3 5  There are some opposition 
groupings in the parliament, but many of them are oppositional only on the surface. 6 3 6  
At the same time, Russia meets many of the conditions of the next, transition phase. 
Legal reforms, which are intended to limit arbitrary use of power by the regime, have 
been introduced. There have been extensive constitutional and legal changes, which 
have been aimed at eliminating the role of non-accountable powers of veto groups. A 
new constitution, which guarantees equal political rights and civil liberties to all 
citizens, has been ratified. Also, the so-called founding elections have been held, and 
regardless of the fact that they were not as free and fair as was claimed at the time, the 
results were widely accepted and no party challenged the results in the end. However, 
many of these reforms and legal changes have not been reflected in Russian practices.
634 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, pp. 92-93.
635 Kagarlitsky, Russia under Yeltsin and Putin, pp. 170-72.
636 Centre for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative and Transparency International Russia, 
"Final Report: Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during the Campaign for 
December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections," pp. 71-72.
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These contradictory tendencies and gaps between words and deeds have confused the 
theorists and practitioners alike. Paradoxically, the European policies seem to be 
simultaneously too "realistic" (calculating their benefits and impact on their 
international reputation), and too idealistic (hoping that the developments would follow 
the general phases of democratisation, despite growing contrary evidence) to see what 
the development was really about.
The potential decision to go Russia's way and make an exception could have significant 
consequences for the organisations. For example, allowing Russia to interpret the norms 
in its own way may diminish the legitimacy of the organisations in the eyes of the other 
members. Furthermore, if Russia is granted an exception, other members might be 
tempted to ask for exceptions too, either on the same issue, or some other that is dealt 
with by the organisation. However, many researchers have claimed that violation of an 
international norm does not necessarily mean that the norm as such has lost its 
significance. If the violator of a norm is excluded by the society, the efficacy of the 
norm will be confirmed. 6 3 7  Deviation from the norm may also be considered permissible 
by the community on the basis of good justification "together with pleas for 
understanding or admissions of guilt" . 6 3 8  Russia's policies and the European policies 
towards Russia do not meet these two conditions. Therefore, it is likely that Russia's 
deviation has weakened (and, if nothing is done, will weaken further) the European 
consensus over the common norms.
Big boats always turn slowly, but it seems that the organisations are gradually taking 
Russia's challenge to European norms seriously. Realistic overall assessment of the 
developments in Russia is a key factor in making European policies towards Russia 
more effective. The study does not advocate Russia's exclusion from the cooperation, 
but it does warn against making an exception to the rules and norms that these 
organisations promote in Europe. Membership conditions of the CoE should be 
respected by all member states, including Russia. The OSCE and the EU should also 
strive to maintain the standards that they have set for themselves earlier. Downgrading 
the commitments would be sending the wrong message not only to Russia, but also to
637 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 5.
638 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the 
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other member states. The OSCE and the CoE's whole raison d'etre would be 
jeopardized, as would the EU's legitimacy. 6 3 9  In order to compensate for the loss of the 
asymmetrical relationship and material bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia, the 
organisations could establish a wider coordination of strategies towards Russia. 6 4 0  This 
would not only improve their structural position, but would also increase the coherence 
and reduce overlaps in their policies. This could have a positive impact on the 
effectiveness of their policies.
4 Future Prospects: Continent of Community or Islands of Order?
Early in his career, John Vincent noted that in a world where there are only islands of 
order, rather than a continent of community, state sovereignty and non-intervention 
reigns in international relations. 6 4 1  His teacher and friend, Hedley Bull, was also worried 
about the dangers of overstretching the solidarist society of states. According to him, 
solidarism "fits a world where there is solidarity. But in one in which there is not, the 
attempt to introduce these rules only exacerbates conflict. " 6 4 2
Although Bull and Vincent were talking about the global society of states, their 
scepticism (although, it must be noted, Vincent later changed his mind on the issue) 
over the possibility of solidarism in international relations is reflected in contemporary 
accounts of Russia's relationship with European organisations. The supporters of a 
pluralistic relationship claim that narrowing down the normative agenda would bring 
benefits to both parties and advance deeper cooperation in other fields. Pami Aalto, for 
example, claims that paradoxically the narrowing down of the normative agenda may 
even bring progress in relations with Russia in all respects, including from the
639 Among other researchers, Ian Manners has claimed that in order to legitimate itself as more 
than the sum of its parts, the EU "needs" to be a more moral actor than normal nation states. See 
Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," p. 244.
640 Something similar but on a more general level and partly for different reasons has been 
suggested by Elena Jurado. See Elena Jurado, "Assigning Duties in the Global System of 
Human Rights: The Role of the European Union," in A Responsible Europe? Ethical 
Foundations o f EU External Affairs, eds. Hartmut Mayer and Henri Vogt (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 130-33.
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normative point of view. 6 4 3  Another pluralist, Sergei Prozorov, defends the traditional 
sovereignty-based pluralistic order in EU-Russia relations by claiming that the current 
"logic of integration" is inherently flawed, and even morally doubtful. 6 4 4  He advocates 
interaction without integration, and claims that the EU should stop defining Russia’s 
difference in terms of "deficiency, underdevelopment or irrationality" and appreciate 
Russia's difference and accept it as a permanent feature of Russia. 6 4 5
Several objections can be raised against Aalto's and Prozorov's lines of thinking. Firstly, 
Pami Aalto's optimism does not seem to be backed by empirical facts. In the absence of 
shared values and norms, progress easily languishes in other fields too. 6 4 6  Meaningful 
cooperation is based on mutual trust and trust, for its part, is based on shared values and 
norms. In reality, it is difficult to treat different fields of cooperation as completely 
independent entities. Secondly, Prozorov's approach is extremely statist and sees states' 
policies as moral just by virtue of the fact that they stem from states. This kind of claim 
is more theoretical than existent: in real life, the legitimacy of state action needs to be 
earned. 6 4 7  Moreover, the pluralist order based on absolute state sovereignty as envisaged 
by Prozorov has never existed; it is at least as utopian as the post-modem integrationists 
he seems to despise. 6 4 8  As Reus-Smit convincingly argues, state sovereignty has never 
been an independent self-referential value, but it has always been justified by some 
reference to the moral purpose of the state. 6 4 9  Societies of states are bound together by 
"intersubjective meanings that define what constitutes a legitimate state and what counts 
as appropriate state conduct. " 6 5 0  In reality, state sovereignty as total independence to 
decide "how it will cope with its internal and external problems" 6 5 1  is usually more of an 
argument employed by those in power than a genuine existing state of affairs. Thirdly,
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both Aalto and Prozorov ignore the very nature of the European organisations (in their 
case the EU, but this argument can be generalised here to include the CoE and OSCE) 
and the expectations people have about the policies. The member states and their 
citizens expect the organisations to take up normative questions -  that is considered to 
be the very basis of their legitimacy. In this light, it is not advisable to grant exceptions 
in Russia's case: the organisations might get praise from Russia, but they would be 
biting their own leg by doing so. This is particularly the case with CoE and OSCE, but 
also with the EU. In a recent survey of European Russia experts (including MEPs, 
academics, NGO representatives, diplomats etc.) 81% per cent of over 100 respondents 
felt that the EU should seek greater leverage in a renewed PCA (or its replacement) 6 5 2  to 
address democracy, civil liberties, judicial independence and the state of the rule of law 
in Russia. 6 5 3  European people are generally concerned about the state of human rights 
and democracy in Russia, and they expect their governments to raise these issues with 
Russia.
These human expectations are a key to the discussion on the nature and future prospects 
of the relationship between the European organisations and Russia. Russian cooperation 
with the European states and organisations comprises many levels and cannot be 
reduced merely to exchanges of state-level acts. It is because of this comprehensive 
multi-level nature of the relationship that the question of common values comes in. 
Despite the fact that states and intergovernmental organisations are the core institutions 
and decision-makers, the notion of a solidarist European international society cannot be 
approached on an exclusively state-centric basis. 6 5 4  As was outlined in Chapter 3 and 
elaborated further in other chapters, growing solidarism brings transnational, non-state 
actors into the picture as interaction takes place on various levels. A pluralistic order 
based on the traditional interpretation of state sovereignty as envisaged by Prozorov is 
incapable of providing this level of interaction. Such an order would inevitably mean
652 The PCA expires in 2007 but can be prolonged one year at a time, as long as the parties so 
wish. Negotiations on a new agreement should be starting soon (and in any case the parties have 
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to avoid legal vacuum in the relations).
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more restricted collaboration: instead of common institutions and sustained efforts to 
solve common problems, one sees more ad hoc arrangements between the organisations 
and Russia. However, the European organisations and Russia are both unwilling to 
downgrade the relationship: despite the disagreements on the common norms between 
them, there is a mutual recognition of the importance of institutionalised, long-term 
cooperation in various fields. 6 5 5  This basic point makes Prozorov's nostalgia for 
pluralistic order futile.
If deepening cooperation is what the parties want from each other, then they have little 
choice but to try to agree on common norms and values that enable deeper interaction. 
The norms and values that were once agreed are currently contested by Russia. Whether 
these norms change and how they change is something that only the future will tell. 
Nevertheless, what is evident is that there is no turning back to the pluralist society of 
the Cold War years. The wider European society will remain solidarist for the years to 
come. Along the lines of Barry Buzan, this thesis argues that a solidarist international 
society does not equate with some ethical cosmopolitan world society. Although most 
works on solidarist state societies -  including this one -  have revolved around human 
rights norms and norms of democracy, solidarism as such does not need to be based on 
some ethical, "progressive" ideas. The norms on which a solidarist society is based may 
be good or bad ones. Solidarism refers first and foremost to the degree and depth -  the 
"thickness" -  of cooperation between states and their societies. 6 5 6  The main feature of 
solidarism is that the international society pursues substantive goals of its own, and its 
action is based on mutually shared, constitutive (ethical or unethical) norms and rules. 
Thus, although Russia and the European organisations will continue forming a solidarist 
society in future, what kind of values that solidarist society will be based on, is for them 
to decide. The norms and values are shaped by their own actions; not only through high 
politics and declarations, but also through everyday practices and interaction. The 
promise -  and danger -  of future relations lies in this. Norms are not cast in stone, and 
by consciously acknowledging this fact -  and the risks and promises that come with it -  
the European organisations are one step closer to realistic and better-balanced policies.
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